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THE ORGANISATION OF THE RIPI STATE 
The text of the bay'a of Mulýapmad bin 'Abd al-Karlm 
read as follows: 
"Praise be to God alone. May God's blessing be upon 
our Lord Mu4ammad, his family and companions. Praise 
be to God who has set up the Caliphate to unite the 
religion and the world, who has raised its power above 
all other, so that it is of the highest rank, who has 
raised its sun above all things, illuminating all 
things with its light. He has made a friendship 
between the hearts of his servants, between those who 
are close to each other and those separated by a great 
distance. He has made the Caliphate a rampart, against [the spilling of] blood, (protecting men's]. fortunes 
and-Isafeguarding) against the accidents of fate. 
'With the Caliphate He has bound the hands of tyrants, 
so that they may not achieve that evil which'they 
intend. Through the Caliphate He has-brought about 
morality and righteousness. Laws and limits and 
principles have been established. He has raised the 
minaret of the Caliphate as a banner by which [men]. 
may be guided, calling them to the truth. ' in its long 
shadow both the powerful and the weak, the. lowly and 
. 
the high-born, seek refuge. 
Praise be to Him who decides, and guides mankind. 
Man does not ask [for sustenance]. in vain. But He 
has ordered fman]. to do some things and has forbidden 
him others. He has warned mankind against following 
his desires and He has set upon him the performance of 
religious duties and good works. He is the'most wise 
of the wise. 
If it were not for some men who fought-others, so 
that the world was degraded ... 
[text unclear]. ' 
But God is, possessed of mercy towards the inhabitants 
of the world, and through his mercy,, kings'*(al-mu%lQk) 
have been-set'up, and He has shown roads aloR_g -which 
men may travel and a conduct which they must follow. 
Otherwise man would sink into anarchy, some would 
devour others and the people of order would fall intc 
factionalism and anarchy. If it were not for the 
Caliphate the roads1would not be safe for, us, the 
strong would prey upon the weak. *** (illegible] 
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Praise be to God for him who was. sent as a sign of 
God's complete mercyl the origin and foundation of 
all things, the. height and greatest extent of per- 
fection, the most holy of the saints, the leader of 
the pure, and for the family of him who has universal 
glory and the greatest power [i. e., the Prophet]. and 
his Righteous Companions and the rightly-guided 
leaders, who set up the principles of the faith and 
arranged its foundations for those who would build 
upon it. They told what he [i. e., Muýammad] had 
done basing ( the badlthg ] on his authority, God Is mercy 
and peace be upon him. He said: 'God has conferred 
this distinction upon a Ourashl, and God has settled 
on him, *and God has bestowed his power on the man he 
wishes from amongst us. ' 
[The Prophet] said: 'A man who dies and has not 
made a bayla, has died in ignorance. ' 
According to the $a414 pf Muslim he said, God's 
mercy and peace be upon him: 
'He who wishes to break up the nature of. this com- 
munity, when it is one, cut-off his head with'a sword,, 
whoever he may be. ' 
According tothe ýalýTV. of Muslim, he said, God's 
mercy and peace be upon him: 
'if a man comes to you, when you are all agreed on 
one man-[as amir. ] and he tries to break up. your com- 
munity, kill him. ' 
In -the ýa4llý of al-Bukharl . it is said, on the authority of ibn. lAbbas'--may. God be, pleased with him-- 
that the Prophet of God, God's mercy. and, peace be upon 
him, said: 
'If a man dislikes anything that his*amir does, -, 
let him bear, it in patience, for he-who-removes him- 
self from the authority (of the Sultan]. by even an., 
inch will die the death of an ignorant man. ' 
Als o in [the ýa]ý14. qf al-Bukh arl]. it is reported on 
the, authority of Aba Hurayra, May'Go 
, 
d. be pleased with 
him, that the Prophet of God, God Is mercy and peace be 
upon him, said: , 
'He who obeys me,, obeys. God, and he 
who disobeys me, disobeys-God, and he 
, 
who obeys, my' 





of the Faithful, "Umar bin. al-Khattd. h, 
may God be pl 
, 
eased with him, said to ibn "' Uqba: -- 
'Perhaps'after today you will see [lit., Meet] Me no 
more., You must be strong in faith in God, %may He be 
exalted, and listen*to and obey the. amir. *,. be he a-' 
slave or, an Abyssinian. ' 
The'[firstl. con-munity [of Islaml. swore together that 
a single imdm, should be appointed over-the Muslims., 
for it-is _jn_-Jýof-the precepts of suitability in'the 
eyes. of God ... . 
[illegible]. just as the organisation 
of, the Caliphate, is an obligation pointed out by the 
texts, of the badiths and the verses [of. the Qur'An].. 
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The poet said: 'It is not good that the people 
should live in anarchy with no authority over them, 
and there is no authority if the ignorant among 
them have control. I 
Thus the tribes of the Rif and the tribes of the 
Jibala, before the [events of the past]. two years,, 
lived in [a state of]. extreme ferocity and disgrace, 
in great ignorance and tyranny and obduracy, and 
lived far apart from the rules of law (sharlea), and 
crime grew among the believers to such an ii-xtent that 
resistance to him who held authority in. the country 
became general, and they continued [to live]. in 
factionalism, to kill and to rob people's goods. At 
the same time they had [to face) what the enemy fi. e., 
the Spanish]. brought in the way of sedition and 
terror so. that they had no place of refuge or even of 
habitation, except what they could bring abo t thr gh t I 
great cooperation. And, when all this exhauTed thoeum 
and they knew no remedy, they sought someone who 
would take over their leadership, [a man), commissioned, 
by them, and they came together to consider, and they 
entrusted their business, in its importance, both'in 
heaven and on earth, to Him who is most praiseworthy 
in His deeds in all the length and breadth of the 
earth. A man responded. to their wishes and. took over 
their affairs and he ordered them first of all to 
follow the law (sharl'a) of the Prophet. through which 
every expectation-is achieved,. After he' -, 
had-made them 
swear on the Holy Book (alý-maqlýaf) to, keep their 
covenants. and promises., He set up over them 
[illegible]. 
and', then he organised them and he taught them the 
methods of war and, defence ofthe fatherland '(watan), 
and the way'to attack the servants of. the cross and- [worshippers'l, of, idols [i. e.,, the Christian Spanish], 
They seized, the opportunity of, attacking. thdirenemy 
at once. Atýonce they came on him,. victorious, caring 
nothing, for the strange [methods? --illegible]: which-'. I-'- the'Spaniards brought against them, neither. were they 
stopped. by'their unfamiliar fortifications. And. they, -' 
went at, once and became, united-. ... Praise be'to " Him who'has-destroyed them (i. e., the-Spanish]. for.,. 
in His power. ' he has-every matter always_[text very. - 
unclear here], By-following this their. amlt,, may God 
help him,, they found happiness and by. foll-o-wing-his- 
excellent orders they started (on-thei-road]. towards 
complete victory, and they achieved,. their ultimate 
(endsl. in organising their. country., And this is known 
both far and-near,, and no human being would_deny. it., 
The man who scorns [this: achievementl. is'scorning the 
light of day: for how. could anything [be said to],, be, 
right in men's. minds if the, light of day is in need 
of proof?. 
Then, when-th - ey had gained . security, b, oth for them- 
selves, 'and their possessions,, they multiplied and' 
progressed, [they, rejoiced]. in great peace. and success 
and well-being in accordance with their'dearest wishes, ', 
and so the'disruption caused by murder, and robbery 
and the other kinds of'misfortune to which, 'they had 
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been accustomed in the past dwindled and faded. All 
the fires of revolt were put out and God dispelled 
their worries and spread out his mercy and removed 
their griefs, and their hearts became resolute where 
they had been miserable, and their faces smiling 
where they had been melancholy. And the evil and 
violence that came between them vanished and the 
standards of peace and well-being [came close].. God 
directed the armies of the Muslims to pleasing actions 
and inspired them to what is for the good of the 
world, and the faith and the soul, and the citizens. 
Opinions concurred and the coinmunity joined together 
to proclaim him who has risen on the horizon of 
happiness whose full moon has appeared and risen in 
the heaven of knowledge. The man [in whose hands],. 
the reins of the Imamate are joined, and the 
*. to him have come the benefits of the Imamate itext 
unclear].. He is a man to whom the Caliphate' 
came dragging its robe behind it, and. he took it with- 
out wasting time. [The Caliphate] was. appropriate 
only for him, and he was appropriate only for it. 
[He is a man], whom the hearts of all.. creatures were 
created to love, who has found a welcome throughout 
Islam because of his glory and great importance, 
the commander of the fighters for the faith. * He is 
the man who puts his trust in God, the one singled, 
out [for. this task].. Our Lord Mubammad, son of our 
learned and distinguished Lord 4Abd al-Karim. al Khattd. bl 
al-Waryaghll. 'al-Rlfl.. ' They have proclaimed him, may 
God fortify him and. make him victorious, in, accordance 
with the Qurlari of God and the sunna of His Prophet - 
[to]. install justice which is the aim of all desires. 
A Proclamation (bay! a) ,a duty In. which 
[all men's] .ý hearts and tongues are bound, towards which all men's 
feet and heads strive, obediently and humbly, '[promising] 
never to set aside their. obedience. towards-. him and. 
never. to-deviate from the road of thd community, by 
whichwe pledge. allegiance to our Lord. the. Prophe't of 
God,. God's, mercy and. peace be'upon him, and the 
rightly-guided caliphs after him and. the rightlyý- 
guided im7ams. ' They. will keep their promise to hear 
and obey his commands.. Their eyes have seen, it, -and' 
they-have borne witness to it through''the. purity both 
of their secret desires and their public. actions, and 
they have 'given their hands ( as a seal. to - the 'promises 
upon it, and they have signed their namesto it, owing 
it [i. e. 1' the Caliphate]. their. allegiance, *. both 'in ' 
private and in public, in what. is encouraging and what 
is hateful, in what is easy and what is"difficult.: 
They"have borne witness, to themselves aware, of their 
secret thoughts-and cognisant of all.. that is hidden, '- 
saying: 
We have given you our bayla, and we have invested 
you with authority So that you may direct-us with. 
justice and kindness and in sincerity and that you 
should, judge between us'in truth just., as God, may'He 
be-exalted, said to-his Prophet: [illegible]. 
'Indeed we'have created a Caliphate on earth, so, 
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judge between men with justice. ' 
He also said, may He be exalted, and His words are 
true: 'He who carries out what God has promised, him 
we shall reward greatly. ' 
He also said, may He be exalted: 'Be not used as 
an advocate by those who betray their trust. ' 
on this are agreed those who (bind]. and loose, those 
who can speak on matters great and small, those who are 
characterised. by knowledge and judgement, those who 
are allowed to reject and contract [lit. si n].. There 
was no argument between them (when they met7. before 
any mosque, not from scribe nor legal expert [lit. 
possessors of the fatwal who are asked. and. who reply, 
neither from those who persevere in their views--be 
they right or wrong--nor among those who are known 
for [their]. religion and probity, no horsemen of war 
nor fighter, nor from men of responsibility in [affairs] 
or government, nor the alyarfl the. noble*sh"arifs-, nor 
the important. faqlhs, nor. from those of-Iesser power 
and position. 
Those who were present witnessed this themselves in 
obedience. God be exalted, they did. their duty by 
the law, God. has made [thd Caliphatel. a mercy for 
creation, and through it He has set up, on the earth* 
justice and truth. He helps the man, who. meets'[thd* 
Caliphate). with a welcome, with His aid. and.. assistance, 
and with the success [He grants].. and His. guidance. 
Man is given life through the sunna, our. Lord and. Master, 
the Prophet, God's mercy, peace, glory and kindness. be--ý 
upon him. 
Let our country be happy since'its fetters have been 
cut away, jet it [be given to] the man who undertakes 
its protection, who spares'its blood, who suppresses 
it enemies, who defends it from destruction, makes, 
the law triumphant, and. who undertakes to, build it. 
May God make him triumphant, make him victorious. 
May he destroy heresies and errors. through [this man], 
and theýparty of oppression and unbelief and depravity. 
May he make the Caliphate stay in this man's family 
until. the dayýof resurrection. 
Indeed, Oh our master,,, you are able to do, this. You 
are indeed-the Lord, the one who gives victory. 
There is no power, no strength, except. through God 
the highi the-great. - May the blessing and-complete- 
peace of God be on, our Lord'Mubammad, his family and 
companions'. 
Finally we'call out to Praise'God, Lord. of the worlds, 
On the day, of the full moon 14 Jumada, II 1341.11, 
MAEF, Maroc 517,, p. 180. - Proclamation of Mul; am db 
'Abd al-Harim, dated 14 Jumada 11 1341/2 Feb. -192'3; 
t & 
original is signed by a number of people of whom it is pos-, 
sible to distinguish the following names: - Mul; ammad b. OA11 
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i With these words, Muta. mmad bin 'Abd al-Karlm was 
formally invested as the Rifls. " leader. This was his bay'a. 
This document is, of course, of vital importance in under- 
standing the nature of the Rif.! 'state, laying down as it 
does the political principles of the state, the need to 
maintain the, sharl'a, and to defeat the Spanish, and giving 
the reasons why bin 'Abd al-Karira was to be considered the 
most likely acceptable man to lead the Rif, and above all, 
throwing light on the nature of his leadership. Thus the 
bay'a of 2 February 1923 was the legitimisation of a new, 
fully independent state in the Rif, but one which, unlike 
traditional Berber chiefdoms, was based on an entirely new 
conception of the 'r6le of Islam in society, on the need for 
modern technique allied with religious reform. 
The Bayýa 
The bay'a of Mujýaqmad b. 'Abd'al-Karlra begins 
with'direct references to the value of the institution, of 
the Caliphate. It praises the Caliphate's advantages, prom-' 
oting unity,, order, morality, law, and its opposition-to 
tyranny, and to factionalism. It. emphasises the religious- 
necessity of the Caliphate, the amit, whoever he might be 
(and this of course--is vitally important in', the context of 
al-Ghumdr. l.., al-Rlfl,: 'All b. al-: Vdjj Muýammad al-Huzmdrl, * 
Bil-Qasim b. ' 'Abd al-Qadir al-FIjIjI al-lVassani,: Shallb b. 
al-]Vaj'j' I. Abd al-Raýmarf al-Ya"qUbl, Mubammad b., al-: Uajj, 
Salaý al-VassanI, , Shal, ib b. MimUn b. '"AllAl: al-Wazzani 
al-Walshakt, Mubammad b. al-V4j*j Mulýamm&dlh al-ýTimsamanl. * 
The French translator of this document (whose rather in- 
complete-translation appears on pp. 181-186 of MAEF file 
517) claims to distinguish also the names of Mubammad b. 
al-Vassan al-ljaýssanl, ' alý-Ijaj j T7ahir - al-Ya 
`qQbI, ' A ad b. bLm 
al-Muqaddam al-HaskUsh! . and Mubaýmmad b.. 
'Amar. al-Talbanl 
(from the Timsamaft). ', This document-is reproduced in the.. 
Appendix (No. 4). 
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of the Rif, since bin 'Abd al-Karim's claims to descent from 
'Umar b. al-Khattd. h were, to say the least, dubious). 
1 
Thus 
the bay'a is talking about the necessity for a Caliphate. 
Then the bay'a moves on to describe the-anarchy, 
Violence and disruption of RIfI and Jiball society 
which pertained before a man--who-is not yet named 
--came to reorganise society and bring about order, and lead 
them to vidtory against the Christians. Now all was peaceful, 
and the "reins of the Imamate" were joined in this man Is 
hands. The Caliphate had come to him "dragging its long 
robe behind it. " Then the man is named as "Mulýammad 
b. 'Abd al-Karim al-KhattAbi Al-Waryaghli'al-Rifl".. So 
this man, according to his bay'a was a Caliph, God's "shadow 
on earth"rand he had been proclaimed, not because of his 
family connections, or his birth, but, because.. 'of whatýhd 
had already done to organise the Rif according, to the- 
sharl'a and the necessities of war. It was, so to speak, 
a bay'a ex post facto, and in this very similar to those 
traditionally given to Moroccan Sultans in-recognition of 
the authority that they-already held. Like the Sultan's 
baylas, the final part of this one is directed. -at what bin 
'Abd al-Karim, was expected to do: 
"We-have given you our bay'a and we. -have'. invested- 
you'with"authority so that you may direct--us with 
justice and. kindness 
He'is expected to-protect his country, defeat its enemies,, ' 
make the shar! "a triumphant, and destroy heretical-doctrines 
(bidala). These'were similar to the expectations placed in' 
See above, ' p. 147. 
2 MAEF, Maroc 517, p. 180, Proclamation of Mubammad b. ' 'Abd 
al-Karim, da-ted 14, Jumada II 1341/2, Feb. 1923K. 
521 
MrilAy 'Abd al-Vaf! Z.: in his bay'a from the Fez 
--the expulsion of the Christians, the reinforcement of 
Islamic practices, the establishment of a just rule of 
law. 1 The difference, of course, was that b. "Abd al-Karim 
already had carried out these aims, in part at least, so the 
bay'a was far more a confirmation of his authority than that 
given to 'Abd al-VaflZ', which was more in. the way of being 
a plan for his future government. 
This bayla appears, therefore, to be a document 
which confirms the CaliDhate upon bin 'Abd alr-Karlra, giving 
him wide personal power. However, this contradicts what a 
% number of other sources say were his intentions. Nationalist 
writers like 'All7al al-F7assl, 'for instance, -denied that 
bin 
'Abd al-Karim proposed himself as a Sultan. Writing from 
a Royalist-Moroccan-nationalist standpoint, he stated: *-. 
"It is fortunate that this movement, for. 'liberation,,, -- 
like its predecessor [i. e., that surrounding M51&y 
'Abd al-Ijaf1fl. had a democratic, orientation'that 
aimed at improving-the lot of the people, given 
the time in which it was happening, and at protect- 
ing the people's. existence, and possessions. The 
foundation of. the Republic [of the Rlfl.. didýnot mark- 
a deviation from a monarchist position in'thd 
thoughtsýof. the leaders of the RTf, but in'reality, 
. they were unable so speak in the name of. the King of Morocco, whom force of circumstance. had. placed in the 
French zone. But they did not wish. 'to fall into the' 
error of al-ljýba, and his father Mal. 'al-*Ainiri, who 
announced themselves to be kings. when in the t 
they had been loyal to the throne: (of Morocco and 
had defended it. 
, 
'For this reason they found a com- 
promise solution. by setting up a-temporary regime' 
in which an administration could be organised and' 
the people'trained. to govern themselves, and when 
the liberation of. the rest of the country had been 
achieved, the-liberated territory- would. be returned 
to the King. "2 
David Hart has agreed with this-view, and has stated that bin, 
'Abd al-Karim styled himself amir al-mulminln'. and that"'in 
1 See'above, P. . 34,, and-Laroui, -Origines, 
- p. 3960' 
2 Al-Fasli,.. Op. cit., p. 121. 
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no way did 'Abd al-Krim think of himself as Sultan: there 
was only one Sultan in Morocco, Mulay Yussif ... even 
though he may have been regarded as a tool in the hands of 
the French. "' 
There is indeed, primary evidence that bin 'Abd 
al-Karim, at least formally, rejected the role of Sultan. 
The proclamation of bin 'Abd al-Karim--be it. as'amIr, 
President, Sultan, or whatever--was not a single. event but 
a series of proclamations as different groups and tribes 
accepted his authority. The first proclamation. of all had 
been in January 1923,2 and the bay'a reproduced at the begin- 
ning. of this chapter is only a latbr proclamation of another 
group, whose members were relatively obscure. people from 
the eastern Rif. 
The original bay! a of 18. January is ý not, however, 
preserved. But. an account of the ceremony is given by SkIraj, 
who entitles it thus: "A description of the. swearing of the 
bay"a of the AmIr Muýapmad bin 'Abd al-Karini, -, the'agreement 
of the Muslims upon, him, and the complete imposition of 
, 
his 
command. ,3 (Certainly, the phrase "complete imposition of 
his command" is an accurate description of the tenor of', the 
2 February bayla. )ý ýI.... II 
Present at this initial ceremony, held in. the' house 
of Sharrad b. 'Amar al-Buqquyl: (according to. later Spanish' 
4' 
reports), on Jabal Sijjum near Ajdlr., were some of the 
important leaders of the RU: the FaqIh`AlI. BQ Laýyaj 
and the FaqIh Mulýaýmmad. al-Shargl, *. both from the. BanQ'. TQzIri 
1 Hart,, Aith Waryaghar, p. 377. ' 
2 See aboVe, pp* 503-504. 
p 0. ý3 Skiraj, U. ' cit. r 8 
4 Cab. Reb-.: '1913-1927, pp.. 32-34* 
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and later the executors of the sharila-isation policy of the 
government, tAbd al-SalAm, b. al-V4j'j Muýand of the Banil 33Q 
'Ayy&sh clan of the BanQ Waryaghal, and the Minister for 
War, and AýLmad BU Drae' of the Banri YCIsif clan of the Banrl 
Waryaghal, 'Abd al-Salam's successor as Minister of War. 
Also. present,, since this was a local bay"a for-the BanU . 
Waryaghal, were Mubammad b. $ad1q, the powerful leader of 
the Banri VAdhifa (once again b. ýadlq was cooperating with 
bin 'Abd al-Harlm) and representatives of the Imrabadhan 
and Aith 'Abdallah, along with men from other Rifl. 'tribes. 
From the Buqquya came 'AllUsh b. Vaddu, "Angitta" of the 
Izamuran clanj%--another man whose loyalty to bin 'Abd al-Karli 
had not been total in the past, for he was one of. the group 
who had gone to visit Sid! ]Vaýmidu of Snada in April 1921 to 
ask him to take over the leadership of-the Rif against the 
Spanish. 2 From the Bdnfi Bri Fralý came al-lja. jj. Muýammad b. ' 
Misa'Qd Shalra of the Awlad SaIld clan, 
3 
whose an'ti-Spanish' 
credentials were unimpeachable. He was-a rich man, one of 
the leaders of his tribe 
4 
whom the Spanish'in 1917 had des- 
cribed a. s an. "old fanatic"', '5 and a man whom bin"Abd al-KarIM 
6 had already appointed as qalld of his tribe., The fact that 
Muýapmad'b., ýadlq was there shows the pressure that was put 
on local leaders by the supporters of, bin . 
'Abd al-Karim to go 
Skiraj,, op. cit.,, p., 80. 
2 
See above,, p. 295. 
3 Skiraj's, loc. cit. 
4 SHIM Melilla Leg 27, Informaci6n de Alhucemas, carpeta 
--archivo relativo a la oficini Pefi6n de V61ez,, Relaci6n de 
los moros mas, notables,, en los poblados y kabilas que se 
expresan (Recopilaci6n de datos de 1913 a 1921)--Oct. 1925. 
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 12, Memorias, Memoria segunda 
quincena de julio de 1917. -- 
6. SkIraj, op. cit., p 66. 
-N, 
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along with them, for bin ýadlq was most. unreliable in his 
loyalty himself. 
The really significant thinge however, is who was 
not there. S! Ma4aýimnad was in Parisl Azarqaia: and Sl . 
'Abd 
al-Salam al-Khattdblvere absent. Above all, bin 'Abd 
al-Karim himself was absent. 
1 To all appearances, at least, 
by accepting the bay'a he was only responding to the wishes. 
of his people. 
When he did accept, on 21 February 1923, his speech 
of agreement# according to Skirajo made precisely this point. 
He told those present that. his Amirate would not be like 
government by a king, and he would not allow. them. to treat 
2 him as one, for he was their collective voice. The aim 
was to defeat. the Spanish: "I served with'them and I dis- 
covered that misfortune had came down-on-our land from above 
when they came into it. ... Le& us dedicate ourselves to 
,3 rescuing ourselves, our people and our land. Thus,, the 
Spanish were the main enemy but he was also. concerned about 
any possible threat fran. the French: 
"You must picture yourselves as'a prey between the 
claws of a ferocious beast which is always ready to 
ravish you. So that I fear. that if God gived us 
victory over it, there. is another nation,,... . that 
will not allow. us to enjoy our lands in-peace and 
silence. For unbelief, is. one'nation-ind they will 
inevitably interfere in our affairs. " 
However, he felt that the French would not intervene at the 
moment, and he stressed-his desire for peace. He also emphas- 
ised that the bay'a did not-impinge, on the sovereignty of 
1 ibid., P. SO. 
2 Ibid., P. 81. 
3 Ibid., 




1 The real need was to fight the Spanish: "There 
is no doubt that jihdd is a duty for us, to attack the enemy 
that [has come] upon us in our land. We shall defend our 
religion and our land. " 
2 This reference, to jihAd once again 
contradicts bin 'Abd al-Karim's later, widely-quoted, claims 
to have laid aside jihU as a-medieval practice no longer 
I 
relevant to the modern world. 
3 
The tone of this declaration was. not new in the 
/ 
history of the Maghreb. It is most instructive to compare 
this speech with that of the Algerian AmIr. *. "Abd al-Qadir, 
after his acceptance of his bayla. in November 1832. He said: 
"I accept this position of amir with reluctance, hoping 
it will be a vehicle for uniting the Muslims, for 
preventing strife and dissension among them, for 
assuring the safety of the roads, for. terminating 
activities which are contrary to the pure. Sharila, 
for protecting the country from the enemy [i. e., the 
French],, and. for establishing law, and justice for thd 
powerful and feeble alike. ... Know that my 
utmost- goal is the unification of the Islamic commun- 
ity and the execution of Islamic practices . 1,4 
In another proclamation at the same time, "Abd al-Qadir 
had stressed the other role of the Caliphate, as the leader 
of jih7ad. 
5 
It is clear that the language of bin 'Abd al-Karlm's 
speech and of his bay'a are remarkably similar to-that of 
'Abd al-Qadir. In other words, the aspirationsexpressed 
by bin 'Abd al-Karim and those of his bay'a were not partic- 
ularly new or. original. 
The comparison between 'Abd al-Qadir and 'Abd 
al-Karim throws a new light on what was. meant In- the. Iatter Is 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid., p-. 83. 




4 Danziger, ' -P. 72 
5 Ibid., pp. -72-73. 
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bay'a by the references to Caliphate. As Danziger has 
pointed out, the claim to be amlral-mulminln: was in essence 
a claim to sovereignty. 
' The use of the word Caliph had 
a similar purpose and implied here not the leadership of 
all Muslims but the sovereign right to put into effect the 
r6le of the Caliphate in creating a state independent of 
the control of unbelievers, in which the sharila was supreme. 
It had the effect of laying the basis for. a "local Caliphate" 
when the larger Moroccan Caliphate had fallen into the*con- 
trol of the French. Thus the bay'a gave bin. 'Abd al-Karlm 
supreme power, both secular and religious in the Rif. 
"Democracy" versus "Dictatorship" 
According to 'Allal:. al-Fasl,., the., basis of thd 
new Rifistate was democraticý Democratic. structures had 
been organised following the victories of 192.1 with a 
National Assembly (which he refers to'as, al-jamlla 
al-watanlya), composed, of representatives. of the tribes, 
shaykhs and military, commanders, which drew up a constitution 
"based. on popular sovereignty", but which did-not "maýe a 
distinction, between legal and executive'authority'as, is-the 
,2 constitutional practice'in democratic'statess, for'both 
these authorities were invested in Muýaýmad b. 'I, -. 'Abd al-Karim 
himself, who, alone was responsible-to-thd National Assembly#". 
while the, members of. his government were, responsible'to him: 
"This was in accordance with-thetraditions. of'thd country-" 
,3 which make the king personally responsible. to. thd'people, 
(a remark which seems to Imply that bin . 'Abd al! -Kar. jm, was-,. 
Ibid.,, -PP. 93-94. 
2 Al-ý-rl-as,!,. Varakrat, rm. 121-122 
3 122. Ibid*, p. 
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after all, a king). This description of the government of 
the Rlf* is to say the least, both inaccurate and 
tendentious. Al-Fas! was, after all, interested to present 
the Rif. l. government as part-of the Salafiya-inspired 
"democratic" nationalist movement which he himself represented. 
But furthermore, the details are wrong. According to him, 
there were only four ministers: an assistant to the Pres- 
ident, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance, 
and Minister, of trade; "other government positions--such 'as 
Minister of the Interior and Minister of War--were left by 
the constitution in the hands of the President of the 
Republic. "' This, he asserts, ýias the form. of government 
of the "Republic of the Rif". 
In fact other government posts did exist--in 
profusion--and in particular the Ministries'of the Interior 
and War were placed in other hands than those of bin 'Abd - 
al-Karim. The "Ministry of Trade" does not appear in any- 
other account. 
Certainly there was a Parliament of sorts but it 
was called-the majlis al-9umma (The Assembly of. the People), 
not al-jamllac al-watanlya. -- Hart des cribes this Assembly-- 
which he refers to as. "barlam&n", (an Arabisation, or 
Berberisation, of "parliament")--as "little, more than a 
full-scale tribal agraw of the Aith Arbalin. [i. e., 
jj2 under a new name. 
- It was this majlis al 'umma which, after bin tAbd 
al7Karlm's acceptance of the, bay"a on 21 January 1923,, set 
about giving-the proclamation an effective form. In its name 
Ibid. 
2 Hart, 'Aith Warya'ghar, p. 377. 
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a number of Ministers were appointed. The head of the majlis, 
Shaykh Yazld b. al-Vaj. j Uammu, was made Minister of the 
Interior. 1 Yazld came from the Banrl. *All. 'clan of the Banii. 
Waryaghal, was a man in his early forties, and had. been one 
of the principal. proponents of resistance to the. Spanish at 
the beginning of the war, and had visited the markets to 
make propaganda in this cause. 
2 
Muýzqmad Azarqaxi, bin "Abd al-Kariml. s brother-in- 
law, was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and 'Abd 
al-Salam b. al-U4jj Muýand of the Aith Bil : 'Ayy7ash clan of 
3 the BanU. Waryaghal was appointed Minister of War. , The post 
of Minister of Justice ('adl) went to the FaqIh Mubammad b. 
eAbI AbQ Labya, 4 the man who had led the expeditions to the 
Qallaya in 1921 and later to the Ghumdra.. He was. not just, 
a war leader, however--although he continued to be*present 
at battles after his appointment. to his Ministry. He was a 
man of some education, having studied in Fez, 'Iand, was a very 
5 
efficient propagandist, not only for the_Rlfl.. government,, 
but also for the policy of imposition of the sharl*a, "a 
function he shared with the Q&4ý-. *al-Shargl.: 
'Abd al-Salam al-Khattabl,: bin 'Abd. alrKarim's 
paternal uncle--who was only slightly older than he was--was 
6 
appointed Minister of Finance, entrusted with. the money 
raised by the ransom of the prisoners, and helped by Aýmad. 
Sk1raj, 02- cit., p. 84. 
2 Ibid,,, p. 89;, and SHAT, Maroc E. 24, "Note sur le Maghzen 
Riffain", Dec. -1925, P. 3'(henceforth referred to as "Maghzen 
Riffain"). 
3 Sk1raj, op- cit., P. 84. 
4 ibid., 
5 Ibid., p. 909 
6 ibid., p. 84. 
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Ugarradh, who was placed in charge of habus'property. 
1 
In fact,, these were the people who, by and large, 
had been occupying these jobs before the formal proclam- 
ation of the bay'a, and as bin 'Abd al-Karim told the 
maj lis al- 9 umma, they were i ust the people he would have 
appointed, and he confirmed them, 
2 
an indication that, 
although the majlis might have been responsible in theory 
for their appointments, it was really bin 'Abd, al-Karim 
who had the final word. 
However, the majl'is al-lumma could. make it clear 
that there were some people of whom it did not. approve in 
positions of responsibility. On 15 January 1923--three 
days before the first h2yja--it deliberated on the choice 
of a Minister of Justice, and made the following declaration: 
I 
"Praise be to God -alone. 
When the mailis al-.! umma had. examined and consulted 
and circuTated. the suggestion of the Sayyid, Mulýammad 
b. 'All,. *who is second in. command,, that. the man who 
should take charge of justice is the faqIh and'the 
erudite man. Muýammadl. 
, 
Al-Shams they all replied in 
the negative and refused to accept it, and they 
decreed that the-undersigned should register their 
lack of agreement so that a statement of. it may be' 
placed before the great AmIr, may God prolong his 
power and give him victory. On. the twenty seventh 
of Jum&da the-First in the year one'thousand three-' 
hundred and forty one. 
The servant of his God 
3 Sha'Ib' b. Abrýad al-Vaýtlati. [illegible].. " 
BQ laýy. a became Minister of Justice.: Beneath him 
was a qa4l quýat, (chief, 2Eýn): I- Muba=ad bin al-$&Iib.. - This 
Ibid.; and Hart, Aith Waryaghar, 'p. 378. 
2, Skiraj', ''op. cit. , p. ' 84. 
3 
MAEF, Maroc 520, p. 34. ' Sha'1b b. AbMad, announceme'nt 
on behalf of the majlis al-lumma, 27 Jumada 1 1341/15 Jan. - 
1923 (Appendix, doc, 5).. ar , ith Waryaqhar, .. gives "Qadi 
sh-Shims" as the first Minister of-justice, but-this is 
clearly incorrect in the light of this new evidence. 
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man did not himself have the power to appoint Sialls'but he 
could recommend suitable people for appointment. For example, 
in April 1924 he recoomended that a certain A4mad al-WajdIrI. 
of the Simsamari be qppointed aaEl "of the clan of Raba'a 
al-Fawqanl: in that tribe. The letter is addressed to 
"Sldl"., but as it ends "it is this that I have the honour 
to lay before your majesty (jalal'atikum)", it seems clear 
that the recipient was bin 'Abd al-Karim. 
1 once again. the 
final authority was the amir. 
The aim, in facty seems to have been to appoint a 
qadi: in all the tribes and in the major clans,, to ensure the 
spread of the sharl"a-as Muýammad b. al-ýal'ilýls letter points 
out. 
2 There were other appointments to be made as well, of 
course-amins were needed to oversee the financial. affairs 
of the tribes, and qdsids to administer them. In February 
1924, another note was put out appointing an'amiri. It was 
unsigned but came from the malýakma of. al-Muzimma, the 
central command post. Again the central authorities were 
the final arbiters. It read as follows: 
"Praise be to God alone. God's mercy be. on. our Lord 
Mubzýmmad, his. companions and family. 
The Mabakma of al Muzimma. 
Let it be'known from this our letter--may'God elevate 
it and make it effective--that with the [help of].. the 
power and might of God--we-have appointed the excellent 
and distinguished Sayyid Mulýammad bin 'Umar '- 
al-lUmaran! 'to be our. chief-lamin in the Wargha. ', On 
being informed, of this everione should act. in, accord 
ance with his [instructions and not disobey them. 
MAEF, Maroc 519, p. '185, letter, - Mubammad'b. al-ý; alilý 
to (bin 'Abd al-Karim), 23 Ramaqft. 1342/28 Apr. 1924. 




On 2 Jum&da 11 1342. "' 
The appointment of q7a'*ids in tribes was a touchy business, 
as S! Ma4aýmmad had discovered in Targist in 1922.2 After 
the proclamation of his bay'a, bin eAbd al-Karlm was still 
faced with this problem. In February 1924, the people of 
Burid in the Gaznaya tribe wrote to bin 'Abd al-Karim in 
very fulsome terms asking that a certain Qa! i. d M4ammad 
Amziyyari b. al-Vajj Ta'junt! should be their 'Amil. 
3 
Apparently bin 'Abd al-Karim immediately acceded to their 
request, for on the same day a local bayea, recognising 
Mu4amad Amziyy3n, was issued, signed by many of the notables 
of Burid. 
4 Once again, although bin eAbd al-Karim asked 
for suggestions about the most suitable candidate to be 
appointed, it was the amir's authority that confirmed the 
appointment and the local people were well. aware of the fact. 
A Makhzan in the Rif? 
This organisation, a government with ministers, 
cr7adi-s' and a qli(ýT quýAt, amTns, and qVids, looks very like 
a Rifl. version of the traditional form of a Moroccan makhzan. 
As David Hart has pointed out, all the titles given to those, 
Ibid., p. 196j, unsigned letter of appointment as 9amin 
al-ýI-umand!. of Mulýammad b. 'Umar al-'Umrdnl,: 29 Jum&da 11 1342/ 
6 Feb. 19-24. ' This' document is reproduced in. the Appendix 
. 
(No. 7). Al-Muzimma, it will be recalled, was the name of 
the position at the mouth of the WAdi NakQr which had been 
the port of B5dis in the Middle Ages (see above, -p. 101). 
It is therefore likely that al-Bri . 
"Ayy&shl is incorrect in 
putting it south of Ajd1r. `(op. cit., vol. II, p. 134). 
2 
See'above, p. 499-- 
MAEF, Maroc 519, p. 206, All the people of Burid to- - 
Mul; ammad: F-. 'Abd al_-Karim, Burid, 12 Rajab 1343/18 Feb. 1924. 
4 Ibid., p. -53, 
Jama'a of Burid, accepting'Mul; ammad b. ' 
, 
AmziyyAn' b. al-Va, ij TaIguntl 'as"dmil, 12 Rajab. 1342/18 Feb. 
1924. 
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Photograph IX :1 
Mulýaýmad Azarq&ft, Rif! Minister of Foreign Affairs 




who held positions in the RIfI 'state were Arabic rather than 
Berber. Even more significant were the large numbers of 
lesser positions which were filled, for the main ministries 
mentioned above were by no means the only posts. As Hart 
again remarks: "One of the most striking facts about the 
Moroccon political system in general ... is the over- 
abundance of legitimacy: there are ... far more claimants 
to office than there [are], jobs to go round. .2 
This was partly the result of the large proportion 
of bin 'Abd al-Karim's family which was involved in the Rif! 
government. A glance at a family tree (Table 1) shows that, 
of his close relatives and their husbands, no less than 11 
were at some point involved in the government. They ranged 
from important figures such as 'Abd al-Salam, his uncle, 
and Minister of Finance; his cousin (and. brothdr-in-law), 
Abmad BU Dra,,, later Minister. of War; and his brother-in-law 
Mubammad Azarqari:, the Minister for Foreign Affairs (see 
Photograph IX,: 1), to the second or third-rank leaders such 
as Mulýammad b. al-Va. jj SI Mu4ammad, a brother-in-law of bin 
'Abd al-Karim, who was a. secretary. 
Of course, not all the members of, the Rifl govern- 
ment were relatives of bin 'Abd al-Karlm, although'thd' 
majority were from the BanQ Waryaghal. 
3, However,, the'offic- 
ials most concerned with the implementation. of the'sh'Arl"a 
policy, BU-La4ya, Qa45ý al-Sharg! : (both from the BanQ TrAzIn), 
and a later Minister of Justice,, Muýamnad b. 'Amar b. 
'Abdallah of the Timsamari, and, the 04ý-'-Quýa. t Mu4ammad b. ' 
$Alalý pf the Timsam&ri, were. not even from bin ýAbd 
11 Hart, Aith Waryathar, p. 385. 
2 Ibid., p. 3800 
3 Hart, Aith Waryagha pp. 378-379. 
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al-Karlm's tribe. In other words, for this function bin 
'Abd al-Karim, preferred to rely on people with an ideological 
and religious commitment to the imposition of the sharil. 'a 
rather than on people who were defined solely by their 
relationship to himself. 
So, with all the outward appearances of a makhzan, 
was this in fact what existed in the Rif under bin 'Abd 
al-Karim? Certainly the people of Burid in the Gaznaya 
referred to the government as such. They asked for the appoint- 
men of an 'amil to serve as "an intermediary. between us and 
the Makhzan, "l and in their letter of acceptance they repeated 
this formula. 2 On the other hand, as might perhaps have been 
expected, the Spanish supporters and agents in thd'Rlfl 
occupied areas referred to the Spanish administration as the 
makhzan. Thus a man from the Banfi Tfizirif . Shaykh 
"AllAl' b. 
'Allal: Igh&rbl,: wrote to the Spanish in February-1923 in 
these terms. 3 So it appears that "the Makhzan" depended on 
who was speaking: Spanish agents saw the Spanish as the 
makhzan, and pro-Rif! s. ' saw the new, government headed by bin 
'Abd, al-Karim as the. makhzan. The point is that while he*- 
acted as a Sultan, bin 'Abd al-Karim presented himself as 
such by popular acclamation, 'and his makhzan-(and, that of- 
the Spanish) gained authority in just the same. way; the 
Rif-government acted as a makhzan, 
_ýand-in. 
increasingly power- 
ful one. Despite the initial flurryýof. -activity by the-* 
majlis al-9umma, that assembly's power was always limited: 
1- MAEF' Maroc 519, p. 206. * All the people of Burid to 
Mubammad b. 'Abd al-Karim, 12 Rajab 1342/18 Feb., 1924. 
2 Ibid., -p., 53, Jamal. a of Burid, accepting appointment of 
lamil, 12 Rajab 1342/18 Feb. 1924. 
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, 'Cartas Arabes 1, Ban: L'Tuzin, Shaykh' 
, 
All&l* b. - 'Alldl' Igharb! al-TQzanI and Shaykh, MUý-, -ýmmad b., 
'Amar to Colonel, 2 Rajab 1341/18 Feb. 1923. - 
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bven when it agreed not to accept Qaýý al-Shams as Minister 
of Justice it laid the whole matter in bin 'Abd al-Karim's 
hands for a final decision. By 1924 the people of Burid were 
acknowledging the authority of, the makhzan and trying to get 
bin 'Abd al-Karim to appoint an"amil to be "the intermediary 
between us and the Makhzan", with no reference to the assembly 
at all. It was effectively a contractual arrangement between 
a Sultan'and a local group in the traditional manner of 
Moroccan politics. 
If bin 'Abd al-Karini's government acted as a 
makhzan it was, however, no longer a matter of a distant 
Sultan in Fez confirming a powerful local figure in his pos- 
ition in order to gain his support--as MUlay' IAbd. al-'AzIZj' 
MUldy ýAbd al-Vaf !?., - or MUMy. Zain had done In . the case of 
al-RaisUl*!, ' 'or even of bin 'Abd al-Karimlsýfatherj 
1 but of. 
a powerful central authority in AjdIr'j which-*certainly. -Icon- 
firmed the wishes of local people. as bin 'Abd... al-Karim, had, 
done in Burid, but also was quite capable, -eveh 
before the 
bay'a was proclaimed, of removing local qVids. and. substitu-'--_ 
uting others. The immediacy, of this authority is, reflected 
in the curtness of-the, documents of-appointment. 
_These officials,., 
the'local representativeslof the 
central authori: ty, gave bin 'Abd al-Karim's administration 
a, quite_considerable, power, which, was backed. up by a small 
but always growing bureaucracy. There were officials, tol' 
2 
administer, the, habiýs: property--one Atqad, g Gharradh several, 
3- 
secretaries, ', and a-man, S! Muýammad b.. -QashusIf,,, -'. whose 
See abover p. --145., 
. 
-Maghzen Riffain", P. 3. -and H art, Aith Waryaghar,,. p. 378%' 
_3 Apart 
from Mubammad bin S! Muýaýumadl these were al-lj4jj 
b. Hitml,, ' Qalld, ý; adlq and an Algerian S! Hassan b. , 
"Abd 
al-IAzizj "Maghzen Riffain", passim, -, Hart,,. op. *cit., p. 380. " 
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function was to keep records of taxation. 
1 in addition, the 
two important ministries*of Justice and War had a large number 
of assistants, whose r6le will be discussed later. 
However, from all this it should not be assumed 
that all the members of the government spent all their time 
on administrative matters, for many of them still saw their 
most essential task as defeating the Spanish. The most not- 
able example of this is BQ Laýya the Minister for Justice, 
who spent a considerable part of his time in military 
expeditions. For. example, in September 1923,.. he was sent 
2* by bin 'Abd al-Karim to the Ghumdra to raise troops, in 
May 1924 he was sent to the Marnisa for the same reason 
because that tribe was refusing to provide a. 4drka,. 
3 in'May 
of the same year he only succeeded in escaping capture 
during the G humar*a revolt. 
4 However, as_will be. seen, this 
did not prevent him from putting the policy of enforcement 
of the, sharil. a into effect with considerable. vigour. In facto, 
it is often difficult to. distinguish between the military 
activities and the civil activities of the Rifl. 'administration, 
a situation which, 'of course, resulted from-the war. Thus 
the qal. ids whom bin 'Abd al-Karim appointed in, the. tribes' 
were placed under the control of Pashasý--the military com- 
manders of the regions with their headquarters in military 
command posts, referred to. as malýakmas,. 
The. main ma4akma was at the military headquarters 
at Ait QamZita, in the Imrabadhan clan of the. Banii Naryathal. 
1 
. "Maghzen Riffain", p. 3. 2. SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Informaci6n Septiembre, Res-umen 
General de Confidencias,, 9 Sept. 1923. 
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 24, -Informaci6ri Marzo, Resumen General 
23 Mar. 1924 and Resumen General-24 Mar. 71924. 
4 Sk1raj, 'OP. cit. pp. 126-127. 
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Photograph IX: 2 
ARIET field gun, captured froM the Spanish or 
the French, photographed after the surrender of 
'Abd al-Karim in May 1926 bin 
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in the mountains overlooking the Wadi Ghis'. This was where 
bin 'Abd al-Karlm: kept his family, safe from Spanish bombing 
missions, and had one of his principal camps for prisoners 
of war. 
1 As we have seen, there was another mabakma at al- 
Muzimma, at the mouth of. the Wadi Ghls'. A third and vitally 
important ma4akma was at Akshah Amgh&r, on the. west bank of 
the Wadi Amqarari, between Dahar . Abarrdn' and Anwal 
In the tribe 
of Timsamari. This ma4akma covered the defence of the whole 
eastern front in the tribes of TimsamAri, BanU NUzirif Banil 
Salid, BanU. Walishak, al-Mata. lsa, and the. eastern part of 
the Gaznaya. In charge of this position for the. 'first part 
of 1923 was the Minister of-War, 'Abd al-Salam b. al-]Vajj 
Mu4and of the BanU BU. "AyyTash clan of the BanU. Waryaghdl. 
2 
The western part of the Gaznaya tribe, and the tribes of 
Marnisa, and those of, the Sinhaja Srair were-placed under 
the mabakma at Targist, and that at-BanU -BQ FrAlý. covered 
the western front, and undertook political action'in the 
3 Ghumata and Jibala. The force behind this organisation lay 
with the new Rif! -'regular army. 
The Foundation of the Regular Army 
, Bin "Abd-al-Karlrd had started to create., a modern 
trained, force even, before the Anwal victories, ýbut-the real, 
impetus came iahen he had-both. equipment and-money to carry 
out', a complete, reorganisatio In of the Rlfl*forces. "'The equip- 
ment, of, course, . ccirne from that captured by the'Rif. is. 'Ifrom- 
the, Spanish, ', and although. '. a fair. amount was never. recovered 
Al-Bri : "Ayyashl,: 02- cit., vol-. II, pp'. 134, ' 144., Fqr 
the position of this malýakma see the discussion above on 
P. . 531,, n. 2' Ibid. p. ' 13 4, '. and SkIraj 'cit. pp. 92-93*"', 
3 Al-BU : 'Ayyashl, * op'. ' cit., Vol. -_ _II,, 
p. 135,, and Sk1raj, 
OP., Cit I pp. 92-93. 
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by jjaddu b. Vammu and others, the quantities that they did 
take back to the Rif were enormous. The money mainly came 
from the ransoms of the Spanish prisoners of war. The 
four million pesetas was indeed used, As the Wargha tribes 
had predicted# "against you and us". 
' 
There were several men responsible for the new 
army. The first was Sha'Ib b. Ijammdd! had 
been one of the leaders in the abortive attack on the 
Ghum2ira in 1921 and 1922.2 . Bin 
'Abd al-Karim had, met him 
at Anwal* and according to al-BU "Ayyashl had decided that, 
al-Fala4yas a suitable person to take control of the train- 
ing of the new army when he discovered that when. al-Falalý . 
-. - 
was called away from repairing guns captured from the 
Spanish--a. technique at which he was expert--he had hidden 
part of the trigger of the gun on which he. was working, 
thereby disabling it so that it could not be sold back to 
the Spanish. This so impressed bin "Abd al-Karim with his 
caution that he put al-FalaýL in charge of the regular army. 
3 
Al-Fala4 took ýAmar b. Mu4 ýb. Sa'ld of the Banil Bil . *Ayyash 
to the Monday market, of the BanU BCI . *'AyyTRsh, ' where they made 
an initial recruitment of 75 men, although the numbers soon 
reached. 900 men, and were initial ly divided into 3 tabUrs, 
5 
presumably, of. . 
300 men each.. 
See above, p. 501. 
2 
, His origins are disputed--al-Brj"'Ayydsh1'(op. cit. r Vol. 
III p. 176) says-he cametrom the TimsamAn, HaFt__ýFA_M 
Waryaghar, p. ' 386) -says he was a Waryaghl! from thi; _BanQ 
3 Al-BU . "Ayyashl, ' op. ' 'cit., p. 
176. * 
4 Ibid. 
'5 However, estimates of the full complement of a't , abUr. in 
the RM : army vary. Skiraj, * *op'. * 'cit., p. ' 93, puts it at 500, 
Goded, op. *- cit.,, p., 97, at 400,, some of Hart's informants at 
300, others at 5oo--Hart himself '(A: ith Waryaghar, p. 386) 
opts for- 500. But thdý numbers and, organisation of the - 
tabQrs tended to fluctuate greatly anyway. 
The first 
Mubammd b. 'Amar b. 
the BanU Waryaghal, 
This last, tabfir was 
men, as was a fourt 
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commanders of these'-tabtirs were al-Fala4, ' 
HwnmIsh of. thd Banii BrTahim sub-clan of 
and Muýammad Buýra. t of the Qallaya. 
1 
apparently. largely made up of artillery 
h which was set up later. 
The bases of these artillery *tabUrs already existed. 
In late 1922, and possibly before, there had been defininte 
groups of people who were described-as "artillery-men" in 
the accounts of payments. They were a fairly defined group, 
mainly, though by no means entirely,. made up of people from 
the BanQWaryaghal. For instance, on. 7 February 1922 there 
were four men at Tahlil&th'in the BanU. Walishak,. of whom 
two were from the Banfj al-QRd1.... of . the Bania Waryaghal clan 
of MurAblt!, Ti, eleven at Azkagzn7ai:. in, the same tribe, 'of whom 
three were from the Banfi.. "Abdallah, *clan of. -the 
Bani!, Waryaghal, 
one from the Marnisa and one from. thd BanU Walishakl'-seven 
at al-Na:; qr. of the Banfi Walishak, '-of, whom three were 
Waryaghlis' (one from Band'al-QadlAnd two from Tamasind),, '' 
six at ThasliqQ 'in the BanU'. Walishak. (three-from the BanQ'. 
Waryaghal), eleven in, the Tafarsit-tribe, of whom. three were 
from the-BanU,. Qiyadhari'sub-clan, of-the BanU Waryaghal, and- 
so on. 
3 
The significant thing, however, 'is. -the relatively 
1 Al-Bti : 1Ayyash1, ', op. ' cit., Vol., II, pp. 176-177. 
2, Hart, A: ith Waryaghar, - P. 386. ' 
3 'MAEF,, 'Maroc'5l9, - 
- pp.. 81-82,, ' Lists of payments to., arti llery- 
men, 15 Mulýcýrram , 
IJ41t/ Sept. 1922, 'and 3'1ý; aýfar, 1341/25 Sept. -, 
1922, ' and, 6*ýýfar 1341/28 Sept.. 1922, * and 7 ýafar 1341/29 
Sept. 1922. ' ThdwO 
, 
rd used. in-thdde*lists for "artillery-man" 
is (tahj1ya). - This'is not an Arabic word but it is a 
Turkish one. The Ottoman'. word for "artillery-mann-is _1v 
(topji):, J. W., 'Redhouse, "Redhousesls*Turkish'Dictionary, ,I 2nd ed. revised. by Charles Wells (London, 1880), p. 642. A 
ýtypical list of payments 
is reproduced in thd, Appendix (No. 8). " 
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small group at the centre of. these'artillery-men. There 
seems to have been a small group of men who were kept in 
the same area but moved. around as they- were-needed. For 
instance, al- 'Abbasý b. al-Va. j'j Mulýa. inmcjd of the Banfi 
Qiyadhari sub-clan of the BanU. Waryaghal was moved from 
Tudhitha near Tafarsit on 7 September 1922 
1 to Tawrlrt in 
the same tribe on 11 October. 
2 one of these ment 4mad 
al-Srasl,,: who was certainly not a Rlfl, 'was at WardTan'a. on 28 
September. 3 He eventually became the*qV.. *id of the second 
artillery tabdr. Two of his deputies in that tabUr, a cer- 
tain al-Mata. ll'from the Gharb, and one al-Mufaý4al,. apparently 
4 
were not Rifis'either. . These non-Rifis'were undoubtedly 
employed because of their European-taught military skills. 
The best example of this was Mubammad BuhUt, a Qal'ay1who 
had been an officer in the Spanish Fuerzas Regulares before 
the outbreak of the war. However, he joined the Rifis'very 
soon and quickly distinguished himself in their cause. In 
August 1921, he killed a shaykh'from the BanU BU. `IfrQr whom 
he suspected of being pro-Spanish after, a speech the. shaykh 
had madelrecommending negotiations with*the Spanish. 
5 
He 
later led, those Rlfl 1orces whichremained'in the Qallaya 
6 
while the-main body pulled back to the Banii. Sa'ld. 
At lower levels,. there. were. 'qVids over different 
MAEF,, ' Maro'c'. 519, p. 81, List of artillery-men, - 15 M4arram 
1341/7 Sept. 19 2, no. 
. 
33. 
2 Ibid. r p. 80, List of soldiers and payments, 19 ýafar 1341T11 Oct. 1923, -no., 7. 
3 ibid., p. 78, List of soldiers and pay, 6 $afar 1341/28 
Sept. 1922. 
4 Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p., 386. ' 
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, *Informaci6n Agosto, 'Sl : "All 
19 Aug. 1921 
6 SHM Melilla'Leg. 18, *'Informac, i'6n 'Septiembre, Sl 
26 Sept. 1921., 
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sized groups of men. Thus there was a. _qa'ld 
miatain wa- 
khamslii over each 250 men,, a* *qVid, al-mia over each 100 
men,, a qal: id khas6sill over each '50 men, a* *qal., *i*d khamsa 
wa-lashrlri over each 25 men, a'*qN2: id 'ithna--; Iashar over each 
12 men, and beneath them the ordinary soldiers. 
' The rates 
of pay vary according to the accounts given. The best way 
to reproduce these various amounts in in the form of a table: 
Table IX: - 
Pay of of f icers and men in the Rlfl' , *regular army 
according to varkaus 'sources", ''in pesetas per month2 
Hart al-. Bil . 
'AyyZishl. .ý. Skiraj 
Soldier 60 
QVId 12 65 
Qalid 25 70 
Q& I id 50 80 
Qa'id. 100 100 
Qdlid 250 
Qalid tabUr 125 
Qatid 1,000 - 
60 75 
90 





These theoretical rates do not in fact compare with those 
given in September 1922 to the artillery-men in the BanQ' 
Walishak,, -who were paid 25 pts for the three weeks1from 
'3 7 September to 28 September, a rate of 33 pts a month. 
These troops had a wide variety of arms--guns they 
had captured from the Spanish--such as the 1888-model Spanish 
1 Hart, A'ith Waryaghar, ',. p. 386,, ' and SkIraj, " -op. * cit.,, p. 93. 
2, Al-BfI : 'Ayydshl, * 'op., cit., vol. ji, p. 177; Hart, 'Aith 
Waryaghar.,, p. 387; , , 
SkIrY]7 'op'. ' cit., P.. 94. 
3 MAEF, 'Maroc. 519, 'p. 82. Artillery-men and payments, 15 
Mu4arram. 1341/7 ff-ept. 1922, and 6 ýafar 1341/28 Sept. 1922, 
e. g., nos. - 5-8. -', 
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a 
Mauser-guns they had obtained by purchase--: -mainly French 
Lebel 1886-model repeaters--or ones that they had before 
Anwdl, mainly old Moroccan-made BU RafQra muskets. The 
heavy artillery was mainly captured Spanish equipment-- 
Gabrielli, estimated that at the end of 1924 the Rifis had 
about 200 Spanish field guns. 
' Bombs were made by local 
technicians from unexploded bombs dropped by Spanish 
aeroplanes. Al-Bri . 
"Ayyashl'estimates that from one 200 kilo 
bomb they could make 470 hand-made bombs locally. 
2 
The main 
arms dumps for this equipment were at Azghat in the Banti ' 
Waryaghal, BVI Haim, also in the BanU Waryaghal, Bil *Salaý,. 
again in the Banrl Waryaghal in the upper reaches of the Wid! - 
Ghls,. and at the rnalýakmas--especially that at Akshab Amghar 
in the Timsaman. 3 The repair shops for these weapons were 
at Anwal under the supervision of al-Mulallim Muýand, a 
Timsamani.. 'Who had 25 men, many of them from the Banfl BU 
4 Frdlý, working under him. Muband was a master armourer who 
had for long been opposed to Spanish'intervention7-in August 
1919, when he was working at the Friday market in the 
TimsamAft, 'Abd al-Karlm al-Khdtt&. bl, * the 'amirls father, had 
contacted him at the beginning of his efforts to foment an 
5 
anti-Spanish. 'coalition. 
Not surprisingly, in a period of war,. the army was 
perhaps the most. closely administered section of the, govern- 
ment's activity. '. There vas-. an offIcal to take. care of 
Leon Gabrielli, ' Abd-el'-Kr'iM et 'les* Ev6neme'nts du Rif 
1924-1926, Notes et Souvenirs receuillds et presentds par', 
Roger Coindreau (Casablanca, 
, 
'1953), p. 50. 
Al-Bri *eAyyash_1,. -09'-* cit'., Vol'. II, p. 163. 
3 Ibid., pp. 172-474. 
4'. Ibid., ' P. 174. 
5 sHm melilla Leg., 15, ' Memorias* Quincenales, Alhucema S, 
- 
Memoria- .. se4unda quincena de agosto 
de 1919. 
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Photograph IX 3 
(Left) Mulýanund BU lnutaý; arrif 





Photograph IX :4 
A Rlfl'air-raid shelter, photographed in 1926 
Source: ' 'Il'lustrated I; ondon' News, 29 May 1926 
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supplies of food, 'Abd al-Karlm al-Hattash'of AjdIr, one 
I 
to deal with military supplied, 4mad ShammUrI. and a pay- 
master--EaLaýa 
_ýýrrif--S! 
Muýammad bU,. Tib&r, bin 'Abd al-Karim's 
brother-in-law (see Photograph IX : 3). 
2A 
careful record 
seems to have been kept, not only of payments, which have 
already been discussed, but also of the distribution of arms. 
Apparently, the soldiers were paid in accordance with a &V 
number stitched on the turban of each man. 
4 The turbans 
also indicated both rank and the military arm to which the 
5 
soldiers belonged. ordinary soldiers wore green turbans,. 
while officers wore red turbans with"green stripes indic- 
ating rank (three f or a' qV'id tabUr, two for a qV. id 100, 
one for a qVId 50, a half stripe for a qal. id 25,, and no 
6 
stripe for a qal. id 12), machine gunners wore black turbans. 
In addition, soldiers had strict instructions on 
how to conduct themselves. 
- 
A list of army regulations was 
found on the body of a dead soldier in-1926 and read as 
follows: 
"Praise be to God alone. 
God bless our*Lord Mohammed and'his: family. 
Note of the 
, 
military, regulations 6'ýafar 1344 
(26 August 1925) 
I. All officers, must obey ezich'other,, according to rank. 
ii. All . orders-must be obeyed without'question. 
III. There can be no, change or alteration in the position 
. of a' cald once 
he has. been appointed, and no one may have 
"Maghzen Riffain"r p. -6., 
2 
Ibid., p. 3.; Hart,, 'Aith Waryagharrp. '378. 
3 
MAEF, Maroc 520,, p.,, 77 sh6ws-a number of slips'giving the 
distribut on of arms dated Shd'bari 1344/Feb. -Mar. 1926. 1- 
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, 'Informaci6n Alhucemas, 'Abd al-Sal&m,, 
b. 'Amar b. 'Abd al-Karim, (Banfi,. Waryaghal), 29 Nov. 1925*'- 





rank reduced without the authorisation of the Emir. 
IV. Each cald must know by heart the names of all his 
soldiers, 'aini_dkeep on him at'all times a list of 
their names on which he will write'the day on which 
each'one leaves his command either through'death, 
absence or for any other reason. 
V. Each officer must know the number of guns and 
cartridges held by his soldiers. 
VI. The taids in the front line must make an inspection 
with the officer of the post, and must make the latter 
responsible for everything concerned with arms and 
cartridges. 
VII. Immediately they arrive at a position, the calds 
must have trenches dug, build air-raid shelters 
photograph IX : 3]. and remove all rubbish. 
VIII. No one in any position may flee from the enemy 
if he-attacks. Anyone who does so will be punished. 
IX. No one may leave his post at the end of his tour 
of duty, before his relief arrives. If he does, -he 
will be punished. 
X. The fine for being late on arrival at a post will be 
half a rial a day, payable when the latecomer does 
arrive. The money so collected will be equally divided 
among those who were on time. ' 
XI. Anyone who interrupts his time in the harka is 
equally liable to a fine of half a rial a day. The 
product of, these fines will be , 
divided, among the calds 
who remain on duty. The Pasha or his Khalifa, will 
receive, 'one third and the other two thirds will be 
given to the-cald 100 and his subordinates. 
XII. No ca-ld shall give leave to any of his men in 
exchange for money. If hedoes he will be liable to 
a prison sentence, according to his'rank. This penalty 
will be applied to a cald 25, or acald 50, 'or a cal"d 
100. 
XIII. - Anyone who wishes to impose a, fine be. it. great 
or small, must first consult thd minister of War--who 
will refer, it 
, 
to our. Lord--God give him victory. 
XIV. All those who carry an arm must take care that 
it'is not damaged. He who through negligence breaks 
it or exchanges it etc, must repay the"value. ' The same 
applies to a man who sells his arm, and he will be put 
in prison until he' has repaid the value. 
_XV.,., 
The cald 100, as all the other calds must fight 
along, witFT -his-own, men. and. not, mix-them with'those of 
another officer. 
Peace. 
Approved by thd Minister of War the. Caid Ahmed ben 
Draa[sic. ]., God prote. ct him.. ". 1 ...... I 
SHAT, Maroc E24, 'Propagande'Ri'ffaine enclosed in letter 
Ministre Plenipotentiaire Resident Gdndral du Maroc to 
Ministre de Guerre,, * Rabat,, 10 Apr. 1926, 
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The orders lay down a strict hierarchy of command, 
through local qa"ids -to pashas to the Minister of War, and 
finally to bin 'Abd al-Karlm himself. Through such a 
structure,, the'amir. "s authority would be guaranteed by an 
army which owed its loyalty not to tribal leaders but to 
himself. 
In addition to these orders and the identity patches 
on their turbans, the RIfI 'soldiers were given yet another 
symbol of their organisation. They were issued with identity 
cards, reportedly with their photographs stuck to them. 
1 
The Rif! "Navy" 
When it became necessary to set up some form of 
military control over sea transport, the first person to be 
put in charge of it was Ra'Is. Misa'Cid b. 'Amar, "Sibarall, the, 
Buqquyl. who had a history of gun-running. and smuggling along 
the coast, which went back to 1896. - He-hdd joined the RM.. 
movement just. before Abarrazi, only after a-great, deal of 
pressure had been applied to him. 
2 Yet he seems to have been 
loyal to bin 'Abd al-Karlra thereafter and was rewarded with 
3 the title of "Inspector of Marine".. In fact, this title- 
was more imposing. than realistic, for. the Rif! navy con-, 
sisted of no more than a few rowing boats and'two motor 
4 launches. Ra9ls Misa'Qd came to a violent end in November 
SHM Ceuta Leg. ' 23, 'I: nformaci6n Oficina Central Abril 
1924, nota, 6 Apr. 1924. If the detail about the photo- 
graphs is'correct, ' they may have been taken by Josef Klemms, 
a Gel: man deserter from thd French Foreign Legion who had 
f led to the. Rif where he became bin' *Abd al-Karim s of f icial 
photographer. Sheean, 'Adventures, p. 275. 
2ý See'above, pp. J61-162,300. 
3 Hart; Aith Waryaqhar, p. 378., 
4 Goded, 'ý2ýý,, P-_ 102. 
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1924, when he was murdered by a brother of Vaddu b. Vammu 
al-Ka4al. Apparently the brothdrý felt that Misa'Qd should 
sell him some land to which hd'felt himself entitled, and 
when Misa'Qd refused he shot him. 
1 
Thd Spanish report on 
this affair described Sibara as "a native from Buqqiuy [sic] 
charged with carrying out contraband along the coast. .2 
This does, in fact, seem a fair description of the Rlfl 
navy's. function, for arms, ammunition'and supplies were 
brought in from Tangier. The sea was clearly the quickest 
way of communicating with . *the Ghum&ra, and when al-Raisfill . 
was captured in 1925, he was taken to Ajdlr in a boat from 
Wddl L&w. 3 
Sibara was replaced by Vaddu b. ýAll b. al-Muqaddam, 
4 
an AjdIrI, who bought one of the motor launches from an 
American in Tangier to make the'se4 route to the GhumZira that 
much more reliable. 
5 
Furthermorej, * considerabld care was 
taken of the Rif! boats and they were'stored under the cliffs 
at Alhucemas to protect them from Spanish air raids (see 
Photograph IX : 5). 
The Irregular Army 
The total strength of. the. regular. army. was never 
1 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, 'Informaci6n'Noviembre, nota, 6 Nov. 
1924. 
2 Ibid., nota,, ý3, Nov. 1924. On, the other hand, 'Abd al- 
Karim b. al-Vdjj 'All, 'Sibarals brother-in-law told the 
French that he: had been killed, by a servant of Mubaý=ad 
Azarqdri, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (SHAT, Maroc Riff 
14, Dossier' III, , Mars, 1926, 
' Renseignements donn6s par Abd 
el Krim el-Hadj Ali el Boucougi, Tangier, Mar. 1926). 
However, both'accounts are . agreed that Sibara was murdered. 
Hart (Aith Warva har, p. 378) says that Sibara defected to 
the Spanish, but this, is, clearly, incorrect in. the-li5jht-of- 
this. new evidence. 
ý3 Hernindez 
Mir, ' *op. ' *C'it., Vol. II, p. 257. 
4 Al-BU "Ayy&sh1, * bp*. * c*it. *, Vol. II, P'. 175. 
5 ibid. 
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Photograph IX :5 
The Rif! boats stored under the cliffs near 
Alhucemas Bay; an oblique aeriel-photograph, 
taken by a Spanish reconnaissance aeroplane. 
-The large boat in the open enclosure is_one 
of the motor launches. 
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high. Bin 'Abd al-Karim put it*at 6,000-7000,1 but Hart and 
Goded give 3,000 and 2,000 respectively. 
2 Clearly these 
numbers were insufficient to defend thd Rif against the 
Spanish troops, so 4arkas from thd different tribes were 
I 
raised in the old way, as well. 
While Shallb b. al-Fala]ý. and others were recruiting 
for the regular army, bin 'Abd al-Karim wrote to the various 
shaykhs in the BanU Tftlný. As a result, some of those 
shaykhs reported to the Spanish: 
"We went to see him, and he spoke with us, and. said 
to us 'Be on your guard against the Spanish and 
form an army under your authority and * 
we will send 
the supplies', and we replied 'We shall consult 
among ourselves over what is best for all concerned', 
a formula which gave them the opportunity to delay further. 
Clearly, however, bin 'Abd al-Karlra was relying on local 
support under the authority of local leaders in tribal groups 
--just as he had done to form the original'ýarkas. 
In July 1923, another TilzTan,! '. 'shaykh wrote to the 
Spanish to inform them that "The Muslims, that is the 
mujUhidiri, have called openly in the'markets of the BanCi. - 
4 
Waryaghal for an. attack against us. ". , Ten days later the 
same man reported that this propaganda had been successful: 
"The BanU Warvaghal 
' 
[have formed]. a barka. for after 
the 'Id ['Id-ai-Kabir which was less than one month' 
awayj-Nhich will come with violence upon us and will 
attack you and us. 
Roger-Mathieu, 'op. ' cit., P. 140. 
2 Hart, ' Aith Waryaghr, p. 385, and--Goded, ' P. 9'5., 
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 22jCart*aCs* Arabes' *1*, * Bani' Tuzin, Shaykh 
"All&l:, b. "Amar Igharbl al-TUzanl and Shaykh Mulýammad b. 
'Amar to Comandante Claudin, 2 Rajab 1341/18 Feb. J923. 
4, Ibid., 'Shaykh 'Allal b. Mulýand to Captain, received 1 July, 
1923. 
5 
-Ibid. ', -Shay 
. kh**eAllal b. Mulýand to Colonel, 'received 11 
July 1923. 
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Photograph IX :6 
Rifi. Irregular troops on the way to the front 
Source: 'Illustrated Lohdon News,,, 20 September 











Rifi. irregulars on the*way to the front line; 
the son of a shaykh'(on'the right) much better 
dressed than the ordinary irregular troops., 
Source: 'The I'llustrated London News,, 20September 
















Announcements in the markets were the traditional 
way of calling together a*lý'arka, and in August 1923 bin 'Abd 
al-Karlrri made it the responsibility of his' qd`: ids to organ- 
ise this form of recruitmentr 
1 
and in early September, BU 
Laýya was sent to the Ghum&ra to recruit a'harka there. 
2 
Recruiting in the markets continued in 1924--for instance, 
in January of that year bin 'Abd al-Karlr6 tried to recruit 
a harka against 'Amar b. Ijamidu in the'markets, 
3 
and indeed 
throughout the war. (See Photographs IX : 6,7,8. ) 
The Building of Communi'cations 
A modern, centralised state such as the one which 
bin 'Abd al-Karim proposed for the Rif. needed rapid and 
efficient cmmunications between the'centre and the outlying 
areas. The two most efficient methods of communication were 
roads and telephones, and bin 'Abd al-Karlrri did his best to 
ensure that both were constructed. 
At the beginning of February 1923, as part of the 
general propaganda surrounding his proclamation, bin 'Abd 
al-Karim sent letters to the Timsam&n and other tribes 
giving them one month in which'to submit to his authority. 
He also told them he was going. to build a road and that 
4' 
European nations would be sending help. By November of 1923, 
he was building roads into the, Gaznaya from Ajdlr., to Hassi 
SHM Melilla Leg. 23, 'Informaci6n Agosto, SI Muýammad 
al-Fa4sý!,, ' 13 Aug. 1923. 
2 SHM Melilla Leg. '23, 'In'formaci6n Septiembre, Resumen 
General de Confidencias,, 9, Sept. - 1923. 
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 24j* Enero, Resumen General 
de Confidencias, 28 Jan. -1924. 
4', SHM Melilla Leg. 23 , ", Informaci6n Febrero, T. O. C. Comand- 
ande Int I ervenci6n to Comandante General and Coronel de P. I., 
Tafarsit, 7 Feb. 1923. 
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Wazanga, and to 'Ain MidyUna 
1 (sed Map IX: 1). According 
to al-Ba . 
`Ayy&shI, ' the man in overall charge of this prog- 
ramme of road bdilding was a certain Mulý MuzUr, who was 
illiterate. 2 
The construction of thdseroads was by no means 
an easy process. One of the people in charge of the stretch 
of road being built in the Buqquya (presumably part of the 
Ajdlr*to Targist road) asked. the*maVakma of the tribe to 
write to S! Mabammad asking him to send measuring implements# 
shovels, and other equipment "because the road in the Buqquya 
is very difficult with many stones in it. Unless [we receive 
this] equipment it will be impossible to set the road to 
rights as quickly as our Lord [i. e. *, bin "Abd al-KarIm1has 
ordered. " 
3 At the same t ime, hd'asked for, black and white 
paint for sign-writing on thewalls of the'mabakma in the 
Buqquya. 4 
The main labour forcelor this work was drawn from 
the prisoners held by bin 'Abd al-Karim. The list of Moroc- 
can prisoners held at the main prison, Aidir, on 5 May, 
records that 37 were absent building the'"earth motor road 
in Buqquya". In this case,. all were captured-supporters of 
5 'Amar b. -Vamidu, although'captured French and Spanish 
prisoners were also used., 
6 
1 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, ''Info, rmaci6ft Noviembre, Muýammad 
Mubapmadl, ' 23 Nov. - 1923., 
2 Al-Bf1: "Ayyash1, 'op. "cit., Vol. II, p. 166. 
3, MAEF, 'Maroc 520, ý4diq b. al-shadl! to Mabammad b. "Abd 
al-Karlrft, 21 Rama4Ari 1342/28 April 1924. This letter is 
reproduced in thdAppendix (No. 9). 
4, Ibid. 
5 MAEF, '-Maroc*519, List, of prisoners at Ajdlr., 3a Ramaýan 
, 1342/5 May 
1924, prisoners nos. 50-86. ' 
6 SHAT, Maroc Riff 3, * 1' Interrogationes' indig6nes 6vad6s 
du Riff, Tirrailleur Ahmed Zebboy, Nov. 1925, Bashir Agouft 
, 
Feb. 1926, and SHM Melilla Leg., 125, '-Informaciones diciembre, 
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The main road that was completed was from AjdIr 
to Targis't and parts of it are still in use today as a track 
running parallel to the main Alhucemas to ShAwin road. The 
road was good enough for Azarqazi to travel from AjdIr to 
Targist by car in 1924.1 All the roads centred on Ajdlr. *, 
as was natural, and they eventually ran to Targist,, to SI 
'All : BUI . 
'Uqba, via Arbala TawrIrt, to 'Ain Zuhra, and later 
to Sakka. 2 (See Photograph IX : 9. ) 
The other main means of communication was by 
telephone. As the Rifi. territory expanded after 1923, all 
the Aewly conquered areas were quickly linked by telephone 
lines with AjdIr'. The telephone'system was the responsibility 
of S! Ma4aýmmadj who employed a number of small boys as 
operators who had been trained by a Spanish prisoner nick- 
named "Antonio el Mecinico" .3 
The main problem in the creation of a telephone 
system was the supply of equipment--particularly of posts 
and wire. Some was purchased from the French in Algeria. 
In September 1923, S1 144ammad, wrote to Azarqari to tell him: 
"I have paid about 2,000 pesetas to Vaddu [i. e., bin Vammu 
al-Ka4al] so that he may buy telephone apparatus. .4 
Other equipment was simply stolen from-the Spanish 
occupied zone. At the end of September 1923, ' the Spanish 
SkIraj, op. cit. 
_,, 
p. 126. 
2 Al-BU : 'AyyIishI,, * op. 'cit.,, vol. II,, p. 16 6, and Jacques Ladreit de 
Lacharribre, *Le RA-ve' d'Abd el-Krim Esquisse d'Histoire 
Marocaine (Paris, 1925), pp. 24-25. 
3 Hart, Aith Waryaghar, 'p. 387. Antonio's full name was 
Antonio Rojano, and, he seems to have been a fairly enthus- 
iastic renegade, for his signature appears at the foot of a 
design he drew of a "mechanical boat" for theRIfIs", coxiser- 
ved in MAEF, * Ma: r6c*. *520, p. 164. 
4 MAEF Maroc 517, -p.. 139, Maýammad al-Khatta. bl. to Azarqanp 
18 $afar 1342/30 Sept., 1923. ' 
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Photograph IX 9 
The Rlfl. ±oad. ýbetween. Ajdlr* and Targist today, 
seen from the present main road between Alhucemas 
and ShZiwin in the western BanQ. Waryaghal 
territory. 
Source: taken by author, September 1977 
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reported that many of the telephone posts between Tizz! 
'Azz&. *and Tafarsit had been removed and sold to bin 'Abd 
al-Karim at a price of 25 pts each, 
1 
and in mid-October, bin 
'Abd al-Karlrft apparently offered to buy any wire that was 
stolen from the Spanish for his line from TIz'zI "Azz& ' 
to SUq al-Thal&tha". -of Azilaf. 
2 
These thefts continued and 
the Spanish complained in December 1924 that telephone wire 
was being stolen in order to sell it to bin tAbd al-KarIM. 
Apparently the French also suffered from this new industryl 
for a rumour circulated at the same time that they had' 
offered to sell the RIfI*. `amIri at Sakka,, in'the Gaznaya, all 
the telephone wire that he needed provided that their wire 
3 
was not stolen. 
The lines connected AjdIr with all the main Rif!. ' 
positions--with SQq al-Sabat of thd BanQ. Walishak via Akshab, 
Amghar, with 'Ain Zuhra via S! rAll BU Ruqba, with 'Azril,. 
4 
with Banil : BTI Fr&V, - with Sakka, with AknQ1, with, Tawarda, 
with Sh&win via'Targis. t,. and with-al-BarAbir, and other lines 
were added when the. 'Jibala was occupied (Map IX: 1). 
Social Organisation: Health and Education'in theý Rif 
Republic 
In a society at war, like the Rif, there was 
SHM Melilla Leg. 23, *Informaci6n'Septiembre, Resumen 
General, 25 Sept. 1923. ' 
2, 
SHM Melilla. Leg... 23; ' Irffoýrma: ci6n Octub're, Resumen General 
de Confidencias, 19 Oct. '1923. 
3 SHM Melilla, Leg. '25, -1nformaci*6ri Diciembre, nota. 15 Dec. 
1924. 
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 24, ''Inforrnaci6n'Abril, Resumen General,, 
7 Apr. 1924, and Resumen General, 10 Apr. 1924, and SHM 
Melilla Leg., 25, * Informa: c1'6n',; Juni'o, -- nota, 27 June 1924, and, 
Informaci6n'Marzo, Resumen General,, 26 Mar. 1924. 
5 Ladreit de Lacharribre, 'op,. --cit., pp. 24-25. 
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obviousli., -a considerable problem with casualties. Yet 
medical services were practically non-existent. What there 
were, were administered by a ne" pharmacist (fron Tangier or gKo 
Fez) named Ma4bflb*, but he had no proper hospital nor medical 
supplies. To a certain extent, men injured in battle were 
cared for by their wives, who often followed them to the 
front. MabbUbý apparently made some attempt to train these 
wamen by lecturing their husbands in the hope that they 
would pass the information on to their wives. 
1 
Strenuous efforts were made to attract outside 
help--a French medical mission did enter the RIf in 1923, 
and the Red Cross and Red Crescent tried to send help. 
2 At 
least one British Red Cross worker, a Norwegian named Dr. 
Walter Hutyens, did get to the Rif to help, and was captured' 
3 in 1926 by the Spanish. 
Efforts. were also made-by, Indian-Muslims to send- 
medical help to the, RIfIs--in March-'1924, the French Consul- 
General in Calcutta cmplained to-thd government oflIndia 
about the activities of one Mohammed ben Abdel Kader Hilali, 
who "has travelled the whole. "length'of India for propaganda 






02- cit-, V01-'II, P- 181, and personal 
information, ', Idris Rhat-tAb! Jbin 'Abd al-Karim's younger son), 
Sept. lo77. - According to Idril al-Khattdbl, ' Mabbf1h died fair- 
ly recently in Tangier, where he had set up as a dentist. 
2 
Al-Bri "Ayyashl, 'op. cit.,, Vol. III p. 182. 
3 
There is Voluminous correspondence on the case of Dr., 
Hutyens in MAEE, Lc! g. R966, ' Ex. 13, '*Sospechosos en Marruecos 
viajes*,: Detenciones, e. g., Nota Verbal, Legation de Norvoge 
to Ministerio de Estado, 'Madrid; 5, Oct. 1926 (letter) Secret- 
ario General-Ministerio de Estado to Sr. Presidente Consejo 
de-Ministros (Direccion de-Marruedos y Colonias), Madrid, - 
7 Oct. 1926, ', Nota. Verbal, Ministerýio. de Estado to Legac16n".. 
de Norue4a, Madrid, 30 October, 1926 
4 FO 371/11081/240/W8609,, Laronce'(French Consul-General) 
to Secretary to Goverýnmerit of India, Foreign and Political 
Department, Calcutta, 27 Mar. 1925. 
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Hilali apparently wished to set up a "sanitary 
formation" under Dr. Mohammed Naim. This mission was 
abandoned, 
1 but another call for medical aid came in an 
Indian paperf The Muslim Outlook on 7 May 1925. The articler 
entitled "What the Riffians need", revealed that they grew 
enough food, had plenty of men and arms, but they were des- 
perate for trained surgeons and. medicines. 
2 This help did 
not arrive either. 
Another major preoccupation of the new state was 
education. Bin 'Abd al-Karim himself designed-a curriculum 
for the madrasa that was set up in. Ajdlr, which included 
mathematics, science, and "military science". This school 
was put under the charge of Sayyid Mubammad b. al-V&jj Vaddu, 
a faqlh from Azghdr. Another school was set up at the 
zawiya of Adduz in the Buqquya under a Ghumari'faqlh named 
Sldl Muýammad Mashabbal, and, when the RIfIs'occupied., Shdwin? 
a religious institution'was started there under the FaqIh 
al-'Amartl. ' Furthermore, bin 'Abd. al-Karim ordered that 
mathematics be taught in. all. the schools and also ordered 
the tAlibs to confine themselves to teaching their charges*. 
the necessary I Qurlanic-studies--with the implication that 
they should'cease to supplement their income'by having the 
3 
boys stitch jil, labas. Bin "Abd al-Karim also prepared-a 
group of 100, boys from'each clan of'the BanQ, WaryaghAl, to 
go to Constantinople to study subjects such'as engineering 
1 FO 371/11081/240/W8609, Parsons (Deputy Sec retaryl Foreign 
and Political. Department)'to Laronce, ' Delhi, '29 Apr. 1925. 
2, FO 371/11081/240/W860(, Parsons to. Laronce, Simla, -13 Aug. 
1925, enclosing copy of article TroM Thd Mu'sl'iM Outlook, 
7 May 1925., 
3 Al-BQ "Ayy&shI#, * 'c'it.., Vol. II, p. 185, and Hart, 
Aith Waryaghdr, p. 389. 
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and medicine, but it never left. 
1 
Finally, in an effort to recruit teachers, bin 'Abd 
al-Karim inserted an advertisement in the Algiers paper 
Lisan al-Diri in 1922, calling for teachers. This advertise- 
ment received no replies. 
2 
Taxation and Finance 
Any state needs to ensure that it has enough money 
to cover its expenditure. Unfortunately detailed accounts 
of income and expenditure are not available. Howevere 
al-Bil. "AyyRshl- gives what he says was the expenditure for 
the first six months of 1923: 
Table IX: 3 
3 ExpenditUre *of Rif. 1'. Government, 1924 half) 
Amy 
Pay of officials 
General 
Total 
311,, 165.00-, pts_ 
221,936. *75 pts 
200.00' pts 
533,301.75 pts 
According to al-Bd . "'AyyAshl also, 
the total income for the 
whole year was 6'million pesetas,, which leaves a very large 
surplus 
4 
SHM Melilla, Leg. 25, Informaci6n Confidentes, Mubammad 
b. 'Abd-al-Qddir al-rabsil'28 Feb. 1924,, and personal infor- 
mation, Idr1s',, al-Khattdb1, ' Sept. 1977. .. Idr1s' al-Khattabl 
says that the-intentions was to send the'group, which 
included 'Abd al-Karim BU Dra;: 'to Egypt rather than 
Constantinople., 
2 Abderrahman-Youssoufi, "Les Institutions de-la R6publique 
du Rif", in, Coll6que, pp. 95-96; and personal information, 
Idris' al-Kha-ýtabl,. Sept., 1977. 'UsTan al-DIn was formerly 
edited-by SI. Vassan b. ' 'Abd al-'Azlz now one of bin 'Aba 
al-Karim's secretaries'. "'Maghzeri Riffain", p. 5. 
Al-Bra cit., 'Vol. II, pp. -153-154. 
4 Ibid., p. 154. 
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The main resources of the treasury were the ransom 
paid for the Spanish prisoners in 1923-4 million pesetas, 
fines imposed on recalcitrant tribesý, such as those on the 
Akhm&s in the Jibala in 1924-20,000 pts, on the Banil 'Zarwal 
in 1925--50#000 pts, and on the Ghumdra in 1923-30,000 pts, 
and in addition to these irregular, if extremely productive, 
sources of revenue there were two more consistent ones-- 
taxation and customs duties. According to al-BU 'Ayyashl 
again, the product of zak&t on income from harvests and 
from trade was 75,000 pesetas a year, while the revenue from 
customs duties or trade between the Rif and the French zone 
was relatively little. 
1 
I 
These figures are possibly misleading for the 
imply an entirely monetary payment of taxation. - In-fact,, 
the payment was often made in kind. In January 1924,, the 
people of 'Ain Zuhra were taxed at the rate of one animal 
from each 40 donkeys or goats and 2 pesetas on each box of 
sugar that was sold. 
2 Taxes were, also. imposed at-a flat 
rate for each individual in a particular area; 'for-instance, 
in March 1924 bin 'Abd'al-Karim ordered that each person in 
each tribe was to pay. 10. pesetas in order to purchase 
3 
aeroplanes. In January 1924, a Spanish*agent in the' BanQ 
BU Zrd 'reported that the Rif commander in the district 
"imposed on them a tax Of [15 pts]. for each house and now 
4 
he is ordering. them. to, give 'one' mudd -of barley... 
1-, 
Ibid., pp., 152-153. Al-BU 'Ayydshl''says the customs duties 
were low, but then goes on to say that theya, mounted to, 5,000 
pts a'day (over 180,000 pts-ayear), which is presumably a 
misprint. -' 
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Inf orMac16ric Batel',.., 1924, nota, 18 
Jan., 1924. -- 3 SIM Melilla Leg. 25, *Informaci6n* Confidentes,, Sldl Idrls 
b. -al-Bashir'(Gaznaya), 26 Mar. 1924., 
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 21, 'Bajalato de Gumara, Khallfa of BanQ. 
BU Zrdto Castro Girona,, 14 Jan. 1924. 
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Such exactions did not of courseblease the Ghumarls, 
and the same informant wrote in February 1924 to complain 
that they "are in dire, straits from the great amount of 
contributions they are forced to give, and from hunger and 
so on. 111 A flat rate land-tax was imposed in the same way, 
at 5 pts a hectare, which would also be used for buying 
munitions, it was announced. 
The taxes were paid in Spanish or Vaýssanl or French 
currency, for despite the printing of a number of bank notes 
in a new Rifl. currency (rifiyat) for a 'State bank of the 
Rif (Bank VukUmat al-Rif), tied to French and English cur- 
rency, they were never put into circulation and the, State 
Bank was never set up. 
3 Several sources state that these 
notes were printed in the United Kingdom under, the, auspices 
of Captain Gardiner, who was involved in the supply of arms 
to the Rif and in making propaganda in Europe in the Rifl. 
cause. 
The Sharl'a 
The changes, that have so far been described were 
designed. to help in the organisation of. the, new RIfI stateý--, 
and to create a', social and administrative system that, would 
Ibid., Khal1fa-of-BanU. BQ. Zr&. to Castro Girona, 1 Rajab 
1342/7 Feb. 19 24. ' 
,--1, -, I-. IIIII 2 SHM Melilla Leg., 24, informaci6n''Abril., Resumen General,, 
13 'Apr. 1924. 
3 Al-BU : 'Ayyashl, ' op. ' ý'Cit. , Vol. , II, - pp. - 
15 4 -15 5. Hart, Aith 
4 Waryathar 7fý7-3 7 6. 
Ibid. , and Goded, * 'op. * 'cit. p. 93. '. However, tne Spýlfi sh 
Minister in''Constantinople-in 1924 was concerned that-, these, 
notes might, have been-printed in Turkey, MAEE/M. D. E. 'Antiguo 
Archivo., Politica, 2543, ' InfoýrTna: c*i&f OctUbre. - Gardiner,, -, a 
former officer in thd, British army, had a commercial interest 
in Morocco'and set himself up as a. roving ambassador for the 
Rif! state, ' based in London. ý Sed below, p. 807. 
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enable the state to oppose the Spanish. - This was one of 
the objectives laid down by the'bay'a given to bin 'Abd 
al-KarIM. Connected with this organised system was the need 
to impose order in the Rif; however, the imposition of 
order, and the sharl'a also helped to fulfil one of the 
other objectives which the bayla document had in mind. 
"May God destroy heresies and error through this man"' it 
said, referring to bin 'Abd al-Karlm. This was his own 
desire as well. 
In order to carry out the policy of imposing order, 
the Ministry of Justice was fairly well organised. At its 
head, in theory, was the FaqIh BU Laýya. - However, he was 
frequently engaged. in military operations of various sorts' 
and a great deal of the daily administration fell to the 
FaqIh al-Sharg! of the BanCi Triziri, and to M46mmad b. . Amar 
'Abdallah al-Timsamdnl. * These three men were the main 
2 implementers of the'policy of. imposing the*sharl"a. It is 
very difficult indeed to distinguish between which'of, them 
was in fact in charge of the Ministry. at any one time-- 
although Hart gives them control in thd'order al-Shargl, ' 
al-TimsamaniAnd DUA Labya. 
3 However, as will be shown, - both 
al-Shargl'and BU Labya were. involved in ensuring order and 
ý)ringing the sharl'. a into'force'at the same time. A French 
report states that al-Sharg! was more'concerned with civil 
law, while 'Abdallah BU Dr&. "was a deputy minister for crim- 
4 inal af fairs.. Certainly,. in the. light of-the prison records 
MAEF, *Maroc' 517., p. 180, Proclamation of Muýa 
* mmad 
b. 'Abd 
al-KarliTi, dated. 14 Jumada 11 1341/2 Feb. ' 1923. ' 
2 ý'Maghzen Riffain", pp. 3,4, and Hart, ' Kith Waryaghat, 
P. . 378., 3 Ibid. 
4. "Magh , zen Riffain", ' p. ' 4. 
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examined in the next section civil law would seem to have 
been al-Shargil's main area of concern. 
r Of course, the enforcement of order had a stýpng 
political reason as well as the religions one dictated by 
the sharl"a, for, as we have *seen, unity could only be 
maintained while there was peace. Thus there was a major 
attack on the system of blood feuds. Bin 'Abd al-Karlm 
declared the death sentence for murderers and this was fre- 
quently carried out. A case of murder in March 1926 was 
punished in this way and. the written judgement sums up the 
attitude of the new state towards murderers. The case was 
one in which two men agreed with the wife of a third to 
murder her husband. Statements were taken from a number of 
witnesses and from those involved, and one of them was 
condemned to'death: 
"Praise be to God. 
of 4mad. b. 'All,. *the above-mentioned[i. e., in 
the statements from witne 
, 
ssed]. has been proved.. 
He is responsible for shedding . thd blood of his brother Muslim, who had emigrated in. the cause of 
God [i. e., had left the French-occupied zone for 
the Rif. *],. 'Amar b. . Abmad al-Wanj ill,, ' who was pro- tected from the'law of blood feud Ima"q0m) because 
God, may He-be exalted, forbade the killing of a 
believer, 'a man who hds'made'a covenant without 
reason. And he''has-ordained that a killer should 
be killed as a discouragement to killingl' so that 
killing [a murderer] should-be 'a punishment that 
reduces the number of murders,. . -. "l - 
There are two theme's here; 'firstly, that God has forbidden 
murder and. therefore it must be punished-in-order to uphold. - 
the law, and secondly that the execution of a, murderer will 
discourage, others from committing thd'same crime. ' 'Murderers 
had been Iiable to be. shot, before,. of. course,. but, now it 
MAEF, ' Maroc 519, p. 45, statements of witnesses in the' 
case of'Abraad b. TA11,: and on reverse his condemnation to 
death for murdek, signatures'illeg'ible, ' 25 Shaban 1344/ 
10 Mar. 1926. ' This document is reproduced in the Appendix 
(No. 10). 
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no longer seen as a personal right to kill a murderer, for 
that duty had been taken over by the representatives of the 
state. in other words, a crime was no longer a crime 
against an individual but against the law of God, and its 
punishment was removed from theAndividual and taken over 
by the state. People had, of course, been punished by the 
community before the Rif Republic, but the penalties laid 
1 down were fines, -- collected by the*amghar, and which depended 
to a large extent on a consensus of opinion, rather than-, 
the death penalty., which could only be imposed by a state 
system which was above the normal politics of the tribe. 
This was explicitly stated in the judgement of Alýmad b. 
'All. which made it clear that I'thd pardon of the relatives 
of the dead man ... is not valid ... because the death 
penalty for [murder]. is one , of, 
the laws of God which may not 
,, 2 be set aside. Thus the authority of-thd state in this 
matter had the full support of the sharl'a. - The old forms 
of justice were specifically set aside. 
This. emphasis on. the authority of thd state, is 
expressed in the legislation issued by bin 'Abd al-Karlm! s 
administration. A decree signed by, the*_qalid mashawar 
(roughly Chancellor) in the Rif. I. Government, "Abd al-Karlm-, 
(bin ljaýddu) b., Ziyy&ý, in March '1926, laid down the fines 
to be paid. by members ofthe'4arkas (not the regular-army) 
who, were absent-without leave. ' -It ended: "This is an order 
emanating from the fortunate Makh2ýan. ý May God protect it. 
By order of 'Abd, al-Karim b. ' Ziyyari rsic]. "_3 
See above, ' pp. 123-124. 
2 MAEF, 'Maroc -519, p. 45, Condemnation to death'of-AtLmad, 
b. tAll,: -25 Sha"b&ri 1344/10 Mar. 1926. 3 Hart, 'Emili'o Blanco, II, pp. 34-1342., 
1, 
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Another decree, giving a particular f amily exemption from 
taxation, in October 1922,, * was simply signed by bin 'Abd 
al-Karim himself. 
' This is a great contrast with the 
qariUns issued before the Rif Republic, signed and counter- 
signed by numerous shaykhs and amgh7ars. 
2 
The sharl"ar of course, had always tended to 
increase the power of the Sultan, and bin ýAbd al-Karim was 
most concerned that the sharl *.. a should prevail in the Rif 
He therefore attempted to remove most of the characteristics 
of cui3tomary law. He forbade the collective oath by which 
an accused man could call on his allies and family to swear 
with him that he had. not committed the crime of which he was 
accused. Henceforth, only the accused-man was allowed to 
swear and that in the mosque 'on the -Qur. ari*. . 
As David Hart 
points out, this measure, like so many of those of bin 'Abd 
al-Karim, had both a religious and, a political effect. it, 
at once reinforced the authority of the. 8ha: rIO: a and further- 
more broke down family solidarity as, a political force. 
3 
The attack on blood feuds also diminished thd power of the-' 
liff system, which. could so easily have united factions 
against his-rule. : This was vital, because although-bin 'Abd 
al-Karim had used his marriage to a woman from the MurabitIP 
to win-the support-of that clan. of his own tribe,, the, new 
nation which he now ruled stretched far beyond-theold 
boundaries, of,, any*. liff system and took in the Ghumara, and, 
4 Sinhaja regions as well., 
- Not., all. the. penalties. of. the. sharl "a were imposed, 
Ibid., 
_p. ý342. 2 See above, p. 127. 
3 Hart, Aith-Waryaghar, p. -'382. 
4- ibid., ppý" 382-383. 
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however. There was no mutilation for thieves, for example 
--they were fined. A decree for the Gaznaya in 1925 laid 
down that the theft of vegetables, nuts, fruits or grain 
would be punished with a fine-of 6 pesetas'or a week in 
prison. 
1 However, the Qurlanic punishment was threatened 
in certain circumstances. 
2 
Prisons were undoubtedly the greatest legal innov- 
ation in the Rif Republic, and they-were used not only for 
ordinary criminal offences and for "crimes against the 
State" such as spying,,. but. also for social crimes such as 
refusal to repay debts, to keep oaths, and for general bad 
conduct such as scandal-mongering. (The effects of this 
policy will be examined in the neýxt'section. ) 
Beyond these crimes, bin *Abd al-Karlm, went even 
further into the realm of private*conduct, - making it-mandat- 
ory for everyone, even-thd women, to pray five times a day. 
Penalties were'fairly severe; men who did not pray were- 
sent'to the'barka on-the front for betweenýfifteen and 
3 twenty days,, and, women were, fined'a chicken., 
It will be seen, however, that the'term "law" 
went far beyond the limited ideas of the'. sharl"'a. The 
sharl'a was primarily concerned with'criminal and civil law 
--in short with questions of violence and the ownership of 
property, and there, were wholeareas of legal activity in-a 
modern state which it did not touch--; -the'ordered running of 
markets, f or'example, and -above 'all, in -the 'case of - the Rif, 
the problems presented by theparticular needs of the 
Ibid.;, P. 389. 
2 See below, 'p. 729. 
3 liartjý, Aith Waryaghar, P. 3890 
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security of the state from spying and political subversion, 
on the one hand, and the need, which was felt in particular 
by BU Lalýya and al-Shargl, 'to reform the general conduct of 
the people. It is therefore necessary to examine the work- 
ings of the Rif! 'legal system in some detail. 
Arrests for Political Reasons 
Throughout 1923 and 1924, people, were arrested 
by bin 'Abd al-Karlirf's representatives--qd'. ids, the army 
guards, qa(ýIs. --and as a result of his own instructions. 
As we have seen, bin 'Abd al-Karim, ever, since the beginning 
of the war, had arrested individuals for political reasons- 
because they were too favourabletowards the Spanish, or to 
ensure their loyalty. This continued after. his proclamation: 
Qalld Sala4 of the BanQ Walishak and his* kh'allf a, lAllal: b. 
al-U&j'j Qaddur were arrested for a-sh I ort time at the begin- 
ning of February 1923. This sort of political. intimidation 
continued. During the'efforts to. take control of the Ghumara 
in December 1923,, - thirty men were despatched from the'Rlfl 
base at Tandaman'to arrest a certain-SI Mulýammad-b. -Qaddur. 
Their quarry, however, escaped with his family to the 
mountains the night before the'arrival of. the soldiers, who, 
in place of arresting him, destroyed his house and took his 
goats--although he had managed. to take his cows with him 
2 to the mountains. 
ýFighting against the Marnisa produced another 
group of. arrests... At the beginning .. of January., 19 2 4,,, SI 
SHM, Melilla Leg., "23, Informaci6n, Febrero, Informaci6n del 
dia, " 8, Feb. 1923. 
2 SHM, Ceuta Leg. ý21,, Bajalato de'Ghumara,, Sl Muýammad b. 
al-Hashnu,, al-MimUni to 'All. b.,. Sulayman',, 5 Jumdda 1 1342/14 
Dec. ý1923. 
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Ma4ammad was reported to be in the al-Marnisa tribe, 
arresting everyone who went against his orders. 
1 
However, these political arrests were only part 
of the story. Many people were arrested for communication 
with the Spanish and spying, or on suspicion of such an 
offence. This, of course, is normal practice in any war. 
Bin 'Abd al-Karim. was kept informed of possible Spanish 
spies by his own internal network of informants. For instanceT 
on 11 February 1924, his brothdr#,. -S! MakicEýxmadr received the 
following letter: 
"Praise be to God-alone. God's mercy and-peace be 
upon our Lord MulýcEýmmad, his family, and companions. 
May God prolong the existence of our Lord, who has 
been made victorious-by God, our Lord M4ammad bin 
*Abd al-Karlm al-Khatt& 
, 
b! peace be*upon you and 
God's mercy and blessing. 
And to continue: 
My Lord. Let it be known to you that Vidda Barka 
al-Timmitt!. Uto lives in Ushshdri went out--and this 
is true--and went to'Aýmad bin'S1d1. Vaddu_and met 
him and-M#ammad bin. 'Umar Ashshan, may, God. curse 
him, and he told him everything that happens in. 
this area and told him of thd aeroplane, that our 
Lord has and described how it was white. ' He tells 
him about everything that goes on 
, 
around. here. ' In 
truth hd'is a spy. If anything happens to him it 
means that we are punished and not only him. This 
is what I have to tell our Lord. 
And peace. 
On 5 Rajab in the'year 1342. 
Qa 9 id Muýceýmmad 
, 
b. ýMlmQn al-Timmlttl. 'al-Sa'ldl,: may 
God give him success., '2, *- 
It will be seen that such information may partly have been 
the result of fear. of. collective punishment, . That at, 
least 
SHM Melilla Leg. 24, Informaciones, 'Resumen Generals, ' 
4 Jan. 1924. 
2 
MAEF, Maroc 519, p. 47, Mulýammad b. MimQn al-Tamaytl* 
al-Sa'Id! To- Mabammad b. `Abd. al-Kar1m, al-Khattab1,: 5 Rajab 
1342/11 Feb. 1924. The letter isýreproduced in the Appiandix'- 
(No.. 11).. The Rif-Is* succeeded in buying an aeroplane through 
the medium of Vaddu b. Vammu in Algeria. It was polited by 
a European but only made one flight before Spanish aeroplanes 
destroyed it. Godeds, op. 'cit.,, p. '102. 
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is the implication behind the final line which says that 
the writer fears that not only the informant would be 
punished. 
The penalties for spying could be very heavy. 
There are numerous accounts of the death penalty being meted 
out to spies and other traitors. One of David Hart's 
Gaznayl,: informants described the penalty imposed on a man 
found carrying messages to the French after hostilities with 
their zone broke out in 1925. He was bound hand and foot, 
weighted with a large stone and thrown into the sea, where 
he allegedly stayed for fifteen days before dying. A 
brother of. Vaddu b. Vammu al-Kalýal was discovered trying to 
free Spanish prisoners and was shot, 
2 
and six men from the 
Murabitl. ri clan of the BanU. Waryaghal, one possessed of baraka, 
were stoned to death'in thd'Sunday market of Tisar on the 
orders of bin 'Abd al-Karim. 
3 
other crimes also merited the death penalty. FaqIr 
Si Vaddu of the BanCI BQ. eAyyash had been-amizi in-Tafarsit in 
1921 and responsible, like Vaddu b. Va; mnu al-Kalýal in Dar 
DrIUsh, for forwarding the supplies the'Spanish had left 
there to the central Rif. Evidently hedid not send all the 
supplies, for when his home was searched in July 1923, some 
20 cases of ammunition were discovered. On bin eAbd al-Karirri's 
instructions, he was shot. 
4 
These executions for serious offences were complem- 
ented by terms of imprisonment for those who had committed 
Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p'. 388. 
ibid., p. 381, and al-BCI. "AyyAshI, 'op. cit., Vol., II', p. 150. 
3 Hart, Aith, Waryaghar, p. 381. 
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Informaci6n Julio, Vapid b. al-]Vajj,, 
13 July 1,923. 
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lesser offences or whose guilt was only-suspected. 
Imprisonment 
Prisons were, of course, an innovation in the 
Rif, but they quickly became a part of every-day life. 
Large numbers of people were imprisoned--mostly for fairly 
short periods--during the Rif Republic, and the largest 
prison camp of all--at Takhrusit, between Ajdlr* and what is 
now the town of al-Vusayma--was reserved, not for Spanish 
prisoners of war, but for Rifi. prisoners. In September 
1924, Spanish Military Intelligence estimated that bin 'Abd 
al-Karlid had. 800 "native" prisoners-in Ajd1r2--although many 
of these may have been Spanish native troops captured in 
the Jib&l: a. 
Fortunately, bin tAbd al-Kar! rA's officials kept 
registers of the names of prisoners, their crimes, and the 
time for which they had been in the prison--not, it must be 
stressed, of the length of time for which they had been 
sentenced. Some of these registers, covering 1923 and 1924, 
3 have been preserved. 
The first register that is available is for a 
prison at TawrIrt in the southern BanU. Naryaghdl, dated 20 
Rabl'. 11 1342/30 November 1923.4 Unfortunately this, the 
only register from Tawrlrt,,, is the least informative. How- 
ever, a number of interesting things do emerge The register 
would seem to have. been made In rather. a hurry--it Js. very 
1 Al-Ba: Ayy&shl,, * op. cit., vol. jj,, p. 144. 
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Informaci6n Septiembre, nota, 
8 Sept. 1924. 
3A typical register is. reproduced in the Appendix (No. 12). 
4 MAEF, 'Maroc 519, p. 145, List of prisoners at'Tawrlrt 
in the mabakma of Targist, 20 Rabl". II 1340/30 Nov. 1923. 
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scrappily written and disorganised in comparison with the 
registers from Ajd1r--and is really just a list of names. 
In all but a very few cases the offence for which the pris- 
oners were arrested is not established. Whoever made the 
list confined himself to asking the prisoners themselves, 
and not surprisingly they nearly all claimed that they had 
no idea why they were imprisoned and they had been wronged. 
The claim that pasha or I&mil or qdl. ld so-and-so "arrested 
me and wronged me" recurs many times - The exceptions to this 
are a group of 38 Sinhdjls'including a pasha, a qd'. id 100, 
2 qa?. ids 50, and 2 'qV ids 25,, arrested for the theft of 
military supplies, 
1a 
man from the BanaZarwal: who. "killed 
a man he found with his sister, ,2 and a pasha and his khallfa 
from the Fannassa who. explained their offence thus: 
nWhen the enemy of God, Ah. m. ad b. Malýammad, stayed in 
his [the pashals] house the'khaIlfa sent a note to, 
the pasha telling him that an enemy of God was 
staying in his house and when the'mujTahid1ri heard 
that ... the Qal: id MutLammad Azdad al-Rifl: 
arrested him [i. e., the pashd]. ', 3 
Finally, two men from the Matlwa al-Jabal explained that 
"our'larriil arrested us and he thought that we were 
opposed to him. 
',. 4 
In fact, the vast majority of the 132 
prisoners were arrested by either. thd mujahids or the 
'Tardils or by a pasha. This did not mean that holders of 
these positions were themselves immune from arrest, for the 
list includes among the prisoners 5 pashas,, 2 qA9. ids 100, r 
2 qal: ids. 50 and, 3 qA"ids 25. -It seems quite likely,, there" 
fore, that since this was the period of the expansion', into 
Ibid., note on prisoners nos. 1-38. 
2 Ibid., prisoner no. 133. 
3 Ibid., prisoners nos. 116 and 117. 
4 Ibid., prisoners nos. 58 and 59. 
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the SinhAja, most of those arrested were arrested for polit- 
ical offences. Certainly they were nearly all from the 
immediate area, as Table IX: 4 shows. 
It will be seen that apart from the Sinhajis' 
already mentionedi the other large group came from the 
MarnIs'a, the result of the struggle against 'Amat b. Vamidu, 
for they are nearly all listed as being from the jurisdiction 
of 'Abd al-Sald! al-Yidr! 'who was bin 'Abd al-Karlmlsý qalld 
in the area. 
1 Furthermore, most of them appear to have 
been very recent arrests--the length served by the Marnisis 
and SinhajIs: is not given--but the rest, the majority, had 
been imprisoned for less than one month (see Table IX: 5). 
The Ajdliff Prison 
, The prisoners of the AjdIr. prison are considerably 
better documented. There exist five registers dated 17 
Jumada 11342/26 December 1923,2 17 Jumada 11 1342/25 Janu- 
ary 1924,3 1 Rajab 1342/17 February 1924,4 27 Rama4ar! 1342/ 
2 May 1924,5 and 30 Ramaýan 1342/5 May 1924.6 
During the period 26 December 1923 to 5 May 1924, 
that is, less than five monthsl. a total of at least 281 
individuals passed through the AdjIr prison. Certainly a 
number of these were, once again, people captured during the 
fighting with 'Am&r b. Vamidu-: -which explains. the high figures 
Ibid., prisoners nos. 66-70,80,90-105. 
2 MAEF, Maroc 519; *pp. 143 144, List of prisoners in the 
capital of Ajdir, 17 Jumdda 1 1342/26 Dec. 1923. 
3 Ibid., p.,, 142., Unfortunately, this document was not well 
photographed on microfilm, and is partially illegible. It 
has therefore been excluded from all numerical tables.. 
4 Ibid., pp. 134,139. 
5 Ibid., p. 146. 
6 Ibid., p. 147. 
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for the MarnIs*a, and those of the Banra Walld and BanQ WanjIl, 
in February 1924 (see Table IX: 6). 
What is interesting about these figures is the 
relatively low number of people from the BanQ Waryaghal in 
comparison with those from other tribes, particularly the 
BanQ TQzIrij when it is remembered that the prison of AjdIr' 
was situated within the territory of the BanQ Waryaghal. 
For, although 31 prisoners seems high, the reason that this 
is so is that the BanQ Waryaghal prisoners tended to stay in 
prison for only a short time. This is in fact true of nearly 
all the prisoners- , there are only 14 out of the 241 prison- 
ers whose names occur in the registers right through from 
December to May, and not one of them is from the Banil. 
Waryaghal (see Table IX: 7) 
A possible reason for this is indicated'by the 
offences for which people were imprisoned. Of the 14 long- 
serving prisoners in Ajdlr. in May 1924, no less than 7 were 
imprisoned because they were suspected of spying, 2 were 
former Spanish soldiers, and 2 were suspected of murder. 
(See Table IX: 8ý) Those found guilty were often executed. 
It is hardly surprising that suspected spying was 
most frequent among the tribes innediately bordering on the 
Spanish zones--in the BanU. Salid, Banri Walishak, and the 
exiled Qal"ayls* in the east and the Ghum2iran tribesýand the 
BanU Sa'Id al-jabal in'the west. The high incidence of 
violence--fighting and murder--in the BanQ Waryagha'l and 
Band. Tilziri is also scarcely surprising, particularly in the 
case of the former tribe, with its reputation for feudi. ng. 
The most frequent crimes, according to the prison 
records, were ones of threatening the state's security, or 
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of violence (see Table IX: 9) but much the most interesting 
developments are the cases of social and "religious" crimes. 
Probably for the first time in the Rif, people were expected 
to behave in a responsible way with regard to the community 
and in accordance with the sharl"a, even in their personal 
affairs. The main proponent of this policy would appear to 
have been the Minister of Justice, the FaqIh al-Shargl'and 
BU Laýya of the BanU TQzlri. on a number of occasions, 
al-Shargl'is reported to have sent people to prison "for 
reasons of the beloved sh'ar"11--such was the case of two men 
from the BanQ Walishak in December 19231l and a man from the 
Timsam2iri was sent by BQ Labya for the same reason at the 
same time. 
2 
Unfortunately in. these cases the actual'offence 
is not stated. However, in. February 1924 the offences of 
other miscreants are spelled out more clearly. Muýammad b. 
Sha'lb b. 'Umar b. 'Umar. of the Banfi. Waryaghal had spent 
nearly a month in prison, having been sent there by al-ShargI ' 
"because of a woman, the daughter of b. al-Tahir AztUtj 
whom he promised to marry, without it being valid in the 
sharl. " 
3 Q&(ýI'al-Shargl. *sent another Waryaghl! to prison 
because he had failed to pay a debt., By February this man 
had spent 3 months and 8 days in prison. 
4 
As well as offences which directly contravened 
the sharl"a, the judicial officers also intervened in matters 
of personal conduct. The records for January 1924 record 
the imprisonment of''"Allfish al-Mashadi, arrested on the' 
1 Ibid., 'pp. 143-144, prisoners nos. 52 and 53. 
2 Ibid., 'prisoner' no. 14. 
3 Ibid., pp. 138-139, prisoner no. 8. 
4 Ibid., prisoner no. 10. 
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authorization of the Paqlh b. "All. fi. e., BQ Lalýya] because 
of the length of his tongue and the frequency with which he 
says ugly things*"' 
They also interfered in people's domestic affairs. 
A man from the BanQ SaIld (near Melilla) was sent to prison 
by Bri La4ya because "he hit his wif e and knocked a tooth 
out of her face.. 
2 Punishment by authority for wife beating 
was doubtless a new experience for the Rlfls'. However, 
although the authorities do seem to have tried to some 
extent to help to protect women, they were also careful to 
protect the "honour" of their husbands, presumably partly to 
prevent fighting and feuding. In December 1923 a man from 
the BanQ MazdQ! 'was imprisoned because "Sidi. al-Jjassan b. 
al-BU Naqi. rl 'suspected. him of doing something with his wife, 
and certainly it was possible to claim, as the BanQ ZarwUl . 
imprisoned at TawrIrt had done, that he had killed a man he 
had found with his wife, as an excuse for his crime. 
The government was not averse to imprisoning 
women either. In Tawr1rt, 6 women, with 10 children, were 
imprisoned, although they were not accorded the dignity of 
being numbered in the register.. In May 1924 two women were 
imprisoned, one on suspicion of spying, the other on sus- 
picion "of killing her husband" and her female companion by 
night. 
4 
Violence was, of. course, a major social problem 
in the new state. Thus, on 2 May 1924, a man was imprisoned 
Ibid., p. 142 (prisoners not numbered). 
2 Ibid., pp. 138-139, prisoner no. 77. 
3 Ibid., pp. 143-144, prisoner no. 5'5. 
4 Ibid., P. 1 46, prisoners nos., 129,130. 
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for killing a man in the market. 
1 
Another, from the BanQ 
4mad, for killing a man*in self-defence. 
2A 
shaykh from 
the al-Matd. lsa was arrested and "deblared that he killed a 
woman and the bullet came out of her and hit a man, and he 
died. ,3 An 'Am&rti had killed a man who was a guest in his 
house one night, 
4 
and so on. In February 1923, a man from 
the Banfi Waryaghal was arrested on the word of a woman 
who said that she had let him into her house to kill her 
4 husband and his second wife. 
There was, of course, the ever present possibility 
that these killings might develop into feuding, as in the 
case of three men from the al-Matd. lsa tribe who had spent 
some four months in prisonby-26 December 1923 "'for awakening 
the fire of disorder when the son of 4amd Aqudad was 
,, 6 killed. For this reason, some of the murders for which 
people were detained went back some time. Sometime*towards 
the beginning of November, for, on 26 December he had been 
detained for nearly two months, one Ijaddu, b. Idrls*of the 
Banii. Trazlff was arrested "on suspicion of killing a man ... 
7 
at night two years ago, although it appears from later 
registers that this alleged offence was committed at the' 
time of Anwal'. 
8 
The effect of imprisoning a murder suspect, 
as well as serving as a warning to others, and punishing him 
for his presumed crime,. was of course-to, make the'continuanc. e 
Ibid., prisoner no. 139. 
2 Ibid., prisoner'no. 137. 
3 Ibid., prisoner no. 141. 
4 Ibid., prisoner no. '143. 
5 Ibid., pp. 138-139, prisoner no. 12. 
6 Ibid., pp. 143-144, prisoners nos. 34,35,36. 
7 Ibid., prisoner no. 23. 
8 Ibide, p. 146, prisoner no. 26. 
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of a blood-feud quite impossible. 
However, imprisonment was not the only penalty 
that was imposed. Fines were another possibility, and 
people were released in exchange for fines. For instancer 
in May 1924, a Timsam7ani'suspected of murder was released 
on payment of 200 riyals, 
1 
and another Timsamdnl who had 
gone to Melilla by night without permission was also released 
after payment of a fine. 
2 Similarly, people were imprisoned 
for not paying fines. Again, in May 1924, a TQzgnl,,: YakhlIf 
b. V4mmu al-'Aqqlwl, *and his friend Muýb- Muband Amziyyan', 
were fined 4,000 riyals because "they attended the killing 
of a man and a woman for adultery without the permission of 
the government. " 
3 This is an affair which itself throws 
some light on relations between the population and the govern- 
ment, for assuming that it was the killing for adultery- 
that was without the permission of the government (rather 
than attendance at the execution), it shows'firstly that the 
government's aim was to limit such practices, and secondly 
that, on this occasion at least, it failed to do so. 
The Market Inspector's Queries 
There were, of course,, lesser problems of order 
than those which ended in imprisonment. One of, the objec- 
tives of the newýordered society that bin 'Abd al-Karim was 
trying to bring about'was to avoid arguments and disagree-.! 
ments getting out of hand. ' One of the areas in which he' 
evidently hoped to do this was in the markets,, and he' 
................. 
Ibid.,, prisoner no. 55. 
2 Ibid., prisoner no. 57. 
3 Ibid., prisoner nl. 30. 
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Table IX: 4 
I 
origins of prisoners in Tawrlrt on 30 November 1923 
Sinhaja (unspecified tribes 38 
Fannassa 2 
BanQ Bashir 2 
BanQ Silmdn 9 
BanU ZarwK 4 
Marnisa 25 
Mat1wa 3 




Source: MAEF, Maroc 519, pp. 143,144, List of 
prisoners in the capital of AjdIr, 17 Jumdda I 
1342/26 Dec. 1923. 
Table IX: 5 
Lengthsof prison terms served by, pri'soners 
. in Tawritt 'on' '30' November '1923 

















25 were from MarnIsa 
38 were from Sinhaja and 
16ýwere women and children 
Source: MAEF, Maroc 519, pp. 143,144, List of . 
prison in the capital of AjdIr,, 17-Jumlida I 
1342/26 Dec. 1923 
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'Table IX: 6 
Individuals arrested from each tribe in Ajdlr 
Prison 26 December 1923-5 May 1924 
Banil. Waryaghal 31 
Timsaman 7 
BanQ TQzIri 47 
Tafarsit 8 
Banil-: 'Amart 3 
MatIWa al-Ba4ar 7 
BanU SaIld al-RIE (i. e., near 
Melilla) 11 
BanU Walishak 7 
BanQ Yitti; ft 1 
al-Matdlsa 13 
Buqquya 11 




Banil AJ; m. ad 2 
Banil Bil SlAma 2 
Bana. Wanjil 4 
Ran! WaITd 5 
BanU SaIld al-Jabal (i. e., near 
I Tetuan) 9 
Ghumara 25 
BanU MazdQL* 1 





Source: MAEF, Maroc 519, -pp. 
138-139,143-144,146-147. 
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Numbers of prisoners held for entire period 
26 December 1923 to 5 May 1924 expressed as percentages 
All tribes 14 out of 281 prisoners 59 
Banra TQzlri 2 47 it 4 
Ghumara 6 25 to 24 
Matlwa al-Babakr 1 13 7 
Tafarsit 1 9 12.5 
B. SaIld al-RIE 2 11 18 
Timsamari 2 7 28 
Source: MAEF,, Maroc 519, pp. 138-139,143-144,146-147. 
Table IX: 8 
Table IX: 7 
List of prisoners, and crimes, held for entire 
period 26 December 1923 to May 1*924 'and 
total length of imprisonment to. 5 May 1924 
Banfi Tilziri 
)Jaddu b. Idris al-Yabyl 
al-Faqlr Salam b. 
al-V4ssan al-Miýarl* 
Matlwa al-Rlf 
AI-Muf a(ýýIc-ýl b. MutL 
suspicion of murder 
during AnwAl victory 
arrested by muj&hids 
- suspicion communic- 





al-Faqlr Vamrn&dl b, 
ýýdlq 
- "the spy" 12 m. 3 d. 
BanQ SaIld 
Al-Tahir b. Vaýddu 
Vammu b. Daddarft 
- unclear 





]Vamm&dl b. Shd'lb 
Shaykh Tuh&ml Amghar' 
BanQ Bil *Zra * 
Mubammad b. 'Abd 
al-Fa(A-1 
AbMad b. Sidl Mulýanmad f, . 
al-Vassan b. al-'Arbi, 
Banfl Zivv&t 
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suspicion of spying 
suspicion of murder 
- suspicion of com- 
munication with 
Spain 
- says he's innocent 
- suspicion of com- 
munication with 
Spain 
al-Mufaý4al b. ZarnUri - going to enemy zone 
Unidentified tribe in Ghum&ra 
Mubammad b. Mubammad - ex-Spanish q&l. id 
b. al-'Ayydshl 
Banil Mansrliff - 
Sidial-Ijassan b. - suspicion of commun- 








. 18 d. 
Prisoners not held in Ajdlr'in December 1924, but in custody 
for more than 6 months in May 1924 
Qal*aya 
Shallb b. Muti: 
Mub: "Abd al-Q7adir 
MimCin b. Mubaýmmad 
b. - Tayyib 
- arrested on coast at 
Sid! Misa'Ud 
- arrested'on coast at 
Sid! Misa'Qd 
- arrested by maballa 
6 m. 29 d. 
29d. 
3 d. 




Table IX: 9 
Numbers of individuals imprisoned for named crimes on 
26 December 19231 17 February 1924,2 May 1924 
and 5 May 1924 
26 Dec. 17 Feb. 2 May 5 May 
Crime 1923 '1924 1924 1924 
Military offences 
1. Refused service under 3 3 4 2 
. aLLd/absent from ýarka 
2. Captured in battle 1 5 6 4 
3. Arrested by army 1 1 1 1 
Civil and religious offences 
4. Arrested by q&9: ids etc. 3 3 - - 
5. bann7ash (. e., general. 3 10 6 
bad conduct) 
Criminal offences 
6. Murder/suspicion of .5 10 16 17 
7. Fighting/assault 8 5 - - 
Wartime offences 
8. Suspicion of spying 11 14 23 20 
9. Visiting Spanish zone 4 5 6 - 
10. Living in Spanizh zone/ 5 9 10 10 
former Spanish employee 
11. Suspected sabotage - 2 2 2 
12. Hostage 2 2 2 
13. Captured members of - 18 46 46 
'Amar'b. Vamiduls 
party 
14. Unclear 30 11 4 3 
15. Other 22 14 16 16 
TOTAL 96 102 146 129 
Source: MAEF, 'Maroc 519, pp. 138-139,143-144,146-447. 
The term Iýannush is derived from the term for a 
snake charmer and was used in the'qanUns of the 
period before the Rif war to mean "evil. doers",, 
Hart, Emilio Blanco II, p. 289. 
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appointed mulýtasibs, market inspectors,. to carry out this 
function. This was another relatively new idea in the Rif 
and itself posed problems for the officials concerned, for 
they were unsure of the extent of their duties. A scribbled 
note, preserved in the archives of the French Foreign 
Ministry, gives some indication of this. It it neither 
dated nor does it contain any hint as to the person to whom 
it was sent, but the significance is clear enough: 
"Sir, the mulýt-asib Sid! . 'Amar al-JalmUql. Asks 
for 
a clarification of his duties. 
They are: does. he have jurisdiction in the matter 
of the collection of long-standing debts that are 
contracted in [his] market, or not, after the com- 
plainant has left the collection to him? 
What is [his]. jurisdiction in the case of two antag- 
onists who challenge each other over a contentious 
matter in the market, if one of them refuses to meet 
him and then the complainant. comes back to me? Do 
I have a free hand or should I send my helpers behind 
his back and refer it to thd council of the' thar"21 
I have already referred the matter to the* "'Ar6i'ls 
and they refuse to take it under their jurlsdiction. 
Also in the case of a man. buying and selling animals 
and cattle who comes with the permission of his"amIl 
to buy and sell, is he free to do as hd wished iF- 
that matter, because of the permission of"B-til, or 
is he forbidden it all? "l 
Such questions imply a very detailed control of markets at 
least, and a strong centralisation of power. Such control 
is also to be seen in a later documentl -dating from June 
or July 1925 and issued in the Gaznayya tribe'on the. instruc- 
tions of b. 'Abd al-Karim's pasha, setting a fine of 6*pts 
for anyone stealing nuts or grain or fruit, or anyone who 
allowed his cattle to graze upon the leaves- of trees belong--ý- 
ing to others 
2 But wh ereas agreements on theft and, illegal 
grazing existed before the Rif Republic, such'institutions 
Ibid., -p. 183, Note from SIdI. "Am&r' al-JalmQ*Iý,: no date, 
no receipient named. 
2 Quoted in Hart, Aith Waryaghar, pp. 389-39'0. 
589 
as mulýtasibs were entirely new. 
The Changing Life-Style of the Rif 
Din ýAbd al-Karim's reforms went far beyond legal 
penalties for wrongdoing. He was attempting, after all, to 
build a new unified state in the Rif, and everything that 
emphasised differences amongst his subjects he tried to 
suppress. Some of these differences might, at first sight, 
seem relatively minor. For example, before the Rif Republic 
men from each tribehad worn distinctive scalplocks, thus 
setting them apart from neighbouring tribes. 
' Bin 'Abd 
al-KarIM ordered that all men cut off their scalplocks, and 
although some re-grew them after the war, the practice has 
now died out completely. 
2 in a further'effort to abolish 
feuding, he ordered that all the watch-towers previously 
attached to Rif! houses, and useful for sniping at enemies, 
should be destroyed. 
3 
other legal reforms were purely social: bin 'Abd 
al-KarIM abolished the smoking of hashish, '. forbade men to go 
barefoot, 4 and limited the amount of money which was paid to 
the parents of a bride-before a. wedding to. a maximum of 500 




After th(ý battle of Anwal, bin 'Abd al-Karim 
Coon, Tribeý5 of the*Rif, pp. 127-128. 
2 ibid., p. 128, and Hart, 'Aith Waryaghar, p. 390. 
3 ibid., p. 38. 
4 ibid., p. 390. 
Coon, Tribes of the Rif, p. 133. 
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had called a meeting in his 
need to fight the Spanish. 
believe that he had changed 
flight of the Spanish, were 
possibility of final victor., 
a country with a flag and a 
house where. he had spoken of the 
Some found it difficult to 
sides, 6thers, despite the 
still pessimistic about the 
y, and asked "How can you fight 
government? "' 
Bin 'Abd al-Karlm's answer was to create his own 
government, with its own flag. The form of the flag, incid- 
entally, is much disputed. However, the example preserved 
in the Army Museum in Madrid shows a red background in the 
centre of which is a white diamond with a green six-pointed 
star and crescent. SkIraj shows a slightly different 
arrangement (a white square and a battle flag with a smaller 
crescent and star and the words "Lli Jd*@ý. il7a Allah Muýammad 
R4stil AllZh" ("There is no god but God and Mulýammad is the 
messenger of God") in gold (see Photograph IX: 10). 
2 About 
t: he existence of his government th(ýre can be no doubt, 
however. 
The bay'a of February 1923 had laid the obli-gation -, 
of the Caliphate upon bin 'Abd al-Karim--these obligations 
were religious--the imposition of the sharl'a, and 
political--the winning of the war. against the Spanish. To 
fulfil them, bin 'Abd al-Karim carried out a thorough reorg- 
anisation of the Rif. This reorganisation was vital if he 
was to win the war against the Spanish, and thus the intro- 
duction of the sharl"a helped in the military struggle by 
ending blood feuds, bringing about unity, and strengthening 
the power of the makhzan. At the same time the battie 
2 
Personal information, Idris al-Khattabl,,. * Sept. 1977. 
Skiraj, op. cit., p. 145. 
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Photograph IX: 10 
The flags of the Rif! state: top, the flag 
flown at the maýakmas, - bottom, the battle 
flag of the ihujahidIn,. 
Source: Drawing based on the flags drawn by 
Sklraj '(op. 'cit., p. 145) 
On following page: photograph of the only 
existing Rlfl'flag. 






against the Spanish had to be won if the sharll. a was to be 
totally effected. The one depended upon the other. 
So bin 'Abd al-Karim formed a makhzan. It was in 
the traditional pattern of a local qVid building up a 
miniature state in the sense that it was largely--though by 
no means entirely--made up of members of his own family and 
tribe, but was modern in the sense that in one vital area 
it looked beyond its leader's immediate family, for the 
people most immediately concerned with the imposition of the 
sharila--BU. Laýya, al-Shargl, * and others--were not Waryaghlis' 
at all. 
It was also modern in another way--the great power 
of the centre. For a state like the'Rif, with relatively 
few educated people, and during a war, the amount of bureau- 
cracy is extraordinary. Careful records were kept of the 
payment of troops, of those incarcerated in the prisons, of 
the issue of arms. Efforts were made to change the physical 
aspects of the Rif--roads and telephone lines wer'e-built, 
bringing the periphery closer to the centre. 
The foundation of this new state meant that bin 
'Abd al-Karlr6ls own position went far, beyond that of a 
military leader of an alliance of tribes against an outside 
invader, or that of a tribal leader who was trying to set 
up a new dynasty. The bay'a put him firmly in the r6le* of 
a Caliph, as the spiritual and. political leader of the 
faithful in the RIF. The obligations traditionally placed 
on a Moroccan Sultan included the defence of the religion 
and the state. These obligati ons were also placed on bin 
'Abd al-Karim. He also formed a government on the model of 
the traditional Moroccan makhzan, with its own armyl its own 
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flag, its own administration, and so on. At first sight, 
then, it looks as though this. was an attempt to create a 
new Sultanate in the Rif'. 
However, bin 'Abd al-Karlrft, both at the time and 
later,, claimed that he did not wish to impinge on the author- 
ity of the Sultan of Morocco, that he was not a king, but 
the united voice of his people. To confuse matters further, 
the new state was known by two names: al-Dawla al-JumhUrlya 
al-Riflya (literally "The Rifian Republican State"), and 
al-jabha al-Riflya ("The Rifian Front"). The first of these 
titles appeared on official notepaper, 
l 
and the second was 
its title in retrospect, as given by later informants. 
2 
These two expressions need some explanation. 
The term jabha implies that the Rif was only one 
front in the campaign for the liberation of all Morocco, a 
factor that would become an issue of great importance in 
1925. JumhUrlya, on the other hand, is a word coined from 
the Arabic word JumhUf (crowd, mass) in the late eighteenth 
century to describe a new concept of government, originating 
in Europe. Its import was not so much an emphasis on 
republicanii, m --which is what the word now means in Arabic 
--but a concern with*the'constitutional relationships between 
the monarch and the people. Of course, ' according to-sunnI 
jurists, the sharil. a implied that theoretically thd*Islamic 
state should be headed by a non-hereditary elected sovereignt 
so some nineteenth and twentieth-ýcentury, writers felt able' 
1 Paper with this heading was found by Spanish troops at 
the end of May 1926 when they occupied-bin 'Abd al-Karini's 
last residence at the 'zay, 
'jyý 
of Sidi.. 'Abdullah bin YQsif in 
the Banii. al-Waryaghal, Sgnchez-P6rez, '*op*. cit., p. 126. '' 
2 Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p.. 377. 
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to describe the doctrine of the Caliphate as "republican" 
as a result, in the sense of connoting popular and repres- 
entative government rather than what is normally understood 
as "republican" in Europe. In fact, the term'jumhrirlya 
came into practical use only during the First World War, to 
describe the short-lived "Republic" of Azerbaijan in May 
1918, and the equally transitory Republic of Tripolitania in 
November 1910 The comparison with Tripolitania is close, 
at first sight, for in that part of Africa, theoretically 
under the control of the Italians, who had failed to impose 
any form of permanent order, an independent proto-stater 
based on Misurata, had been set up in 1918 under Turko- 
German influence to resist the Italians. It was styled the 
JumhUrlya al-Trablils. lya and was ruled by a "Committee of 
Reform" headed by Rama4ari al-Shtaiwi. This government was 
not, however, nearly so powerful as bin eAbd al-Karim's, and 
found it hard to maintain order, though it received consid- 
erable support from the European left. 
2 
It must be said that the term jumhUrlya cannot in* 
the case of the Rif at least, be translated simply by the 
English word "republic". There are two. very good reasons 
for avoiding this translation. In the first place it is 
misleading because although'thd word ripublik was certainly 
known in the Rif and used in the*colloquial dialect, it had 
a meaning quite different from thdEuropean word from which' 
iý was derived- As bin 'Abd al-Karim explained to Vincent 
Sheean, for the Rifis'the term ripublik meant "small local 
Encyclopedia of Islam, new ed. Vol. II, pp. 594-59'5, 
article by B. Lewis "DjumhUriyyal". 
2 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (Oxford, 
1973), P. 147. 
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groups, even smaller than tribes We have several 
'republics' in every grouping of Riffi infantry. " in the 
second place, the term "republic" in European usage implies 
a state which is governed either by elected representatives 
or by a head of state who was not king. As we have seen, 
neither of these descriptions fits the Rif very well. 
Although bin 'Abd al-Karim did consult his supporters over 
some matters# such consultation did not diminish his own 
personal power. Furthermore, by accepting the title of 
amir al-mu'miniri, and the responsibilities of a "local 
caliphate" he was going far beyond the usually accepted 
authority of a secular "president". 
To explain jumhUr., Iya, it is necessary first of all 
to look at its meaning in Arabic. Its origins in the 
word meaning "mass" or "crowd" are a clue. Bin 'Abd al-Karim 
in accepting his bayla, claimed to represent the collective 
voice of his people, and their desire to come together to 
defeat the Spanish, although as far as he was. concerned, 
the collective voice Is authority beyond that expressing desire 
was very limited. Thus'. jumhUrlya represented a statement,, 
at least in theory', of the popular basis of the Rlfl. * 
movement and expressed a wider and more permanent. movement 
than a mere tribal alliance. Probably even more'important, 
the choice of the word jumhUrlya was influenced by the fact 
that it had a certain contemporary currency in the'Islamic 
world after the end of the First World War. It vas, 'in 
fact, in vogue, and its use bore public witness to the modern 
aspect'of the new Rif! government. Finally, the term was a 
statement that anew political entity had come into existence 
1 Sheean, Adventures, p. 179. See also Hart in Colloque, 
pp. 33-45, who makes the same point. 
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in the Rif--and not in Morocco--thereby. emphasising not only 
its modernity but also its independence. To sum up, the 
word jumhUrlya, although it is very difficult to determine 
its exact meaning either to the citizens of the new state, 
or to its rulers, was an indication that the system of 
government, law and society in the Rif had changed. Out of 
an alliance behind the figure of M4ammad bin 'Abd al-KarIM, 
which had grown up among a few tribes before the war, a new 
state had emerged, dependent on bin 'Abd al-Kar! M, and 
strictly under his control. a control which gave him almost 
absolute power over the administration which he and his sup- 
porters set up, over the legal system which had replaced the 
old system of fines, and over the army which owed its 
allegiance to bin 'Abd al- Karim. It was to this power 
that Robert Montagne, in his remarks on the social and 
political transformation of the Rif, pointed:. 
"The authority of the new Sultan [siC]. is harshly 
used ... and it is held in the unlimited respect 
which force commands in this country. We are far 
now from the vague submission of old to thd Sultan 
in Fez. "l 
Of course, as Montagne himself pointed out in other works,. 
a powerful figure had risen before among Berber tribes in 
Moroccan history, and started a new. dynasty- 
2 But this new 
state was not like that. 
What distinguished this state from the Berber 
proto-states of the past was firstly the new modern organis- 
ation, the army and government, formed. along European and 
Islamic reformist lines respectively, and secondly its 
1 R. Montagne, "'Quelques aspects de la transformation" 
politique du Rif 1898-1925" (Military Intelligence report 
in SHAT, Maroc, Fez, 156, Renseignement sur les chefs 
indigbnes, p. 14). - 
2 Montagne, Berbers, passim. 
0 
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effects on the ordinary citizen, which were quite unlike 
anything that had been seen before. In the space of three 
years every major part of Rlfl*life had been revolutionised. 
Feuding had effectively been abolished. Powerful shaykhs 
were held in check now, not by the strength or otherwise of 
their colleagues in the tribe, but by the centralised force 
of their new governor. A glance at the prison register is 
sufficient to show how many shaykhs did not realise this 
and were imprisoned, or worse, for their crimes. 
Crime itself had been revolutionised. Now, an 
offence was no longer an offence against an individual or 
his family, or against the community in which a man might 
live, but agýinst the wider community of the state. This 
change of emphasis also meant that the range of crimes was 
increased from concern with murder or theft to treachery. 
against the new state, and because this was an attempt at 
an Islamic state, to offences against the *sharl". a. For the 
first time, outside authority could, and did, intervene in 
what had hitherto been private or at most family or clan 
matters: the payment of debts, marital peace, were'enforced 
not by a man's neighbours but by the state. 
The social reforms of the new state went beyond 
simple criminal acts--they set new standards of behaviour, 
attendance at prayers, for example, even the wearing of 
shoes, were enjoined on the RIEi's. The social differences 
which could so easily divide Rlfl'society--such*as scalplocks 
--were removed. 
In return for these reforms--or sacrifices--the 
Rifis'received relative peace at home. It doubtless benefited 
them greatly in a material sense. In a Political sense it 
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was even more vital, for peace and order at home meant that 
the war against the Spanish and against 'Amar b. Vamldu 
could more easily be pursued. 
In short, as Montagne wrote in 1925: 
"The political and military events in the Rif, which 
for the past five years have so often surprised Spain, 
France and all Europe, have caused in this small cor- 
ner of the Sherifian Empire, a profound change in 
social and political attitudes, to the point at which 
the face of the country is no longer recognisable, 
and quite different from that in our own zone. "l 
Montagne, TQuelques aspects 
Chapter X 
THE RYPY STATE ON THE OFFENSIVE 
FEBRUARY 1923 TO SEPTEMBER 1923 
"In the present. -circumstances it 
[i. e., Spanish 
success in Morocco]. is impossible. Swarming as 
it (the Tetuan area] does with her lowest-class 
Andalusians is enough to convince me of that. 
Two things stand out clearly. Firstly not ten 
generations will. make the Spaniards acceptable 
to the Moors, and not in ten generations, such 
as it is at present, (will SPain]. convey any 
civilisation to Morocco. " 
British Vice-Consul Were, in Tetuan, commenting 
on the future of the Spanish in Morocco, August 1923. 
"It now appears that your friends are of no interest 
to you and Idrls. al-Rifi. treats themlike Jews. " 
Letter from shaykhs of the BanQ. TUzln. to Spanish 
High Conuni ssioner, March 1923.2 
"What has happened that you betray the promise that 
you made me that we should work together? You 
knew of the struggle, the difficulties, the 
danger that I am in because I work with you, and 
yet you have forgotten me and compromised me among 
the tribes and given me no support ... You have made me lose my goods, my men and my tribe. ý" 
Pro-Spanish qA'id complaining of lack of support, 
September 1923.3 
FO 371/9470/7048/44, Codrington to Curzonj Tangier, 
30 Aug.. 1923, enclosing report by Were. 
2 SIM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 1, Beni Tuzin, All 
the shaykhs of the BanQTazIn without exception to theýHigh 
commissioner, 14 Rajab 1341/2 Mar. 1923. 
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, 'Cartas Arabes, tAmar b. AIýMad 
al-Marnisi to, Sldi. *al7Wdfi al-Baqqdll,: Spanish Pasha-of 
Shawin, 12-. ýaýfar 1342/24 Sept. 1923. 
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The remarks quoted above all refer to rapidly 
declining political prestige of the Spanish authorities 
after the proclamation of bin 'Abd al-Karim in January 
1923. This declining prestige was mirrored by a rapid 
increase in the authority of bin 'Abd al-Karlid. There were 
a number of reasons for this, not all of them the result of 
Spanish insufficiences, for the political and military power 
of the new RifIgovernment increased in its own right. On 
the Spanish side there were a number of factors that decreased 
Spanish influence. In the first place, the Spanishwere 
unable to help their supporters behind the'Rif! *lines,, in 
the second place, the. contacts which thd Spanish*Maintained 
with those supporters were maintained by their PashA in 
Tafarsit--who became `Aiftil. of. the Rif, in accordance with' 
the Spanish policy of organising their protectorate through 
Moroccan representatives. The new '&mil was Idris, 'al-Riflp. 
who had already cased considerable disquiet in. 1922. ' During 
1923 his treatment of Spanish supporters resulted inyet more 
disillusion with Spanish policies. In addltion,. thd'military 
operations of the Spanish army were hampered by-a weak govern- 
ment in Madrid, which was eventually replaced in a coup 
d'6tat in September 1923.1 11 
On the Rlfl. side,, bin 'Abd al-Karim's mounting 
authority was the result of his ability to imposehis will 
through the use of force. In the period following his 
proclamation, -he succeeded in defeating 'Amar b. Vamidu, 
extending his control into the GhumAta and crushing an 
attempted rovolt there. This control was not a mild affair 
and involved the use of harsh tactics, of repression, and 
the fact that he was able to overcome the resulting resistance 
showed the strength of the new state. 
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The Failure of the Spanish Civil, Protectorate - 
In February 1923 a new civilian High Commissioner 
was appointed in Tetuan. This was Francisco Silvela, 
appointed to replace the Marqu6s de Villanueva, -who had 
never taken office. 
1 He took up his post on 14 February 
1923 and was at once faced with difficulties with the army, 
for only a week later, on 21 February, the Comandante General 
in Melilla, General Losada, resigned after expressing dissat- 
isfaction over the lack of an offensive policy in Morocco 
and over the attacks made on the army in the Spanish press. 
He was replaced by General Vives. 
2 This distrust between 
the army and the government was to be a recurrent problem 
throughout 1923 and 1924. 
There were even more immediate problems in the 
eastern zone, especially with Idris al-Rlfi,,. the*man expected 
to become the one who carried out the policy of allowing 
. the "natives" to govern themselves. He had, never been 
3 popular as Pasha of Tafarsit, but things got steadily worse. 
By, the last week in February 1924, he had succeeded in alien- 
ating most of the important leaders in the tribes bordering 
on the Spanish7-occupied zone in the east. The BanU. TQz. Iri 
were particularly incensed. A meeting was, held of the 
Trizan! 
. 'Clans of Igharbilri,, Banfl . 
"Aqqi,: BanQ Bil-'Aiz,, and 
part of the'BanU. Tsafth, and the important zawiya of 
Bujdayn, which agreed not only to break off, relations with 
Idrls' al-RlfI but to join the guard round Tlz'zl "'Azzd,, * 
.... . ...... ......... 1. 
I See above,, pp. 491-492. 
2 The Times, 15 Feb. 1923, P. * ý, report dated Madrid, '14 
Feb. 1923 and ibid., 22 Feb. 1923, p. 9,, dated. Madrid,. 21 
Feb. 1923.. 
3 See above, pp. 4821484. 
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attack convoys to that position, fine anyone going to markets 
in the Spanish-occupied zone, and to attack the Spanish if 
they advanced. Those concerned were not, however, supporters 
of bin "Abd al-Karim--the Bujdayn family in particular was 
quite definitely opposed to him even thoughSI Mal; a. mmad was 
married to one of the women of the family. 
' Yet, as the 
Spanish informant who reported this meeting pointed out, 
they were quite justified in making their point. in this way,, 
for while the Spanish occupation had been beneficial to them 
before the Pasha was appointed--as it had meant, they 
received firewood, straw, work. in the Spanish'supply. convoys, 
and so on--all these benefits were now distributed among 
Idris al-Rifil. s friends, and they received none. 
2' 
Not surprisingly, even if the shaykhd concerned 
were not his supporters, bin 'Abd al-Karim tried to take 
advantage of the situation to win them over, At the begin- 
ning of March he sent 30,000 pesetas down to the Tafarsit 
area to be distributed among the shaykhs who were opposed 
to Idris al-Rifl.. Another 15,, 000 pesetas were'sent to the 
BanU Walishak. 3 
In fact, most of the Spanish'supporters in the 
BanriTilzin remained favourably disposed to the Spanish, 
although their attacks on Idris al-Rif! knew no bounds. Two 
............ 
See above, p. 534, Table IX 1. The Bujdayn family were 
the main supporters of, the French in the eastern Rif (see' 
above, p. 217). This had so annoyed the emerging 
anti-Spanish coalitionin'the Rif in 1919, that SI'U3, mid Budjayn 
was assassinated in August of that year (see above, 
p. 236)'. 
2 SHM. Melilla Leg. 23, Informaci6n Febreror-Mulýammad b. 
tAmar b. Vzýddush (Igharb-17-In, BanU TQzln), -22 Fe. 1923. 
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, '"Informaci6n Marzo,. Mulýaumad Wuld 
al-041 Maganush. (KabdZinTand SIdI. 'IAbda1Iah. al-Mukht&r,, 
9 Mar. 1923. ' 
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shaykhs from the Igharbiln: wrote to the-Spanish in March to 
say that five friends of the Pasha had been responsible for 
the destruction of bridges and the theft of telephone wire 
near Tafarsit. There followed accusations that Idris 
treated people like Jews, 
2 
and even that he had deceived the 
Comandante General: 
"We must tell you about the men to whom you were intro- 
duced by Idris al-Rifl. 1when you came to Tafarsit last 
Thursday and who were from the clan of BanQ Bil-'Aiz. 
1dris al-Rif! told you 'These two are notables -(a! yan) 
of the BanU Tazin. 1 It is not true that they. are our 
notables. One of them is employed in the selling of 
eggs and chickens. The other sells lemons .. 0113 
Another letter threatened to cut off relations with the 
Spanish unless Idris al-RIfIvas removed. 
4 
The Spanish were faced with a spate of anonymous 
letters of this sort, all threatening to break. off relations. 
Anonymous letters can mean two things, of course, either 
that the allegations are untrue and malicious,, or that they 
are true, and are not signed in order, to protect the writer. 
Howeverr the suspicions of Spanish Military Intelligence were 
aroused, and a close watch kept on the Pasha's home, but 
without coming to any very clear conclusions. as. to what he 
was doing. 
5 
I Nevertheless, on 9 May 1923, in. pursuance of the 
policy of local self-government, Idr1s* al-Rlfl,. was installed 
... .... .... ... ..... .... ....... 
SHM Melilla Leg.. 22, 'Cartas Arabes 1, Beni Tuzin, tAllal: 
b. ' 'All&l: al-Maghrlril 'and Moammad b. 'Amar to Colonel, 
2 Sha'bari 1341/20 Mar. 1923. 
2. Ibid., Shaykhs Of the 
'BanQ. 
TUz1n to High Commissioner, 
14 Kajab. 1341/2 Mar. 1923. 
3 Ibid., The a 1. ydri of the BanfiVizin'to Comandante General, 
receilEved 22 Mar. 1923. 
4 Ibid. F The a ydri of the BanQVQzlný al-Jabal to Colonel, 
2 Sha"b&ri. 13417-20 Mar. 1923. 
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Informaci6n Abril,. nota,. 4a Mia 
(vigilancia),. 6 Apr. 1923. 
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as lairiil of the Rif, thus re-establishing "the ancient Rif 
province". As Walter Harris pointed out, however,, "The 
Pasha's chief work for some time will be to endeavour to 
take possession of his province. .2 British Vice-Consul Were, 
in a typically pessimistic despatch, made the. same'point: 
"No useful result is to be expected from this 
appointment. Dris er Riffi [sic],. despite his name, 
is not a Riffian, and he enjoys no personal. prestige 
in the Riff. It. is, however, interesting as being 
a step in the direction of a semi-indepýendent prov- 
ince approximating to the status demanded. for it by 
Abd el-Krim. '13 
In fact, of course, the new status of the Rif province was 
in no way comparable with the independence that. bin 'Abd 
al-KarlrA sought, but it is an interesting development of 
the argument that the demand for independence should. bemet 
with an offer of internal autonomy, thereby. savIng Spanish 
troops and money. 
A similar policy was being adopted, in, thd western 
zone. The pact concluded with al-RaisUll In. September 1922. 
and confirmed by al-RaisUlil's. semi-submission to. the'. khdl'lfa 
in December 4 still held, and the Jibala, was. relatively 
peaceful. In May 1923, al-Raisill! had returned. to his former 
palace at Astla, 
5 
although he did not remain. there'long. 
Yet, as Walter Harris, who. approved in principle.. 'of the intro- 
duction of a civil administration, pointed out,. it would 
have been more successful had-the adoption of. that policy not 
been the result of the Anwal*disaster, and been. takeh from 
I The Times, 12 May 1923, p. 11. dated Tangier, 11. May 
_1923. 2 Ibid. 
3 FO 371/9469/W4237/44/28, Were to Codrington, Tetuan, 
19 May 1923. 
4 See above, pp. 456-457. 
5 The Times, 4 June 1923, p. 11, dated Madrid, 3 June 1923. 
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a position of strength. 
However, no one was really satisfied by the polit- 
ical changes. Al-RaisQll,. 'angered by attacks. on him in the 
Spanish press, threatened to "retire" from politics. 
2 
Spanish press attacks--all part of a general. campaign by 
the opposition press in Spain to discredit their government's 
policy in morocco--also upset Idris al-RIfI *and he apparently 
expressed a wish to resign. He was only prevented by "the 
earnest entreaties of the High Commissioner. .3 His position 
was. made worse when he lost a close friend of Idris' b. Sa'Id, 
the man who had for so long carried on negotiations for the 
release of the prisoners,, ana. thereby threatened. to subvert 
the Rifi. state. 
4 
IdrIs. *b. SaIld, who had also. been attacked 
in the Spanish press, was shot while he, ' IdrIs. al-RIfI,: and. 
a group of Spanish officers were watching the'construction 
of a blockhouse near Tafarsit. 
5A 
number. of. rumours spread 
as to the reason for this murder. British. Vice-Consul Were 
reported that it was done on the orders of Castro Girona 
because of the links between Idris b. SaIld. and Echevarieta, 
the Basque millionaire who had negotiated, thd. release of 
6 the prisoners. Unlikely as this may souna, a. similar story, 
that the murder was carried out as the.. result of-thd feud 
between the army and the government over the.. 'Policy of the 
civil protectorate, was reported to me by the-son, of bin 'Abd 
. ............. 
1 Ibid. j, 11 Apr. 1923, p. 12, dated Tangier. 2 Ibid. r 19 June 1923, p. 14, dated Tangier, -18 June 1923. 3 FO-371/9496/WS598/44/28, Were to Codrington, Tetuan, 
22 June 1923. 
4 See above, pp. 472,493. 
5 The Times, 23 June 1923, p. 14, dated Madrid, 21 June 1923. 
6 FO 371/9496/W5598/44/28, 
_Were 
to Codrington, Tetuan, 
- 22 June 1923. 
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al-Karim in 1977.1 Bin "Abd al-Karlm himself was given 
another story by the man ýiho allegedly committedthd murder, 
one Wuld al-Vassan of Tafarsit, and bin 'Abd. al-Rarlm had 
him arrested and imprisoned. In his defence Wuld al-Ijassan 
claimed that he shot. Idris. bin Sa"Id because . "he saw that the 
Makhzan [i. e., Spain]. was about to occupy a position on his 
land, and also he did not know that the shots would hurt 
Dris ben Said [sic] ..,, 
2 
Idrls' al-Rif! Yaay not have been content, but the 
Spanish army was not happy either. At the beginning of July 
the Comandante General of Melilla was replaced. yet again, 
this time by General Severiano Martinez Anido, 3 who had 
made his reputation during his office as Captain-Generall 
and later as Civil Governor, in Barcelona, where he earned 
a reputation for brutality in his dealings with. the syndic- 
alist movement. 
4 
Such a man was unlikely to appreciate the 
government's problems of financing the war in Morocco--which 
was now costing 750,000,000 pesetas a year . (the equivalent 
Personal information, Idrig al-Khatt: -RbI,. *. Sept. 1977. 2 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Informaci6n. Juli o, nota, 3 July 1923, 
interestingly a certain "bin al-Vassan" was mentioned by 
Uaddu b. Vammu in a-report from Tafarsit in Oct. 1921 as. being noticeably anti-RIf. I,,. 'MAEF,,, Maroc 517, p. 154, ]Va 
, 
ddu b. 
]Jammu al-Buqquyl. 'to Mulýapmad b. 'Abd al-Karim, 25 $afar 1340/ 
28 Oct. 1921. 
3 
The Times, -7 June 1923, dated Madrid, 6 June 1923. 4 
His methods in Barcelona, according to Brennan, "were 
neither legal ones; nor even those sanctioned by military 
law such as arbitrary imprisonment and trial by court martial. "' 
His Chief of Police armed a gang of gunmen I'and gave them a 
list of the Syndicalist leaders whom they were. to shoot on 
sight. " Brennan quotes, Miguel, de Unamuno, the Spanish nov- 
elist and philosopher, as saying of him, nThe man'is a-pure 
brute--he. can't even talk, he can only roar and bray,, though 
his roars and brays always mean something. " Gerald. Brennan, 
The Spanish Labyrinth, an Account: of the Social'. and. Pol'itical 
'f-ackground of the Civil War (Cambridge, 1969), p. 
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of E25,000,000 at that period) and he pressed for more 
troops in order to undertake a landing at Alhucemas. The 
military estimated that this would involve. at least 6,, '000 
casualties, so not surprisingly the government. was most 
unwilling to allow it. On 14 August, his plan for thd 
landing having been rejected, Martinez Anido resigned and 
yet another Comandante General for Melilla was appointed, 
General Enrique Marzo. 1 
Meanwhile, the Madrid government sent a. conmission 
of the General Staff headed by General Weyler to. Morocco on 
a fact-finding expedition. On its return,. it. r-eported that 
the eastern line should be defended, that an all-volunteer 
army should be set up in Morocco, that political action 
among the unsubmitted tribes. should be'incredsed, and that 
2. further action should be taken against the Bana-Maryaghal. 
This report, and the subsequent. debate on the' 
proposed landings at Alhucemas, -brought about yet anotherý 
government crisis. On-23 August 1923, troops embarking for 
Morocco at Mdlaga mutinied and shot their sergea . nt. * A cor- 
poral who had led this mutiny was sentenced. to death but 
then reprieved by the government, which also forbade any 
further troop movements to. Morocco. 
3 The army. was not 
pleased. 
Even by its own lights the civil protectorate' 
policy was a failure. Under-the previous army control 
the Protectorate ai1thorities hdd spent 815rOOO pesetas in 
............... I ......... 
1 The Times, 4 Aug. 1923, p. 7, dated Madrid, -.. 2. -*Aug. 1923, * 
and 8 Aug. 1923, p.. 10, dated Madrid, -7 Aug.. 1923, ' and - 15 Aug. 1923, ' p. 9, dated. Madrid, 14 Aug.. 1923,, ' and 23'Aug. 
1923, P. 10, dated Madrid, 22 Aug. 1923. 
2 pleming, ''op. *cit., pp. 84-85. 
3 Payne, ' Politics" 'and the Mil, itary,,. p. 196. 
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three months on education, and the development of trade and 
commerce. Under the new policy, over the same length of 
time, only 383,000 pesetas was expended on'these things. 
1 
As The Times pointed out, "This can hardly be considered 
anything but a very poor demonstration of colonizing 
activity. ,2 
The full details of Weyler's plans were released 
on 3September. Three mýnisters resigned. when the Foreign 
Minister, Alba, agreed to change the policy and accept the 
idea, expressed in the report, of carrying out landings at 
Alhucemas. The cabinet resigned, but re-formed, and the 
government limped along for a little while longer. 
3 
However, the army had been plotting a coup for 
some time. The man chosen to lead it was Miguel Primo-ae 
Rivera. Primo de Rivera had in the past expressed firm views 
on the need to withdraw from Morocco to defensive positions 
on the coast4so on the face of it he would appear to have 
been an unlikely candidate for the. task of leading the 
Spanish army to greater glory in Morocco.., However, he was 
one of the few high-ranking generals who had both taken no 
part in. the arguments over the milltary. defence*Juntasi, 
5 
and who was untouched by the Anwal. scandal. Furthermore, he 
had made. serious efforts during the'preceding. months to per- 
suade his co-conspirators that he hc-id. moderated-his views on 
Morocco,. and no-longer felt the. 'need ', f or-a. total.. withdrawal. 
6 
The Times, 28 Aug. 1923, p. 7, dated Madrid, 24 Aug. 1923. 
2 ibid. 
3 Pa 
. yne, , 
'ýPolit'ics and the, Mi'litaKX, pp. 196-197. 
4 See above, 'p. 393. 
5 See above, pp. ' 476-477, for an explanation of the Juntas. 
de Defensa. 
6 Payne, ' Po'l*it'i*cs and the Mi*l': Ltary,,. pp. 194-195. 
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On 13 September 1923, Primo de Rivera proclaimed 
martial law in Barcelona, where he was Captain-General, and 
announced a Military Directory. For a day or so success was 
uncertain, but on 15 September, with the King's tacit support, 
1 Primo arrived in Madrid and formed a government. 
The Moroccan problem was by no means the only 
factor which led to the coup--terrorism, corruption, and 
national security played their part as well. But many of 
the Moroccan commanders distrusted Primolz intentions in 
Morocco and he came into conflict with_. them very soon. 
Meanwhile, in Moroccor there were other changes. 
Idris al-Rlfl-. *was promoted to a position of authority in 
Tetuan so that he could gradually be eased out of direct 
contact with the local people. In July 1923, two Vydri of 
the BanQTQz*1i7i wrote to the Spanish to express their satis- 
faction, and promised they. would work with the Spanish more 
closely in the future. 2 In September,. another.. letter arrived 
from a shaykh of 'AzrQ, 'in the Gaznaya, saying that he would 
resume relations with the Spanish, which he had broken off 
because of Idris'al-Rlfl. * 3 
The Battle against 'Amr b., Ijamidu 
At the very moment when bin, 'Abd al-Karlm was, 
being proclaimed, 'Amar. b. Vaýmidu, the old enemy. of. the Rif! ' 
leader in the Sinhaj'a, was. trying to gather forces to attack 
Ibid., pp., 198-201. 
2 SHM Melilla. Leg. 22, 'Cartas'Arabes*, *l', *Beni'Tuzin, Qal. id 
tAbd al-Salam b. Mizzyaz* -al-miýl&rl.: and al-'Abb&s'. al-Bujdayn1 to Colonel, 8 Dhu al-]Výjja 1341/22*July 1923. ' Note thht 
once again a member of-the Bujdayn. family was helping the 
Spanish. ' 
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, *. Cartas' Arabes, *1', ' Igzinnayen, 4mad 
b'. 'Amar to Colonel, received 5 Sept. *. 1923. 
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him again. 
On 12 January, five days before the first proclam- 
ation, 'Amar b. Vaýmldu was reported to have taken a column 
of 1,800 men from several tribes against the Rif! 'dominated 
Banfi . 
'Amatt in support of the Warghd tribes, who had started 
fighting the Banfl-'Amart a few days before. Once again,, bin 
Vamiduls forces attacked the houses of Mulýammad b. al-Tayyib, 
bin 'Abd al-Karim's qa2., *id in the BanU . 
'Amart, who. was still 
held by 'Abd al-Malik as a prisoner. 
I The. houses were burned 
and the inhabitants fled to safety in the Banri Waryaghal. 
Bin 'Abd al-Karim's supporters in the BAnU Maryaghal then 
attacked those of 'Amar b.. lVaqIdu in - the Banri Ijadhif a clan 
of that tribe. Seven of bin 'Abd. al-Karim's men were killed 
in this attack. 
'Amar b. Ijamidu had been. joined by al-]J4jJ 
Bil-QIsh of the Gaznaya. They both appealed to the Spanish 
for money. at the beginning of. ]February.. and tried to prevent 
bin 'Abd al-Karim's declaration as Sultan. in. the Tuesday 
market at Azil&f.. 
3 
For the moment, bin 4Abd al-Karlid was not very 
worried by the two southern leaders for. he*was much more 
-concerned about. the Spanish and hd*ordered his front line to 
be reinforced:. '. -.. in'mid-Februýary, over 
1,000 men were sent 
to the eastern lines. 
4, The greater. importance which bin "Abd 
al-Karim gave. to the. Spanish was theresult of divisions. 
See above, p. 481. 
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, 'Informaci6n Enero, kNimid b. 'Abd 
al-Salam b. Vamid, 12 Jan. 1923. 
3 SHM melilla. Leg. 23, *Informaci6n Febrero, T. O. C., 
Comandante 
' 
Intervenci6n to Comandante General and Coronel 
de Policla (Tafarsit)', 7 Feb. 1923, and Informaci6n del 
dia, 8 Feb. -1923. 
4 ibid., S! Mulýapmad al-Fa4sý! *and Mukia=ad: AgharbT,: 15 Feb. 
1923. 
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among his opponents in the Sinhdja and Karlsa. On 8 March, 
several MarnIsIs. wrote to the Spanish. to, explain that they 
had fallen out with 'Amar b. Vamidu and had transferred 
their allegiance to 'Abd al-Mdlik. 
1 
Apparently the argument was over the release of 
prisoners held by tAmar b. VamIdu. 200 men from the BanQ 
'Amart had appealed to Bil-Qlsh'. in mid-February to ask 
'Amar b. Ijamidu to release prisoners from their tribe and 
others from the Band. Waryaghdl. Bin Uaýmldu replied that 
before he did so the petitioners would have to fight bin 'Abd 
al-Karim for two months, and that the Waryaghli prisoners 
would have to pay a 250,000 pesetas fine each. (The amount 
seems ex cessive to say the least. ) Matters became worse 
when 'Amar b. Va. midu was held responsible for a murder com- 
mitted in the MarnIs*a, but refused to pay the fine of 20,000 
pesetas that was demanded. This was yet another demon- 
stration of-the fact that unity,, be it against-the Spanish 
or against bin 'Abd al-KarIW could not last long if it 
depended. -solely on the fragile system of'jýýfines. The 
other shaykhs of the Marnis'a wrote to, the other Sinhaja 
tribes to ask that their shaykhd should come to enforce the 
V 
fine. These shaykhs apparently put pressure on, 'Abd al-Malik, 
who ensured that the prisoners were'released-including, at 
last, M4apmad. b.. al-Taýyyib, bin 4Abd al-Karim's former 
qal*id in the. BanU '4Amar. t. 
2 
Bin-'Abd al-Karim's supporte rs. 
SIPI Melilla. Leg. 22, ". Cartas Arab'es' '2, * Marnisa y Wargha, 
'Abd al-Salam. b. al-ljaj*j Mulýammad al-Yidrl,. ' Mlsa4ild b. 
al-jalAll, * al-'U4j'j Muýammad B'utuba [si6],. "All b. [illegible],. - 
and M4apmad b. al-ljaj'j M4ca; =ad. al--B-a-sliri to 'Abd al-Salam 
al-Fannas'sl,. ' 20 Rajab 1341/8 Mar. 1923. 
2 ibid. and SHM. Melilla Leg. 21, '3: nformaci6n, 'Amar Hamido 
Informaci6n 4a Mia, 15 Feb. lo23, and Informaci6n 4a MIa, - 
8 Mar. 1923. * 
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took the opportunity to burn down 'Amar. bin 1VamIduIs house. 
So the Marnis'a and five other Sinhajan tribes--the BanU 
Wanjil, Awlad BU *Slama, Fannassal BanTi Walid and mat1wa, 
al-Jabal--agreed to work with 'Abd al-Malik and the Spanish 
1 
rather than with. "Amar. b. IjamTdu.. 
Not surprisingly, bin . 'Abd al-Karlm tried to use 
this split in the ranks of his opponents to divide them even 
further. With the help. of M4. -kirmad bin 'Amar Akhittu, he 
managed to get some considerable support among the Gazhaya, 
2 in an. attempt to cut off Bilý! -Qish from 'Amar bin Vamidu. 
However, this was unsuccessful. and, Bil-Qlsh, collected a very 
large number of men and moved into-the BanQ. Waryaghal lands. 
3 
At the same time, Rif! 'forces obliged 'Abd al-Mal'ik to leave 
his base at SI: I'All b. Darld. But he. took refuge with 'Amar 
b. Vamidu, 4 axesult which was. the opposite of the one which 
had been intended. 
Bin 'Abd al-Karlm responded. to thd'renewal of the 
alliance by trying to buy support. 50,000 pesetas were sent 
to the BanU TUziri at the beginning of April and later in 
April, 150,000 pesetas were. -. sent to help form a'Iýarka in the 
Matt. wa al-jabal. 
5 
Thi's tactic was as ineffective for him 
as it had been for the Spanish "before.. the. war,. for the 
1 SHM Melilla Leg 22, Cartas Arabes'2, " Marnisa-y WarghA, 
"Abd al-Saldm b. ai-Vajj Muýapmad etc. to 'Abd al-Sal5ra 
al-Pannas'sl,,: '20 Rajab. 1341/8 Mar. 1923; and SHM Melilla 
Leg. 22, informaci6n, 'Amar Hamido,. Informaci6n 4a Mia, 8 Mar. 
1923. 
2 
SHM Melill a- Leg. - 23, - Informaci6n. Marzo, . S! M44mmad 'Abd al-Qad'ir.. al-Falýql And Mubammad. b. al-r]Va. j"j Agharbl, * 
11 Mar. 1923. 
3 Ibid. SI Mu. hammad b. al-Uajj iVaqmu ('Azlh Mi44r), 13 
Mar. T9-2i. 
4 SHM Melilla. -Leg. - 21, ' Informac-i6ft, ' Amar Eamido, 27. Mar. 
1923. 
5 
'Ibid., - nota, 17 Apr', '-, 1923, and SHM Melilla Leg. 23, 
Informaci6n, Abril,. T. O. C., -Oficial... encargado de Intervenci6n 
to Cor. de Policla, 12 Apr.. 1923, 
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response of the BanQ TQzIri was to ask for yet more money. 
This was all part of a Spanish plan that they should ask 
bin 'Abd al-Karim for money. so'that'llif he refuses, it will 
be each for himself in his own land, and after that [the 
rift]: will become deeper and things more confused. "' 
However, by the beginning of-May, bin 'Abd 
al-Karim's forces had grown stronger. and things began to 
look difficult for his opponents. On 7 May the. brother of 
'Amar b. Vamidu took two bulls to. sacrifice to bin 'Abd 
al-Karim as a gesture of peace. Bin. 'Abd. al-Karini fixed 
the peace conditions at a fine of 50,000 pts and. instructed 
'Amar b. lVakmidu to stay in the BanU. Waryaghal under his 
command. 
2 
It was also not long before Bil-Q1sh was also 
brought under control and by 22 May he. had been forced to 
join the Iýarka at Azilaf in preparation-for an attack on 
'AzTLh Mi4a. r. 
3 'Abd al-Mal'ik fled-to the Spanish, 'zone where 
at the beginning of July he was put in. charge of a newly ý 
created group of Moroccan irregulars, named the "Harca [sic]. 
de Abd el-Malek" in his honour. . -Tt was a rapidly assembled 
collection of. local. recruits, meh-from the Gharb,. and former 
members of the Spanish native. *police., some. l,, 400 strong,, 
but with. no more than a minimum of- instruction 
4 
--an undis- 
tinguished end. to. . "Abd a]--Malik'. s varied career. 
SHM Melilla Leg.. '22, ' Cartas Arabes* *1, * Dani Tuzin, Shaykh 
Vaýmu Wuld. 'Amar al-Mid4r!. to Colonel,, 29 Shalbdn 1341/16 
Apr. 1-923. ' 
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Informaci6n Mayo, T. O. C. Alf6re'Z 
Martinez'to, Cor., de Policla,,. Tafarsit,,. 7-May 1923. 
3 Ibid., TOC.. Comandante. Interventor to Cor. de Policla, 
Tafarsit; 22May 1923'and T. O. C. Comandante Interventor to 
Cor. de. Policia, 22 May 1923. ' 
4 Historkal' de*, *la' Harka' Mel, i, 1,1, a,,, Campafias- afios 1924-1926, 
Melilla,, Tipografla La Hispana, n. d. . (but pre-1930),, pp. 15-17. 
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For the present, then, Bil-Qlsh and 'Amar b. 
lVamidia-vere subdued and, indeed, had been forced to support 
bin 'Abd al-Karlrd; . 
'Abd al-Mallk was otherwise engaged. 
The Rlflsý could once again turn their attention to the 
Spanish and both defend their eastern lines and extend their 
power into the west and the Ghumaiffa. 
The Campaign In the*West 
In 1922, a Rlfl 'force under'S!. Maýzk=ad had 
attempted to enforce some control over. the Ghumdra. It had 
failed,, and. the Spanish,, through the medium of al-Raisillit' 
had succeeded in keeping the area relatively quiet. 
1 
At the beginning of January 1923, while prepar- 
ations were being made in the Rif to proclaim b. 'Abd 
al-Karim, the RIfIs* tried again to take the Jibal: a and 
Ghumata. On 2 January,, a small'Darka,,,. mainly formed from 
the BanQ Silmari and BanU 'Ehalid, but including about 15 
2 Rifis, was reported in Tandaman. . This was the precursor of 
a larger invasion. On 15 January,.. 300 Rlflsý were reported 
3 in the BanU Khalid led by 'SI Tulýa. ml a- sharif 
from the BanU. Ipssan whose subsequent changes of alliance 
were to prove a source of some difficulty to the Rifis. 
This force temporarily dominated the BanQ Khalid, for on 
8 January it had, attacked the major pro-Spanish leader 
4 
there, Sid! Ijamidu b. 'Abd al-Warith, ' . who also caused the 
1 See above, p. 456. 
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 191 Informaci6ri 6a Mia--Enero de 1923, nota, 
2 Jan. 1923. ' 
3 SHK Ceuta Leg. l9, -3: nformaci'6n-5a Mia-Enero de 1923', nota, 
15 Jan. 1923. 
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, Int'erven'ci6rf Mi: l'itar ýde Ajmis.,, - Resum6 
of year 1923. (no date). 
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Rifis some difficulty later. The other. tribes were less 
enthusiastic about the Rlfls*--the Akhm&s', for instance, by 
far the most powerful tribe in.. the Jib&l*a, were still dis- 
1 
posed toward al-RaisUl'i.. Thd. local-qaI*ids loyal to the 
Spanish tried, to stop the, 4, arka before things went too far. 
The Banil Silmdný, 13anU Manpri. r*, and Banii Ziyyat each sent 50 
men to fight the Rifis'. Meanwhile,, bin 'Abd al-Warith 
regroupead on the borders of the BanQ. Rhalid and Akhmas',, - 
at Izuqari. 
2 
Izuqan: was burned on 18 January# and when b. 'Abd 
al-War'ith retired to Wadyari the next day,, they attacked him 
there as well. At this point,.. one-of the clans of the Banra 
Silmdri changed sides, and attacked b.. 'Abd al-Warith from 
the rear. A pro-Spanish barka, sent from the Spanish position 
at Amtat in the. Banfi. Garlr'was surrounded by anti-Spanish 
forcest several were killed, and the khallfa of the Banri. 
Sijjil,, one of, the barka leaders, bought his own life for 
15,000 pesetas. If he had not, he would have been shot, as 
some of the other prisoners were. - The anti-Spanish'barka 
grew, in the expectation of booty, and the BanU. Kh&l*id clans 
of the BanUlarwil: and BanU Anbath sacrificed to al-Tuhaml 
for peace. 
3 
At some'point. during this fighting, bin "Abd 
al-Karlm's most important supporter in the west, S! l4uýzý: mmad 
b. ýýdlq al-Akhamlish of. Targlst, joined the. anti-Spanish 
forces. The-Akhaml§hlri, an important family of marabUts from 
Zarqdt, whose influence prevailed over much of the Sinhaj**a, 
had alreadi played a x6le. 'of, some. importance in the Rifwar, 
Ibid. ' 
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, 'Informadores,, nota, 18 Jan. 1923. 
3 Ibid., nota, 25'Jan. 1923. ' 
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in support of bin 'Abd al-Karim. S! Muýaýmadls son Alýmad 
had been murdered by 'Amar b. Vamidu after a battle with 
the French at 'Ain Midyaria in 1919; his other sons and his 
grandson became commanders, on various fronts against the 
French and Spanish during the war. 
1 
His nephews, the sons 
of his brother S! 't'All, 'were less reliable in the Rifl. 'cause, 
as will be seen. Nowr SI. Mulýapmad went to BanQ DarqQI in 
the Akhm&s' with the intention of trying to secure for the 
RIfIs* a free run in Shawin. He left behind him a'barka of 
2,000 men, in the BanU Xhdl'id,, who were. ready to attack the 
Akhmasý. if. they did not cooperate. 
2 
Meanwhile, in the wake of al-Akhamlishl,, RIfI. 
tax-collectors moved into the area, backed by armed force, 
making all protests useless. 
3 In February, a Rif! force was 
reported to be in the BanU Sijjil with the intention of 
making a base at J. Qal'a overlooking Shawin and moving on 
into the BanQ Vassan. 4 But such objectives. were still 
beyond the limited forces at the disposal-of. the Rlfls.. 
The real effort came in March'1923.. On 2 March, news came 
from the BanU. Waryaghal that. 5OOR1f1s. * were on the way to 
5 Amta. r' in the BanQ Garir. 
Likewise, in the Banfl, Mastlirar. in the unoccupied 
part of the French zone, MUlay 4Mad al-Baqar,. al-Raisillil. s 
1 S! Mulýammad b. ýaýdlq had a history of opposition to the 
French and Spanish, see above, p. 363; "Maghzen 
Rif fain", p. 14. 
2 
SHM Ceuta, Leg. 19, 'Informaci6n*7a Mla--Enero de 1923, 
nota,, 22 Jan. 1923. 
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, -Informa*ci6n, 6-a Mia, nota, 28 Jan. 1923. 
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, ''Intervenci6n Militar de Ajm6s, Resum6 
of year 1923. 
5 SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, 'Mla'na. **3--Marzo' de 1923, nota, 2 Mar. 
1923. 
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was forming a*kiarka with which to oppose 
the sharif In the Ghaz&wa--in this he. was cooperating with 
the Rifis. *. 2 Evidently Rlfl. strength was growing, for the 
qVId of Qalla in the BanQ Sijjil. said-that unless he 
received protection from the Spanish he would be f6rced to 
join the Rlfls*, 3 and leave the way to Shawin open. The 
Ghumar. ls* agreed. to give 1,, 500. pesetas from each tribe towards 
the maintenance of the Rif! 1ýarka, and on. 12 March they 
attacked TalambUt, the Spanishposition protecting the road 
from Shawin to Wddi 1&w. 4 on 29 March, another 500 Rifis. 
under QVid Kuyasý of the Zarqat-tribe, arrived in the BanQ 
Silmari, and were joined by 60 men from theAkhmds under 'Amar 
Zarlýqnlbf. the clan of Saba"a. Qabail,, "influenced by the 
events that are unfolding in. the Ghumata, " as the Spanish 
*5 report put it. Among the other. ledders of this group which 
was equipped with 2 machine guns and 4 cannons--was SI: 
'Abd al-Karim b. 'All Al-Jj4ttash of . the Banra Waryagha'l, who 
became one of the more important figures.. in the-crushing of 
the Ghumara*-. revolt in 1924.6 
The overwhelming impression of this period is one 
of confusion and lack of, coordination., Most of it was taken 
up with guerilla-type attacks-9n. villages supporting the 
7 Spanish--such. as, AmaghUs. near W&d1 L&w. on. -23 April. Not 
See above,,, pp. 363--: 364. 
2 
SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, Mia no. 5--Marzo de 1923p nota, 4 Mar. 
1923 
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, Mia no. ' 7--Marzo de 1923, nota, 6 Mar. 
1923. 
4 
Ibid., nota, 9 Mar. 1923 and nota, 12 Mar. 1923. 
5- Ibid., nota, 29 Mar. 1923. 
6 SHM Ceuta'Leg. 19,, Mfa no. * 6-Marzo de-1923, nota, 13 Mar. 
1923. 
7 SHM Ceuta. ''Leg. 19, 'Mia no. ' 3--! -Informaci6n abril, nota, 
23 Apr. 1923. ' 
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surprisingly such attacks weakened the prestige of the 
Spanish, for people felt that they were being abandoned to 
the Rifis. Some of the BanQ Sijjil expressed this feeling 
at the end of Aýril, as did the BanU SaIld at the beginning 
of May. 
1 
On 20 May, a meeting was held at the Rif! base 
camp at Tandaman to discuss the effort to invade the Banil. 
Sijjil and then to turn on the Spanish positions, starting 
with Amt&. r. SI Tuhami al-Wazz&nl was appointed top qalid 
in the Ghumara and the plans were agreed* 
2 
Rif! strength was growing rapidly now: they had 
been joined by the 
and BanQ Man! ýqr. 
3 
and the BanQ SaIld 
the Spanish for ari 
-Banfil Silmdn, Banfa. Ziyy7at,, BanU BUI Zra 
They had forces in the BanQ ManqUr, 
4 
felt so threatened that they had asked 
ms with which to defend themselves. 
5 
The'Rifis had also made political advances. The 
cradi- 'of the BanQ Sijjil, S! 144ammad b. Abmad b. al-'Arb! . 
Vanis was arrested by the Spanish in Wdd! -Law because of the 
threat he posed. He had helped the barka, in the attack on 
TalambUt,. and had then sent a nephew, S! *al-'Arbl, 'to the 
Rif to see bin. 'Abd al-Karirft, and he returned with bin 'Abd 
al-Karim's nomination as qalid of the BanQ Sijjil. SI: 
Muýammad. hadthen wrecked Spanish political action in the 
1 Ibid., nota, 30 Apr. 1923, and SHM Ceuta Leg. 20,, 6a Mia 
--Iiiformaci6n Mayo, nota, 1 May 1923. 
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 20,. Informaci6n P. I., T. O. C. Capt. Interv. 
Gomara-to. Cor. delegade de interv. mil., Wad Law, 20 May 
1923, Urgentel and T. O. C. capt. Interv. Gomara to Cor. 
delegado Interveni6in Mil., Wad Law, 21, May 1923. 
3 ibid., T. O. C. -Teniente de interv. to Cor. Tropas de 
Pol-ic-Ta-, Tassa, 24 May 1923, *. Urgentissimo. 
4 
_Ibid., 
*T. O. C. Tte. Comandante 7a Mia to Cor. de Policla, 
ShO--i=n, 25 May 1923, * Urgente. * 
5 ibid., T. O. C. Capt. Interv. . Gomara, to Cor. delegadode' 
interv. Mil., W. Law, '22 May 1923. 
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BanU Lait tribe by persuading the principal Spanish contact 
in that tribe, the Faqlh S! . 'al-1jajj Muýaý=ad "Budagiall 
[sic] 
not to work with the Spanish. ' Thd'Spanish, fearing that he 
would raise the whole of the BanU *Sijjil against them, 
cutting the wan Ldw to ShRwin road, arrested him and made 
arrangements for him to be transferred to the Hacho Prison 
in Ceuta. In addition, some of the Akhmas' went over to 
the Riff. bause at the end of May, for-al-RaisUll. s authority 
there was declining andthe people round ShZiwin threatened 
to kill anyone entering or leaving. the city. 
2 
By the beginning of June, there was a'barka of 
about 400. at Tandaman, mainly. made up of men from the wesýern 
Ghumara; the Banrl. ' Silmaný,. BanQ Yhalid and Banfi Man.. ýfi r had 
also sent contingents--along with a small. one from the Rif-- 
to attack TalambU-V,. - and . MU1*ay. Abmad al-Baqarl 'and 
the son 
of TuhZimi'al-Wazzanl had joined, togethe'r. for a planned attack 
on Shdwin. 
3 It is quite clear. from this. that, -th e. main". force 
of the operations-against the Spanish. in the Ghumara came 
from the Ghumarls. themselves. They were certainly supplied 
and encouraged--and taxed"-by the Rifis', but it was local 
people who supplied the main force, ', and much of the leader- 
ship--Wuld . *Sl. TuhZim! 'came 
from the Banfl Vassan and Mialay 
Aýmad from the Banri . ArUs. 
However, a firmer control. by the Rlfiswas about 
1 
SHM Ceuta, Leg. 20, 'Goumara, *Mayo'-Junio, 1923, Capt. Interv. 
to Cor.. Amtar, 27 May 1923, and, TOC. Oficial CiRdte. 6a Mia 
to Cor. Jefe T. P Wad Lau, 26 May 1923. ' 
2 SHM Ceuta Leg 20, ' 'Inf orma'cIort. *3a Mla-; -Maya de 1923,,, nota, 
28 May 1923, ' and notay 29 May 1923. 
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 20, ' Informa*ci6n' P. I*. *, ' Junio, 1923, T. O. C. 
Capt. Interv. Gomara to Cor-de P. I. Amtar, 2 June* 1923, 
Urgente, and T. O. C. Tte. Cor. delegado to Cor. de P. I. 
Larache, *. 3'June-1923, * Urgente, and T. O. C, Capt. Interv. 
Goumara to Col. delegado, Amtar, 5 June 1923. 
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to begin. On 25 June 1923, Sl Mabapmad-returned to Ajdlr' 
from Paris, where he had been for some months trying to 
negotiate with the French. 
' He was soon on his way to the 
Ghum&r'a. to take command, in the west. 
S! Malýammad in the Ghumara 
A month after his return to Ajdlr. ', it was announced 
that SI. Maýammad would go to the Ghumata to. take charge. 
2 
The reason was a revolt amongithe Ghumarls'. It was only a 
minor affair, nothing like on the scale of the one in the 
same area in 1924, but it. could have been, dangerous. Once 
again the quarrel was over taxation. 
3 On 5 July, repres- 
entatives of. the Ghum&ra tribes loyal. to the Rlfls*went to 
the Sunday market of BanCl DarqUl: in. the Akhmas, and there 
made the sacrifice of a bull, in, the, hopes of receiving help 
4 from that quarter. The Akhmas, refused. A week later, MQlay' 
Aýmad al-Baqajc 'and Wuld S! Tuhaml'al-WazzAnlment to the 
same market. with the same intention. 
5 They seem to'-have been 
equally unsuccessful. 
These failures must have comforted those Ghumarls' 
who were opposed to the Rlfls*. Certainly the-Akhm&s',, while 
opposed to the Spanish were.. not keen to provide physical 
help to the. Rifis'. Bin eAbd al-Karlrd,, clearly worried by 
these developments,, moved to. the* malýakma of BanU 'Bri Frati,, - 
the command-centre for the Ghumar'a front. He first of all 
......... . 
Sklr'aj, '. op. - 'Cit. -I pe 101. 
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 20j, ', 'Informa'c1'6ri Oficina, Central, -Julio 
de 1923, * nota. 28 July 1923. 
3 Sklr'aj,, '. "opv cit.,, p. 1020 
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 20, *'Informaci6n* Oficina: Central', Julio 
1923, nota, 6 July, and nota, 8 July , 1923 
5 Ibid. -,, nota, 12'July 1923. ' - 
0 622 
tried to calm the situation by lessening the tax burden and 
then by preparing a force of 1,000 men under tAbd al-Karlm 
al-Vattash, with its 'qal., *i'ds . 100 drawn exclusively from the 
BanU. Waryaghal and the Buqquya. On. 19 July, the Rifig 
appointed a new qal: id in. the BanQ ManqUr, 
2 
and when rumours 
sPread that thd''qd9id of the BanQ Silm&n* was about to go 
over to the Spanish he was arrested by the Rlfls*and taken 
to Ajdlt,,, where more rumours stated he was executed. 
As the Rlfl. *forces under al-Vaýttash moved into the 
Ghumar*a, they encountered considerable resistance... At the 
beginning of August, their only sure support was in the 
Band Silmari, around Tandaman in. the Band BU. Zra,, 'and in part 
of the Band Ziyyat. However, the*Rlfls* quickly stopped the 
revolt. As they regained control, thdy. appointed new qTao'ids 
in each tribe, not necessarily from-the tribe itself. For 
instance, on 6 August Alimad' alT-Baqar *from the BanUl. "ArrW 
was appointed over the BanU. Ziyyat:. 
4 Several Ghum7ar. l. ' 
notables were arrested and taken to prison in Ajdlr*, and 
fines were imposed, as the Spanishnoted, with, no care"for 
local feelings. 5 On 9 August, al-Baqar. '. 'ordered the Banrl. 
Ziyy&t to prepare straw for. thd'animals of a Rlfl Army 
that was about to arrive. The-Spanish. "Intelligence Service 
reckoned that this-was'no more than attempt to frighten 
his charges.. 
6.. It was probably. not necessary.,, for. the ...... 
1 Sk1raj,, -op. 'cit. 'j, pp. 102-103. 
2 SHM Ceuta. Leg. 20, Informaci6n Oficina Central, Julio de 
1923, nota, 19 July 1923. 
3 Ibid., 
' 
nota, 23 July 1923, and 27 July 1923, and Sk1raj. 
op. cit. _, 
p. 103. 
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 20, ''In'formaci6n'Oficina Central, Agosto de 
1923, nota, 6'Aug. 1923, and. Sk1raj,, 'op. 'cit., p. 103. 
5 SHM Ceuta Leg. 20j, '1nforma*c'i*6ri Oftcina Central, Agosto de 
1923, nota, 8 Aug. 1923. 
6 Ibid. # nota, 9 Aug. 1923. 
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Ghumarls' seem to have been sufficiently. cowed by this time 
anyway. When the BanQ Manqri. r. ' and Banra BU Zra 'complained 
about two RIfIs* whom they had caught red-handed with two 
local women, and demanded that they be executed "as happens 
in the Rif if. a Gomari commits a crime'[of this nature],. " 
they were practically ignored, for. the. 'Rlflsý escaped with 
a beating. 
1 The Ghumarls. ' had. to contain themselves, for 
the forces against them were overwhelming. For instance, 
S! TuMmI. *al-Wazýan! had 600. men from his own tribe at his 
disposal, under the watchful eyes of. two'Rifis'and 30 men 
from the. Rifl, regular. army. Spanish*Intelligence described 
these two men as "interventores", drawing a parallel between 
them and the Spanish officers. appointed to oversee the work 
of local qa"ids in the-occupied tribes .. 
2 
At this time the RIfIs*, were collecting support 
in a number of other. tribes. Groups. in', the Raý, a. na, a tribe 
to the west of the Ghaz&wa, and thd Maziyyat, sent. contin- 
gents of 100. men from each'tribe*to bin. "Abd al-NarIM for 
service on the eastern front. 
3 At thdrisk'of being slightly 
anachronistic, it is worthlooking at.. the case of the 
Maziyyat a little more. 'carefully.. This--is a small tribe, 
centred on Tawnat in what was. undeniably part of the French 
zone,, although. *it was not yet occupied. In. November 1923 
some of the. a'yah*. (wh6 typically described themselves as "all. 
the alyZin") wrote to the Spanish to explain their. relations 
with the Rlf! S': 
"We inform your excellency that we-have'opened relations 
with Wuld al-Sayyid 'Abd al-Karim because'of our fear 
.................. 
1 
Ibid., nota, 13 Aug. 1923. 
2 Ibid. 1' and nota,, 14 Aug. 1923. 
3 Ibid., nota,, 18 Aug. 1923. 
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of the French who are getting close to our lands 
and we have written to him, proclaiming him ... (We swear]. by God alone. that our tribe and that 
of the Sinhaj'a [ijee., presumably, the Sinhaj'a, Misbulý,: 
a neighbourihg tr b ]. want only your government 
and we. are opposed to Wuld al-Sayyid 'Abd al-Karim, 
whom we do not want in our country .. . "l 
This initial impression of favouring the Spanish is, however, 
rather spoilt by a subsequent appeal to release a member of 
their tribe whom the Spanish had-imprisoned. 
2 Ho'wever, it 
seems quite likely that the Maziyyat had decided to join the 
RIfIs'in the hope that they would.. escape the attentions of 
the French, for a while at least. 
Far-more importantly for the-RIfI*cause, they gained 
an ally in 4mad b. Muiýapmad IsbU of. the Banri EuzmZit,, more 
commonly known by.. the name of. Akhr! rU. 
3 He had been a' 
principal supporter of al-RaisUll *and, one of his more trusted 
leaders. However, in August 1923'he., 'quarrelled with 
al-Raisfill, ' for reasons. that are-un. c. lear-4.. Following this 
1 SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, Cartas Arabes , All the' Alyari-of - Maziyyat to Governor of Sh&win, 11 Rabill. II-1342/20'NoV. 1923. 
2 Ibid. 
3 
The spelling of this name has a number of different ver- 
sions. The. one. used here is that. of al-Bii : `Ayy1ish1. -'(op. cit., Vol. II, p. 212), who gives the-vocalisation of.. the name in 
some detail. It is often written Khariru, or even Kheriro, 
Jeriro, or. Heriro, etc. 
4 
SHM Ceuta Leg. 20, Informaci6n Oficina Central, Agosto 
1923, nota, 24 Aug. 1923. The-date at, least is clear--this 
report was confirmed by the BritishActing Vice-Consul in 
Tetuan, who gives the Spanish version of the reason. Accord- 
ing to. this, when the Spanish handed back part of the lands 
they had. confiscated-from al-RaisQl'1,: Akhrird. claimed that 
he owned, some'of. it. The Spanish. 'refused to back him, so 
"Gueriro [sic]. seeing the, hopelessness of obtaining justice, 
openly reý7e_lled, against Raisuli and the Spanish authorities. " 
(FO 371/9470/W7244/44/28, Morillo to Codrington, Tetuan, 30 
Aug. 1923) ý. Rupert Furneaux, * Abdel: Kr'irn, * Emir of the Rif 
(London, 1967), p.. 113,. has another version. According to, 
him, AkhrlrU. And al-RaisUll-quarrelled over the'sharing of 
booty after, a, raid. This is quite. obviously. nonsense - 
(Furneaux is. very frequently wrong over details), since he 
places it after the"'C*Oup . dIdt'at in Spain in mid-September 
1923, and states that al-Raisall. Was tryingto take advantage 
of the confusion caused by thd*coup,. whdreas in reality he 
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quarrel Akhririd went back to the Band Huzmar. and made con- 
tact with al-'Abl . 
"Sinwana" . (sic) of the 'Anjara tribe, north 
of the Tangier to Tetuan road, and Wuld al-Asbalia of the 
Hawz. The links with'these tribes were. to prove of great 
use later. On 22 Augusti, AkhrIrra, 'together with a group of 
supporters, carried out a daring night-time raid into Tetuan 
itself , penetrating to the very centre of the city. 
2 At the 
end of August, he. brought, two leaders of the Bana Abmad, 
one of them a sharif.. of.. the. zawiya of. al-'Arab, into alliance 
3 
with the RIfIs. 
By the beginning of-September, bin *Abd al-Karlm's 
authority was almost secure in the Ghumara. The RIfIs were 
able to call upon it as a reserve for troops, and BU Laýya 
was sent there, for the purpose of recruitment. 
4 However,, 
when Bia Laýya moved-into the Akhmas'in mid-September, he 
was expelled after a few days. 
5 
At the end of September 1923, therefore,, the Rifis 
could count on controlling some of the Sinhaja and most of 
the Ghumara--with the exception of the Spanish posts on the 
coasts and In the WAd. 1 Law valley.. . This political and 
was desperately anxious for the support of the new government. 
Al-BU *lAyydshl jop. cit. 
_, 
Vol. IIj, p. 212) rightly dismisses 
this, but then goes on to claim that it was (a) after the 
coup itself and (b) the result. of a raid carried out by 
all-r-IrU'on Tetuan, for which he was pursued. by al-RaisUll's 
nephew 'All,: thus showing up the "treachery" of the al-Raisrill 
family towards-the resistance-to, the Spanish. 
SHM Ceuta Leg. 20, Informaci6n Oficina Central, Agosto 
de 1923, nota, 24 Aug. 1923. 
2 
Ibid., nota, 25'Aug-1923, and al-BQ *, 'Ayydshl,: op. cit., 
Vol. II, p. 213-- 
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 20, Informaci6n: Oficina Central, Agosto 
deý1923, nota, 30 Aug., 1923. 
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, 'Informaci6n'Septiembre, Resumen' 
General de Confidencias, 9 Sept. 1923. 
5 SHM Ceuta Leg. 20, ' Resumen Politica de' Larache, 15 de 
priembre de 1923, nota, 13 t. 1923, and 
nota, 16, Sept. 1523. 
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military advantage was the result of local-opposition to the 
Spanish, of theýRlflsl use-of force, and of fear of the French. 
It made up for the relative'failure of the action against 
the Spanish in the east. 
The Campaign in. the East 
After the temporary subjection of 'Amar b. Vam1du 
and Bil-Qlsh in May 1923 and the retirement of 'Abd al-Malik 
to the Spanish zone to take charge of his new ýarka there, 
bin 'Abd al-Karim was able to devote his energies to the 
Spanish on the eastern front. -In fact, things 
did not work 
out quite. as he wanted. 
The first attack came at the beginning of June. 
'Abd al-Sal&m b. al-vaii Muband, who had been appointed the 
first Minister of War in the new Rif! 'government, had 
decided on a, full attack on the. Spanish forward position at 
2 
Tizzl "Azzd.. In the first day s fighting, the Spanish 
suffered heavy casualties--two. officers were killed, seven 
wounded, and there were 100 casualties. among thd 'other ranks 
--mostly Moroccan Regulares. 
3 In the days that followede 
the Rifis' made great efforts to take the position. They 
succeeded in cutting off the supply. route to the Spanish 
position and in denying it access to water. The Spanish 
replied with*gas bombs-dropped by their aeroplanes, but the 
garrison at, Tlz'zl under siege and in a des- 
perate situation. Idris'b. SaIld tried. to organise negoti- 
ations through 'Azdrq&ri; at the. *same 'time as trying to 
persuade a Rif. 1 to poison bin,. "Abd al-Karlm In exchange. 1or 
p. 523. 1 See above; 
2 Skiraj, -qý-* cit., P. 95- 
3 
-The Times, -2 June 1923, p. 11, dated Madrid,, 1'June-1923. 
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a "bucket of money". 
' This was IdrIs b. SaIld's last 
important action, for he was shot a. fortnight later. In 
the event, it was unnecessary, for on 5 June Spanish forces, 
despite more "heavy losses", broke through to TIzzI . Azza . 
with supplies. 
2 
This attack proved to be the undoing of 'Abd 
al-SalArd b. al-Vaji Mu1jand as well., He made the mistake of 
involving himself in political affairs beyond his brief qnd 
gave people who had pro-Spanish inclinations permission to 
visit Idrls. '. al-Rif 1 In Taf arsit. Two of these people were 
genuine spies. They were executed and 'Abd al-Salam was 
removed from office for his indiscretion, although bin 'Abd 
al-Karim apparently recognised. that there was no bad Inten- 
,, 
2 tion behind his actions . Possibly this would not on its 
own have been enough'to end. his. "career, but he had also failed 
to take TIzzI"Azza, *and this doubtless sealed his fate. 
4 
other qVids were arrested at the'same*time,,, including Vaddu 
b. Mu4. Amziyyan, from the same clan as 'Abd al-Salam, the 
Banf1. BU-'AyyTRsh. In all, bin 'Abd. al-Karim was-reported to 
have replaced 42 qVids of varying degrees of authority 
5 because of their military inadequacies. 
However, the strength of the'l)arka on the eastern 
front did not decline. The'ýarka.. regrouped at'Amz&wrQ--ý-a 
thousand men were there on 22 Juner-along with 500 in Jabal 
Yuddiea. 
. 
-Three days later,. these had been dispersed between 
various positions ý'nd been joined by more: ' and'over 3,000 
....... ...... 
SkIraj, op. 'cit-r PO . 95. 2"The Times, 7 June. 1923jp*, dated Madrid, 5 June 1923. 
3 SkIraj, on. ''Cit., P. 91. 
4 Cab. Reb. ' 1913-1927, p. 320 
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, 
-Informaci6n 
Julio, Resumen, 3 July, ' 
1923. 
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men were distributed at various points on the eastern front. 
' 
Bin 'Abd al-Karim called for more volunteers at 
the end of June, 
2 by which time, as a result of the measures 
he had taken against inefficient and corrupt-q7alids, moral e 
was considerably higher.. 
3 
Nevertheless, the purge continued. 
"Amar b. $adlq, of the BanQ VadhIfa, a man who for 
4 
long had had links with the Spanish, was arrested along 
with others, 
5 
and Bil-QIsh was apparently worried that the 
6 
same would happen to him. 
Bin 'Abd al-Karlm spent most of the month trying 
to organise. the barka against the Spanish. The intention 
seems to have been to hold the operations at the same time 
as those in the Ghumara, possibly in the hope of repeating 
the victories of July 1921, just two years before. However, 
there were some difficulties. 'Amar b. IV4m! du. had involved 
himself in a feud with 'Abd al-Sal&m Uld al-Yidrl, 'and Bri . 
Labya was sent to the MarnIsa to sort out that problem. 
7 
Then the 'Id al-KabIr'came at the end of July and Bin 'Abd 
al-Karlm put off all operations until ten days after the 
festival to give the more distant tribes time to regroup 
8 
and to provide 500, men each. Next the al-Matalsa 
1 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Informac6n Junio*, S1 Mulýammad 
al-Faýs.! 'and Muýarrmad b. al-V&jj 'All Ighdrbl, ' 22 June 
1923, and Va 
, 
mid b. Talýar b. MukhtAr' (Banil'Sidal),, 25 June 1923. 
2 
SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Informaci6n, Julio, Samuel Benhammu, 
1 July 1923.. 
3 Ibid., Resument 3 July 1923. 
4 See above, p. 174. 
5 SHM Melilla Leg. -23, 
': Enformaci6n Julio, Informaci6n Batil,, 
5 July 1923. 
6 Ibid., Elias Benhammu, 9 July 1923. 
7 Ibid., Mutiammad b. 'Abd al-Qadir al-Fal; sl. and Mubammad b. 
al-VM33 Ighdrbl, * 14 July 1923. 
8- Ibid., 'Abd al-Salam. al-Fannas'sl, ' 18 July 1923. 
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started feuding and a representative had. to be sent to sort 
out that quarrel. 
1 
At the end of August bin tAbd al-Karim was showing 
signs of losing patience with local leaderships. He 
replaced most of the military commanders he had dismissed 
at the beginning of the month with. people he could trust. 
Significantly, all these replacements were men from the 
central Rif, with the exception of IdrIs'b. MimOn Khiljja 
of the BanQ Bil Ifrrar. * and Muhzqrmad b. Talýar of the Banfl Shikdr. 
E ven some of the tribal qVids were replaced, and SI . 
"Amar 
BU. 'Azza of the BanQ Waryaghal was appointed over the 
remaining part of the BanU Sa'Id that was not under Spanish 
domination. 2 
To accompany the reorganisation of the military 
command, bin 'Abd al-Karim decided to impose a tighter control 
on recruitment. In mid-August, he gave up calling for ýarkas 
in the markets and instructed his*-qa"ids-to organise them 
through conscription at once. 
3 The adoption of a policy of 
compulsion was immediately successful, troops were raised 
and the offensive began again on 19 August. 
There were heavy attacks. on AfrAw on. the first day 
and then even more serious action against the Spanish pos- 
ition at Tifarwin', -a few*miles to the'sOuth-west. 
4A large 
R1f1 tarka arrived on 21 August, 
5 but it was too late to 
.............. 
1 Ibid., Informaci6n Batil, 30 July 1923. 
2 Ibid. 1' *Abd al-dZidir. Wuld Sdlýiml, *30 July 1923. 3 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Informaci6n Agostor S! Muýammad b. 
'Abd al-Qadir al-Faýsl, '13 Aug. 1923. 
4 The Times, 20 aug. 1923, p. 10, dated Madrid, 19 Aug. 
1923; 21 AUg. 1923, p. 8,, dated Madrid, 20 Aug. 1923; 
22 Aug. 1923, p. 8, dated Madrid, 21 Aug. 1923. 
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Informaci6n Agosto, 'Abd al-QAdir 
Wuld STRý: iml, *22 Aug. 1923. 
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help in action, for Tifarwiri was relieved on 22 August with 
the loss of 800 Spanish casualties. 
1 Despite the failure of 
the attack more'Rif! 'forces moved into the area. By the end 
of the month there were at least 2,500 men in the BanQ 
Walishak and BanQ. TQzIri. alone. 
2 
Certainly the campaign had failed, but the Spanish 
had only just saved their positions. As a result of the 
purges of inef f icient and corrupt* ýýrka leaders and Sa 'Ids 
and the far greater level of mobilisation achieved during 
the campaign, the eastern front-was made firm at a time when 
the campaign for the Ghumara was about to begin. 
Conclusion 
The period between the proclamation of bin 'Abd 
al-Karim in January 1923 and September of the same year 
was spent, on. the Rif. 1 side, in strengthening his authority 
in the Rif and in enforcing it in the Ghumara... In the Rif,, 
tAmar b. V(Eýmidu and Bil-Q1sh were defeated and-for'ced. to 'ý 
join the Rif! 'forces. It is important to realise just what 
happened here. From the point of view of bin 'Abd al-Karlm, 
'Amar b. Vamidu and Bil-Qlshwer'e rebels who refused to 
recognise his authority in-thd Rlf;,, from their own point 
of view they were not, for, until they were forced to, they 
did not recognise the validity of the state at all. They 
chose to opt out Of the new state, to remain independent 
of the Rifis'and rý'ly on Spanish*support for their autonomy. 
nowever,. in. choosing to opt out of thd'Rlfl 'State, ' 'Amar 
The Tirned,, 23 Aug. 1923, ' p. 10, dated Madrid, 22 Aug* 
1923, and 2; r-Aug. 1923, * P. 8, dated Madrid,. -23. Aug. 1M. 
2 SHM Melilla, Leg. 20, ' 'Inforrnaci6n' Agosto, Informaci6n de 
1923, Tafarsit, 23 Aug. and -Muhammad b. Ta4ar b. ' Mukht&r, 
27 Aug. 1923. 
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bin Tjamidu, Bil-QIsh and others were forced to rely for their 
strength on local alliances, and because they did not control 
the security of the area where the haqa-fines still obtained, 
they were vulnerable to the unified authority of bin 'Abd 
al-Karim. This was not, therefore, a civil war between two 
contenders for power within the Rif! state, but a war of 
expansion carried out by the central Rif! tribes at the 
expense of the Marnis'a and Gaznaya. The same is true of the 
Ghum&ra, where the situation was even clearer. Although the 
RIfIs were joined by powerful supporters--Tuh5m! al-Wazzani 
in the Banri. KhZilid, and Akhrlril, a renegade from al-Raisfill 
--the main effort was made through bringing Rif! troops 
into the area in July and August, crushing the revolt against 
Rif! taxation. By the end of September, the Rifis held 
the Ghum&ra', with the exception of scattered Spanish posts, 
principally along the coast. This was done by force, just 
as the defeat of 'Amar b. VamIdu had been achieved. Bin 'Abd 
al-Karim relied on force more and more, for it was. the only 
way to take control--efforts at buying support were as inef- 
fective for him as they had been for the Spanish. As a, 
result, the Rifis'began to act as an army of occupation in the 
Ghum7ara, burning houses and-raping women. They did not, by 
and large, 'control the. Jibdla, which was largely still under 
the waning- control of al-Raisilli or of the Spanish but the 
Rifis. could control'the northern Sinhajan tribes through their 
alliance with, the Akhamlishin, although they had not yet 
expanded into the southern Sinhdja, nor into the large 
BanCllarwdl tribe to the south-west. As the eastern line 
proved to be unassailable, this was obviously the direction 
for one of the next moves of expansion and conquest. 
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The other direction was towards the Jibala, where 
the Spanish were largely on the 'defensive. Here there were 
two opponents--thd Spanish, * and some 'of the Jiballs' them- 
selves, who, encouraged by al-Rai'sQll, would oppose them. 
The fact remains that bin 'Abd al-Karlm was quite 
clearly on the'offensive. He was more and more self-confident, 
and his propaganda reflected this. In mid-July he sent a 
letter of encouragement to the Akhamllshlný in Zarqat: and 
Targls: t, and to Qa9id Kuyas'of the Zarqat',, telling them to 
call a meeting with Sinhaj*a tribes of TaghzUt and Kitarria. 
This was done, and a letter f rom him was read. Bin 'Abd 
al-Kar1rd laid great emphasis on the support he said he was 
receiving from the Turks. He had rejected four Spanish - 
peace offers on Turkish Anstructions. The Turks had sent him 
money and, significantly, a flag. Turkish boats were coming 
in two months to unload supplies on the'coasts of the 
Buqquya and BanU bU. Fraý:.: To prove his point,, he sent 
Turkish coins with the letter. This, he said, was a war to 
protect Islam, but there'followed a piece'of secular 
nationalism. They should learn from history, he said. Spain 
had thrown them-out of the Iberian peninsula, robbed them 
of great works of art and literature, * "vexed" their women,, 
and sacked their homes; now "Spain has come to Morocco with 
the same intentions, and a few years after they have 
occupied all the tribes, it. will do the same things. "' It 
is doubtf ul whethe'3F his audience knew very much 'of art or 
literature, but that is not thd'point. - Thd lost treasures 
of al-Andalus-had been used in thd'past as a-symbol of trad- 
itional p m4ty wi. th'Spain,. and they were so used here.. 
1 -Ibid., 'Abd al-SalAm, al-Fannas*s1j, '18 July 1923. 
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The self-confidence was well justified, for bin 
*Abd al-Karlm's personal authority was growing stronger all 
the time. He hdd been proclaimed as' 'aYalf al-mu"mifilri in 
January and. February 1923 and by August of the same year his 
authority was almost unchaLlengedble in the Rif. From now 
on, the'r6le of bin 'Abd al-Karim, as an individual became 
more and more. distinct. It was. hd who gave instructions to 
the qa2lds to raise conscripted troops and he, on his personal 
initiative, who replaced a. large proportion. of those *qa": ids, 
and other offici4ls-,,, with-people he trusted. An example of 
this is the removal of 'Abd. al-Salam bin al-jja. j'j Mubaýnd as 
Minister of War. ýAbd al-Salam-was one of the few members 
of the top level of the government who was not in some way 
related to the amit. He was replaced by a brother-in-law, 
and cousin of bin 'Abd al-Karlm, 'Si A4mad Bri Dra':. There 
was a perfectly good reason, for this change'of command--the 
political errors of 'Abd al-Salam;. nevertheless, it had 
the result of further centering authority onto th&**aAn1r'and 
his immediate family. .. Thd'Rlfl movement had already 
moved far-away from. an alliance'of tribes against the Spanish 
towards a government controlled from above by the members of 
one important. family, aided by certain individuals from 
Out. ýide. It was another example. 'of. thd progress towards the 
formation of a government in thd style *of the, makhzan in the 
Rif, and one whicli, 'depended greatly on the use 'of coercion, 
rather than agreem6int. 
In the monthd thdt. followed, this. coercive power 
would be turned against the Jibala and the'people 'of'thdt region 
would be 'obl. iged to join. thd RIfI . 'state. 
* There would be no 
way of redisting thd'coeiýcive*presýsure'of the RTfls*because 
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the Spanish forces in the Jibala would themselves be ejected 
from the area under the attack of. a superior Rlfl 'army. 
Chapter XI 
THE EXPANSION OF THE 'RIF!: STATE 
"I exerted myself to the utmost to free my land from 
the influence of the shaykhs of the orders who are 
an obstacle in the way of any sort of freedom and 
independence ... 
(they]. were the bitterest enemies 
both of myself and of the progress of my country. 
They omitted nothing in their efforts to frustrate 
my policy ... 11 
Bin 'Abd al-Karlrrý speaking in 1927 of, his quarrel 
with the 
_tarlqas. 
"As for the people of the GhumarAr they are greatly 
Afflicted by the taxed which'thdy have'tO give, by 
hunger and so on 
The economic conditions in the Ghumara under Rif! . 
occupation, described by the pro-Spanish'khallfa of the Bania 
BU *Zrcl, ' February 1924". 
2 
"The tr-ibe of the Bana Warrayn, who have emigrated in 
the cause of God, earnestly desire to be under your 
command, and to join you, to seek refuge with you 
from the' enemies of. God, the French, * under your rule 
which is based on the pure 'sharl'a 
Five of the leaders of the' Banil Warrayn confederacy 
in the Middle Atlas, south of Taza writing to bin 'Abd 
al-Karlm in April 1924.3 
1 Speaking in an interview in Al-Man&r, Vol. 27, pt. 8, 
1344-5 A. H., p. 632. 
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. -22, Bajalato del Gomara, khallfa'of the 
Ban5 Bil, Zr& to Castro Girona,, 1 Rajab 1342/7 Feb. 1924. 
3 
-MAEF, M aroc 
517, p. 275, SI Mabammad b. Mubammad al--! 'Al&wl: 
al-Warrayn! 'al-Tij7anl, '. Sid! RabQ , .' 
Sldl : *All Shallb b. Mulýand 
and Alýmad Tamast to Mulýammad bin 'Abd al-Karlm, 6 Rama4ari 
1342/11 Apr. 1924. 
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The economic situation described by the khallfa 
of the Banil Bia Zra applied not only in the Ghum2ira but also 
in much of the rest of the Rif'. As a result, bin 'Abd 
al-Karim. was obliged to look for ways of expanding into areas 
that he did not yet control and which offered supplies of 
agricultural products. Such an area was the land of Bania. 
Zarwal; but the attempt to annex this tribe brought bin 'Abd 
al-Karim into contact with the powerful leader of the 
Darqawlya tarlqa 'Abd al-Raým&ri. The resulting battles led 
to a full-scale revolt in the Ghumara, but one which the 
Rif. l. 'forces were quite able to contain and then put down with 
considerable ferocity. in the Jibdla, from where the Spanish 
forces withdrew in late 1924, another rebellion started, 
encouraged by another religious leader, al-RaisUll; These 
moves to resist the expanding Rif! *state explain bin 'Abd 
al-Karim's dislike of the Variq'as. However, although both 
sides attacked each'other using religious language,, it was 
not really religion but power whichwas at issue. Bin 'Abd 
al-Karim's increasing auth6rity'threatened the power and 
prestige of leaders both religious and secular. Al-Raisall 
and 'Abd al-Rabmari were not the only people'to oppose bin 
'Abd al-Karim, for others,, like"Amar bin, Vamidu tried to do 
so as well. With the exception of 'Abd al-Rabmari--and even 
his success, was only temporary--they all failed, because bin 
'Abd al-Karim was so powerful that there was little'or no 
chance of success. 
In fact, bin 'Abd al-Karim appeared so strong that 
the new state attracted the attention of people fightin. g the 
French in their zone of Morocco. - These people looked towards 
bin "Abd al-Karim for, help. However, apart from a few minor 
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brushes with French troops, bin I'Abd al7Karlm did nothing 
to help them for the moment, and concentrated on pushing 
the remaining Spanish troops out of the Jibala. 
However, all was not entirely easy for the RIfIs'. 
Their military problems, caused by 'Abd al-RabMdri and 
al-RaisilliAmongst others, were aggravated by the economic 
situation in the Rif. So, before discussing the military 
events, it is necessary to survey the economic conditions. 
The Economic Situation-The Climatic Background 
As we have seen, the economy of the Rif was based 
on agriculture, and this was dependent-on the vagaries of 
the climate. Rainfall, which had been the determining 
factor on the harvests and consequently the level of resist- 
ance before the war, seems to have been good during the 
1922-1924 period. Of course, rainfall statistics were not 
kept by bin tAbd al-Karim's government, still less were they 
published in meteorological journals. Howeveiý, an overall 
impression may be gained by examining the returns of the 
nearest meteorological stations to the Rif: at Melilla 
and Tetuan. 
Between 1921 and 1924, the rains came with the 
expected regularity and with little fluctuation between the 
rainy seasons- -although there wase of course, yild fluctuation 
during each year. The important rainfall, which had to be 
maintained, 'was that between October and March each year. In 
comparison with the rainfall during these months in the years 
before the Rif. * war, the years 1923 and 1924 fared well (see 
table XI: 1 and, 2). 
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Table XI: 1 























Average over 11 years, 336. -75 inm 
Average for Melilla, 1 October to 31 March over 
years 1923-34 and 1943-55: 304.7 mm. 
2 
The same pattern may be seen in the Tetuan returns: 
Table XI:. 2. 
3 Rainfall at Tetuan, 1 October'to '31 March 
1918-19 391.6'mm. 
1-19-20 (record incomplete) 
1920-21 422A nun 
1921-22 450.0 nun 
1922-23 574.3 mm, 
1923-24 645.8 mm 
1924-25 682.6 mm, 
1925-26 848.8 mm 
Average'over. 8 recorded y. ears,,. 569.. 4 mm. 
Direcci6n General del Instituto Geografico y Catastralf Res- 
umen de las observarionbs efectuadas en las estaciones del 
Servicio Meteriol6gico Espanol'durante"el, afiO- (Madrid, 
1915-26) (Annual publication) (henceforth referred to as 
"Resumen de la observackonesý'). 
2, Meteorological Office, 'Tables ofýTemperature, Relative 
Humidity and Precipitation-Y-orthe World, ' Part'IV, Africa,, 
the Atlantic ocean south of 39-0N, -and the Indi'ari Ocean 
(London,, 1967), p. 6. 
3- Resumen''de las - observaciones, passim. 
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These figures, incomplete though they are, show 
that rainfall increased during the winters of the first 
three years of the Rif! state from 1921-1922 to 1923-1924 
and then dropped off slightly in the eastern R1f. in 1924-1925, 
and further in 1925-1926, while they increased in the Jibala 
and the west. In neither 1923 nor 1924 was there any rain 
while the grain was ripening, so, with these favourable 
weather conditions it might have been thought that the 
harvests in both 1923 and 1924 would have been good. This 
was indeed the case in 1923--but definitely not. in 1924. 
Since the weather was favourable, other explanations for the 
collapse of the 1924 harvest must be found. 
The Lost Harvest 
As might have been expected, given thd'weather 
pattern over the previous winter, the harvest of early summer 
1923 was excellent. 
' The BanU Waryaghal were reported to be 
trying to collect in their crops before any of the other 
tribes, ahd before the price of grain dropped as a result of 
it being so plentiful. The price of grain at this stage 
was put at 10 pts. the mudd. Although bin 'Abd al-Karim. 
followed the example of the traditional Moroccan makhzans 
and never appointed a wazir. to take charge*of agriculture, * 
he did make efforts to ensure that the grain was properly 
used. In July 1923, he gave orders that the' mills in the 
Timsam&n which had-fallen into disrepair during the fighting 
should now be put into. order. meady for. use. 3, . It seems ... 
The Times, 2 May 1923, p. 13, dated Tangier, 1 May 1,923. 
2 SHM Melilla. Leg. 22, Informaci6n Mayo, T. O. C. Comandante 
Interventor to Coronel de Tropas de Policia, Tafarsit, 20 
May 1923. 
3 SHM'Melilla Leg. 22, Informaci6n Julio, information, 'of 
Mutammad b. al-Vaj'j cAmar (BanQ Sidal), 24 July 1923. 
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likely that he gave similar instructions elsewhere. Despite 
the generally excellent harvest, bin 'Abd al-Karlm also tried 
to stockpile as much grain as possible, and in June, he wrote 
to people in the Spanish-occupied zone offering to buy their 
harvest as well. 
1 
That autumn, however, was not a good one for agri- 
culture, for there were too many other tasks which also 
needed to be carried out. The eastern front had to be 
2 
reinforced, from just over 1,000 men in September 1924 to 
over 3,500 by December. 
3 These figures may not be exact but 
they do indicate an enormous mobilisation of troops. At the 
same time, there was road building to organise--and although 
some of this was done by bin 'Abd al-Karim's prisoners, they 
could hardly do all of it, and there were defence works to be 
dug, and so on. Above all, there was the regular army to be 
formed and trained. Thesewereall reasons why the Rifis 
found it difficult to make time for sowing. The* Spanish 
disrupted. things even further. Thd*frequen'ce'of air attacks 
added to the Rlfls*l difficulties. 
Spanish bombing raids, in fact, seriously damaged 
the economy of the Rif. Market sites were moved--in the 
BanQ Walishak, for instance, 'all the* daily markets were' 
shifted to Ait 'Abd al-'Azlzin January 1924 and were held 
on Friday and Monday only. 
4 In the BanQ. TQz1n:, in an effort 
1 SHM Melilla Leg.. 22, Informaci6n Junio, Oficina de 
Intervenci6n, Beni Bu Yahy, Capt. Interventor to Coronel. 
Jefe'de Intervenci6n, 4 June, 1923. 
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Informaci6n Septembre, Resumen 
General de, Confidencias, 14-. Sept. 1922. 
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Informaci6n Diciembre, Sldl., Idrlsý 
b. al-Bashlr*, 3 Dec. 1922-. 
4 SHM Melilla''Leg. 24, *Informaciones Enero, Resumen General 
de Confidenciasp 21 Jan. 1924. 
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to avoid this disruption from air. raids, the important market 
at Azilaf' was held at night, as was the lesser Friday market 
of Ihababan. 
1 However, the bombs certainly did not stop 
the Rifis' from attacking the Spanish in the west, or anywhere 
else for that matter. Nor did they break the will of the 
Rifis'to carry on fighting, for in addition to inaccuracies 
of the Spanish pilots, 
2 the Rif'ls'had long learned to cope 
with Spanish bombs. As early as February 1922, some enter- 
prising people in the BanU Sa ' 1d. at BU . 'IrmZina, Talat and 
other places had turned the air-raids to good profit by 
digging air-raid shelters and then charging 50 cts to any- 
one who used their shelter to take refuge from the aeroplanes. 
It became a "new industry" for a short while. 
3 
However, while the RIfIs*were not too concerned 
about conventional bombs, the Spanish poison gas bombs, which 
they began to put into use at the end of May, terrified them. 
Fleming quotes a Spanish operations report on one'raid (which 
I did not see) as follows: 
"As a consequence it is known that 15 indigenous were 
left partially blind, scme'of these have'remained 
completely blind, and other indigenous, who were' 
close to the site of the explosion, suffered burns, 
accompanied by nausea whi: ch*lasted three, hours. Other 
tribesmen who reached the bombed areas some hours 
later. could still feel the burning effects of the gas. 
The post"bomb reaction is one-*of panic and fear that 
the bombing will be repeated. "4 
SHM Melilla-Leg. 24, Informaci6n Febrero, Resumen General 
de Confidencias, 23 Feb. 1924. 
2 Sheean, visitindthe RIE in 1924, noted that many of the 
Spanish bombs were dropped on completely empty countryside, 
Adventures, pp. 53-54. 
3 SMM Melilla Leg. 20, Informaci6n Febrero, Minuta para la 
informaci6n de hoy, 27 Feb. 1922 
41-! , Fleming, o]2. cit., p. 141, quoting SHM Material as explained 
on p. xiv. Fleming's citation of these archives are not 
easilyjollowed. 
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Political decisions also seem. to have made economic 
life in the Rif difficult. In February 1923, as part of 
his moves for greater independence after his proclamation, 
bin 'Abd al-Karim declared that henceforth no Spanish money 
was to be used in the R1f. Only French or "Moroccan" (i. e., 
Vaýssanni) money was to be tendered. 1 In fact,, this decree 
seems to have been widely ignored: people did not stop 
trading with the Spanish zone--which was presumably the 
intention--as a result. But there was a shift in the emig- 
ration patterns anyway. It had become even more profitable 
to work in the French zone of Morocco or Algeria because of 
the disruption caused by the'war in the north, and large 
numbers left both the Spanish 'and Rif! 'zones despite bin 
'Abd al-Karlrals best efforts to stop them. In September 
1923,22 men from the BanQ Walishak were reported to have 
been arrested in the Rif! controlled zone on their return 
from Algeria. 2 This is only an example, for overall figures 
are not available. They must have. beeri large, ' however, for 
on 30 January 1924 alone, some'20,000 French'francs were 
changed in the Spanish controlled market of'SQq al-Arba"a 
3 of Harrayg in thd BanQ BU Ya4y. l.. Bin 'Abd al-Karim tried, 
again, to stop the emigration in April 1924, and threatened 
severe punishments for anyone who went to thdFrench zone 
to work on the land. 
4 Nevertheless, many Mat&lsls'left for 
5 the Gharb plain In the. west to. woxk the, I ol lowing month.. 
1 SHM Melilla Leg. - 22, Informaci6n Febrero, S! Mubammad 
al-Fabq! . and Mubcýmmad Agliarbl, ' 15 Feb. 1923. 2 SHM Melilla Leg. 24, Informaci6n Enerol, Mulý, Qaddur Tahar, 
21 Jan. 1924. 
3 Ibid., Resumen General,, * 31 Jan. 1924. 
4 SHM Melilla Leg. ' 24, Informaci6n Abril, Resumen General, 
6 Apr. 1924. 
5 
, SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Informaci6n Confidentes, Allsa-b. 
al-Vaij, 24 May, 1924. - 
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Bin eAbd al-Karim attempted to prevent not only 
people from leaving the Rif, but foodstuffs as well. In 
February 1924, he forbade the export of eggs and chickens 
to the Spanish occupied zone. In an effort to ensure that 
food supplies to the troops were maintained, he expropriated 
50 baggage'animals from the Timsamari and 40 from the BanQ. 
Walishak and ordered that they be kept to take supplies to 
the ýýkasý--especially of bread. 
2 In a further attempt to 
assure his supplies, he reopened commercial relationswith 
the French as soon as the skirmishing with their zone was 
3 
over in June 1924, and forbade any further attacks on the 
French zone in order to keep commerce open. 
4 
The caravans 
from the French zone were of some'importance--and indeed 
were encouraged by Gabrielli, the French*Controlleur-civil 
5 
at Tawriat, as a way of collecting information about the Rif. 
Nevertheless, these measures did not help the Rifian 
economy. The harvest of 1924 was poor. Bin"Abd al-Karlm 
tried to stockpile as much as he could, and as it was harvested, 
6 it was moved up into the BanU. Waryaghal. it was needed for 
the army, of course, and this meant that there was even less 
available for the rest of the population. By September 1924, 
barley was becoming expensive. By October 1924, prices were 
1 SHK Melilla Leg. 24, Informaci6n Febrero, Resumen General, 
21 Feb. 1924. 
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 25,, Informaci6n Confidentes, nota, 9 May 
1924. 
3 SHM Melilla Leg. -25, Informaciones Junio, Resumen General, 
29 June 1924. 
4 SHM Melilla Leg. ' 25, Informackones Julio, Resumen General, 
9 July, 1924. 
5 Gabrielli, op., cit., p. 4. 
6 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, 'Informaci, 6n Batel, nota, 8 July 1924. 
7 SHM'Melilla Leg. 25, 'Informaci6n Septiembre, nota, 16 Sept. 
1924. 
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very high. Exact comparisons are difficult, because at this 
stage of the war Spanish Intelligence reports only occas- 
ionally mentioned prices. However, a pattern is visible. 
Barley and wheat cost 12 pts a mudd and 25 pts a mudd 
respectively, 
1 
as against 10 pts a mudd for barley in May 
1923,2 a 20% rise in barley over one year which is high but 
not excessive. Sugar rose from 2.50pts a pil6n in April 
1922,3 when the Spanish lines had been finally stabilised, 
to 4 pts a pil6n in October 1924,4 a 60% rise. However, com- 
pared with the period at the height of the Rif! 
in August 1921, the inflation was enormous. Then, in August 
1921, eggs were valued at 2 pts a hundred. 
5 
Now# in October 
1924, they were 13 pts a hundred, 
6a 
rise of 550%. an overall 
average of 169% a year. 
By October 1924, because of bombing, bad harvests 
and economic disruption, there was considerable hardship in 
the Rif. Bin 'Abd al-Karliri made an attempt at rationing 
barley by ordering that it was only to be sold to those auth- 
orised by him, 
7 thereby incidentally increasing the degree 
of centralisation in the Rif. But the needs of the war came 
before agriculture. In December 1924, bin 'Abd al-Karim 
1 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, informaci6n Batell nota, 26 Oct. 1924. 
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Informaci6n Mayo, T. O. C. Comandante 
Interventor to Cor. Tropas de Policia, Tafarsit, 20 May 
1923. 
ý SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Informaci6n de la 8a Mia, Abril 
1922, Informaci6n, Ddr Dr! Qsh, 3 Apr. 1922. 
4 SHM Melilla Lega 25, Informaci6n Batel, nota, 26 Oct. 
1924. 
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Informaci6n Agosto, Sultan, 9 Aug. 
1921. 
6 SHM Melilla-Leg. 25, Informaci6n Batel, nota, 26 Oct. 
1924. 
7 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Informaci6n Octubre, nota, 22 Oct. 
1924. ' 
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ordered that there be no further sowing, because all the 
men were needed for the barka. 
1 
This was despite the refusal 
of many Rlfls, at the'end of November, to send 4arkas to the 
Jibala because of the misery in their own tribes. 
2 Indeed, 
rather than join the victorious ýarkas for the westp or 
garrison the eastern front, by the beginning of December 
1924, people were again emigrating to find work, precisely 
so that they could avoid service in the 4arkas. 
3 
However, it was during this bleak economic period 
that the Rlfl'state achieved its most rapid period of 
growth, attacking first of all the lands of the BanU. ZarwTal:,, 
then the Jibala. While the expansion was not altogether 
successful in the case of the Banri -ZarwZil, 
it was quite the 
reverse in the JibdIa. Here, the Spanish were forced to 
evacuate all their troops and bin 'Abd al-Karirri imposed his 
authority, crushing first of all a revolt in the Ghumara 
and then one in the Akhmas*in the process,, notwithstanding 
the tension caused'by the economic situation. Partly this 
was the result of Spanish weakness but it was also the 
product of the growing Rifistrength pointed to in the last 
chapter. 
The Spanish Directory and Morocco 
When he gained power in September lo23, Primo, de 
Rivera-set up a "Military Directory" to take over the govern- 
ment of Spain; stý'ffed by "advisers"--army officers who were 
1 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Informaci6n Diciembre, *nota, 9 Dec. 
1924. 
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Informaci6n Noviembre, nota,, 27'Nov. 
1924. 
3 sHM MelillaýLeg. 25, Informaci6n Diciembre, nota, 6 Dec. 
1924. 
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inferior to himself in rank--rather than ministers, origin- 
ally for a maximum period'of ninety days. In fact,, the 
dictatorship lasted much longer, until 1930.1 In one 
of his first announcements he promised to find a "swift, 
worthy, and sensible" solution to the Moroccan war. 
2 
On taking power, he at once replaced the civilian 
High Commissioner, Luis Silvela, with a general Luis Aizpuru 
y Mondejar, who had considerable experience of Morocco--he 
had been Comandante General of Melilla from 1915 to 1919-- 
and who had been Minister of War in the Garcia Prieto govern- 
ment which the coup, had overthrown. However, despite the 
ending of the civil Protectorate in Morocco, Primo, neither 
sought nor wanted a great military expansion in Morocco. On 
16 December, he said: 
; "The military character of the movement. excites the 
suspicion ... that everything there 
[i. e., in 
Morocco) mill be done by military action, giving 
way to an era of permanent war. This suspicion is 
both reasonable and logical, although it is quite 
incorrect., 13 
Morocco, he said, needed two things: "A plan, and silence. ,4 
His plan was to try to cut down on the amount of 
money being spent in Morocco and to withdraw as many of the 
conscripted troops as possible. This was done--29,000 troops 
were sent home in December 1923 before their term of con- 
scription had expired. 
5 
In an'effort to maintain control in the Jibala, 
Primo at first looked to al-RaisralT.: Al-Raisill! 'was equally 
anxious to make a deal with the Spanish. His authority. had 
1 Payne,,. Politics and the Military, pp. 202-204. - 
2 Ibid., p. '208. 
3 Quoted in G6mez-Jordana y Souza,, op. ' cit. _,, 
p. 55. 
4 Ibid. j p. 56. 
Payne, Politics and the Military,. p. 209. 
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been much eroded by the Rif! gains in the Ghumara, and he 
was anyway a sick man--4is body was so bloated with dropsy 
that he had difficulty in moving. He was caught in a 
vicious political circle, his prestige was evaporating in 
the eyes of the Jiballs. because of his dealings with Spain, 
and yet he could only hope to maintain his power now with 
Spanish support. Not surprisingly he made rapid efforts to 
show himself friendly towards the new dictator. on 17 
September he wrote to Primo offering his unconditional 
friendship and help in fighting the Rifis'. A conference 
between the two was arranged in October,, but this reached no 
definite agreement. Al-RaisUll really hoped that he would 
be made khallfa of the Spanish zone when MQlay al-Maý41, ' who 
was sick, diedl. and indeed when the MQldy al-Maýd. l , *did 
die, 
on 24 October 1923, he considered that his chance had come. 
It was impossible, however--the French were decidedly against 
it, for one thing, and for another, al-RaisUl'il. 'S prestige 
had sunk too low for it to be worthwhile. 
Prima, also attempted to negotiate with bin 'Abd , 
al-Karlrri. Through Echevarrietal the Basque millionaire who 
had negotiated the return of the prisoners in January 1923, 
and the Tunisian Shaykh al-TijanI,,. 'he offered bin 'Abd 
al-Karim. the office of "Amir of the Rif", with a salary and 
internal self-government,, in return for an exchange of pris- 
oners and a surrender of arms. 
2 The offer had been made 
before, -after, the 13attle at Abarr&ft 
3 
and-now Primo, was neg- 
otiating from. a position of even greater weakness and bin 
1 Fleming, op. it.,, pp. 113-rll4; 'and The Times, 25 pct. 
1923, p. 11, dated Madrid, 24 Oct. 1923. 
2 Fleming, op. cit., pp. 117-118. 
3 See above, 318. 
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'Abd al-Karlx6 knew it, and refused. 
In January 1924, therefore, Primo proceeded to a 
reorganisation of the Protectorate. In the Melilla 
Comandancia he created a "vanguard zone" protected by the 
forward positions which were, somewhat ironically, named the 
"Silvestre Line", with prepared defences to which troops 
could safely fall back if necessary. I 
The administration was reorganised as well. A new 
government department, the Moroccan-Office, was set up to 
take over all responsibility for Morocco, and the High Com- 
missioner was made Commander-in-Chief of the army in the 
Protectorate once again, reversing the trend towards a civil 
Protectorate. 1 
The military problems were still daunting, for 
while it was feasible to build a line along the eastern foot- 
hills of the Rifto protect the occupied plains behind, such 
a policy was more difficult in the Jibal: a, a muchmore 
irregular and mountainous area altogether. Here the Spanish 
forces occupied hundreds of small blockhouses and positions 
which were difficult to protect once the surrounding tribes 
had risen. Primo, realised this and wanted to initiate a 
policy of semi-abandonment, by which. Spanish forces would 
retreat to secure lines.. Behind these lines the inhabitants 
would be disarmed and protected and the peaceand security in 
the occupied, area would serve as a focus of attraction for 
the unoccupied tril; es. A similar plan, -on a smaller scale, 
was proposed for the eastern zone. 
2 
Such a plan, understandably, was not welcomed. by 
Fleming, op. cit., pp. 120-122 
2 Ibid. 
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the leaders of the African army. The Africanistas (suppor- 
ters of an aggressive policy in Morocco) argued in the press 
against withdrawal, particularly in the Revista''de Tropas 
Colonialest where Generals Quiepo de Llano, Lt. Col. Mill5n 
Astray, founder of the Foreign Legion,, and Lt. Col. Francisco 
Franco, future dictator of Spain, all argued in critical and 
sometimes emotional terms against any withdrawal. The 
Revista was eventually curbed, but resistance from the army, 
and particul&rly f rom the commanders of the eastern zone, 
continued. As a result, Primo agreed to withdraw troops 
only in the western zone. 
1 In such circumstances, it was 
hardly surprising that bin tAbd al-Karim and the Rifls' 
decided to take as much advantage of Spanish weakness as 
they could. The easiest area into which they could expand 
was that formed by the southern Sinhaja, the Wargha and 
Banri. Zarwdl: tribes. Here there were no Spanish posts at 
all. All that had to be done was to defeat any local 
opposition. This was, however, more difficult than it 
seemed. 
The Expansion into the South-West 
The Banfa *ZarwTal is a large tribe south-west of the 
Sinhaja Srair tribes (see map XI:, l). Its territory was,, 
and is, immensely fertile and rich'in agricultural products 
--olives, grapes# figs, oranges, and in the lowlands corn, 
barley, wheat, beans, and so on. - So richwas it. -thdt the 
"ancients", according to one writer, named it "jabal al-zabib", 
the "mountain of raisins". 
2 Thus it was an attractive. prize 
1 Ibid., pp. 150-160. 
2 Mubaýmmad al-Bashlr* 'Abdallah al-rasl . 'al-Fihrl,. ' Qablla Ban! Zarw. Rl: --mazTahir havatiha 'al-thaa7aflv'a w-al'-i*itimdllva 
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in the straitened economic circumstances. But it was also 
a desirable political objective because the BanQ. Zarwal 
was the headquarters of the Darqawlya tarlqa, with its 
principal centre. at AmjUtt'inthe west of the tribe. 
In order to collect this prize, however, the Rifis' 
would have to control all the lands between the BanQ Zarwal 
and the Rif, which would mean securing absolutely their 
power in the Marnis'a. This was bound to cause yet more prob- 
lems with 'Amar b. Vamidu. Secondly, the RifIs'would have 
to secure either the cooperation or the obedience*of 'Abd 
I 
al-Rabmdri b. al-Tayyib al-Darqawl,: the leader of the tarlqa. 
This would not be an easy task, for 'Abd al-Ralpari since the 
First World War had had close links with the French. 
1 
Thirdly, they would have to compete with'the French since 
the supposed boundary of the French*and Spanish Protrectorates 
cut the BanQ Zarwal in two. 
At the beginning of September, therefore, bin 'Abd 
al-Karim sent two representatives off to the BanQ. 'Zarw&l:. ' 
They were Idris' b. MimUn Khujja, one of the few. QaVaylsý 
whom he still trusted, 
2 
and a certain Faqlh. BU Sha'mIr. 
3 
The Banfi'Zarw&l'do not seem to'have been very impressed. with 
these emissaries, for a month later some of them wrote to 
the Spanish "Governor, " of Sh&win,, Captain Costello, saying 
that they wanted to be in the Spanish sphere of influence 
because they were worried about the threat posed by the 
4 
approaching French armies. A similar letter came, at the 
See above, p. 185. 
2 See above, p. 629. 
3 SIP4 Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes, 1, Bani Tuzin, Shaykh 
'Alldl'b. Muband 'Allto Col. of O. A. I., received 9 Sept. 1923. 
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, 'Cartas Arabes, QVid Malýammad 
al-Murabit, - Sayyid 'Abd al-SalAm al-Zarbrjý:, and Shaykh. 
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same time, from another Zarw&l*l rejecting any 
dealings with the French, sentiments similar to those 
expressed, in November, by the Mazziyyat. tribe, which have 
already been discussed. 
2 
Bin 'Abd al-Karim clearly had to move with some 
speed if he was to do anything effective in the Banri 'Zarwdl'. 
At the beginning of November 1923, he prepared a Iýarka, 
reportedly of 600 men, with which to overawe the tribes on 
his route--the Marnisa and Upper Wargha tribes in particular 
--and tried to "enchant us with money and other things so 
that there should be a brotherhood between us and them, " as 
some of the Warghals pro-Spanish inhabitatnts put it in a 
3 letter to the Spanish. 
At the same time, bin 'Abd al-Karim strengthened 
his links with 'Amar bin VaýmldU.. He already had a telephone 
line from Ait Qamdra to bin ]Vaýmlduls house in the Marnisa, 
4' 
and had just started to build a road through the Marnisa to 
'Ain MidyUria as well. 
5 In mid-November, he appointed 'Amar 
b. Vzýmldu as Pasha of the Wargha, giving him-. the authority 
to appoint qalids in the region. 
6 The normal accompaniments 
of an extension of Rif! 'authority--telephones, roads and 
administration were being-introduced into the Marnisa and 
al-Vzýssan of the jamd'a of Tazghadra and-Pall their brothers 
who are with them" to Capt. governing Sh&win, 10 Oct. 1923. 
1 Ibid., Mulýammad b. al-Vdjj al-Zarwdli to Capt. Costello, 
governor of ShAWin, 27 ýýafar 1942/9 Oct. 1923. 
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, Cartas Arabes,, All the aIVAft of 
Mazziyat to Governor of Shawin, 11 Rabil. 111342/20 Nov. 1923. 
See above, p. '624. 
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes, 2, Marnisa y Wargha, 
unsigned letter to Col. Coronel, received'5 Nov. 1923. 
4 SHM Melilla, Leg. 23, Informaci6n Noviembre, Muýammad, b'. 
'Abd-al-Q&dir al-Fabsi,: 16 Nov., 1923. 
5 Ibid., Mulýammad b. al-]V&. j'j 'All Agharbl,: 17 Nov. 1923. 
6 Ibid., V&, mid b. Tahar b. 'Mukht7ar (BanU. 'Sidal), '19 Nov. " 
1923 and Mubammad b. Mubc-ý: mmadi, '23 Nov. 1923. 
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Upper Wargha tribes. 
Rebellion in the Gaznaya and Wargha 
Certainly 'Amar bin Vamidu was cooperating fully 
with bin "Abd al-Karim at this stage. At the beginning of 
September, the amitcalled for contingents from the Matlwa 
al-Babar and BanU. 'AmZirt to go to join him in the Marnis'a, 
and then move into the territory of the BanQ. Wanjil in 
order to subjugate that tribe. 
1 However, 'Amar b. Vamidu 
encountered some opposition from his erstwhile supporters. 
Ten men were killed. in the Wargha in fighting. which started 
when 'Amar b. VamIdu tried to confiscate Iýabus property for 
use in the war effort. The confiscating of the babus', not 
surprisingly, excited the opposition of 'Abd al-Raýmari 
al-Darq&w! 'in AmjQt: t,. who joined the resistance to the 
Rifis'. Bin 'Abd al-Karlrd sent 200 more men to help 'Amar b. 
Vamidu. Despite the 300 who were already there under Bri: 
Labya, these reinforcements were not enough, and bin 'Abd 
al-Karim told Akhamllsh and Kuyas. in the Targis't and Zarqat 
tribes to organise yet more help to go tothe MarnTsa. 
2 
At the same time, the first wave of arrests began 
in the Marnisa and Upper Wargha tribes. Qal. id B4Q. t: paid a 
quick visit at the end of November and arrested 17 people, 
who were taken to the BanU. Waryaghal, and the BQ Laýya column 
arrested 11 in the tribe of Sinhaja Ghiddu4 and two in the 
Marnigaý. 3 
SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Informaci6n Diciembre, Mubammad b. 
al-U4j'j al-Muqaddam, 2 Dec. 1923. 
2 
Ibid., Mubanunad b. 'Abd al-Qadir al-Fabsý!,: 6 Dec* 1923, 
and Muba 
' 
nunad b. al-V& ' 
j. j al-Muqaddam, 7 Dec. 1923,, and 
Mulýammad b. ! Abd al-Q&dir al-Pabsý!,. '14 Dec. 1923. 
3 Ibid., Muba 
* 
mmad MutapmMI,: 7 Dec. 1923, and Muýaimad b. 
al-ýýJj Mulýammadl, *7 Dec. 1923. 
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'Amar b. : VamIdu was still working for bin 'Abd 
al-Karit and he imposed a*heavy fine, allegedly of 80,000 
pesetas on the Sinhaj*a tribes because of the fighting that 
had taken place when 'Abd al-Mdl: ik was in the area. 
1 As 
'Amar b. VamIdu had at that time been an ally of 'Abd 
al-Mal: ik's, this was an outrageous example of double stan- 
dards, and the Marnisis', not surprisingly, refused to pay. 
'Amar bin Ijamidu may have been cooperating with 
bin 'Abd al-Karim, but his former ally, Bil-QIsh of the 
Gaznaya, was not. There had been a certain amount of dissent 
in both the Gaznaya and BanQ TUzlri during September and 
October which increased after Idris'al-Rif! Ieft the scene. 
For example, at the beginning of September, Shaykh A4mad b. 
'Amar of "AzrU wrote to the Spanish offering to reopen 
relations; 
2 
and Mubammad BU. Qaddur of the Timsamdri contin- 
3 
ued to write promising to submit when the Spanish advanced , 
although he had done this so many times over the previous 
five years 
4 that it seems. doubtful whether, thd Spanishpaid 
him much attention. It was in the Gaznaya, and to a lesser 
extent, the BanQ. TQz1ri, that the trouble for bin 'Abd 
al-Karim lay. It came, as usual, from Bil-Qlsh. 
In mid-October a quarrel broke out between Mulýammad 
b. 'Amar Akhittu, bin "Abd al-Karlm's main supporter in the' 
Gaznaya, and his opponents, apparently the result of oppos- 
ition' to. the q& 'Ids appointed by. . "Abd al: -Karim.. 
5 This 
1- S11M Melilla Leg. 23, Informaci6n Diciembre, Mubammad b. 
al-Va. j*j 'All Agharbl,,: 20 dec. 1923. 
2 SILX Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes, 1. Igzinnayen,, Mrqad 
b. 'Amar of 'Azrd to Col. and Gen-. l-"134111, Rec1d. 5-Sept. 1923.. 
3 Ibid. , Timsaman, Mubammad bra Qaddur to Colonel, 14 
ý4far 
134272-6 Sept. 1923. 
4 See above, pp. 187?,, 189,417, -for example. 
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 23' , *Informaci6n Octubre, Resumen General 
de Confidencias, 10 Oct. 1923. 
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quarrel ran in parallel with another one in the Banfi ' 
Waryaghal itself. It had*started in mid-September in the 
clan of BanVi Ba. *'Ayydsh and was led by 'Abd al-Salam b. 
al-: Vdj'j Mulýzknd,, the BU : 'AyyAsh! 
1 
. *who, a month or so 
previously, had been sacked as Minister of War. 
2 This 
struggle, in which the Banil BQ . 
'Ayylish received the help of 
the Banil . 'eAqql 'clan of the BanU Tilziri, resulted in a number 
of deaths--bin 'Abd al-Karlm had two BVI "'Ayyashl men shot 
in mid-October, and on 20 October there was a pitched battle 
at Arba'a TawrIrt, in which two men were killed and three 
3 
wounded. 
Bil-Qlsh, who saw his power being slowly eaten away 
by the loss of his allies and the increasing power of the 
RIfI. State, took as much advantage of the situation as he 
could. He refused to help in the barka at Mi4a. r, and started 
to plot with various shaykhs of the Warghd tribes against 
his former ally 'Amar bin Vaýmldu. At the end of November, 
he started to fight Akhittq and later,, at thebeginning of 
December, continued his campaign against bin'*amidu. 
4 
Later V 
in December, other clans of the Gaznaya decided to submit 
to the French in the hope of preventing bin 'Abd al-Karim's 
power from increasing further, and asked that the extremely 
1 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, 'Informaci6n Septiembre,,, Resumeri :ý 
General, 15 Sept. and Resumen General, 23 Sept. and Resumen 
General, 25 Sept. 1923. 
2 See above, p. 627. 
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, -Informaci6n Septiembre, Redumen'. 
General, 25 Sept. 1923, and Informaci6n Octubre, Resumen 
General, 18 Oct. 1923, and Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 316, and 
SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes, l, 'Timsaman, Mulýaýnunad b. 
IdrIs. *al-'ArqUbIto Col. Coronel-and Cmdte. Claudin, 18. 
Rabl'. 1 1342. 
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Informaci6n, Diciembre, Mubaýnmad b. 
"Abd al-QZidir, al-Faýs,!,: 1 Dec. lo23, and Mulýaýmnd b. al-IjZi 
' 
jj, 
al-Muqaddam, ' 2, Dec. 1923, and Muýarmad'b. 'Abd al-Q7adir 
al-Faýq!,: 8 De. c. -1923.. 
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pro-French Qd9id Midbub should rule them. 
' Like the BanQ , 
Zarw&l, the Gaznaya was divided by the zonal boundary between 
the French and the Spanish, 
2 
so once again bin 'Abd al-Karlm 
was brought up against the French. 
Not all the Gaznaya were opposed to bin 'Abd 
al-Karlm, however. In mid-December there were still about 
4,000 Gaznayls. 'on the eastern front. 
3 For the moment, 'Amar 
b. VamT-du was cooperating with bin 'Abd al-Karlm but this 
situation did not last. 
on 16 January 1924 it was reported that Mutamad 
Bu. 4fi. t,, 'who had been collecting a ýarka in the Jib&la, had 
been ordered-by bin 'Abd al-Karlm to arrest 'Amar b. Vamidu. 
The reasons for this order are unclear, but the attempt was 
singularly unsuccessful, for 'Amar b. Vamidu arrested Bubilt 
instead, and troops had to be detachdd fr(xn thd*eastern 
I 
front to deal with the situation. 
4 Consequently, 'Amar b. 
Ijamidu changed sides again, and renewed his pact with 
Bil-Qlsh. They were joined by Midbuh. -in mid-January and by 
most of the rest Of the Gaznaya. But Bil-Qlsh was wary of 
committing himself too far, for he remembered how 'Amar bin 
Vamidu had betrayed him. 5 
Bil-QT-sh was justified in his caution, for bin 
'Abd al-Karim made immediate moves to crush the rebellion. 
His forces in the Marnisa arrested a largenumberý of Marnls'ls' 
1 Ibid., lj7amid Mukht&r:,. 17 Dec. 1923p and Mubahmad b. 'Abd 
al-Qa&ir al-Fabql,: 26 Dec. 1923. 
2 See ýabove, p. 78. 
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Informaci6n'Diciernbre, ' Sidl Idrls 
al-Bashir', 15 Dec. ' 1923. 
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 24, 'Informaciones, 1jaddu b. al-ljajj 
Vamid; 1 Jan. 1924, and Resumen General, 16 Jan. 1924. 
5 Ibid., Resumen General, 17 Jan. 1924, 'and Informaci6n del 
Dia, 18 Jan. 1924, and Mubammad b. ' al-ljdjj "All Agharbl, * 
22 Jan. 1924, and Resumen General, 23 Jan. 1924. 
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and Warghis'. These joined a large number of people who had 
been imprisoned on 'Amar bin Vamiduls request at the begin- 
ning of January, a graphic illustration of how the Marnisi 
qAIId had changes sides. 
2 
Bin tAbd al-Karim, took considerable numbers of 
troops from the eastern front to deal with the situation, a 
price of 15,000 pesetas was put on 'Amar b. Vamiduls head, 
3 
and by promising to release all the shaykhs that he held pris- 
oner from the Bann TUzIri, he succeeded in persuading that 
tribe to send contingents against 'Amar b. Vamidu as well. 
4 
Under this, pressure Bil-Q1sh collapsed, and made his peace 
with bin 'Abd al-Karim on 26 or 27 January. 
5 At the end of 
the month, the Rif! 'leader sent another 700 men after 'Amar 
b. Vamidu, despite an attempt by 'Abd al-Salam b. al-Vajj 
MutLand to start yet another rebellion against him. Bin 'Abd 
al-Karim was now reported to. have massive forces in the Bann 
'Amart, ready to move into the Marnis'a--one estimate put it 
as high as 8,000 which was doubtless an exaggeration. 
6 But 
these were pursuit parties, for 'Amar b. Vamidu was already 
beaten, and fled to the French zone on 28 January. 
7 There 
could have been no clearer demonstration of how bin 'Abd 
al-Karim's power had grown.. In 1922, he had been defeated 
1 
Ibid., Resumen General, 17 Jan. 1924, and Mubqnd Qaddur 
Tah-ar, 21 Jan. 1924. , 2 
MAEF, Maroc., 519, pp. 139-140, prisoners nos. 79-96. 
3 SHk Melilla. Leg. 24, Informaci6nes, Muýzkmmad b. al-Vajj 
al-Muqaddam, 22 Jan. 124, and Resumen General, 23 Jan. 1924, 
and Mulýammad. b. 'Abd al-Qddir al-Faýsý!,. 24 Jan. 1924. 
4 Ibid., Resumen General, 24 Jan. 1924, and Resumen General, 
25 Jan. 1924. 
5 Ibid., Resument General, 27 Jan. 1924. 
6 Ibid., 'Amar b. -ýzýdlq, 30 Jan. 1924, and Mulýammad b. 
al-U&. jj 'All Agharbl, '30 Jan. 1924. 
7 SHM Melilla Leg. 24, Informaci6n'Febrero, Ampliaci6n al 
Resumen General, 6 ý'Feb. 1_9T2-4. 
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by 'Amar b. Ijapidu. Now he could expel. him from the Rif.. 
The mopping-up operations were severe, and gave 
Bil-Qlsht who joined in, the opportunity to revenge himself 
on ýAmar bin Vamiduls previous treachery. With the help of 
Muýammad. b- Tayyib of the BanU "Am&r. t --who also bore 'Amar 
b. Vamidu no friendship, having been imprisoned by him and 
1- 
'Abd al-Mdl*ik in the past- and Akhittu and BU Rabayl of the 
Matdlsa,, the houses of 'Amar bin Vaýmldu's supporters were 
burned, 85 Marnisis' were taken prisoner, and heavy fines were 
imposed. 2 On 10 February, bin 
"Abd 
al-Karim felt able, quite 
without foundation, to delare 'Amar b. Vamidu dead. 
3 
On 18 January, the people of Burid, in Bil-QIsh's 
own clan of BanU. "'Assim, petitioned bin 'Abd al-Karim to 
accept one of their number--but not Bil-Qlsh--as "intermed- 
iary betweenus and the Makhzan", and this was accepted by 
bin 'Abd al-Karim, 
4 
aftd, immediately after the'flight of 
'Amar b. 1jamIdu, new officials were appointed in the Wargha 
--for instance, Mulýammad b. 'Amar al-'Amarani Was named as 
amiri al-umanli " by the ma4akma of al-Mazimma. 
5 
With these appointments, the whole area came under 
Rif! control and the troops were moved back to the eastern 
front. In the Tafarsit. sectoro, the Spanish estimated there 
1 See above, pp. 481,610. 
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 124, Informaci6n Febrero, Resumen 
General, 7 Feb. 1924, and Resumen General, 9 Feb. 1924, 
and Resumen General't 12 Feb. 1924. 
3 Ibid., Resumen 6eneral,, 10 Feb. 1924. In fact, he es- 
caped to the Branls*and thence to, Taza, where the French 
kept. a close watch on him--ibid.,, Resumen General, 27 Feb. 1924. 
4 MAEF, Maroc 519, p. 206, People ofBurid to Mubammad b. 
'Abd al-Karim, 12 Rajab 1342/18 Feb. 1924, and p. 53, - 
Jamala of Burid-jjýa 
_pf 
new 'qa9: id,. . 12 Rajab 1342/18 Feb. 
179-24. 
5 Ibid., p.. 196, 'mabakma of al-Mazimma, letter 'of appointment 
of Mubammad b. 'Amar al-Amarani, 29 Jumada II 1342/6*Feb. 1924. 
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were 1,300 men of different tribes and a small number from 
the BanU. Waryaghal "which has the function of controlling 
the others, making them obey any orders given by bin 'Abd 
al-Rarim, and imposing sanctions on any who do not carry 
them out. "' Once again, by relying, on-. the strength of the 
BanU Waryaghal, bin 'Abd al-Karlm was in complete control 
and he could turn his attention to the BanU. Zarwdl. 
The Second Attack on the Banfi. ZarwZil: 
Towards the end of March, there was renewed fight- 
ing between pro-Rif! . 'forces and the 
BanQ Wanjil and Matlwa 
al-Jabal tribes of the Upper Wargha, who, supported by 'Abd 
al-Rabman al-Darqdw! In the BanU. Zarw&l, were refusing to 
supply men for the* Iýarkas_. BQ Laýya was dealing with the 
2 
Marnisa at the same time for precisely the samereason. 
The Banfl. Zarwdl were too disruptive to Rif! polit- 
ical influence to be ignored. At the beginning of April, 
Tuhami 'al-Wazzdni of the Banri Khalid, one of bin "Abd 
al-Karim's main supporters in the Ghum7ar. *a,,. was sent to the 
3 
BanQ Zarw&I to make propaganda for the Rifis'. Towards the 
end of the month, a 4arka was organised in Targist under the 
leadership of Mulýammad "Aqquh of the Banil Gamll and Mu4ammad 
Ku-yas of Zarq&t, with instructions to go to the BanQ Zarwdl 
to "force them tojoin their Muslim brothers in defence of 
the Rif. ,4 The Immediate. reason f or. this. attack was. that 
1- SHn Melilla Leg. 24,7nformaci6n'Marzo, Resumen-General,, 
12 March 1924. - 2 Ibid. 1 Resumen General, 23 Mar. 1924, and Resumen General, 24 ýFa-r. 1924. 
3 Sk1raj,, op. cit.,. p. 124, and SHM Ceuta Leg. 23,, Inform- 
aci6n. oficina Central', *Abril*1924, nota, 6 Apr. 1924. 
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 24, 'Informaci6n Abril, Resumen General, 
22 April 1924. 
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'Abd al-Ralýmdn: had killed another Zarwdll,. one Wuld 
al-Murdbit-. Uamid, whom bin 'Abd al-Karim had appointed qal. id 
of the tribe. 
1 
Making its way through the Taghzat tribe, 
between the BanU Abmad and Hitama tribes of the Sinhaj'a 
Srair, the forces of the Rifis'met those of 'Abd al-RalýmZin: 
at the end of April. In this first encounter, the Rifis. ' 
lost 16 dead and 'Abd al-Ralpn. an: only 7, so more RIfitroops 
were sent led by M4ammad Buba. t and BU La4ya, but the R1f1 
barka continued to come off the worst in the fighting. 
2 
After about a week the fighting stopped, while 
atttempts were made to find some grounds for an agreement 
with 'Abd al-RaýMari. Kayas went on alone into the Banfi. 
Zarw&I in an effort to contact him. He left the Iýarka with- 
out appointing a temporary commander, and while he was away, 
'Abd al-Ralým ari ordered his forces to attack the 4arka. 
Fighting started again on 20 May, and, on BU DrV. s instruc- 
tions, transmitted by telephone from AjdIr, 'Aqquh took over 
command of the Iýarka and withdrew it to the border between 
the Matlwa al-Jabal and BanQ ZarwAl. Meanwhile, 'Abd 
al-Rabmari moved into the Mazzyat tribe3 (to the south of the 
Matlwa al-Jabal), which had, perhaps unwillingly, joined the 
Rifis' in November 1923. Bin 'Abd al-Karlrri also ordered that 
Kuyas be arrested but he fled back to his tribe, the Zarqat, 
and started a rebellion týere. 
4 
1 Ibid., Resumen General, 24 April 1924. 
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Informaciones Mayo, Resumen General, 
2 May 1924, and Resumen General, 3 May 1924, and Resumen 
General, 4 May 1924, and Resumen General, 5 May 1924. 
3 Ibid., - Resumen General, 9 May 1924, and Resumen General 
18 May 1924,, and Resumen General, 19 May 1924, and Resumen 
General, 29 May 1924, and Resumen General, 22 May 1924, and 




'Abd al-Ralým. an was now posing. a serious threat to 
the security of the Rifl. 'state. He had strong support in 
the BanU Siddat, ZarqAt and even the BanQ MazdUl and BanQ ' 
'Am2irt tribes on the borders of the BanQ. Waryaghal, based 
largely on his religious prestige. 
1 Potentially even more 
seriots was his growing alliance with the Bujdayn family, 
sharifs of the Nasirlya Varlqa in the BanQ TQzlri. 
2 This 
family had in the past been a centre of pro-French propaganda, 
'3 in their tribe. On 22 may 1924; one of S! Alýmadls sons 
was reported to be accompanying tAbd al-Ralýmari in his 
struggle against bin 'Abd al-Karim. The Rif 1 1eader was 
apparently furious with the two sharifs, who were attacking 
him in their propaganda on the grounds of his lack of 
religious prestige. 
4 
This alliance laid the ground for bin 
'Abd al-Karim's attacks on the religious orders because the 
resistance of 'Abd al-Raýmaft had sparked off, or incorporated? 
a general rebellion among the Ghumara. tribes, who used the 
opportunity to attack the Rlfl'forces in their lands. 
Rebellion in the Ghumara 
After control of the countryside'in the GhumAta had 
been secured by the RIfIs', earlier in 1923, the area remained 
relatively quiet for some time. ' Individual Spanish positions 
were from time to time besieged--for instance,, ' 200 men from 
the Banil Silmdri surrounded the position. at Taza, south--; east 
SHM Melilla Leg. 25, 'Informaciones' Mayo,, Resumen General,, 
23 May 1924. 
2 Drague,, op. cit. 
_, 
p. 206. 
3 See above, pp. *217,236. ' 
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Informaci6n Confidentes, Shar1f 
al-Uaj'j al-Faqlil b. Mutammad al-Ndsirl,. '22 May 1924. It is 
ironic that this particular informant should himself by a 
Nas'irl 'sharif. 
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of Tighlsas, in mid-October 19231--but the succeeding months 
were spent mainly in strengthening RIfI Authority in the 
area. The remaining tribes to the east, in the Sinhaja 
Srair, which had not fully submitted to the RIfIs' yet, 
were incorporated into the state. The qVid of the tiny 
tribe of TaghzCItSI 4mad b. SaIld, received a letter from 
the Ghumara announcing the imminent arrival of Rif! forces 
at the beginning of October. 
2 TaghzUt lay on the way to the 
MatIWa al-jabal and the BanQ Zarwdl:, and would be used as 
the line of approach for the attack in March 1924,3 so its 
strategic importance was obvious. 
In mid-October 1923, the Spanish authorities banned 
all commerce with the Ghum&ra through the coastal positions 
but this only made the Ghumarls'dislike the Spanish even more 
and did not prevent cheap food from being smuggled in from 
4 Shawin through the Akhmas'. In any case, the Rifis had 
already banned commerce with the Spanish-themselves--presum- 
ably in the hope of hindering Spanish intelligence-gathering 
and political work. On 10 October, the market at Amt&. r was 
deserted, a fact which worried the Spanish*considerably for 
5 it showed the extent of Rif! control. 
At the end of September or beginning of October, 
the Spanish began to receive a series of complaints about the 
way in which the Rifis' were behaving in the Ghumara. There 
was forced conscription;. for example., '. one. 'alLid recently 
1. SIM Ceuta Leg. iO, Informaci6n Central Octubre de 1923, 
nota, 14 Oct. 1923. 
2 Ibid., nota, 5 Oct. 1923. ' 
3 See above, p., 660. 
4 SHM Ceuta. Leg. 20, Informaci6n Central Octubre'de 1923, 
nota, 14 October 1923. 
5 Ibid-r nota, 10 October 1923. 
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back from a visit to the Rif, announced. that he wanted half 
of all the men to join the Iýarka; and there was a heavy 
burden of taxation. 
1 
Things got worse for the GhumArls', not better. 
Sid! M#and b. Qaddur, whom the new authorities wished to 
arrest, escaped to the "mountains" in the face of an exped- 
ition sent from the Rif! headquarters at Tandaman to take 
him. Finding no one at his house, it was destroyed, along 
with his property. At the same time a tax of 15 pesetas was 
imposed on each house. 
2 
People were forced to submit to 
Rif! 'authority because: 
"The whole Ghumara is like this, we have no 
power, no news or information, no leaders of pres- 
tige or experience. No goods come in or out, 
buying and selling has been cut; and, we have 
alreadý told you of the lack of salt and so on 
In January 1924 another collection of taxes was imposed. 
After the . 
15 pesetas a -house 
levied'ih December j, a tax of 
one mudd of barleyvas collected from each house, in order 
to buy food for Akhr1rQ1. s forces. 
4 
Nothing much could be 
done about this situation, however, for the Rifis'held many 
of the commanding positions. Each post was manned, on 
average, by 25 Rif! regulars and these forces were reinforced 
with local levies. Thus the Ghum7arls'had no hope of 
receiving any help-because the'Spanish were incapable, and 
al-RaisUll. Was even more distatasteful to them., 
5 
It will be 
SHM Ceuta Leg. ýlj Bajalato del Gomara, Muba 
' 
mmd Badr al-Diri 
al-Miman to 'All. by. Sulaymdn, ý4far 1342/Sept. -Oct. 1923. 
2 
Ibid., Sid! Mulýammad b. al-V7a 
' 
shim al-MimUni. to"All. b. 
Sulaymarij 5 JumAda 1 1342/14 Dec. 1923. 
3 
ibid., 'Vammadl Mushbal to"'All b. Sulaym&n, 5 Jumadq I 
1342/14, Dec. -1923. 
4 




remembered that there were discussions at this stage over 
the possibility of al-RaisUll becoming khallfa--but the 
very suggestion inspired opposition to the Spanish to an 
even greater extent. 
1 
By the first week of February the economic situation 
in the Ghumara had grown even worse. One of the Spanish agents 
in the area suggested that the Spanish should take advantage 
of this and bring the area to a state of starvation by 
preventing any foodstuffs from being moved out of Shawin, 
completing the blockade. 
2 As it was, the Rifis'were still 
stronger and were clearly intent on staying permanently in 
the Ghum&ra. The telephone line from Bani!. BQ. FrZilý was being 
extended along the coast. On 8 February, it had reached a 
point near Amt&. t in the BanU Gar1r. Nearby, at Targhassa, 
SaIld Wuld Si-Al-IAbId Afailal:, the owner of a mill, was 
obliged to grind 70 mudds of barley each night to make bread 
for the troops. The Rifis' further announced that they wanted 
a command post next to the former house of 'All bin Sulaymari, 
and one near Galdat. Interestinglyr these command posts were 
3 
referred to as fi'sina, an Arabisation of the Spanish-oficina, 
a vivid reminder of how, in the eyes of the Ghumaris', the 
nature of Rif! *occupation was very similar to that of the 
Spanish. 
By the end of February, houses were being built for 
Rif! troops in the BanU Ziyyat,, Banri 'Silmari and BanQ Mi ZrA. ' 
4 
Ibid.,, Khallfa of BanUBUZrato Castro Girona, 1 Aajab 
13427ý7Feb. 1924. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., Khal lfa of Banli M-2ra to Castro Girona, 2 Rajab 
13427-8Feb. 19247 
4 Ibid., MutLaumad Badr a-1-Din b. MimQn to 'All b. Sulaym&ft, 
17 Kabai 1342/23 Feb. 1924. 
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At the beginning of March, groups assembled at Tigisas, 
Amta. r. -, Qa'. Assr&s. *, and Tirinas, with the intention of occu- 
pying the Banfi. Sijjil and Akhmas'as part of a general attack 
on the Spanish positions. Akhrlrfi, *who had large forces 
near AmVa. t, composed of his own band and men from the BanQ* 
Manýfi. f, Banra Razin, Banil Samllý,. - Mat1wa al-Ba4aýr, and Banra 
Khdl'id, was supposed to attack Amtdr, TighIsAsiand Magan, 
and then move on to Tetuan (see Map XI: 2). On 4 or 5 March, 
S! Ma4a. mmad brought 200 Rifis. for the attacks on Amt-4r and 
Tighlsas; a few days later, two more cannon were sent 
from the Rif into the Ghumara, and 200 more men from the 
BanU Gamil arrived at AmV5. r. By 10 March, the Spanish 
estimated that there were 2,000 men mobilised on the Ghumara 
front. 
2 Yet, despite heavy fighting at Amtar on 11 March, 
the general offensive never materialised. There are two 
reasons. Firstly, bin 'Abd al-Karim wanted to concentrate 
on defeating "Amar-b. ljapldulsý revolt, and secondly there 
was a minor revolt in the Ghumata itself. 
The Ghumdra, as has been shown, was deeply upset. by 
the heavy taxation and demands for troops. Prices had also 
reached new heights. In parts of the Ghumara, people were 
paying one peseta for one of the tiny cups used for drinking 
tea, filled with salt. 
3 Some of the tribes took,. the oppor- 
tunity offered by 'Amar b. Vamiduls revolt to rise as well 
--the eastern Ghumara tribes of the flatlwa al-Baýar, Bana: 
SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Informaci6n oficina Central Marzo de 
1924, nota, 2 Mar. 1924, and nota 5 Mar. 1924, -and nota, 8 Mar. 1924, and nota, 9 Mar. 1924, and nota, 10 Mar. 1924, and 
SkIraj, op. cit. 
_, 
p. 123. 
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Informaci6n Oficina'Central Marzo de 
1924, nota, 11 Mar. 1924. 






















RazIri, BanU Samltl,: Banrl Garlr,, and BanQ Man;; Q. t started to 
fight the Rlfisý. But the"western Ghumara remained loyal and 
the rebellion died down. 
1 
But food remained scarce in the Ghwmara, and at the end 
of March the Spanish army in Morocco was hopeful that it 
would soon be able to invade the Ghumara, for the defenders 
had no salt or barley, and cartridges were expensive. 
2 
This really was misplaced optimism, because no matter how 
weak the Ghumar. is'were from hunger, Primo, de, Rivera was 
unlikely to grant permission for such an operation. Never- 
theless, bin 'Abd al-Karlm, took precautions. He made sure 
that his positions facing the Spanish were well manned--on 
21 April there were reported to be 1,400 at Tighisas and 300 
at Amta. tj and on 9 May, 825 at TalambUt.. 
3 
Also, a plan was announced in bid-April to disarm the 
Ghumdris'--except those in the 4arkas, of course. At the 
beginning of May, al-Uqttash was sent from the Rif to carry 
out this policy. 
4 This was not a new idea--bin 'Abd al-KarlrA 
had talked about doing the same thing in the Rif--but it 
infuriated even his supporters in the Ghumdra. Wuld Tuh7aml 
al-Wazz; a-nl, ' the pro-Rif! qV. id in the BanQ Y%h&lid, immed- 
iately disbanded his 1ýarka and went home, giving as a reason, 
as though one were needed, that he was worried about the 
threat from the BanQ Zarwal*, where fighting between the 
1 
Ibid., nota, 19-Mar.. 1924. 
2. Ibid., nota, 26 Mar. 1924, and nota, 30 Mar'. 1924. 
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, 'Informaci6n Oficina Central Abril, 
1924, nota, 21 Apr. 1924, and SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Informaci6n. 
Oficina Central'Mayo''1924, nota, 9 May 1924. 
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, 'Informaci6n Oficina Central Abril 
1924, nota, ly Apr. 1924, and SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Informaci6n 
Oficina Central'May*o *1924, nota, 10 May 1924. 
668 
forces of 'Abd al-Ralýmdn and the RIfIs*Was now in earnest. 
1 
Indeed, the fighting in the Band Zarwdl gave new 
hopes to the Ghumar. 1 dissidents, particularly after Xuyas 
rebelled against bin 'Abd al-Karim. A meeting was held at 
Jibýa,, attended by people from the Bana Gar1r, Banri Khal'idr 
Zarqat, Banil. Gamil and parts of the Banil RazIn and Mati-wa 
al-Baýar,, presided over by S! al-Vassan b. Sal*ilý, a sharif' 
from the Bana Raziri. The rebels appointed KUyas as their 
military leader and decided to start by attacks on Targist 
and to cut the telephone lines between Targist and Thalathal. 
Kitama,, and between Jiblýa and Tighisas (where they 
' 
had reached 
2 in AprilY. . It seems quite likely that at this stage, the 
rebels did not "represent" their tribes as such, for the 
different tribes rose one by one, and at different timest 
during the following days, as the dissident leaders returned 
home. 
On 13 or . 14 May, telephone lines between the Rif. 
and Ghumara were cut. 
3 Those responsible then proceeded to 
mock this particular symbol of RUI power. They took a 
sizeable length of the severed wire and. tried to shout down 
it to someone "listening" at the other end. Not surprisingly, 
he could hear nothing,. whereupon they announced that bin 'Abd 
al-KarIm was lying and that the telephone lines were a trick. 
Others said that telephone lines were unnatural, the work of 
Satan, and should be destroyed. This sort of behaviour can 
be explained, as ar-Bd "Ayyash! does, as "foolishness or a 
SH14-Ceuta Legý 23, ''Informaci6n Oficina Central, Mayo 1924, 
nota, 10 May 1924, and nota, 11 May 1924, and nota 14 May 
1924. 
2 Skiraj,, op. cit., pp. 125-126. 
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Informaci6n oficina Central Mayo 1924, 
nota, 14 May 1924. 
ýI 
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pretence at foolishness, "' but the telephone lines, primitive 
though the system might be, were a physical symbol of the 
technological and organisational superiority of the RIf. Is'# 
and of their political authority. It is not surprising . 
that their opponents in the Ghum7ar'a hated the telephone wires,, 
and took great pleasure in destroying them--quite apart from 
the tactical necessity of doing so in order to isolate the 
R1. f. 1s' in the west from Ajd1r. 
once again, it was the eastern Rlf. ls*who had risen 
first--the Matlwa. al-Balýar, Band Razli7i and Banii Samllý. * They 
2. 
attacked the Iýarka besieging Amtd. r, and Shalibb. al-Fala4 
was obliged to bring forces of the regular army from Tigisas 
to oppose them, reducing the numbers on that front. On 15 
May, 30 RIf. Is were killed, 
3 
and Rif! forces in the western 
GhumAra were cut off from support from the Rif. by the rising 
in the eastern GhumZira, although, the Band ZiyyZit,, BanCI BCI 
4 
Zra and BanCi Silman remained loyal to. the RMS. AkhrIrCI 
5 
was cut off in the Bana Sijjil. The rebels nearly caught 
BU Lalýya as well, who was in the Kit&ma tribe on his way to 
the, BaniI, ZarwTaI. When he found he could not get'through 
because of the rebellion, he returned as quickly as possible 
to Targist, hotly pursued by rebels who tried to capture him. 
They also failed to. capture the Rif! pasha' of the Banfl Khalid, 
and. Qd"*id A4mad b. 'Amar al-Buqquyl, * an important Rlf. 1 .' 
military leader. In the. tribe. The failure 'to. .. take. 
imx). Ortant 
Al-BU"`Ayy&sh1, -op. cit., Vol. II, p. --203. 
2 Ibid., -and SHM Ceuta, Leg. 23, Informaci6n Oficina Central 
Mayo 1924, nota, _, 16 May 1924. ' 
3 Sha'1b bý al-ý-Fal&lý. commanded one, of the' , tabrirs of the Rif! ' 





4; SILM'Ceuta Leg. 23, ' Informaci6n oficina'Central Mayo 1924, 
nota, 22 May 1924. 
5 Ibid., nota, 21 May 1924. 
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leaders caused the downfall of the rebels, for when Ba . 
Laýya got back to Ajdlr'he brought back the first certain 
news of the rebellion. Preparations were at once made to 
crush it. DU DrA ment to the eastern front, to Akhshab' 
Amghar. *to-ensure. that rebellion did not spread there, where 
it might have been fanned by the Bujdayn family, and 
Azarq&ri set off by car for the maýakma of BanU BU Fra4: 
accompanied by two Waryaghl! qVids, "Amar b. 'Allrish and 
'Abd al-Had! b. ýAzzilz', and followed by So men from bin 
'Abd al-Karim's own bodyguard. At BanQ BU Fr&4*.. he met S! 
Ma4ammad, who had. returned there from Targist, on his 
brother's instructions, again transmitted by telephone. 
Meanwhile, the tribes of Targist, BanQ MazdQI, 
Zarqat and BanQ. Gamjl had risen, around 23 or 24 May, taking 
the rebellion even closer to the RI: E itself, and making com- 
mon cause with the Wargha. tribes whichýhad risen in alliance 
2 
with "Abd al-Ralýrqan al-Darqawl.. The rising in. the Targist 
and. Zarqat is partly explained by the activities of Kuyas, 
and partly by those of Sl-, Maýaimad b. 'All'. "Slittayn", a 
nephew of the leader of the. Awlad Akhamlish, SI Muýaýmmad b. 
*adlq (who remained loyal to the Rifist. "Slittayn" had 
been present at the Jibha. meeting, and now he was joined by 
his younger brother . 
'All,. who was only. 19 years old., 
3 On 
1 Skiraj, op. cit., pp. 126-127. 
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Informacion Oficina Central'Mayo, 1924, 
nota, 21 May 1924. 
3 Skiraj, 'op. ''cit.., p. 125, and "Maghzen. Riffainl', p. 14. 
Mubammd b. 'All. was about 31 years old at the time, and 
after the revolt was protected by his father, S! . "All,: until he received bin 'Abd al-Karlhils pardon. Nevertheles,, during 
1925 he started corresponding with the French. 'All,: his 
younger brother, fled to Tangier in*Dec. 1924, where he was 
received by Primo de Rivera. on the younger 'Alllsýreturn 
to the Rif', bin-'Abd al-Karim imprisoned him until Muýammad 




21 May, the inland part of the Banra Samllý -joined the revolt, 
while the lowlands near the coast remained loyal to bin tAbd 
al-Karim. 
1 But the RIfIs'had already started to put down 
the revolt. When AzarqAn: advanced into the Mastas aj, immedi- 
ately west of the maýakma-at Banri. BCI Frab-. -repairing the 
telephone lines on the way--he arrested the*qal. id of the 
tribe, and sent him back to BanU BQ Fralý. as a prisoner. 
Fifty more men arrived to help him from the eastern front, 
and in. one engagement the Sharif al-Vassan b.. Salilý. al-Razlnl. 
was wounded and the main rebel force was split up. Kuyas 
fled to Fez, and 'All, *the brother-6f Slittayn, was arrested. 
'Abd al-Karlm b. I'All. *al-Vaýttash then wrote to Akhr! rU' 
I 
telling him to come to join them, and at AzarqAnIs request 
they proceeded to "punish" the rebels. 
2 
The punishment was very harsh. On 26 or 27 May, 
Rif! Iorces, led by al-Vattash and, Akhrirrj, 'ýattacked the 
Bania Garlr and Banrl Sam! 4. - Houses in the territory of both 
tribes were burned. 
3 The BanU. Garlr. quickly made peace and 
sacrificed a bull to the Rifis, and Wuld S! Tuh&ml,: aware 
now that the Rifis would win, quickly joined them again. 
This change of heart, at the end of May, was quite possibly 
hastened by a group of 600 troops, same of them from the 
Rif! regular army and some irregulars (mujAhidIn) led by 
al-VattAsh,:. who after dealing with the BanQ Samllý and BanU 
Gar1r. moved into. the BanQ. Kh&l'id to attack a'ýarka led by a 
paternal cousin ofl'Abd al-RalýMdn: ý1-Darqawl,: named "Abd 
al-Karlm. Al. -Vaýttash was joined-by 200. more. men from thd 
1 SHK Ceuta Leg. 23, ' Triformacl6n- Of-i6in-a *Cýntral' Mayo 1*924,, 
nota, 27 May-, 1924. 
2 SkTraj, op. ' ci*t. -, pp. 127-128. 
3 Ibid., p. 128, and SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Informaci6n oficina 
Central Mayo'1924, nota, 27 May 1924. 
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Rif--again led by two Waryaghlis', 'Abd al-H,! dT And 'Amar 
b. 'Allfth--with instructions from bin 'Abd al-Karim to deal 
with the BanQ XhUid and BanQ. ZarwU harka very firmly 
indeed. -'Abd al-Ralýmarils cousin only just got back to the 
BanU 'Zarw&l* in time to escape capture, 
1 but for the moment 
Rifi. forces did not atteznpt to follow him into that tribe. 
By 3 May the RIfIs'had regained control and those 
responsible--particularly the Banfi. Garlr--had been heavily 
punished. Any further opposition in the Banil. KhUld and 
Akhmas'was allayed. by a reported 250,000 pesetas sent by bin 
2 tAbd al-Karlm to buy support in that quarter. 
Other tribes were dealt with even more severely. 
In the Bani!. Razlii, the houses and lands of the southern clan 
of BanU. Qasim near the Kitama were. burned out. Once the 
obedience of the Banfi. Kh2ilid hadýbeen secured, the borders 
of the Akhmas' were attacked, and 20 villages in that tribe 
3 
were burned. 
By the end of the first week in June, 'the rebellion 
had been completely crushed and the Rifis were back in force 
on the W&d1 Law front; 100 Rifis. arrived at Tandaman on 
6 June. 4 The action had been taken with considerable fer- 
ocity, and crops and houses were burned. But now, when all 
was quiet, bin 'Abd al-Karlm ordered that the telephone lines 
be repaired, 
5 
and S! Maýammad himself arrived. in Targh&ssa 
with a reported 15,000 men.. 
6 
1, Skiraj, op. 'cit., p. 128. 
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 24, Informaci6n Oficina Central Junio 1924, 
nota,, 3 June 1924. -'- 3 Ibid., nota, 4 June 1924, and nota, 6 June 1924. 
4 Ibid., notal 6 June 1924, and nota, 8 June. 1924. 
5 Skir'aj, * op. * 'cit.,, p. 129. 
6 Al-Bri : 'Ayydshl,. ' op. cit., *Vol. II, p. 204. 
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The continued threat from 'Abd al-RalýMan al-Darqawl ' 
in the BanQ Zarwal'was also removed for the. moment. On 5 
June a truce was arranged between him and b. 'Abd al-Karlm, 
and on 12 June the Rif! troops began to withdraw from the 
Band Zarwdl. 1 
The rebellion was the last effective challenge to 
bin "Abd al-Karim's power in the Ghumdra. It had expressed 
fury over taxation, the lack of food and the disruption caused 
by the Rif! presence, and had been directed against the Phys- 
ical manifestations of the power--the telephone wires, for 
example. Furthermore, as specific evidence of the position 
of the BanU Waryaghal within the new state, the anger of the 
Ghumdris had been particularly directed against that tribe. 
At the height of the fighting, the rebels had told the Buqquyl .' 
contingents in the Rif! barka that they could return home in 
peace, for their quarrel was with the BanQ Waryaghal. 
2 
'How- 
ever, although they may have felt that the'threat came from 
the BanQ Waryaghal, bin 'Abd al-Karim had enough allies in 
the area--and in particular the support of Akhr! rU--: -to ensure 
his final vi ctory. 
Conflict with the French 
In October 1923, the Frenchlorces' hzid entered the 
territory of the'BanU Mazgilda. This. worried the BanQ Zarwal 
and they wrote to the Spanish asking them to come into the 
tribe. 3 In Novembei. 192.3, the Mazziyat tribe-in the, northern 
SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Informaci6n*Junio, nota, 5 June 1924, 
and nota, -12 June 1924. 2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, ' Informa: ci6n Oficina: 'Cen: tral: Maya 1924,, 
nota, 25 May 1924. 
3 S10 Ceuta Leg. 19,, *Cartas Arabes,, Qdl-id Muýa 
, 
mmad al Murabit,, 
Sayyid 'Abd al-Salam al-Zarbuh? and Shaykh'al-Vaýssan of the 
jamd'a, of Tazghadra and all their brothers who are with'them, 
to Captain governing Shawin, 10 Oct. 1923, and Mubammad b. ' 
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Wargha valley, equally concerned about French advances, had 
written to the Spanish explaining that they had joined the 
Rifts-because of those advances, but expressed a similar 
desire to work with the Spanish instead. 
1 Clearly'. further 
French advances in the Wargha area would eventually conflict 
with the Rifis" own expansionist plans. Not surprisingly, 
those most at risk, the unoccupied tribes-in the French zone, 
bordering on the Rif, looked towards bin 'Abd al-Karlm for 
help. Bin 'Abd al-Karim seems to have wanted to avoid any 
trouble with the French and tried to play down their offers 
to submit to him, and to ignore their, appeals for help. 
SkIraj, who does not give a date (but from the context it 
would seem to have been in the late. autumn of 1923), relates 
what happened when representatives of the Banrl Aýmad. and the 
Mastara tribes went to see bin 'Abd al-Karlra to of f er him 
their bayla. Bin 'Abd al-Karlm agreed to appoint-qVids for 
the Banri Alýmad, but told the Mast7ara representatives: 
"You are not included in this zone, and at this time 
we have no desire to interfere in the affairs of the 
French zone in. whichyou are included., For this 
reason we cannot appoint a q&I. id over you at this 
time, although we greatly r-e-j"H`Fe'that you have come 
into the sphere of the Muslims who are, vigilant in 
defence of the land of their brothers, and you will 
be well rewarded by God. "2 
Bin. "Abd al-Karim's reluctance to become involved against 
the French is understandable because he would-have wished to 
avoid a southern front as well, but other factors would 
inevitably force him to fight them. 
In, the past, the French had worked, through*'Abd 
al-lj&j*j al-ZarwTa]Ll to Capt. Costello, governor of Shdwin, 27 
ýafar 1342/9 Oct. 1923. See above, p. 625. 
1'' Ibid., All the alyari of Mazziyat to Governor of Shawin 
11 Rabi' 11 1342/20 Nov. 1923. See above, 
2 Skiraj, op. *cit., pp. 122-123. 
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S 
al-Rabiý&ri al-DarAwl In the Banri Zarwal:, -and since this 
alliance put them objectively with him against bin 'Abd 
al-Karim's expansion into the Wargha, that was another pos- 
sible point of friction. Finally, the RIfis" success 
against the Spanish and the subsequent declaration of an 
independent Muslim state in the Rift made it a rallying- 
point for tribes in the French zone who were still fighting 
the French but who had no territorial link with the Rif at 
all. So, on 11 April 1924, the leaders of the BanU. Warrayn 
confederacy in the northern part of the Middle Atlas, south 
of Taza--the famous "Tache de Taza"--wrote to bin 'Abd 
al-Karlm. They described him as: 
the man whose ancestry is good and pure, going 
back to the Caliph [of the Prophet],. God havemercy 
upon him and grant him peace, 'Umar al-Khattdh, may 
God be pleased with him ... Sidi:. .. Mu4ammad b. 'Abd al-Karlrri al-Rlfl,:. the man who governs in the 
name of God, may, 
'ye 
be exalted, God. 's 
. 
peace crown all 
your works ... 
They announced that they had "emigrated in the cause of God" 
and that they wished to submit to bin 'Abd al-Karlm's orders, 
because his rule was founded on the principles of the 
sharl'a. 
2 
They they told him that the French had surrounded 
them in their mountains and they were suffering greatly 
from the cold and the attacks of the French aeroplanes. They 
only saw their wives and children at night, they said, because 
by day they were hidden: 
"Indeed we are iike an island in themiddle of the sea 
So have pity on our state bedause*of our weak- 
neLs before God, may He be exalted, and his Prophet, 
MAEF, Maroc 517, MatLammad bin Muiýammad. al-'Aldwl al- 
Warrayn! 'al-Tijaril,: Sid! Rabu-, Sid! : "All, * Sha"Ib 
' 
b. Mulýand, 
and Aým. ad Tamast to Mulýaýmad b. 'Abd al-Karim, 6 Ramaýdn 1342/ 
11 Apr. 1924. 
2 Ibid. 
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God have mercy upon him and give him peace. You 
must come to our country from your own with your 
armies or however it'seems best to you. You know 
what must be done [to help]. us. "l 
With these three factors combined, it is clear that even if 
bin 'Abd al-Karim himself felt no desire to invade the 
French zone, he would eventually be drawn into conflict 
with the French. 
However, until now bin 'Abd al-Karlm had been gen- 
erally believed to be in league with the French. 'Abd 
al-M&l'ik had used this against him, and in June 1924, purely 
for its propaganda value; 'Abd al-RabMad al-Darqawl did the 
same. On 15 June, after the agreement with Bin 'Abd al-Karim 
had been concluded and the Rlfl., forces were withdrawn, 'Abd 
al-Ralým. an wrote to his opponent. He said that he would fight 
the French if they came to the Banfl. Zarwdl, just as he would 
fight the Spanish, for both were Christians. He could not, 
he said, understand why bin 'Abd al-Karim was, friendly towards 
the French. 2 The implication, of course,, ' was that he was a- 
better Muslim than bin 'Abd. al-Karim. Bin 'Abd al-Karim was 
not particularly concerned about such'allegations, and at a 
meeting of the alyari and q&. ids of the Rif and Sinhaja, held, 
after the conclusion of the temporary peace with 'Abd 
al-RaIMAri, at the Sunday market of RuAd! In the Buqquya, he 
told his audience that the whole rising had been organised 
by the murabitiri of the Darq&wlya order, and that those 
"traitors" were in league with the French, who' were advancing 
into the Sinhdja. He also told them that he*suspected that 
the French would attack the Rif. and that everyone must be 
ready to defend his. country.. 
3 
Ibid. 
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Batil, nota, 15 June 1924. 
3 Skiraj, op. cit., pp. 129-130. ' 
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on 16 June, presumably to give the lie to 'Abd 
al-Raýmarils insinuations, * bin 'Abd al-Karim wrote a letter 
to the French authorities in which he claimed they had 
betrayed-him, and that as a result he would have to seek a 
peace with the Spanish. It was absolutely necessary for bin 
"Abd al-Karlm to make this sort of propaganda, because when 
the French had occupied positions around 'Ain Midyuna at the 
_beginning 
of June, the Rifis. had not opposed them. Indeed, 
RifL. 'representatives had met the French and. negotiated with 
them. This had caused an extremely bad impression among 
the tribes bordering on the French zone, and people began 
to I say, that although he fought the Spanish, bin 'Abd al-Karim 
helped the French to occupy the. tribes. 
2 
So, on his return to Ajdlr'from saq al-Aýad 
Ruddl, 'bin 'Abd al-Karim called all his ministers and senior 
qVids together to discuss. the problem of the French who were 
advancing through the BanU Mizzyat-aridMat1wa al-Jabal to the 
edge of the Banr2. Zarwdl, and so to the edge of the territ- 
ory which bin 'Abd al-Farim claimed for the-Rif. On bin 
'Abd al-Karim's instructions, the Minister of'War, Bri DrA,, ' 
sent 500 men under 'AllUsh b. $adiq al-Waryaghli. to take up 
position on the border of the, Sinhaja Srair and Matlwa 
al-Jabal, which. were to be considered "the borders of the 
,, 3 amir"s authority. , These troops were to remain there and 
to guard the, border, but were to take no further action, 
unless the French a7ttacked them, despite a general feeling 
4 
among, the troops that they. wanted to attack, the. French.. 
1 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, -1nfo=aci6n'Batil, nota, 16*June 1924. 
2 SIM Melilla. Leg. 25, *In'formaci6n aunio, nota, 6'June 1924. 
3 SkIrAj, op. ' cit., pp. 180-181. 
4 Ibid., p. 181., 
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Thus bin 'Abd al-Karlih tried to limit his action against the 
French. 
However, for a short time, bin 'Abd al-Karim for- 
bade any dealings with the French, 
1 
and some of his supporters 
actually engaged the French in battle. In operations in the 
Sinhja Ghaddu and BanU Wanjil tribes in mid-June, 13 men from 
Mi4dr were wounded. 
2 When the French advanced into the 
southern part of the Marnisa on 20 June, the Rif! barka 
joined the MarnisIs' and Gaznayis in the resistance. 
3 However, 
hostilities ceased when the French advance stopped, and com- 
mercial relations between the French zone and the Rif 
reopened. 
1 
Nevertheless, the Rifis' had acquitted themselves 
well against the French. Fighting alongside. local people, 
they had stopped the French advance and forced it back, 
winning for themselves some useful booty in the process. 
There were'supplies of ammunition and some guns, and some 
livestock was also captured--or expropriated. BU Rahayl 
returned home with 25 cows. 700 RIfIs. who remained on the, 
French front, mainly in the BanQ Walld and Mat1wa al-Jaball 
5 
were forbidden to undertake any further action against the 
French, since bin 'Abd al-Karim. was concerned. to keep the 
commercial routes to the French. zone open. 
6 However,, at the, 
end of July, the French complained that Rifi. forces, had. twice 
1 SHM Melilla Legý 25, -Informaci6ft Junio, nota, 15 June 1924, 
and nota, 29 June lk4. 
2 Ibid., nota, 15 June 1924, -and nota, 18 June 1924. 
3 Ibid., nota, 21 June 1924. 
4 Ibid., nota, 29 June 1924. 
5 S*HM Melilla Leg. 25, * 11iformati6n Batil, 'Abd al-Sal7am 
al-FannZis*s1,: l July 1924. 
-6 SHM Melilla Leg'. 25, **Inforrnaci6n Julio, nota, 9 July 1924. 
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attacked them in strength in the upper valley of the Wargha. 
On 25 July, they 
Rifis'was driven 
attacks continue, 
were reported to 
between Taza and 
said, an organised raid involving 1,200 
off their newly occupied positions. 
1 These 
d into August. On 7 August, groups of RIfIs 
be fighting the French in the Hawara area 
Garsif. 2 
Apparently what had happened was that QVid 'AlllUsh 
b. ýadlq, who had been sent out to watch over the French 
frontier, had been asked by a group of the Hawara to come 
into their lands to help them against. the French, in return 
for, which they promised to give their'bay'a to bin "Abd 
al-Karim. "AllUsh, without consulting anyone, agreed and 
moved into the tribe, and as he did so wrote to. Ba Dr& to 
tell him what he was doing. Both BU DrA And bin 'Abd 
al-Karim were deeply concerned by what 'Allilsh, was doing, 
and that his unauthorised invasion of the French zone would 
cause trouble, just at the point when things were going well 
in the Jibala and GhumarA. Therefore, they telephoned their 
orders for the Rifis. to withdraw at once, and when this-was 
done 'AllUsh was arrested. 
3 
Sporadic hostilities continued for a while but bin 
'Abd al-Tarlm had more immediate concerns, than the French,, 
for the attack in the the Ghumdra and Jib&l'a. was reaching 
its pitch. IdrIs' b. MimUn KhGjja was transferred to the 
4 Shawin front and bin 'Abd al-Karlm forbade anv further 
5 
attacks on the. French. 
I The Times, 1 Aug. 1924, p. 11, dated Tanjier, 31 July 1924. 
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 25,, 'Informa'ci6n*h: gosto, nota, 7 Aug. 1924. 
3 SkIraj, op. cit., pp. 136--ý137. 
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, '*Informaci-6ri Batil, notap 22 Sept. 1924. 
5 Ibid., -'nota,,, 25 Sept. - 1925. 
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The first attacks on the French were unplanned 
and, by bin 'Abd al-Karim at least, seemingly undesired. 
However, the underlying strains remained and would reappear: 
rivalry over the control of the UVper Wargha, and the 
interests of the tribes in the French zone, who were still 
fighting, For the moment, however, the Rlfls*had more 
concern for the Ghumara and Jibdla. 
The Spanish Withdraw 
In July 1924, Primo de Rivera mAde it clear that 
he wanted to pull back the Spanish forces in the Jibala. and 
Ghumdra to secure lines of defence. However, he issued no 
time-table for the withdrawal. 
In fact, the timing of the withdrawal was dictated 
by events, for at the beginning of July 1924 the Rifis began 
a major offensive in the Ghumara. Events turned out very 
much as Prima, de Rivera had foreseen and the RIfIs*attacked 
in turn each of the isolated Spanish blockhouses scattered 
along the Ghumdra coast and up the Wadi Law valley. After 
the AjdIt conference in which the problem of the French had 
been discussed, S! Maýammad had gone to Targa toljoin the 
army commanded by al-Vattdsh and other, Waryaghll. 'and 
Buqquyl. leaders, along with a few Ghum&rIs', including S! 
Mubammad Mulýrýilsh of the Banra Silmari, and the important 
Sharif SIal-MakkI. 'al-WazzTanI,, of the zawiya of BU Alýmad 
near Tighisas, who later became the Rif! Pasha' of the-Ghumara. 
S! Ma4ammad told them to begin the attacks on Spanish pos- 
itions, under the'overall. command of AzarqZin . 
On 1 July, Spanish Military Intelligence reported 
SkIraj, op. *cit., pp. 131-132., 
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that a 4arka of 800 men was being prepared in the Rlf, to 
join in the attack on communications between Tetuan and 
Shawin. 1 
Azarqan"s plan was to attack all positions between 
TalambUt: -and al-Qub&l. Darsa--Skiraj says there were about 18 
of them--and at the same time Akhrlr. u- was sent with 200 men 
to, the BanU Vzcýssan to attack the road from Tetuan to Sh&win, 
al-Vaýttdsh and S! al-Makki al-Wazzani'were sent to attack 
the coastal positions near Wad! Law, 700 men (200 of them 
from the regular army) to Adghas', and the same numberto 
attack positions between Wadi Law and TalambfiE.. 
2 Clearly 
the RIf. Is* had large numbers of troops available (see Map XI: 2 
above, p. 666). 
The attack began on 27 June. The first posts to 
be besieged were at KhQj and al-Qubal Darsa in the Wadi Law 
valley. They were cut off for several days before they 
were relieved on 6 July. 
3 
Although the Rif! &' military activity quietened 
down once these two garrisons were relieved, the two Spanish 
columns which had been sent into the Wad! Law valley, one 
from . each end, did not finally meet until 23 July, 
4 
and- 
there were isolated attacks on other Spanish positions, for 
instance, on the Tetuan to Shawin road at SQq al-Arba'a, 
of the BanU Vassan on 26 July. 
5 
The semi-calm gave time. for the Rifis'to group 
1. 
SHM Melilla Leg. 25, *Informaci6n Julio, nota, 1 July 1924. 
2 SkIraj, ' op. 'cit., pp. 132-133. 
3 Fleming, -opý. -cit., p. 172 and The'Times, -8 July, p. 13, 




Ibid., 25 July 1924, p. 13. 
5 
Ibid., 29 July, p. 11, dated Tangier, 27 July 1924. 
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more forces locally and to move up others from the RIf to 
attack the Spanish. Al-Vakttash ordered the BanU Man*Ur., 
Banil Silmari, BanU Khal: id and Mat1wa al-Baýar to raise 365 
men for Akhr! rCi-'on 26 July. On 27 July, a reported 1,000 
Rifis under S! Maýammad arrived at SQq al-Ah. ad of the Banfl 
-Ziyy&t. ready to move on the Wddl Ldw positions. 
2 On 4 
August, 200 men grouped at Agalal ready to move on Qala'a 
overlooking Shdwin. 
3 On 8 August, Rlfl*forces arrived at I 
Md'Id on the western side of the mountains dividing the BanCi 
Sijjil from the BanU Ziyyat. 4 
At the end of the second week of August more 
attacks began. On 12 Augustj 70. men led. by AkhrlrQ 'attacked 
the Tangier to Tetuan road. in. the Wadl. Ra5s tribe, 
5 
and a 
general attack was started on Spanish positions between WddI : 
Mw and Ifart&ft. Telephone lines between Dat 'AqUba and 
Sharilta were cut, and the civilian inhabitants of Shar0ta, 
6 were evacuated. On 13 August, 150 men were sent to the Uawz 
7 to persuade that tribe to rise. 
On 17 August, the Banfl. ]VcEýssan joined the Rifis 
8 
and rose against the Spanish. Some of the Akhmas were now 
1 SHM Ceuta Leg. 24, Levantamiento de CSbilas, Gomara, T. O. C. 
Tte, enc. desp. to Cor. S. M. I. Wadi Law, 26 July 1924. 
2 ibid., Telefonema Capt. Interv. Gomara to Cor. S. M. I., 
27 July 1924. 
3 Ibid., Akhmas, T. M. Tte Interv. Akhmas to Cor. S. M. I., 
Shawin, 4 Aug. 1924. 
4 Ibid.,, Gomara, -TO. O. C. Capt. Interv. Gomara to Cor. S. M. I., 
Wadi Law, 11 Aug. 1924. 
5 Ibid.,. Wad Ras, T. O. Grl. Jefe to Cor. S. A. I., Tetuan, 
12-Aug. 1924. 
6 The Times, - 14 Aug. 1924, p. 10, dated Madrid, ý13 Aug'. 1924. 
7 SHM Ceuta Leg. 24,, 'Levantaziento'de Ccibilas, Gomara, 'T. O. C. 
Capt. Interv. Gomara to Cor. S. M. I., Wadi Law, 13 Aug. 1924.. 
8 The Times, 18 Aug. 1924, p. 9, dated Madrid, 17 Aug. 1924, 
and Skiraj, ' op*. * 'cit., p. 134. 
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also becoming committed to the*rising as well, and 500 men 
from the Gaz7awa, Akhmas',, and Band Vuýzmar. ' were grouped in 
the tribe. 1 On the eastern side'of Shawin. the T)ro-RIfI. 
forces were also approaching. Mdl'&y' A4mad al-Baqdr. 1 was 
reported in Igarmdn: in the BanQ Sijjil with 800 men, on 
19 August. 2 
Although the Spanish managed to relieve-some of 
their positions--others, such as KhQj, remained cut off. Worse 
still, Spanish positions actually started to fall to the 
enemy. Tassa fell on 25 August and 45 Moroccan Regulares 
and one Spanish Lieutenant were taken prisoner. 
3 
On 2 September, the Rifils. prepared to lay siege 
to TagsUt and Talalat Adgu-z, on either side of the Wddl ' 
4 Talambilt:,. a tributary of the Wadi Law. The position at 
Wadi Law itself had been cut off on 28 August both by 
besieging forces and gales at sea. The Banrildhir and Wadi 
Ra's tribes joined the rising. 
5 At the end of August the 
attacks had spread to the Larache zone, and the postal ser- 
vice between Tetuan and Tangier was suspended, so'dangerous 
had the road become. 
6 
On 4 September, The Times reported that the tribes 
in the North-west of the Spanish zone were joining the 
1 SHK Ceuta Leg. '24,, Levantamiento de Cdbilas, Akhmas,, T. O. 
Tte. Cor. S. M. I. to Grl. Jefe and Cte. Grl.,. Tetuan, 29 Aug. 
1924. 
2 Ibid., Telef6nema Tte. Cor. S. ýM. I. to Gl. Jefe, Tetuan, 
19 Aug.. 1924. 
3' SHM Ceuta Leg. 24, Levantamiento de CAbilas, Akhmas, T. O. C. 
Capt. Interv. Akhmas to Cor. S. M. I., Sh&win, 26 Aug. 1924. 
4 Ibid., T. O. Tte. Interv. Akhmas to Cor. S. M. I., ShZiwin, 
2 Sept. 1924, Urgentissimo. 
5 The Times', 29 Aug. 1924, p. 10, dated. Tangier, 28 Aug. 1924. 
6 Ibid., 1 Sept., 1924, p. 10, dated Tangier, 31 Aug. 1924. 
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rebellion. The pro-Rif! movement had been gathering force 
in the area for some time. Its initiator was the Sharif Sid! 
al-Tayyib al-Uaddwl, ' head of the NZLsifl-yya 'zawiya at al-Ramla 
in the BanQ Masawar. Before joining the RifIs* he asked per- 
mission of the head-of the NdsirTyya in Marrakesh. This 
permission was given, but he was recommended to find out 
more about the leadership of the Rif! movement. To this end 
he made contact with the Rif! representative in Tangier,, Si 
'Abd al-Karlrd b. al-]Va. jj tAll Lulý, * the brother-in-law of 
Ralls MisaeCid "Sibara", who answered him that it was "an 
Islamic national revolution against the conquering foreigner.,, 
2 
This assurance was apparently sufficient and when - 
al-Hadawl had smuggled in enough supplies from Tangier he 
started operations. He was joined by 120 men from the BanQ 
Vassan, and then by a group under S! Al-IArbI b. 'Vamima of 
the BanU. IdhIf.. The Spanish position at SUiq al-Thalatha9 
of Banfildhir was surrounded, as was Adrri. *just over the 
border in the Banri . 'ArCis. 
3 On 4. September Adrfi 'fell. 4- The 
next target, as the Spanish foresaw, was their large garrison 
at BU Xharraysh in the Banil ldhlr', which was surrounded on 
56 5 September. BU Xharraysh ran out of water by 13 September. 
In the face of. these attacks,, Primo decided to make, 
a final effort to carry out the planned withdrawal which had 
........ ....... 
Ibid., 5 Sept. 1924, p. 10, dated Tangier,,, 4 Sept. 1924. 
2 Al-Bri op'. * cit.,, Vol. II, pp. 242-243. 
3-- 11 Ibid. p. 245. 
4 SM Ceuta Leg. 24, *Levant*amiento de Cgbilas, Beni'Ider y 
Beni Lait, T. O. C. Tte. Interv. Beni Ider to Cor. S. M. I., 
BT1 Xharraysh, ' 4'Sept. 1924. 
5 Ibid., T. O. C. Tte. Interv. B. Ider to Cor. S. M. I. Bfi: 
Jarraysh', 7 Oct. 1924. 
6 Ibid., T. O.. Interv. to Cor. S. M. I.,. -BU Jarraysh, 13 Sept. 
1924, and -al-Bfl . 'AyyZish1, ' op. --cit., Vol. II, p. 
245. 
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been put off in August precisely becausp of the Rif! 
offensive. Under the successive attacks of the RIfIs'and 
their supporters, willing or unwilling, the operation was 
now even more difficult than it would have been then. 
The extent of the problem was enormous. Nearly 
all the Spanish positions were under siege. The Spanish . -were 
unable even to set up a protective position at Band Sal&lý,, - 
only two miles from the Protectorate capital of Tetuan, 
which did not augur well for the establishment of the. protec- 
tive, line from Tetuan to Tangier, protecting the. road between 
the two cities, behind which Primo, intended to retire. The 
road itself was still closed. Even ShAwin was cut off. The 
Spanish army, therefore, had two objectives: firstly to 
relieve and withdraw the besieged positions, and secondly 
to open the Tangier to Tetuan road. On 7 September, the 
post of TagsUt in the Wadi Law valley, was evacuated; 
l 
on 
8 September, that at Amtaron the coast was withdrawn as 
well. 
2 At the same time the rising against the Spanish was 
spreading. The sharifs of theWadi. Ra's tribe agreed to'join 
it on 8 September, 
3 
and on 9 September representatives of 
the Akhmas met a Rifl. group in Bab Taz'a and agreed on an- 
immediate attack on all the Spanish positions, and to attack 
the supply convoys between Shawin and Dra' al-Asaf. They 
were joined by men from the BanQ Aýmad, Gazawa and Banfi. 
4 Salid al-Gharb. On 13 September, Qal. id bin Tayyib of the 
Banii Sijjil left Shawin to join the Rlfls*., '. Two days later, 
1 The Times', -8 Sept. 1924, p. 12, dated Tangier, -7 Sept. 1924. 
2 Ibid.,, 9*Sept. 1924, p. 12, dated Tangier, 8- Sept. 1924. 
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 24, 'Levantamiento de, Cdbilas, Anjral T. O. C. 




, Ibid., Akhmas, T. O. C. Tte. Cor. S. M. I. to Grl. Jefe, 
Tetuan, 10 Sept. 1924. 
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Tighlsas, al-Qubal. Darsa, Tisgarlri and Sharrida (the last 
three in the lower Wad! Law valley) were abandoned. 
1 
The road to Shawin was cleared on 12 September, 
2 
but the revolt against the Spanish was spreading to the 
'Anjara, behind the Spanish defence line, and preparations 
were made to attack the Spanish position at al-Qaqr . 
al-Saghlr* on the coast. 
3 
Meanwhile, S! Matka. mmad had moved his headquarters 
to TalambUt,. followed by an extension of the telephone lines, 
and Rif! forces continued to arrive in the western Jibala 
and Ghumara. Large numbers of Rifis'were reported in Qala"a 
and Imharshari behind Shawin on 16 September, and 500 more men 
arrived on 22 September. 
4 
The Spanish now attempted to send a column through 
to ShZiwin. On 19 September, The Times reported, 40,000 
troops were moving up from Tetuan to relieve the 3,000 
troops in Shawin itself, and the others in the vicinity of 
5 ShaWin. They also tried to persuade al-Raisillito leave 
TazarUt, as once they had gone they. would be unable to pro--! 
6 
tect him, but this was quite unsuccessful. 
Al-RaisQlI himself was the object of a fairly con- 
sistent campaign to join the Rifis. Bin 'Abd al-Karlm had 
1 Ibid., T. O. C. Capt. Interv. Ajmas to Cor. S. M. I., Shawin, 
' 
13 Sept. 1924. 
2 Fleming, op. cit., p. 179. 
3 SHM Ceuta Leg., 24, * Levaritamiento de C6bi_las*, Anjra, T. O. M. 
Capt. Interv. to Cor. Jefe S. M. I., Condesa, 13, Sept. 1924. 
4 Ibid., Gomara, T. O. C. Tte. eincargado Interv. to Cor. S. M. I., 
Wdd! Idw, 17 Sept. 1924, and Ajmas, TO. O. C. Capt. - Interv. 
to Cor. S. M. I., ShWin, 16 Sept. 1924,, and al--.; Bri 
op. cit., Vol. II, p. 219. 
5 Thd-Times, 20 Sept. 1924, p. 10, 'dated Tangier,, 19 Sept. 
1924. 
6- Ibid., 22 Sept. 1924, p. 10, dated Tangier, 21 Sept. 1924. 
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written several times to the'sharif at Tazarrit:, asking for 
his cooperation', requests which al-Raisrll:! "refused. ' Bin'Abd 
al-Karim turned to threats. If al-Raisillidid, not join the 
struggle against the Spanish the Riffs would-turn on him in 
Tazarrat: before -they dealt with the "Christians". In a piece 
of bitter, but highly apposite, irony bin 'Abd al-Karlm 
referred to TazarUt as "the Madrid of the JibUall. To these 
threats al-RaisUll. replied: 
"Close your eyes, take stock and you will see that , 
this is an ocean which you may not cross,. for this is 
no way to make war. To make war in accordance with 
the law, you must first respect your brothers, then 
you must respect the law, respect the habus, in that 
way you can make war on the Christian, and God the 
'merciful will help you. Moveover the image fades, and 
only reality, remains. our only desire is peace and to 
avoid the shedding of blood which is today quite 
useless. 111 
Al-RaisQ11'retaliated to bin 'Abd al-Karim's claim to rep- 
resent the sharl'-'a by stating quite categorically that he 
was not,., because he had illegally "nationalised" the' babus' 
properties. Bin 'Abd. al-Karim replied by saying that 
al-Raisfill's treachery to his religion was thdgreater., He 
might respect the ýabus*properties-which . after all was in 
al-RaisUll's interest--but he had committed the much worse 
offence of cooperating with the Christians: 
"You should know# 0 Sharif,, that we'are'quite'aware' 
of what you are. You aspire only to personal 
[greatnessh. scattering over your brothers the' 
filthy mud of the Christians. Your love, *for, them 
is public knowledge. Your rejection of your 
Islamic-faith'is also public and notorious. Those 
Muslims who believed that you were'like them, you have 
thrown into the sea of iniquity. As a result of this, 
soon, very soon, we will come upon you and those who 
would defend you. This, is-our last letter to you. 112 
Intervencift Larache', *Berii'Aros., p. 47. The. 'quoted pas- 




Once again, despite bin 'Abd al-Karim's-later disclaimers-of 
jihad,, the propaganda war'between the Rifileader and 
al-Raisdll vas expressed-in terms of religion. But there 
was a difference. Al-Raisrill saw religious principle in 
terms of what had been the custom in Morocco for centuries, 
the importance of the sharifs and their economic and religious 
prestige. Bin 'Abd al-Karim, on the other hand, presented 
a'new approach to Islam, that the resources of Islam should 
be-used to strengthen and defend the Islamic state. This 
was Islamic nationalism in a modern manifestation and the 
different attitudes of the two concepts are most clearly 
expressed in these letters. Walter Harris-also realised the 
I. difference between this new Islamic nationalism and the old 
concept of jihad, although he expressed it in a rather 
simplified form: 
"There is no 'Holy War'. at all,. though they imagine 
they are carrying on one. It is purely the'nation- 
alistic desire to clear thd Spaniard out--and he is 
going in fact, anyhow out of the Rif and Jibala 
districts. "l 
The Spanish were indeed leaving the Jibala, with increasing 
speed,. but. first they had to relieve Shawin. Spanish troops 
finally reached the city at just after midday on 30 September, 
ten day . s. after they had set out. 
2 The Spanish casualties in 
the previous two weeks (from 18 September to 1 October) over 
the whole zone had, been between 4,000 and, 5,000 killed and 
3- 
wounded,, and the Spanish had still to fight their way back 
from Sh&win. 
Spani. sh. positions, continued. to, be withdrawn,. not 
T. A. H. P. file, "The Times Correspondence, 1894-1933"Ir 
Harris to Williams (Foreign Editor of'The' Times), Tangier, 
4 Oct. 1924. 
2 The Times, 1 Oct. 1924, p. 14, dated Madrid, 30 Sept. 1924.. 
3 Ibid., 8 Oct. 1924, p. 13, dated Tangier, 7 Oct. 1924. 
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all of them intact. BU Kharraysh in the BanCildhit, which 
had been besieged since the beginning of September, surren- 
dered on 11 October. The 400-strong garrison was allowed 
to withdraw to Tetuan unmolested, but they left behind all 
their supplies, including about 1,000 rifles and over 
400,, 000 rounds of ammunition, which were impounded by a local 
Waryaghl! "interventor". 
By this time, the morale of the pro-Rifi. forces 
was reaching a very high pitch. As early as 10 September, 
Walter Harris was reporting that he had great difficulty. 
in dissuading Moroccans that the Rifl. state did not have the 
support of the British government, 
2 
which would have set the 
seal of international approval on Rlfl'independence. At 
the beginning of October, Harris was writing to the Foreign 
Editor-of The Times that he had been visited by several 
"more or less important rebels and they seem intoxicated 
with their successes. "? 
The raised morale was carefully fostered by the . 
Rifl. government. -In the Rlfj,. a. total ban was imposed on any 
discussionýof the casualties in the western zone,, which were 
very heavy. Indeed, in order to counteract the wild rumours 
about the huge numbers of casualties, bin OAbd al-Karlm 
decided to make use of the great propaganda value of the 
continuing Spanish withdrawal, by ordering the''t7al: ibs in the 
tribes to pray and. to recite suitable verses from the Qur! ari 
in thanks for the victories over Spain in the west and "for 
............ ...... .. 
u. s. m. i., XXIII, p. 10418, and al-Ba, 'IAyydshIj*op. -cit., 
Vol. II, p. 247. 
2- The Times, 11 Sept. ' 1924, p. 12, dated Tangier, 10 Oct'. 
1924. 
3 T. A. H. P. file, '"The, Times Correspondence, 1894-1933", 
Harris to Williams, Tangier, 4 Oct. - 1924. 
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the proximity of the Muslim liberation. "-' I-I- 
The "Muslim liberation" was brought. even closer by 
the threat from behind the Spanish defence line from Tangier 
tol Tetuan. The 'Anj ara tribe was on the pointý of rising 
again. A Spanish convoy was attacked on the border of the 
international zone on 21 October. On 25 October, telephone 
lines to Spanish positions were cut. 
The principal instigators in this movement the 
tAnjara were two men, ýAbd al-Qadir b. Mulýammad Kanya, known 
as-Qadur Kanya, and S! Bii.. Ganayn, known as 
Janana. Both had turbulent histories and as they will, 
reappear it is suitable to recount these'now. 'Qadur Kanya. 
came from an important fam ily in the 'Aanjar'. His father 
Mulýaýnunad had been an extremely tough 'qal*id of the tribe in 
the time of MU12iy Ijassan, until he was murdered. In 1916, 
Qadur, and his brother 'Ali, had joined the strong anti- 
al-RaisQll. *party in the 'Anjara, until in the'course of 
factional fighting 'All. was killed, ý whereupon Qadur joined 
the'al-Raisall party. He remained loyal to al-Rai's5l!. *after 
the latter's break with the Spanish in 1918, but later fell 
out with the RaisUlist -qdl.. id of the tribe, - who held him 
prisoner for some time. His resultant. opposition to 
al-RaisCil'i'attracted the attention of Rif! 'agents in the 
'Anjara. ' and they persuaded him to join them. -He 
joined 
Akhr! rU,. ' who gave him some men, with whom he'returned to 
his'tribe, raised more recruits, many of them former members 
ofl the Fuerzas - Regulares I. and returned to help i'n,. thd 'siege 
of BU Xharraysh-' His companion in thdse'campaigns, in the 
SHM Melilla Leg. 25, ''In, formac'i6ri Octubre, ' nota, A Oct. 
1924,. and, nota, 13 Oct., 1-924. 
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'Anjara, Janana, was from a lesser family altogether, a man 
who had gained his prestige as a robber, specialising in 
attacking the convoys from Tetuan to Shawin. 
1 
on 29 October, these two men attended a meeting 
in one of the zawiyas in the 'Anjara, which reached no very 
firm decision on whether to call a general rising in the 
tribe. 2 of course this did not satisfy the two agitators, 
and on 2 November, Janana was reported to have metýbin Va-11ma 
of the Banilldhir to ask him for help. 
3 This was evidently 
forthcoming, for on 8 November it was reported that 600 
Rif. is'were on the way and that bin Vallma was ready to send 
4 600 more men to the 'Anjara, Wdd!. Rals and Vawz tribes. 
However, the 'Anjara as a whole still 
rather reluctant to enter the war def. 
ember, bin 'Abd al-Karim was reported 
them, insulting them and calling them 
them to join him. 5 
showed themselves 
Lnitely, and on 10 Nov- 
to have written to 
"Jews", and ordering 
However, if the Rifis were not yet succeeding. with 
the "Anjara, they were doing well in the organisation of 
other Jibalan tribes. Akhr1rQ Imposed control on the BanQ 
Vassan,. for example, by instructing his deputy in that tribe 
to ensure that a qVId and a muqaddam were appointed, and to 
collect up all the arms, which were to be'distributed only 
Oficina Central de Intervenci6n y Tropas Indigenas de 
Tetucin, Datos sobre los principales cabecillas rebeldes de 
la cabila de Anyera, n. d. in BNES de A, pp. 1 and 13-14 (hence- 
forth referred to as "Cab. Reb. Anyarall). 
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Politica Octubre 1924, Informaci6n del 
dia, 29 Oct. 1924. 
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25', ' Politica Noviembre-1924,, Informaci6n 
del dia, 2 Nov. 1924. 
4 Ibid., Informaci6n del dia, 8 Nov. 1924., 
5 
'Ibid., Informaci6n del dia, 10 Nov. 1924. 
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when men went out to fight. The qVid who was appointed, 
one S1, al-Mati '(sic) of Bastu, had considerable difficulty 
in carrying out this instruction but he managed it in the- 
end. 
1 In other tribes a similar measure of control was 
being imposed. Bin Vallma, in the Banfl Idhir",, ordered that 
no one. was to go to the market in Tetuan, and threatened to 
confiscate the property of anyone who did. The same rule 
applied in the wadi Rals, where the penalty was a fine and 
500 lashes. This was completely effective, for on 12 Nov- 
ember, the Spanish reported that "Today no one from the Wad 
Ras has been seen in the market. ,2 
The Spanish withdrawal went on. Wadi Law was 
evacuated by sea on 15 November and, the evacuation of Shdwin, 
started on the same day. - The troops were unmolested while' 
3 they withdrew from the city. There was a simple reason for 
this. on 15 November, as the Spanish started to leave the 
city (a process that took two days in itself), a, deputation 
went to the 700 Akhmds', Rýfls and others waiting nearby, to 
ask them that they should not attack the city, itself. This 
was agreed and the pro-Rifi. leaders promised not to attack 
unti l, the Spanish had reached Dar 'Aqaba. 
4' (see Photograph 
XI: 1). 
The attack duly materialised at Dar' 'Aqaba. SharUta 
was also attacked, and there were very heavy losses. However, 
the forces managed to retreat as far as Saq. * al. -Arbala of 
SILM Ceuta Leg. 25, Politica Octubre de 1924, Informaci6n 
del, dia, 26 Oct. 1924, and Informaci6n -j-eldia, * 30 Oct. 1924. 
ý ýSHM'Ceuta Leg. 25, Politica Noviembre de 1924, Informaci6n 
del dia, 3 Nov. 1924, and Informaci6n del dia, 12 Nov. 1924. 
3 The Times,, 18 Nov. 1924, p. 14, dated Madrid, 17 Nov. 1924, 
and Fleming, op. cit., p. 190. 
4 SIM Ceuta Leg. 25, Politica Noviembre de___1924, Informaci6n 
del dia, 15 Nov. 1924. 
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Photograph XI: 1 
The centre of Shawin befor e its evacuation by 
Spanish troops 
Source: -' The Ill'ustrated Lond= News, 25 October 
-1924, p. 767. 
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Banfl Vassan, where they regrouped on 25 November. Fighting 
continued until 13 December, when the last Spanish troops 
entered Tetuan. The losses had been enormous. The-with- 
drawal from Shawin, according to Harris--who gives a relat- 
ively low estimate compared with others--had cost 800 
officers dead and 17,000 men. 
1 
Behind them they left a huge 
amount of supplies, military buildings, and even a hospital 
in Shawin. "It will be curious, " the Madrid correspondent 
of The Times remarked, "to see what use the Moors will make 
of . these elements of civilisation. " 
2 
In-fact the "Moors" 
preserved Shdwin intact, as they had. promised its inhabitants 
and the hospital was preserved for use. 
3 As soon as the 
Spanish had left the city, *it was-occupied for the Rifis by 
S! Sha'Ib* b. Muýammad Awqiriu4,. who appointed Mu4ammad 
Bainainu, "who was the foremost among the Muslims [i. e., 
pro-Rifis] of his hometown of Shawin, .4 as Pasha of the city. 
S! Mabammad confirmed Binainuls appointment,. and himself 
showed exaggerated respect for the city, when he entered it 
on 14 December. ' Reportedly, he took his shoed-off before 
passing through its gates... . But. after. a speech of. welcome. in 
1 Harris, op. cit., p. 147. Other estimates of casualties- 
ranged from the Conde de Romananes' information of 16,000 
casualties, Hern6ndez Mir's estimate of l8jOO0 casualties, 
and General Lop6z'de ochoals claim of 16, '000 Spanish troops 
alone, that is excluding the Moroccan casualties in the 
Fuerzas Regulares. Fleming, working on daily military reports 
in the S. H. M., estimates a much lower figure, about 2,000 
Spanish lives. The whole question is discussed at length in 
Fleming, op. cit., pp. 193-195. In any case, ' the important 
point from the Moroccan'point of view was not the number of 
Spanish casualties, but the fact that all the Spanish forces 
withdrew from the Jibdla. ' 
2 The Times, 13 Dec. 1924, dated Madrid, 12 Dec. 1924. 
3 Sheean, Adventures,. pp. 250-251. According to'Sheean, it 
was in the care of a "Danish surgeon from Tangier. " It is 
possible that he. made a mistake and that the'surgeon was the. 
Norwegian Hutyens. See above, p. 562. 
4 Sk1raj, op. cit., p. 135. , 
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which he congratulated the "good Muslims" who were prepared 
to fight for independence, S! Ma4ammad himself quickly left 
the city, on his brother's instructions, for fear of Spanish 
air raids. He retired to Talambdt,. and then to Tagsfit, the 
main RIfI headquarters in the Jibala. 
1 Here he remained, in 
the company of BU Lalýya and Abmad BU Dra, 'with whom he had 
come from the Rif--partly by boat--to take charge in the 
Ghumara. 2 
The usual consequence of Rif! domination quickly 
followed: a road was started betwecýn Talambdt: and ShAwin; 
3 
qa'. ids were appointed--a Shaykh BukhUt in the Jabal Ijabib, 
and al-Vashim b. Uamima in the Banrildhir, 
4 
who would soon 
rebel against the Rlfls*. In the BanU. Vassan, Al; rqad b. SaIld 
al-Ijassan! Was made qalid. The choice for the Banri Sa"Id 
is interesting, for it was Mubammad al-Baqqall Wuld al-Qurfa, 
who was the principal anti-RaisUlist qal. id in 1920.5 In the 
Banfi 4mad, there was another interesting appointment, the 
T411b Mulýammad al-Shawnip who originated from the Sumata. 
He had hated al-RaisfilT . 'ever since the, sharif had ordered 
the blinding of his cousin. He swore vengeance against 
al-RaisUll,: but was arrested and imprisoned by him, and after 
ýhat gave out that he had forgotten his enmity, and even 
succeeded -in 
becoming: - a shaykh after al-Raisfill 'made his 
peace with the Spanish in 1922. When the opportunity came, 
1 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, 'Pol: Etica Diciembre, Informaci6n del 
dia, 14 Dec. 1924, -and Herncindez Mir, op. cit.,. Vol. III, 
pp. 25-1253,. and Cab. Reb. 1913-1927, p. 43. 
2 Skiraj, op. cit., p. 138. 
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Politica Diciembre, Informaci6n del 
dia, 23 Dec. 1924. 
4 
, ibid., Informaci6n del dia, 28 Dec. 1924. 5 Skiraj, op. cit., p. 136. For Wuld al-Qurfa, see above 
pp. 272-273. 
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however, he switched sides again and joined Akhrlru-.. ' 
I 
The Rif is' took economic control as well. On 27 
December it was reported that they were confiscating the 
Property of everyone who had supported the Spanish and were 
impounding babUs property. in the Akhmas', v for instance, a 
large supply of olive oil which had been stored in a mosque 
was confiscated. 2 On the other hand, bin 'Abd al-Karim agreed 
to extend credit to the Jiballs--he ordered the Ghumaran and 
Jibalan tribes to send pack animals to AjdIr` to collect wheatt 
3 sugar, candles and cloth,, which was to be repaid later. 
Meanwhile the OAnjara tribe behind the Spanish 
defence line had finally risen completely. The rebellion in 
this tribe had been fermenting for some time. There had been 
an attempt in October, instigated by Oadur Kanya and Janana. 
Since then, they had been joined by a number of other leaders 
ill the tribe. Friendship with Akhr1rQ brought into the 
alliance al- 'Arbi b. al-Khadir, who returned home to help 
the rising. He had joined the Rlfls. 'much 'earlier In 1924, 
in June, when he had left the tribe and gone'to help SI: 
Ma4anmad in the attacks on the WddI Law positions. 
4, Since 
then he had been absent from the tribe. Another *AnjArI who 
had behaved in a similar manner was si Mubammad b. Mu4ammad 
al-Mujahid, a tAlib who had been'muqaddam of, thd tribe, but 
had joined the Rlfls*at the beginning on 1924 after a dispute 
With the Spanish'appointed qVid of the trib e 
.. 
b. i. n.. 
.A111 
Lbid., p.. 139, and Jefes Rebeldes en 1925-1927F El Tallb 40hý=Med--Mha-uni, types-cr*-f-pt 1925, and Intervenci6n Militar 
- . M-- de Larache, Rabila de Sumata (Zaaora, 1928). 
2 
SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Polltica Diciembre, Informaci6n del 
dia, 27 Dec. 1924. 
3 
4 
Ibid., Informaci6n del d1a, 31 Dec. 1924. 
The Times, 15 Dec. 1924, p. 14. 
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After Joining the R1f1s, he had been given money for the 
Purpose 
Of propaganda in his tribe, becoming, in the words 
Of a, Spanish report, "the soul of all the movements in 
f, 41701'r of the R1f1 
. 'Cause which arose in the tribe. "' The 
InOvement 
was also joined by S1 Mubammad b. al-Vusayn al-Gamls 
'211-ýasnaWI, ' a former Spanish makhzAnl,: and khallfa of - Part of the BarqCiq! yAn' clan. In 1918,, he quarrelled with 
41-1ýais0l! 
-when the sharif broke with Spain. After 
41-Raisal. T ' . -s agreement with Spain in 1923, he tried to get 
reinstated, 
in an attempt that, despite Spanish support, 
failed, 
for al-RaisOll did not lay aside his grudges with 
ease. At this point, al-lVasnawl 'gave up all hopes of advance- 
Ynent through the Spanis`h-a1-RaisQ11 alliance and joined 
al"Arbl 
b. Uallma of the BanQ 'Idhlr in the siege of Bil 
Ylh ar ra Ysh- When that position fell on 15 October, he returned 
2 
to his tribe, ready for a final rising . 




ke of the Spanish, who organised the ris- ing in the 'Anjar. On 5 December'.. 1924, Qadur Ranya attacked 
S Panish convoy at SharOta and then moved on to lay siege 
to the Spanish Position at SQq al-ThalathA'.. This was an 
extremely 
Profitable enterprise on his partr for his share of 
the 102,000 
pesetas which the Spanish paid for. the peaceful 
017c, cuation 
Of 'the position was no less, than 20,000 pesetas. 
3 
Meanwhile, S1 Mubammad al-MUJAhid, was helping in 
the 
attack on the Spanish position at al--Qaqr al-ýaghlr on the 
CC) 4 aste 
- This operation was also successful. and , the 
2 'Al-1311 'tAyy1jsh1,: op. cit., Vol. II,, pp. 215-216. 
3 Cab. Reb. Anyara., 'pp. 10-11. 
-Tb id 4 22. 
Ibid. 
Z-zt 4, P- 18. 
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position fell on 12 December. 
1 At the same timer the neigh- 
bouring tribe, the Hawz, had risen as well. The main 
instigator here was Mubammad b. S! Vaddu, known as Kurtiý, VQ.: 
He had been a soldier in the Spanish mia in the Hawz for 
3 years, but in 1919 had joined the forces fighting the 
Spanish at Dar' bin Qurraysh. He had already fallen out with 
al-Raisilll,, * for reasons that are not clear. When he robbed 
property from a friend of Vapidu Sukkan:, al-RaisUlIl. s import- 
ant supporter who was killed in the Spanish offensive against 
TazarUt:, in 1921, he fled to the Rif, where he was at the time 
of the Spanish defeats. He became a trusted lieutenant of 
bin 'Abd al-Karim, and. was sent to the Jib&la and the Hawz 
2 to-organise the resistance there. It will be seen that the 
I 
majority of these leaders in the past had fallen out with 
al-RaisUll and they had now joined his principal enemy. 
Not surprisingly, the Spanish were deeply con- 
cerned by these developments, for the rising in the ýAnjara 
and Hawz threatened not only the road from Tangier to Tetuan, 
but also the vital railway from Tetuan to Ceuta. An attempt 
3 to recapture al-Qaqr al-ýaghirfailed on 19 December. 
By the end of December 1924, the Spanish forces 
had retreated behind, their defence line--with the 'Anjara-and 
Hawz in revolt and cooperating with the Rifis behind those 
lines.. It would seem, at first sight, a complete Rif! : 
victory. In fact, however, Rifidomination of the Jibala 
was by no means complete. The local people were perfectly 
1 ibid.,, p. 11, and The Times, 15 Dec. 1924, p. 14, dated 
Tangier, 12 Dec. 1924. 
2 Oficina Central de Intervenci6n y Tropas Jalifianas de 
Tetuan, Datos sobre los principales cabecillas rebeldes de 
la cabila-del Hauz, n. d., in ENES de A. 
3 The Times, 20 Dec. '1924, dated Madrid, 19 Dec. 1924. 
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prepared. to cooperate with the RIfIs to. expel the Spanish, 
but they were less keen to have Spanish domination replaced 
by a, RIfI 'one. The Akhmas'in particular, who had provided 
many of the men for the assault on Spanish positions, were 
particularly opposed to Rif! methods of government--espec- 
ially. the expropriation of babus' properties and the domination 
of their tribe. And while al-Raisfill. 'remained in the Jibala,, 
sick and fallen in prestige-though he was, he was still able 
to provide a focus for resistance to Rif! 'domination. 
The Akhmas Revolt 
One of the first problems the RIfIs. had to face 
in the Jib&la was what to do about al-RaisQll. * On 18 Dec- 
ember, S! Maýammad and AkhrIrQWent to TazarUt: to see 
al-Raisfili, to tell him that "he could no longer remain on 
the mountain [i. e., Jabal 'Alam].. and that if he *did not 
leave the. area he would be taken to Ajdlr'with his wives 
and children. " This had no effect whatever, so on 22 Dec- 
ember, S! Mabammad called a meeting of all the' main pro-Rifl. ' 
leaders, in TaghzUtf at which it was decided to summon 
al-Raisrillto a meeting at MQI&y' 'Abd al-Salam: within three 
days so that he could agree to join the Rif! 'alliance. 
2 it 
is doubtful that even if he had agreed to go to the meeting# 
al-Raisral*l mould have been able to do so, so sick was'he with 
dropsy. In, any event he did not even answer the letter. BQ: 
Lal&a went to MU'ay 'Abd al-Salam himself with a group from 
the Taghzilt: barka and made a speech attacking al-RaisQll,. * 
SHM Ceuta-Leg.. 25,. Politica Dicie-, rrbre '1924,. Informaci6n 
del dia, 22'Dec. 1924. - 
2 Ibid., and Intervenci6n Larache, **Beni' Aros, p. 48, and 
Sk! Fa--j, 2p. ' 'cit., P. 138. 
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1ý 
and he and those who were with him swore to attack Tazarrit 
within a short while and to eliminate "the greatest Christian", 
as Bii La4ya described al-RaisQl: I. * They then returned to 
Taghzilt. 
However,, a more urgent problem had arisen in the 
Akhm2is*. The RIfIs* had begun to expropriate the 4abus*prop- 
erty, which itself sufficiently infuriated the local people;. 
other grievances were felt as well. At the beginning of 
January 1925, reports started to circulate that RIfI: soldiers 
2 
were raping women in the Akhmds*, precisely the same stories, 
as those which spread in the Ghumdra, in 1923.3 Whether or 
not they were true--and it is, of course, impossible to dis- 
cover this now--they contributed to stirring up hatred for 
the RIfIs*. The AkhmasTs' had other objections as well--they 
resented the Rifis" control. They told AkhrIrQ,, 'who was 
furious about lack of cooperation from the tribe, that they 
resented not having been invited to attend the meeting at 
MQ1*ay' 'Abd al-Sal&rri; that they objected to the authority 
of bin 'Abd al-Karlm, indeed they had never heard of a Sultan 
from the Rif before, and felt that "now each tribe should rule 
itself as it wished"; and they complained that they had 
suffered many casualties in the attacks on the Spanish, and 
that in return they had-been treated with'contempt--S! 
Ma4ammad had even forbidden them to enter the city of Shawin 
carrying their arms. 
4 
Indeed, i7mmediately after the*capture of Shawin, 
Intervencidn Larach e, Beni Aros, pp. 48-49. 
SHM Ceuta Leg. -125, Politica Enero 
1925, 'Informaci6n. dal 
dia, 1 Jan. 1925, lst report. 
3 See above, p 623. ' 
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Politica Enero 1925, Informaci6n del 
dia, 1 Jan. 1925,2nd report. 
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St Mabammad had ordered the tribes to be disarmed and 
imposed a tax of 5 pts a week on each household, in all the 
villages. 
1 Not surprisingly these measures led to 
resistance. The Akhmas: mýde the traditional "ar sacrifice 
of a.. bull to the Gazawa to ask them for aid, 
2 
and at a 
meeting of some of the notables of the Bana Ijassan, Bana, * 
Lait,, BanU Idhir,, Banil ljuzmar. ' and, above all, the Akhmas', 
at D5rdara, in the southern AkhmNs', they agreed that "they 
could not allow a RIfTforeigner to come to rule over them, 
making himself rich at. their expense. and prejudicing their 
interests. " 3 They challenged-S! Maýammad to come and dis- 
arm them, probably hoping, as Spanish Military Intelligence 
guessed, that if he did so they would be able to capture him. 
As both S! Malýanmad and the Spanishrealisedj, the real 
4 instigator of all this was al-RaisUll-. ' 
Matters got worse for the R! fTs*. On 5 January 
1925 the Akhmas', Bana Alýmad and Gazav! a refused to supply men 
to the Rif'! Iýarka. on 8 January, the Rif.! *appointed qA'id 
in the Banri IdhTr', ST Hashai6T b. IjalTma, told the RIfIs* that 
so many men were not needed for the barka, and they would not 
supply any more. He also ejected the 150 R! fTs. who were in 
the tribe, saying there was not enough'to feed, them. 
5 
Hunger in the Jibal: a had already, reached an appalling degree: 
in the Bana Vuzm5r. *,, the Spanish'reported, people were reduced 
to making bread from. "flour" made from the fruit of'mastic 
trees (lentiscos), aried and ground. The people of Tetuan 
1 Ibid., Informaci6n del d1a,, 3 Jan. 1925, lst report. 
2 Ibid., Informaci6n, del'd1a, -1 Jan. 1925, lst report. _ 3 Ibid., Informaci6n del d1a, 3 Jan. 1925, lst report. 
4- Ibid. 
5 Ibid., InformaciOn del d1a, 8 Jan. 1925. 
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attempted to help them by throwing food-over the walls of 
Tetuan at night. 
I 
On 9 January, Binainu, the RIfIs" Pasha in ShAwin,, 
tried to impose his authority. Supported by 80 men, he moved 
north, from ShaVin to Imahar*shAri, on the way to Dar. ' 'Aqgba 
and the BanG Vakssan, presumably with the intention of stop- 
2 
ping the revolt from spreading any further. The Banil 
1jakssan, taken by surprise, surrendered and sacrificed to 
Binainu on 10 January. 
3 If the rebellion against the Rif1s. ' 
was forestalled in the BanQ Jj4ssan, in the Akhmas'it was 
just beginning. on the same day as the surrender of the 
BanU 114ssan, 10 January, there was a struggle at the gates 
of ShaVin. The Rif! And Ghumati guards placed there to stop 
people from taking guns into the city tried to disarm an 
Akhm5s'l.: In the resulting struggle, * a Ghumarl guard was 
killed.. The Akhm7asl responsible was sentenced to death and 
despite local appeals for clemency, S! Maýammad confirmed 
.4 
the sentence. 
About this, and about thdprices of essential com- 
modities, the Akhmas'Ts' complained to al-RaisUl'!. * Prices 
were certainly high: wheat, for example was 50 pts a'mudd. 
The sharif said he quite agreed with 'them, and that it was the 
f ault of the Rlfls*,, which had led to the markets in Tetuan, 
Tangier and Asila being closed to the Jibdlls'. He then 
gave. the. Akhmas*ls* a. rms with which 'to fight the, R1f. 1s. 
1 Ibid., Informaciýn del dia, G'Jan. 1925, and InfOrmaci6n 
del dfa-, 7 Jan. 1925,2nd report. 
2 Ibid., Informaci6n del d1a, -9 Jan. 1925,2nd report and 
Herngn-dez Mir, a., 
-cit-,, 
V01* II, pp. 254-255. 
3 politica. Enero 1925, Informaci6n del SHM Ceuta.. Leg. - 25, 
dia, 10 Jan. 1925 , :, 2nd 
Feport. 
4 Ibid., Informaci6n del d1a, 10 Jan. 1925, lst report. 
5 Ibid., Informaci6n del dia, 11 Jan. 1925, lst report, 
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The AkhmNsis made good use of-the weapons, for on 
13 January they captured Binainu in the Jabal Khaza'. 1n, where 
he had gone to try to reason with the Akhmasl 'alyan. 
1 He 
was held by the Akhm5s! s. 'for a few days and then was handed 
over to al-Raisall Who# according to Garcia Figueras, impris- 
oned him in "the most horrible cell in his prison. " The 
rept of! -his barka was killed, the bodies mutilated and their 
heads exhibited in the villages. 
2 
The Akhmasis. 'surrounded another Waryaghll gald, 
one "al-'Ayyashill, in the middle of their tribe, but he. 
managed to get word to S! Mabammad, who was in Tighisas at. 
the time. S! Maýammad ordered all the Ghumarls-to join in 
the attack on the Akhmas; 3' and on 14 January a barka, made 
up of RIfIs and. led by Akhrlril, * started to attack the 
4 
rebels. According to SkIr'aj, the I)arka consisted of 500 
men and. was quickly joined by another under al-Baqqall 
5 Wald -a1 -QQr. *f a. Late on 14 January, Akhr! rU. 'ordered the 
burning of AmajrI, 'BanQ. Zid and al-Khazaria, south-east of 
Sh&win. 6 On 18 January, Imahdrshari, north of Shawin was 
burned. The inhabitants of the village sacrificed to SI 
Maýammad, who was not inclined to be merciful and took most 
Ibid., Informaci6n del dia, 13 Jan. 1925,2nd report, and 
SkIraj,, 02- cit-, P- 138. 
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Politica Enero de 1925, Informaci6n del 
dia, 18 Jan. 1925, 'lst report, and Tanas Garcia Figueras, 
Del Marruecos Feudal (Episodios de la vida del Cherif 
Raisuni) (Madrid, Barcelona, Buenos Aires, 193o),, p. 209 
(henceforth referred to as Garcia Figuerast Marruecos Feudal), 
and SkIraj, op. cit., p. 138. 
3 Ibid. ' 
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Politica Enero 1925, Informaci6n del 
dia, 14 Jan. 1925, lst report. 
5 
, Skiraj, op. 'cit. _,, 
p. 138. 
6 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25t Politica Enero 1925, Informaci6n del 
dia, 14 Jan. 1925,2nd report. 
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of the inhabitants prisoner. The next day SI Ma4ammad wrote 
to the inhabitants of the Akhm2is' saying that they should not 
fight Muslims, but Christians. To this the Akhmas replied 
that "What you have done in three months the Spanish did not 
do in three years, "' a reference to the social, political 
and,. above all, economic effects of Rif! rule. 
On 21 January, Spanish intelligence reported that 
the RIfIs'had "cut off many heads, and taken many women and 
children as prisoners to the Riff [sic]. ,2 Nevertheless, 
al-Hashdmi b. Vallma of the BanU ldhirtold his tribe that 
bin 'Abd al-Karim was in touch with another Christian nation 
who would take over the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco# and 
that they were better off, under the Spanish. 
3' 
On 25 January, a huge barka of 800 men arrived from 
the Rif. Akhr! rU took 300 of them to Dar"AqQba to attack 
the Band Jabara clan of the -western Akhm7as*; the rest of 
the force went with S! Yazid b. Sala4,. the' 'q7a'-*id of the 
Band Razin, to the area south--ýwest from Shawin. Within three 
days a large part of the tribe's dwellings had been burned. 
4 
By 29 January, most of the Akhm2is*had submitted. 
5 
The repression continued into the first part of 
February 1925. On 4 February, Akhrlrra was reported to-have 
ordered the burning of villages in thd BanQ 'Jabara clan of 
the Akhmas. More houses in al-KhazAria were. burned as well., 
6 
I Ibid., Informaci6n del dia, '19 Jan. 1925,, 2nd report. 
2 Ibid., Informaci6n del dia, 21 Jan. 1925. 
3 Ibid., Informaci6n del d1a, 23 Jan. 1925, lst report. 
4 Hern9ndez Mir, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 355, *and SkIraj, 
op. cit., pp. 138-139. 
5 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Politica Enero 1925, Informaci6n del 
dia, 29 Jan. 1925, lst report. 
6 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Politica Febrero 1925, Informaci6n del 
dia, 4 Feb. 1925,2nd report. 
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The fires of the burning villages of the. southern Akhmds' 
could be seen as far away as Wazzari in the French zone, to 
whic h many fugitives f rom Rif! vengeance had f led. 
1 The 
Akhmas, ' revolt was over, for the Rifis' had crushed it. As a 
'final punishment, a fine of 250,000 pesetas was levied on 
the tr ibe. 2 All that remained was to deal with the instigator 
of much of, the trouble,, MFilay. ' 4mad al-Raisdl:!.. ' 
The Capture of al-RaisUll 
on 1 February 1925, Rif. l. forces moved up from the 
BanQ Issaf, to the south of the Banii "'Arrls*, towards Tazariat. 
Many of the sharifs of the BanCl*"Arfis. 'went to Tazardt to 
explain the danger to al-RaisQlT. * He is reported to have 
replied to their anxieties with the enigmatic phrase,, "The 
sky is far above the barking of dogs.,, 
3 Such'misplaced 
optimism did not allay their fears, and they took much of 
their property to the zawiya of 'Abd al-Salam in the hopes 
that there at least it would be respected. They asked 
al-RaisCill to distribute arms, but the-sha: rIf clearly knew 
he was defeated and replied, speaking of the' forces that 
were massing against him: "They cannot take away my dreams: 
4 
who are they to do so? " 
But TazarUt was surrounded, and the night before 
the attack, al-Raisaliwas warned that it. would come'at dawn. 
To this he replied: "Thanks be*to God, the All-Powerful, now 
SHAT, Maroc Fez 157jQuotidiens Pol'itIques 1925, Report 
from Captain Giacomoni,. Cercle de Ouezzan, Telegram No. 20, 
20 Jan. 1925.1 am indebted to Mr. George Joffe'for this 
reference. 
2 Hern9ndez Mir, o,,: ). _cit-, 
V01- II, P. ý355. 
3 intervendi6n Larache, Beni' Aros,. p. 49. 
4 ibid. 
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arn able to see who are Jews 
He then distributed arms in' a 
attacks despite the appeals o, 
Tazarat- 
willage, who appealed 
Which the sharlf* met with the 
raercy,,, 2 
and the sons of Jews .. O"l 
last attempt to hold off the 
f many of the inhabitants of 
to him to surrender, a request 
taunt that "only Jews ask for 
Tazarft was attacked in the morning of 8 February 
1924# 
and after Rif! reinforcements arrived in the evening, 
I 
al-Rais'ali's 
supporters deserted him (see Photograph xi: 2). 
110 then surrendered to the pro-Rif! forces. By this time, 
Practically 
all the principal pro -Rlfl. leaders in the Jibdl'a 
G4umara had joined the attack, including Akhrlrri,, ' MM&Y. 
Aýmad 
al-Baqqali,. Wuld al-Qrirfa of the Band Saýid,, Bri La4ya 
, 'nd Others of lesser importance. Binainu was released and 
demanded 
the immediate execution. of his prison guard. The 
Other Supporters of al-RaisUll were told that they were trait- 
o. rs to Islam, and were 'ordered to bury their enemies' dead. 
41-Raisall 
v. -s supporters were left unburied,, "to be eaten by 
the dogs and crows.,, 
3 
Al-Raisall himself was transported on a specially 
Mcade l'itter--; 
or he could not walk or ride on account of his 
illness-to 
Sh&win, then to Tags0t, where-he was seen by 
17incent 
Sheean, the American journali'st-who had managed to 
enter the Rif. Finally, hd was moved. down to the *coast and 
tcilken by boat to the Rif,, 'where he'was imprisoned in Ta'masind 
the BanQ 
-Waryagha7i .4 The rest of 
his family were lodged 
2 
lntervenc16n 
Larache, Beni AroS', P. 50- 
3 
Garcia Figueras, Marruecos Feudal, p. 214. 
citIntervenci6n Larache, Beni Aros, p. 53, and 
SkIraj, OP. 
P- 13 9. 
Intervenci6n Larache, Beni Aros, PP- 53-54, and Sheean, AdVent1j,,. 
; -ý es, pp. * 293-295. 
.. 0 
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Photograph XI: 2. 
I. 
Al-Raisillil. s supporters before thdir defeat 
by Rifi. troops 
a 
Source: The-Illustrated London News, 7 February 





Al-Raisilll,, 'unrepentant to the last, accused bin 
'Abd al-Karim of behaving with greater cruelty than the 
Spanish. To this bin "Abd al-Karim again replied that 
al-RaisUl'i had betrayed Morocco to the Christians. Never- 
theless, despite the decision of a meeting of the'lulamV' 
of the Rifi.. tribes that al-Raisril'i be put to death for his 
treachery to Islam, this was vetoed by bin 'Abd al-Farim. 
The booty that was taken from TazarUt was enormous. 
75,000 Spanish pesetas and 40 cases of ammunition figured 
among the principal items. They were not, however, shared out 
among the victorious RIfIs. 'and their supporters, but were 
impounded by S! al-'Arb! b. Vallma,. who was instructed to take 
charge of them 
3 
--yet another sign of thd centralising author- 
ity of the Rifl. 'state. 
Since October, -the Spanish had been. completely 
ejected from the Jibala, the revolt. of the AkhmZis*had been 
crushed, and the major figure of resistance had been defeated. 
The Rlfl*state stretched from the Timsamdri to the walls of 
Tetuan, and bin 'Abd al-Karim had reached theheight of. his 
power. 
Conclusion 
The events of the latter part of 1923,1924, and 
the beginning of 1925 were confusing. This is not to be' 
wondered at, for the Rifl. state was. facing, fighting,, and,, 
most important of all, defeating a number of enemies, and 
T 
Skiraj, op. cit. p. 139. 
2 Intervenci6n Larache, Beni Aros, pp. 54-55. 
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Politica Febrero 1925, Informaci6n del 
dia, 10 Feb. 1925. 
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strangely enough the least important and least dangerous of 
these enemies were the Spanish. This may seem paradoxical, 
for the Rif! 'state had been formed out of the need to oppose 
the advancing Spanish armies in 1921. However, the very 
existence of that new state so changed the political and 
social structure of the area that it was the threat from 
internal enemies which was the most serious. From these con- 
flicts--which took the form of revolts against the Rlfls'--a 
number,, of themes emerge. 
The first theme is thenature of Rif! 'authority. 
As Rifidominion extended over a new area, a number of things 
happened. In the first place they collected taxes. This was 
resented by the local people, not simply because they disliked 
paying taxes--for contributions had been exacted from thim 
in various ways by qal. ids before--but because they were so 
heavy and because the ability to collect taxes was-the symbol 
of an outside authority which was governing them. There were 
other symbols as well--the Rif! telephone 'lines, emphasising 
the technical superiority of their new masters, the building 
of Rif! ma4akmas and command posts. Significantly, at, least 
some of the Ghum&rls' referred to the latter as "fisIna"t 
recalling the practice of the othdr. power in the *area which 
was competing for the control of the Ghumara--the Spanish. ' 
Furthermore, as. the territories of the different tribes were 
occupied. by the Rifis., the new authorities attempted to disarm 
them, just as the Spanish had attempted. to do or would like 
to have done. In fact, this was just as much a "foreign 
domination" as*the Spanish had been. The Ghumdris recognised 
this when they told the Buqquya they could leave during the 
rebellion of May and June 1924; 'their quarrel wis with the 
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BanVI Waryaghal. The Akhm7as' expressed the. same view when they 
said that they had never heard of a Rif 1 'Sultan, nor would 
they permit "foreigners" to prejudice their standards of living. 
The second theme, inextricably linked with this, 
is why local people initially supported the R1f1s. In the 
case of certain individuals the reasons are clear enough. 
Some were implacably opposed to the Spanish. Such men were 
Qadur Kunya of the 'Anjara, and above all Atqad Akhrlril.. 
of'the BanU Vuzmar; - Akhrlrral. s hatred for the Christians is 
clearly expressed in a letter he wrote to bin 'Abd al-Karlm. 
in April 1924. After the customary greetings he went on: 
"'We were, before this, among the maballa [armed groups] 
of the enemies of God and his Prophet in the tribes 
of BanQ : Uazmar', in the BanQ Maldari [a clan of the BanQ. 
Vuzm&rIAnd the BanQ Sa'1d, and we kindled the war in 
all the tribes around thd city of Tetuan--may God 
return it to the Dar. ' al-Islani ... We started fight- ing [in the neighbourhood of Tetuan] , with 
T iveý men f rom 
the Police [i. e., the Spanish P. I. 1--may God annihilate 
them ... Then the Infidels from Tetuan arrested our brother Muslims from the BanQ Mald&n: and BanQ Vuzmar. ' 
... Then we went to the city of Tetuan and with the help of God and his Prophet we carried off six infidels 
--three adults and three children. The three adults, 
they were people who are held among thim in honour as 
wise and respected--may God annihilate them. " 
He continued in such terms at some length. 
' 
Others, like Kurt#ia,: who worked, for the Spanish 
in the past, joined the RIfIs because they had fallen out 
with the Spanish and al-RaisUll so that the 'Rlfls' were their 
only hope of safety. 
Others joined out of opportunism or out of a 
desire -. to'drive out the Spanish, ' but. not to be-dominated by 
the Rif is' afterwards. Such 'a one 'was al-Hash3mi b. Vakllma,, 
whcxn the Rif is. ' made qV. id of his tribe, ' the Bana,. Idhlr', but 
who turned against them at the time of the AkhmAs'revolt. 
1 MAEF, Maroc 519, p. 193, AIýMad AkhrIrQ to Mubammad b. 'Abd 
al-Karim, 14 Ramaýd. ri 1342/19 April 1924. 
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Others, still, never joined the Rifis--particularly 
al-Raisilli, ' 'Abd al-RaIM&ri'al-DarqawI,: and the Bujdayn family 
of. the Timsam7ari. They also happened to be sharifs, connected 
with powerful religious orders. 
This battle between bin 'Abd al-Karlm and the 
f, ariqas is a third theme of the chapter. The conflict was 
expressed in religious terms. The religious reforms of bin 
4Abd al-Karim were anathema to the, 
_tarIq'as: 
he expropriated 
babus'property for the war effort, and disapproved of their 
practices and rituals. Above all, he expected obedience., 
To a man like al-RaisQl*!, 'such an expectation was, to put it 
mildly, an impertinence. He, al-RaisUl'!, * was a, 'sharIf ,a 
descendant of the Prophetr while bin 'Abd al-KarIM was a 
nobody, and al-RaisUl*!. 'contemptuously dismissed him as "the 
son of a faq! h". There was a political objection on bin 
'Abd al-Karim's part to the'tarlq'as, for he could not, if his 
centralised. authority was to remain unchallenged, allow 
powerful groups within the state. Directly on the border was 
OAbd al-Raýmari al-Darqawl, * the head of thd most extensive 
order in the Rif, the Darqawlya. Since he' would not join 
him, and it must be remembered that bin 'Abdýal-Karlmtried 
to persuade him to do so, he had to be defeated. This attempt 
was not successful In the case of 'Abd al-Ralýmari, but, it was 
in that of al-RaisQlT-. '-again after many attempts to persuade 
him to join, the R! fTs*. What. was really at stake was'power. 
The Variqas and thd sharifs could combine'against bin *Abd 
al-Karim, and did so, and therefore they had to be-defeated. 
The importance of these'local power struggles-can 
be seen in the case of 'Amar b. VamIdu and Bil-QIsh as well. 
Their objectives. were to maintain their own positions in their 
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tribes, and they failed, just as the religious leaders had 
failed, because of the necessity, for the Rif! 'state, of 
limiting their power. Their other ally,, 'Abd al-Mal'ik, was 
forced to flee to the Spanish to organise his barka. He was 
killed in a skirmish on the eastern front on 7 August 1924. 
On the other hand, bin 'Abd al-Karim was quite 
content to leave in peace those sharlfs and tarlqa leaders 
who agreed to place themselves under his authority. This was 
particularly true of the Akhamlishlri family, who were given 
positions of authority in the tribed. S! Maýammad b. *adlq of 
the chief Akhamlishl zawiya of BQ Ghll: ab practically ruled 
the Sinhdj*a for bin 'Abd al-Karim; S! Mabammad b. "All 
al-V4kim, head of the Akhamllshl 'zawiya of Aguni b. Barrl,,. ' 
was made Pasha of the BanQ Abmad; S! Alýmad Jaddl 'of the 
Akhamllshl 
. 
zawiya of al-TaffaV was made Pasha of the BanQ 
'Amart; and outside the Akhamllshl family, SIal-Vashml b. 
al-Vaýssan of the zawiya of Afgh&I was made' 'qVid of the BanQ 
Sam! 4., 2 
It was not even a question of all of a particular 
family or a particular order being. for or against the RIf. 
Clearly 'Abd al-Ral7mazi al-Darqawl was opposed 'to bin "Abd 
al-Karim, but the 8harif s of thd Darawlya' *zawiya at Tuzghari 
in the Ghumara. cooperated with thd RIfIs'. They had been 
doing so at least since 1922, for SkIraj describes an incident 
when a messenger came f rom the titular head of the, zawiya, 
M4ammad b. ýadlq, who was living in Tangier, and tried to 
intervene in the negotiations ovejý the' 'ransoming, of thd Spanish 
Fleming, op. cit., P. 175, and SHM, Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas' 
Arabes, Beni Tuzin, 'AllU: b. Mu4ammad to Colonel, 8 Mubarram 
1343/9 Aug. 1924. 
2 Drague/Spillman, Op. 'cit--, P. 109. 
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prisoners. In his letter, Mulýaýmad b. ýadlq also asked that 
the zawiya be respected. Bin ýAbd al-Karim replied that the 
zawiya was safe and its faqIhs were acting as good Muslims, 
and that if M4apmad b. ýaýdlq was as good a Muslim he would 
come to join them. Howeverr on 1926, Muýaýmmad b. *adIq was 
still living in Tangier. 
1 Also, as this chapter has described, 
the Nasiriyy1n: were similarly divided. Al-Had&w! bf al-Ramla 
near Tangier supported 'the RIfIs'while the Bujdayn family in 
the Timsamari were opposed. Even thd Akhamlishiri had produced 
two supporters of the Ghumara revolt in 1924. 
It must be repeated that the question came down to 
power. Those families of marabUts or 'sh'drIfs . those' 'zawiyas 
which were prepared to cooperate with bin 'Abd al-Karlm*. in' 
the new order, were lef t in peace. Those that tried to pro- 
tect themselves by allying themselves with 'thd French or 
Spanish might claim that bin tAbd al-Karim, by taking over 
babUs: propertyl and by forcing them to accept his authority, 
was acting in a way opposed to their religious prestige, but 
they were unsuccessful. Bin 'Abd al-Kar1rd described them as 
traitors to Islam and tried--and in most cases succeeded--in 
crushing them. There was no place for'tarlq'as. in the'salafiya 
interpretation of the sharl"a, but neither was there 'a place 
for them in the political structure of the'RIfI 'state, if they 
tried to assert an independent existence. 
The final theme to emerge during the''year 1924 was 
the possibility of conflict with 'the French. ' Bin "Abd 
al-Karlm may have been brought in against his will, but if his 
enemies in the Rif, Sinhdja and Jibala sought backing from the 
Sklfaj,, op. cit. 
_#, 
p. 73, and Cerdeira, op. cit., p. 66, 
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French, and if the French insisted on occupying territory 
which it was both politically and economically necessary 
that he should control, conflict was inevitable. The fighting 
stopped in 1924, but the threat of its renewal remained, and 
it. was conflict with the Frenchthat would eventually destroy 
the RIfI: state. 
Chapter XII 
THE RIF! STATE AT THE HEIGHT OF ITS POWER-THE 
INVASION OF THE FRENCH ZONE JANUARY TO SEPTEMBER 1925 
After the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from 
Shawin to the defensive line from Tetuan to Alcazarquivir, 
and the abandonment of most of the Jibdl-a to the Spanish# 
the RM state reached the peak of its power. It now 
stretched from the eastern edge of the Rif'(where the Spanish 
"Silvestre line" had held throughout thd'withdrawals in the 
east) almost as far as Tetuan and beyond it to the west into 
the, BanQ Masawar, only a short distance 'from Tangier. Behind 
the Spanish defence lines, the Hawz and 'Anjara tribes had 
risen, threatening the vital Tangier to Tetuan road and the 
equally vital Ceuta to. Tetuan railway. Within the R1f1 
dominated area, most of those leaders who had in thd past 
opposed bin 'Abd al-Karim had been silenced. Al-RaisUll had 
been captured and taken to the' 'central RTf where, close 'to 
death, he was imprisoned at Tamasind in the BanU. Waryaghal. 
'Amar b. Vamidu had fled to thd French*zones although he 
would re-emerge to help the French'in their invasion of the 
Rif later in 1925. 'Abd al-Malik was dead, and bin 'Abd 
al-Karim had defeated any, possible'thteat from Bil-QIsh. 
Organised opposition to -the*-Rif is. ' in the Jibdl: a had been 
severely dealt with during January and February 1925. The 
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only remaining focus of opposition was that provided by 'Abd 
al-Ralýmaný al-Darqdw! In the Bane Zarwal. For this reason it 
was vital for the RIfIs to take the Bane Zarwal: and the other 
tribes on the north bank of the W&dI Wargha. There were 
other reasons as well, of course, principally that the RIf 
relied on the food resources of the Wargha valley. However, 
action in that area would undoubtedly bring the Rlfls*into 
conflict with the French once again. 
Bin "Abd al-Kar1rd was therefore very careful about 
his preparations for an attack which would lead to war with 
the French. He first had to make absolutely sure of his 
control of the territory that he already held, and undertook 
the consolidation of the Jibala, building roads and setting 
up command posts and mabakmas in the tribed--all connected 
by telephone, of course--and strengthening even further his 
political control of the area. However, thd'economic con- 
ditions in the Rif and Jibala were, getting steadily. worsep 
so the urgency of securing the upper Wargha valley %4as great. 
Initially, the Riflattacks on the Wargha and the 
French posts north of that rivek were extreiýely successful. 
They were so successful, in fact, that Rif. i. troops crossed the 
river, and after advances on otherý sectors of the front, for 
a short time threatened Fez itself. However, thi-d led to a 
hasty alliance between the French and Spanishforces in 
Morocco, which resulted in a Spanish'landing. at Alhucemas in 
September 1925. 
The military aspects of the campaign against the 
French zone will not be discussed in this chapter at great 
length, for it was the economic difficulties and the polit- 
ical situation in the Rif and JibdIa which led to the attack 
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on the French zone, and which also caused stirrings of 
political opposition to bin 'Abd al-Karim within the RIfI 
state. 
The Economy of the Jibala, February to April 1925 
The Jib&la that the RIfIs'took over in December 
1924 and January 1925 fell rapidly into economic chaos. 
Al-RaisUll had been able to point to the defeat of the 
Spanish and the closure of markets in the JibAla as one of 
the reasons why the Akhm2Is'Is* should oppose the RIfIs'. 
1 He 
certainly had a strong argument, for, -in the month 
between 
12 December 1924 (when prices had already been reported as 
rising) and 11 January 1925, the'price of sugar went up from 
8 pts to 10 pts (a rise of 25%) and candled from-3 pts to 
5 pts a. packet (a 66t rise). 
2 
At first, the Rlfls*were able to smuggle in large 
amounts of supplies from Tangier, going through the Spanish 
defence line at night. 
3 
In rebruary 1924, Vincent Sheean, 
the. American newspaper correspondent, met a group of more 
than one hundred Spanish soldiers who had been taken prisoner 
in the 'Anjara in December, behind the Spanish lines, and 
whorin February, were escorted by night through the defence 
lines to captivity in the RIf*without a shot being fired; 
Sheean himself crossed the Spanish-'lined from al-Ramla in 
the BanQ Masawar by night, along with*Some-four hundred men, 
See, above, p. 704. 
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Politica Diciembre, nota, 12 Dec. 1924, 
and Politica Enero, nota, 11 Jan. 1925. The prices for 
December are given in-the report in VassanI 'pesetas and'those 
for January in Spanish pesetas. The December figures have . 
therefore been converted into Spanish pesetas. For an account 
of exchange rates, see above, ' p. xix. 
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Politica Febrero, nota, 19 Feb. 1925 
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women and children,, "with their mules, donkeys,, goats and 
chickens", on their way to the Thursday market in the 
International Zone, and although the Spanish posts fired on 
the convoy, they did it very little damage. 
1 
The worst hunger was in RIfI tontrolled areas 
behind the Spanish defence lines--in the 'Anjara, Hawz and 
Wadl RaOs tribes. Towards the end of February, the notables 
of the 'Anjara and Wadi Ra's wrote to bin 'Abd al-Karlm 
I 
telling him that unless he helped them they would have to 
take action on their own account, because of the very great 
misery in the tribe. 
2 This was quite clearly a veiled 
threat that they would submit to the Spanish. What they 
needed was military support, for starting from. 4 Januaryj, 
Spanish troops led by Francisco Franco (then still a Colonel) 
had begun to move up the border between the International 
Zone, and the 'Anjara lands, and after considerable fighting 
they reached the coast at the end of January. 
3 The Spanish, 
however, were unable to fight their way along the coast to 
al-Qaqr al-ýaghltj which was only reoccupied in a sea-borne 
landing at the end of March. 
4 
This Spanish advance between the "Anjara and the. 
International Zone of course made the tribes' supply problem 
that much more difficult. The Rifis' sent 300 men to the 
'Anjar and Hawz in mid-March, ' although Spanish'Intelligence 
estimated that this was to keep them loyal to the R1f1s and 
prevent them from submitting to the Spanish'rather than to 
I Sheean, Adventures, 'pp. 324-325,337-343. 
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 125, Polltica Febrerol nota, 22 Feb. 1925, 
lst Report. 
3 The Times, 5 Jan. 1925, p. 12, dated Madrid, 4 Jan. 1925, 
and 23 Jan. 1925, p. 12, dated Tangier, 22 Jan. 1925. 
4 Ibid., 31 Mar. 1925, p. 15, dated Madrid, 30 Mar. 1925. 
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help. them open supply routes. 
1 
Meanwhile, the scarcity of food in these two tribes 
got worse. At the beginning of March they were reported to 
2 have no grain at all. An indication of how serious the 
position was came the following month when a Spanish intel- 
ligence report of 2 April stated that a man from the Hawz, 
one 'Abd al-Q&dir, had sold his rifle to get money to buy 
food. 3 On 6 April, when Spanish troops had reoccupied parts 
of the 'Anjara tribe around al-Qwp7 al-ýaghlr, they found 
that the local people were eager-to eat the leftovers of the 
rations of Spanish troops, and the bits of bread dropped by 
those troops. 
4 In the rest of 'Anjara, the parts not occupied 
by the Spanish, persistent bombing by Spanish aeroplanes 
meant that the markets could not be held. 
5 
Matters were not much better in the''Jibala in front 
of the Spanish lines. "Great misery" was reported in the BanQ,. 
Masawar, and many Jibdlls left to seekwo"rk, or at least food, 
in Tangier, or the Spanish . occupied towns of AsIla, Larache, 
6 
and, Alcazarquivir. The Akhmas'and BanU 7dýmad were equally 
afflicted, and when AkhrIr. Q 'asked for their help to 
"punish" the 'Anjara for their threats to submit to the 
Spanish, they ref used,, saying thdt that tribe was too f ar away, 
7 
and that anyway they were too hungry to move. ' The situation 
was not helped by the actions of the RIfIs'themselves", who 
1 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Polltica Marzo, nota, 13 Mar. 1925, 
2nd report. 
2 Ibid., 6 Mar. 1925,2nd report. 
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Polltica April, nota, 2 Apr. 1925. " 
4 Ibid., nota, 6 Apr. 1925. 
5 Ibid., nota, 14 Apr. 1925,2nd report. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., nota, 15 Apr. 1925. 
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were reported to be taking food supplies--peas and beans-- 
from Shawin to AjdIr as "war bootY" -1 
The refugees pouring into Tangier to find food 
became a matter of international concern, and in April, 
Prince 'Umar TussUrf, a cousin of the King of Egypt, issued 
an appeal to the Muslim world for help for the "Rif! ". home- 
less, and started the fund with a personal gift of five 
hundred Egyptian pounds. 
2 The Nizam of Hyderabad. contributed 
3 
another C500 sterling in May. 
Not surprisingly, these conditions caused consid- 
erable ill-will towards the RIfIs* in the 'Jib&la,, but there 
was little that the local people could do about it, for RIfI : 
control of the area was too strong. 
The Rifl. Administration of the' ; Jib7ala 
After the burning of the Akhm&s'and thd capture of 
al-Raisilli, * the 4arka that had supported al-RaisUll In 
4 
TazarUt disintegrated. Now theRifis'could set about 
organising the Jibdla in accordance with 'their wishes. 
Their first step, at the end of, February, was to 
call the notables of the Jib&la to a meeting in, AjdIt. 
At this meeting, qa "ids and other off icials'were appointed. 
5 
Bin "Abd al-Karim told his audience that they should defend 
thier country (watan) against anyone who tried to take it:, -" 
"Spain is the bitter enemy of [our]. religion, and 
has no other intention than thd. 'abolition of Islam 
in the Rif, arýd in any other tribed she occupies, 
and she. will. spare no ef fort, to. eliminate it. in 
ibid., nota, 9 Apr. 1925. 
2 The Times, 29 Apr. 1925, p. 15. 
3 Ibid., 27 May, 1925, p. 15. 
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Politica Febrero, 'nota,, 19 Feb. 1925. 
5 Skiraj, op. cit., p. 139. 
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in any form .. . 1" 
0 
This was presumably in the cause of a general encouragement, 
for bin eAbd al-Karim then moved on to more practical aspects 
of administration. He appointed Sl Ijaddu b. "All 
al-Muqaddim, of Ajdlr. ' (Ralls. Misalild "Sibarals" successor 
as Minister of Marine) as a temporary inspector, based at 
ShZiwin,, to set up telepýone lines and an organisation, and 
to coordinate attacks on Ceuta and Tetuan 
2 (see Photograph 
XII: 1). They were then told that each tribe should choose 
a place to put a malýakma suitable for the administrator of 
the tribe and his helper, that they should make a census of 
all the arms in the tribe and store them at the malýakma so 
that when an idala left to join the Iýarka, all its members 
would be armed. This last instruction apparently infuriated 
the JiNills. ' as they considered, quite correctly, that it 
was an attempt to disarm the tribe. 
3 
When AkhrlrQ 'returned from Ajdlt and, on 27 
February, announced these decisions at TaghzUt, the local 
people were angry, and told him that they would not hand 
over their arms, that they would notallow the appointment 
of administrators, and that they would prefer to submit to 
the Spanish or the French. Once again the belief that by 
ejecting the Spanish the JibZills*could return to living as 
autonomous tribes and clans, as they had before the Spanish 
arrived, was being expressed. They had seen thd RIfIs' as 
liberators, but onfy now realised that they had been forcibly 
incorporated. into thd. nei4 state. *. . They. may. not, 
have liked 
1 Skiraj, op. cit., pp. 139-140. 
2 Ibid., p. 140. 
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. ý 25,, Politica Marzo, nota,, 2 Mar. 1925. 
4 Ibid., nota, 5 Mar. 1925. 
t 
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Photograph XII: 1 
A European traveller's drawing of a meeting of 
Riflofficials in a house in the Wadl Law area 
in late 1924 or early 1925. Notice the man in 
the right foreground speaking into a telephone 
mouthpiece. 
Source: London' News, 21 February 




this, but there was very little they could do about it, for 
the RIfIs'were quite definitely in control. At the begin- 
ning of March, bin. 'Abd al-Karlra ordered the BanU IdhIr to 
pay a fine of (reportedly) 50,000 pesetas, an enormous sum 
in the straitened economic difficulties of the tribe, because 
of five Rlfls*who had been-killed in the tribe. When they 
refused, a large Iýarka was sent from the Hawz, and arrived 
on 4 March, in order to enforce payment. 
1 
Generally speaking, the attitude of the Jiballs. ' 
seems to have been a begrudging acquiescence to RIfI: 
domination. Sheean, on his journey out of the RIf through 
the Jibala in February 1925, noted that when he spent a 
night in a village of the Banil "Arras. ': 
"I could see what had never appeared before in the 
whole journey across northern Morocco': a latent 
hostility, or at best an unwilling friendship, for 
the Sultan Mohammed ben' Abd al-Krim ... They 
were not unfriendly [ towards Shddan, and his RIfI 
companion],,. but they smiled slightly each time 
Mohammed and I referred to the Riffi leader as 
the 'Sultanl. "2 
Some people did feel able to protest about some aspects of 
RIfI : rule. A meeting at MUlay 'Abd al-Salam in the second 
week of March agreed to wage total war against the Christians, 
but also to write to bin 'Abd al-Karlm complaining about the 
behaviour of ihe Rlfl. troops. 
3 It will be remembered that 
stories, true or otherwise, * about Rlfls'abusing Jiball 
womenj had spread before theAkhmils'uprising in January. one 
man, a former S: ajl_in Tetuan, and well-disposed towards the 
Spanish, made his own individual protest. When R1f1 soldiers 
started. drilling In. the. main square bf. *Shilwin, he nailed up 
1 ibid. 
2 Sheean, Adventures, pp. 320-321. 
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Politica Marzo, nota, 13 Mar. 1925, 
lst report. 
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all the windows of his house looking over the square. For 
this insolence he was fined 5,000 pesetas. 
1 
In fact, those Jibalis. *who disliked the R1f1s 
could only content themselves with such gestures; for they 
could take no effective action at all. On 28 March, Spanish 
Intelligence reported that the Akhm&s'had been completely 
disarmed, 2 and on 4 April, it reported that all the Ghumdran 
tribes had been disarmed as well. Qal. id Wuld al-Qurfa then 
proceeded to deal with the Banfi Sa'Id al-Gharb in the same 
way. 
3 At the end of April, information came from the Larache 
Comandancia that Rifl. agents were counting up arms in the 
BanU. Sikkar. 4 
Once again, bin 'Abd al-Kar1rd's policies were 
serving a variety of ends at once. * By disarming the tribes 
he could claim, firstly, that it prevented feudinge and 
secondly, that it ensured that the*barkas were adequately 
armed. It also ensured his own continued dominance over the 
Jibdla. 
In fact, the only placewhere that dominance was 
even slightly questioned was in the *Anjara. Cut off from 
direct Rlfl'Control, behind thd Spanish lines, and htingry as 
well, the people of thd 'Anjara, showed a marked tendency to 
ýubmit to the Spanish. However, thepresence of sympathetic 
tribes behind the Spanish'defehce'lines Was obviously of 
great strategic importancelor the RIfIs; and a concerted 
propaganda effort wýs madeto keep thd, 'Anjara opposed to 
the Spanish. One letterl sent by a Rlfl'agent in-mid-March 
Ibid., nota, 27 Mar. 1925, lst report. 
2 Ibid., notal 28 Mar. 1925. . 3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Politica Abril, notar 4 Apr. 1925. 
4 Ibid., notal 24 Apr. 1925. 
725 
1925 to four people in the valley of the Wadl'al-Marsa, in 
the eastern 4Anjara, not far from Ceuta, ran as follows: 
(After the traditional greetings) "Know that all 
the Muslims of the zone, from the Muluya as far as 
your country, are agreed and united under a lord 
sent by God, an excellent person, who has great 
powers and facilities to fight and expel our 
enemies. We shall rejoice that you listen to the 
voice of God and come to join the rest of your 
brothers. From them you will hear the plans for 
the triumphs of the Muyahidin [sic].. If you do 
not heed the call you will suffer the same fate as 
the Xerif Raisuni Lsic] who lost-everything: 
freedom, goods and money which has fallen into the 
coffers of our Mahzen [sic],. and his children have 
been arrested. Be as qU-ick as you can and at once 
decide to join your brothers. "l 
This is a fairly primitive bit of propaganda--a mixture of 
appeal for jih&d and threats, but it contains a passing ref- 
erence to the new character of the Rlfl'state, pointing to 
the facilities which the "lord sent by God" enjoyed in his 
battle against the Spanish. Bin 'Abd al-Karlm was also quite 
willing to try to carry out thd threats implicit in his. 
agent's letter, for on 23 March he wrote to the OAnjara 
that there were people in the village of 'AzIb bin al-'AishIsh 
in the far west of the tribe, near the border with'the 
International Zone, who were disloyal. They were to be' 
arrested and sent to Ajd1r. 
2 
Whether these people were in fact arrested and 
sent to Ajdlt is not known but it does not seem to have 
stopped people in the OAnjara from submitting to the Spanish. 
On 5 April, ten villages in the east of thd tribe submitted 
to the Spanish.,. partly in their desperation -to get food.. 
3 
1 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Politica Marzol notal 20 Mar. 1925,, 
lst report, containing letter TtEranslated into Spanish) of 
letter from Mohamed Ben Mohamed el Muyahed Mesrandi to Sidi 
Enfed-del Cheraid, Taleb Sidi Enfed-del el-Kamell Sidi el 
Bach Mohamed Kanya y Sidi, el-Hossain, Ben Yiaa, dated 1343. 
2 Ibid., noial 23 Mar. 1925# lst report'. 
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, *Politica Abril, nota,, 6. Apr. 1925. 
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The 'Anjara apart, bin 'Abd al-Karim's control of 
bhe main part of the Jib&la was absolute. There were guard 
posts in all the tribes and at places like the* 'zawiya of 
1 Sid! , Yusif of TilTdi.. ' In each village, according to 
Spanish Intelligence, five men and five women were paid by 
the R1f1s* to report anyone who spoke ill of the Rifis' or 
Df bin 'Abd al-Karim--or indeed spoke of him at all, for a 
rumour had spread that no one had seen him for four months, 
with the implication that he was dead. Anyone who was 
anwise enough to comment on this rumour was liable to suffer 
the death penalty, the market-criers announced. 
2 
The same penalty--death--was announced for anyone 
who discussed the death of al-RaisUll, * 
3' 
who had died at 
ramasind on 3 Apr. 1925.. 
4 The same prohibition applied in 
5 the Rif' as well--only there the penalty was a very heavy f ine. 
It is an extraordinarily vivid illustration of 'thd extent , 
to which bin tAbd al-Karim controlled the Rif and the Jibala, 
that the first rumours of al-RaisQIII. s death did not reach 
6 Tangier until 17 April and that even on 26'April, the' 
Spanish authorities at Alhucemas Island. could not decide 
7 
whether the rumour was true. 
Certainly bin ýAbd al-Karim held the Rif under the 
same tight control as he did the Jibala. Thdre*is an account 
of a visit by a Moroccan agent of the French in January and 
February. 1925 which shows. this. very. clearly... 
1 Ibid., nota, 20 Apr.. 1925. 
2 Ibid. ' 
3 Ibid., nota, 23 Apr. 1925. 
4 Hart, *Aith Waryaghar, p. 393. 
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Informaci6n' Matalsa, nota, 26'Apr. 1925. 
6 The Times, 18 Apr. 1925# p. 10, dated Madrid, 17 Apr. 1925. 
7 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Informaci6n' Matalsa,, nota, 26 Apr. 1925. 
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The Visit of 'All Al-MajAwl b. Mukhtar. ' to the Rif 
On 8 February 1925, 'All. al-Majawl b. al-Mukht&r.,,, 
a man, from one of the unsubmitted tribes of the Band Warrayn, 
came'voluntarily to the French post at Berkine in the foot- 
hills of the Middle Atlas (on the edge of the Banii Narrayn 
confederation) to offer information about a trip he had just 
made into the Rif. His aim in providing this information, 
according to the French, was firstly to earn a little money, 
and secondly to obtain a pardon for various unspecified 
crimes that he had committed between 1920 and 1923. The 
French considered him a reliable informant. 
In order to enter the Rif., he was able. to use a 
safe-conduct pass signed by bin I'Abd al-Karim which he had 
obtained in 1923 when he had acted as a. messenger between 
bin 'Abd al-Karim and leaders of the Band Warrayn. On this 
occasion, armed with his old safe-conduct documents, he went 
to the Rif with the excuse of looking for a Warrayn! leader 
who had gone to the Rif on a visit and not yet returned. 
He entered the Rif'from the south, ' crossing the 
Fez-Taza railway line near MasQn on 13'January. The follow- 
ing day he reached the first Rif! outpost. at Ba Malwiyat, 
near Sakka. There he found a Waryaghll. "qVId, another 
Waryagh 1 !. "notable", and five members of the Rif! regular 
army. They also had a telephone, ' connecting their position 
with Sl *'All B9 . 
'Uqýa and, eventually,, Ajdlr. '. The'qalid 
explained that the purpose of the malýakma at Sakka was prin- 
cipally, to. keep a watch on. the French, '. and to. 'open 
1 SHAT Maroc Fez 156, Territoire de Taza, Cercle de Gue*rcif, 
Annexe deýMahiridga, Bureau de, Berkine., 
-Services de Renseignements, no. 21. "Renseignements fournis sur le Riff". 
Berkine, 8 Feb. 1925F Confidentiel (henceforward referred to 
as "Renseignements fournis sur le Riff"). 
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negotiations with people in the French half of the 
Banil Ba Yalýyl, ' who were encouraged to come to markets in the 
Rlf and were welcomed by the Rlfls*. "All . 'al-MajAwl was also 
informed that while bin 'Abd al-Karlrft had made it quite 
clear that at that point, in January 1925, he did not want 
war with the French, he was making preparations for an 
attack on the French zone with the assistance of a certain 
Sl Khalil b. May Mubammad, a man who claimed, somewhat 
curiously, to be the son of BU Výmara (the pretender to the 
Moroccan throne between 1902 and 1903, wh6 had been based 
1 for some time at SilwAri, near Melilla). SI Khal1l: had taken 
part in the first conflicts with the French 'in the Banil . 
Warrayn in 1922, and had joined the RIf. Is*in 1923, for whom 
he had undertaken to organise all. the refugees from the 
French zone. 'All. 'al-Majawl picked up the rumour that 
Khalil expected to receive Rif! help for an attack on the 
French zone in March or April 1925--a rumour of some signific- 
ance in view of the Rifi. Attack on the French'zone in April. 
The Sakka front was protected by a group of some 400 RIfI 
regulars, who spent their days training, and. building air 
raid shelters. 
On 16 January, 'All . 'al-Majawl. visited thd Friday 
market at 'Ain Zuhra, and noted the political calls made by 
the local Mat4lsl 'qal. ids for the Band Bd. Yaýyl bf the French 
zone to come to the Rif. 'for trade--presumably part of the 
political campaign lo '. 'attract" that tribe. It is interest- 
ing to note that in making use of the markets, bin 'Abd 
al-Karlm was adopting precisely the same methods of 
nattracting" to his cause the French part of the BanU Ba 
See above, p. 30. 
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Ya4yl : as the Spanish had used in 1916 for the part of the 
same tribe that fell inside their zone. 
1 
'All.. 'al-MajAwl visited a number of markets during 
his rather leisurely approach to Ajdlr., and at each he noted 
propaganda being made and calls for 1ýarkas against the French 
and the Spanish. It is difficult to say whether or not it 
was a coincidence, but in the markets close to the "Christian 
lines" at S! . 
"All BU . 
"Uqba, and Sriq al-Ithnayn of the Banri 
T(IzIri, the market announcements that he reported were con- 
cerned with the organisation of barkas, and it was not until 
he reached snq al-Arba'a of the Bana Waryaghal that he 
reported religious and social propaganda. Here, on"21 
January, he heard S! Yazid b. Vaýnmu, the Minister of the 
Interior, who: 
told the natives to observethe religious 
laws scrupulously, so that thdy. would-always have 
God's protection; that Ould. Abd al-Krim required 
everyone to live in peace and that he forbade'any. 
disorder; that he would be very severe towards 
anyone who committed an offence, * that those wh6 
killed would be killed, that anyone who stole would 
have his right hand cut off., '2' 
This last announcement is of particular interest, for it is 
the only mention of such a penalty being enforced. If it 
is correct--and there seems no reason why 'All. 'al-Majawl ' 
should make it up--it shows yet anothdr advance of the 
sharl'a into RifI 'society and one, moreover, in a form which 
had largely died out in Morocco'before 1900.3* 
The following day he went to a Thursday market 
near Ajdlr. *, at which Abmad BQ Drd, 'the Minister of War, made 
a speech announcing the capture of TazarUt:, and giving the 
see above, pp. 163-164. 
2 "Renseignements fourýiis sur le Riff". 
3 See above, p. 128. 
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credit f or this to Akhrlr. fi. ' The very f act that he emphasised 
AkhrlrU"s part in al-Raisflllls capture is significant, for 
it points to a concern to bring home the unity of the Rif 
and the Jibala to his audience. 
Next, 'All 'al-Majawi went to Ajdlt, He found 
that bin 'Abd al-Karlra had moved his headquarters to Azgh&r, 
about a kilometre from Ajd1r, and the rnalýakma of Ajd1r. had 
largely been taken over by S! Khalil b. Mlay' -Mubammad and 
his group of supporters from the French zone. In order to 
stay in Ajd1r, he had to obtain written permission from the 
maýakma, since anyone who did not have this authorisation 
was expelled from the area. Again, this implies a consider- 
able level of social and bureaucratic control. This is not 
to say that the maýakma itself was particularly opulent, 
for it was no more than a house of the traditional type for 
the area (see Photograph XII: 2). 
'All 'al-Majawl *received his permission easily 
enough on production of his safe-conduct pass, and spent the 
week-end of 24-26 January in Ajdlr., making frequent visits 
to Azgh&r. The level of activity in the area seems quite 
remarkable. Some of the Spanish prisoners (between 80 and 
100 of them) were employed in digging trenches and air raid 
shelters; others were employed in making cartridges; yet 
others in making leather gas-masks. Numerous Jews were 
employed in making hand-grenades out of old fruit tins, and 
other Europeans werý involved. in maintaining thd telephone 
service. 
On Tuesday 27 January, *All. *entered the mabakma of 
Azghar*to ask for an interview with bin 'Abd al-Karim. He 
saw the of f ice j with a telephone,. of Alýýad BU Drd,: and that of 
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Photograph XII: 2 
T4e mabakma of Ajdlr, bin 'Abd al-Karlm's 
I former house, after its capture by the Spanish 
in the autumn of 1925. 
Source: Illustrated London News, -24 October 
i925, p. 803. 
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SI 4mad Shiddl. ' who he describes as mutaqarrif in charge of 
making payments to the army and recording taxes and fines. 
Both these offices, and that of bin 'Abd al-Karlm, were 
furnished simply, in the European manner. 'All Al-Majawl was 
then interrogated by Alým. ad Bia Dra, ' in -the presence of bin 
'Abd al-Karim, about the political situation in the Banil 
Warrayn, and his replies were carefully noted down by a 
secretary. He was then dismissed and told to wait for a 
further interview. 
That interview never came,. although he was inter- 
rogated again by S! Xhalil about the political position in 
the BanQ Warrayn. After a week, 'All al-Majdw! decided to 
leave AjdIr: "I was fed up because life is expensive there 
n2 and nobody gives you anything. However, to do sop he had 
to get another permit, this time to leave AjdIr'. He applied 
on the morning of 2 February to the-mabakma. of Azghar, and 
in true Moroccan fashion was told to come back in the 
afternoon. Finally, Alýmad BU Dragave him permission to 
return home and he set off at once, along the Shawin road, 
and through the Ghum&ra. However, by this time he had run 
out of money and decided to return home without visiting- 
Shawin, as he had intended. He went through'the Banfl 'AmArt, 
and the Gaznaya, where he saw extensive_defence works being 
carried out on the French front. 'There were large numbers 
of Rifi. troops--about 1,, 400 near-Kiffanýj ready to attack, the 
French zone. The local commanders were apparently most, 
anxious to do this, but bin 'Abd al-Karlm had forbidden any 
..... ................... 
"Renseignements fournis sur le Riff". According to Hart, 
Aith Waryaghar, pp. 378-379, Shidd! was only an assistant to 
SI Mu4ammad B5 Jibdr., who was chief. mutaqarrif. 
2 "Renseignements. fournis sur le Riff% 
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such'attack because "the hour had not yet struck". 
1 
Eventu- 
ally he regained the French lines and made his report. 
Four things stand out clearly in this report. 
Firstly, the very great level of organisation that 'All 
al-Majdwi describes. He makes numerous references to the 
telephone system, to the bureaucracy, and social control in 
Ajdir. Secondly, he gives considerable insight into the 
authority of the Rif! 'state. His saferconduct pass was 
valid. everywhere. Quite clearly, also, bin 'Abd al-Karlm 
was in full control of his officers and officials on the 
French front, despite their desiresI. to invade the zone at 
once. Thirdly, he gives proof that bin 'Abd al-KarTM was 
under political pressure to attack the Prench'and was pre- 
paring for eventual war against them. Finally, he comments 
upon the economic difficulties in AjdIr, and indeed on the 
French front, where the troops seemed to him "to be very 
underfed, " 
He sums up his own opinions thus: 
"From the conversations I had, I received theImpression 
that Abd el-Krim (sic1has considerably. increased his 
prestige since my trip in 1923, but that thdneces- 
sities of life are very difficult. to find. - Many of, the tribes are tired of sending contingents, but no- 
one dares to protest out loud. Ould Abd el-Krim says 
that he does not want to attack the French because he 
cannot wage war on two fronts, but he'itýfundamentally 
hostile to the French, and I believe that hdIs ready 
to encourage Si el-Khellil Ould Moulay M! Ahmed '[Lic], 
in'his enterprise. "2 
The attack on the French zone, the next major. stage'of the 
RIf war, did not cole until April 1925 but it was, to be well 




The Attack'on the' Pren*ch Zone 
Military preparations for the attack on the French 
zone were well under way at the beginning of February 1925. 
In fact, despite the defeats of the summer of 1924, bin 
'Abd al-Karlm had never given up his intention of dealing 
with 'Abd al-Rabm&ri al-Da: rq5w!.. Af ter the conference at which 
he had announced the arrangements for administering the 
Jibala, held in Ajd1r at the end of January, bin 'Abd 
al--! Karlrft called another meeting of his ga9ids with repres- 
bntatives from the Ghumara and Sinhaja and announced that 
apart from the necessity of dealing with Spain, and ejecting 
her from Ceuta and Tetuan; he also intended to defeat 'Abd 
al-Rabrq7an'"because he has caused trouble between us and the 
rulers of the French zone. " 'Abd al-Ralým. an, he said,, clearly 
wanted the French to take over the BanQ ZarwAl', and it would 
therefore be better if the RIfIs invaded that tribe first. 
Not surprisingly, everyone agreed with this view. 
1 
It is interesting that at this stage bin OAbd 
al-Karim continued to imply that he did not intend to attack 
the French zone as such, but only to occupy those parts of 
the "RIE" that still did not obey him. Neverthelessi he 
himself must have been well aware that such moves would lead 
to war with the French and he made his preparations 
accordingly. 
His military cormnand 
2 
was also aware. of it- and 
SkIraj, op. cit., pp. 40-41. 
2 This consisted of bin 'Abd al-Karim, his brother SI 
Maýammadj 'Abd al-Saldm. al-Khatt4bl,: 4mad BU DrA, * YazId b. 
al-Vaii Vammur Mubammad BU Uibar, BU Laýya, VammAdI al-Shams, 
and sl"Umar b. Muýammddl: (of the Banra. 'Abdallah). According 
to al-Bil : 'Ayydshl,: it also included the latter's father 'Abd 
alý-Sal&m b. al-VA. jj Muband who seems to have reverted to 
obedience to bin 'Abd al-Karlm in July and August 1925. 
Al-Bri 'I'AyydshI, * op. cit. j vol. II, P. 348. 
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it agreed to undertake military action. against the French. 
A special General Staff was formed for the occasion, under 
S1 Ma4ammad al-Khatt&b1,,. * consisting mainly of people from 
the Spanish occupied territories in the eastern zone. It 
included Idris' b. MimQn Khujja, a Qallay1who had served 
with bin 'Abd al-Karim since 1921, Qal*id BQ Ra4ayl of the 
al-Mata. 1sa, QVid 'Amar b. BU "Azza of the Spanish occupied 
part of the Bana Sa t id al-RIf ,a qd I id f rom, the Banil Bil . 
Ya4yl, * a Sid! al-Vassan al-Qadirl al-TilimsAn! from Algeria, 
who was secretary to the General Staff, and three R1f1s: 
'Allal b. al-Vaj'j bQ . 
"Azza 'of the Timsamari,, Mu4ammad Sharrat 
of. Ajd1t, who was to be, chef de cabinet, and 4mad b. S1 
Shallb Aqilari who was to be paymaster. Together these men 
moved to Targis't to begin plans for the operations. 
1 
As 'All al-Majawl showed, part of the preparations 
for the advance consisted of constructing a defensive barrier 
on the southern side of the Rlfl behind which the R1f1s 
could retire if necessary. But all the troops were not 
finally mobilised until the beginning of March 1925 in order 
to preserve secrecy, and even then it was done with consid- 
erable care. The attack was scheduled to begin at the 
beginning of April, just as al-MajAwl had predicted, with a 
group of Rlfl: regular army moving into the Banri Zarwal 
through the Kit&ma. tribe, while irregular'barkas attacked 
the French posts in the upper Wargha valley. 
2 
Troops wýre to be moved to all positions covering 
the front--to the Ghafsai area, to the Wazzan region, to 
the Brariis, to the Marn1s*a and Gaznaya, and to near Tawndt. 
The a: alids. involved included most of the R1f1s: tiind numerous. 
1 Ibid., pp. 348-349. 
2 Ibid., p. 359. 
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Ghumar'i commanders --Wuld al-Qurfal M#amnad bin ýzkdlq of 
the BanU. Vadh1fa clan of the BanU Waryaghal, even Kuyas of 
the Kitdriia, 1 despite the past record of untrustworthiness of 
the latter two. The BanQ Waryaghal tribe of the northern 
Wargha was ordered to prepare supplies for the RIfIs. On 
5 March, all the RIfI 'staffj including SI Ma4ammad,, moved 
from TargIst to the 'zawiya of SId! Mu4ammad b. ýýdlq 
al-Akhamllshi 'in the ZarqZ! t,, partly in order to use his 
religious authority to help the attack, according to al-BU 
'Ayyashl.. ' 2 
Eventually the whole command akrived at Tabarrant 
where the troops were harangued by an aged-muqaddam from 
the Band Walishak, reputedly over 100 years old, who called 
them. to "jihad'in the way of God" and warned them not to kill 
prisoners, and to take all the captured prisoners to the 
ccmmand posts. 
3 
The date of the first attack on the French zone 
varies according to the different accounts of the war, 
although all are agreed that the first attacks were on the 
BanQ ZarwAl'. According to the most trustworthy source, 
that of the BanQ Zarwdl themselves, -'the attacks came on 
April 12.4 They said that on 11 April, the clans of the 
Banrl. Zarwal: received letters inviting them to submit, and 
the following day,, before they had, time. to replyi, they were 
1 




Ibid., pp. 361-362. 
4" 
Al-BC1. '1Ayyash1 'gives 5 Apr. 1925 (ibid., p. 360) Gabrielli 
13 Apr. 1925 (op. cit.. p. 66) , and tiTe-Banil Zarwalls them- 
selves told the French that the invasion came'on 12 Apr: 1925. 
(SHAT Maroc E24, Propagande Riffaine, * Letter, Lyautey to 
Ministre des Affaires Etrangbres-, Rabat, 24 Sept. 1924, 
enclosing Fez B. des R., Amjot, 16'Sept. 1925). The details 
contained in this latter account make it seem the most 
trustworthy. 
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invaded. The invasion forces in this area were at first 
composed mainly of men from the Jibdla. RIfIs' only appeared 
when the fighting was almost over. One ýarka, composed of 
men from the BanQ MastAr. 'al moved into the centre of the tribe, 
2 
and another, commanded by Mubammad b. 'Amar Uammaysh, moved 
3 directly on 'AmjUtt with the aim of taking "Abd al-Raýmaft. 
'Abd al-Ralýmari, however, fled with his family to Fez and 
stayed there, under French protection, until the tribe was 
reoccupied by the French. 
4 
The zawiya at 'AmjUtt. was then 
burned. 
After only a day's fighting, the parts of the 
BanQ*Zarwal which were not under French occupation submitted 
to the RIfIs*. The head of each'barka then called a meeting 
of the notables of the clans: 
"He explained that Holy War had been proclaimed by 
Abd el-Krim, the true Sultan of Morocco, to throw 
out the infidels, and particularly the French, in 
the name of the greater glory of regenerated Islam. 
He declared that the occupation of all Morocco by 
the Rifis was no more than a question of days, and 
invited the notables to tell him what positions 
they wanted to occupy in the tribes and towns. A 
secretary wrote each man's wishes in a large' 
register. The posts offered were all those of 
makhzan officials, Pachas, Caids, Cadis, Nadirs, 
Oumanas, Mohtassebs Lsic], Tt--c. The posts most 
in demand were those of Pacha, Caids and Oumanas. 
The registers were sent Eo Abd ii-I-Rrim to--d-c-c-Ide, 
immediately after the ceremony. "S 
Then the Rifis' took 400 hostages and sent them to Ajdlr, to 
force the Ban(i 'ZarwZ! l' to supply troops and to pay a fine of 
200,000. livestock which was imposed. As-the fines were paid 
1 SHAT Maroc E24, Propagande Riffaine, Fez, B. de R., Amjotp 
16 Sept. 1925. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., and Sklraj, op. cit., p. 140. 
4 Al-Fih'rl, 'op. cit., p. 48. 
5 SHAT Maroc E24j, 'Propagande Riffaine,, Fezj, B. de R., Amjotj 
16 Sept. 1925. 
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the hostages were released. All the babus property in the 
tribe was confiscated by the RIfIs'. 
1 
The speeches by the barka leaders are interesting, 
for they refer to bin 'Abd al-Karlm as Sultan, not only of 
the Rif but of all of Morocco. He was Sultan not because 
of his birth but because he was the man who would lead 
Morocco to expel the infidels. Whether or nor bin 'Abd 
al-Karim had specifically approved this designation is 
uncertain, but it seems quite clear that in thd'eyes of his 
followers, if not of the defeated BanU. Zarwal', he was Sultan. 
The attack on the French positions in the BanQ ' 
Zarwdl: began at once. Biban and BanQ Darqril*,, two important 
French positions, were besieged. 
2 
Rif! forces also struck 
at Kiffdri from the Gaznaya, 
3a 
position on the WAdI Labant 
45 
at others near Tissa, and near Tawnat. At first the French 
managed to repulse the Rlfl. *attacks, but they soon came into 
contact with the previously prepared RIfI trench system, and 
their counter-attack came'to a halt. 
6 
There is not space here to describe 'in detail the 
course of the battles, in which some posts were taken and 
7 retaken several times. But at the end of May the French 
announced that'-they would evacuate most of the' posts north 
of the Wargha, 
8 
and all civilian Europeans were evacuated 
from Wazz&n. 9 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3 The Times, 2 May 1925, p. 11, dated Paris, 1 May 1925. 
4- Ibid., 4 May 1925, p. 14, dated Parisl 2 May 1925. 
5 Ibid., 8 May 1925, p. 14, dated Tangier, 7 May 1925. 
6 ibid., 9 May 1925, p. 14, dated Paris, 8 May 1925 
7 For a fuller account see WOOlman, op. cit., pp. 177-179. 
8 The Times, 27 May 1925, p. 16, dated Paris, 26 May 1925. 
19 Woolman, op. 'cit., pp. 177-178. 
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Biban, "the gateway to Fez", fell on 5 June, 
1 
and 
although the. Rif is' got within 40 kilometres of the city,, 
they did not succeed in entering it as they had promised. 
2 
Nevertheless, bin 'Abd al-KarIM tried to win sup- 
port from the 'ulamEi-* of Fez for his cause. On 21 June, he 
sent a letter to S! A4mad b. Jillall, ' head of the QarAwIyIn 
University in Fez, to pass on to other lulamd I -. -Malay. 'Abd 
al-Malik al-Bashir, 'Abdallah al-Bagrawl,, ' Si Vamid Bum7anl, ' 
Sl TahAml GannUn*, S! *al-Malý41 'al-Wazzani 'and S! 4mad bin 
al-Khiyyat. 
3 
The letter began: 
"We tell you and your colleagues the Imams, who are 
men of good faith and have no relations with hypo- 
crites and infidels, of the state of servitude into 
which the disunited nation of Morocco is sunk. ', 4 
The reason for this situation, said the letter, was that the 
religious leaders were incapable hypocrites, all of them, 
from sharif to 'Vdlib. There were sharIf s who were f riendly 
towards the infidels, there was a gELI'Who gave money to 
help French orphans. MUlay YusIf and his "perfidious 
- entourage" had been corrupted by Christian gifts. 
However, it was not just MUMY YQsif who was 
guilty of such acts: 
"We have exposed the perfidy of the entourage 
of the Sultan Mulay El Hassan [sicl. from the'begin- 
ning to the'end of his reign. We havepointed out 
each traitor by name, and made known their actions. 
We have also exposed the perfidy. of the entourage 
1 ibid., p. 179. 
2 Hart, A'ith War . yaghar, pp. 395-396. 
3 SHAT Maroc E24, Propagande Riffaine Lyautey to Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangbres, Rabat, 24 Aug. 1925, enclosing let- 
ter of bin 'Abd al-Karlm, to AýMad b. JillAl*l, * dated 8 Dhil . 
al-Výjja 1343/30 June 1925. (My translation is of the French 
version-of the original, henceforth referred to as: SHAT 
Maroc E24, b. 'Abd al-Karim to al-jillall.. ) 
4 Ibid. 
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of Sultan Moulay [sic] Abd el-Aziz-and pointed out 
each swindler individually, including those who 
destroyed [Moroccan] sovereignty, such as El Menebhi 
and others. "l 
The Rughl,, ' BU 'Vimara, Jillal'! ZarhCinl,, ' who had claimed the 
throne as S! Ma4ammad in 1909, was dismissed as "one of the 
sorcerers without religion", and al-RaisUll.. as a. schismatic. 
Even Mralay''Abd al-VafIT. was attacked and described as: 
a heretic, and liar, a leader of holy war at 
Marrakesh, where sorcerers built for him imposing 
minarets, although he belonged to a family of base 
origins, and who, having seized great wealth, and 
sought refuge in Spain . -2 
Morocco had been taken over by France, which herself had been 
devastated in the Great War and was now in debt to the 
Americans. 
May YQsif had refused to cooperate with the 
Rlfls*so there remained only one alternative: "Power should 
belong to him who has the people with him in accordance with 
the Book of God and the Mahornmedan [sic] law. " 
3 Once again 
the emphasis is laid on the claim of Muýqmmad bin *Abd 
al-Karim to the Sultanate as the true leader of jihAd. 
The leaders of Morocco had sacrificed the JihAd 
to their personal ambition and greed, the lettýr continued,, 
but this would eventually lead to their impoverishment: 
"Know, oh Oulama, that if the reign of the unbelievers 
continues, ten Moroccans will be valued [by the 
Christians]. at the price of one donkey, and not one 
will keep possession of a single dirham or dinar;. nor 
of a forest or garden, a plot of land to sow his seed, 
nor a shop nor a house.,, 4 
There follows a seýies of quotations from verses of the 







no one should help the Christians for once they had over- 
powered Morocco completely, they would steal all its riches 
and destroy its leaders. 
1 
Once again, bin 'Abd al-Karlm was speaking the 
language of jihad, justifying his claim to the Sultanate 
because he was the only leader of Islam against the Christians. 
It was in many ways a traditional appeal. on the other hand, 
R1f1 propaganda in Tangier at the same period emphasised the 
technological superiority which bin 'Abd al-Karlra had 
achieved, mainly, according to his propagandists, with 
German help. Germany was sending him soldiers, supplies by 
submarine, and "extraordinary machines to make French acro- 
planes fall from the sky. " Even without this help, howeverl 
he had already taken Fez--which of course was untrue--had 
defeated the French army completely, and had amassed war 
supplies with which he could carry: on fighting for another 
2 two years. 
These two sorts of propaganda compensated each 
other, one emphasising the Islamic necessity of supporting 
bin 'Abd al-Karim, the other declaring his power as leader 
of a modern state and army, with support from, the great 
powers. In fact, despite the optimism of the propaganda, 
bin "Abd al-Karim had not taken Fez. Indeed, by the and of 
June, the French had stopped the Rlfls'along most of the 
southern front, although there were still isolated RIO: , 
groups operating býhind French lines. The French certainly 
could not begin to push the Rlfls*back yet. 
Ibid. 
2 SHAT Maroc E241 Relations du Rif avea 116tranger, Etat- 
Majeur de l1arm6e 2bme Bureau section de Renseigementst 
Maroc--Propagande Riffaine h Tangier", Tunisie, 1 July 1925# 
Secret. 
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However, the Rlfl: 'advance on Fez had shown the 
French the necessity of cooperating with the Spanish to 
defeat what was now their common enemy. 
The Franco-Spanish Agreement 
In mid-May 1925, as the Rifi.. attack on the French 
built up, the French Prime Minister, Painlev6, sent a per- 
sonal representative to Madrid to talk to the Spanish 
government. At first the Spanish government denied that his 
visit had anything to do with Morocco but on 1 June, Primo 
announced that French and Spanish representatives would meet 
later*that month to try to come to an agreement over Morocco. 
The conference began on 17 June and, one after the 
other,, six agreements were. signed. The first was on a joint 
patrol of coastal waters to prevent the importation of arms, 
the second to prevent smuggling of arms by land, and the 
return, of "rebels" wanted by either, side. The third laid 
down terms for a peace treaty with the R1f1s. The R1f1s 
would be granted autonomy "compatible with international 
treaties". In return, they would withdraw from the French 
zone and the Spanish would occupy Alhucemas Bay. All pris- 
oners would be exchanged, an amnesty would be granted for 
all the Rifis: who had "rebelled" after 1921, and a native 
police force would be set up to control arms and munitions. 
2 
Primo de Rivera was desperate for this to be 
accepted--and be put into effect as quickly as possible, for 
he apparently feared that if Alhucemas was not occupied by 
the Spanish the French would. seize on the opportunity to 
1 Fleming', op. ' cit., pp. 249-250. 
2 
ibid., p. 252. 
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annex the whole of Morocco. 
1 
Horacio Echevarrietta, the 
Basque millionaire who had negotiated with bin 'Abd al-Karlm 
many times before, was sent to Ajdlr to communicate these 
terms on behalf of the Spanish. As he himself expected# he 
got nowhere. 
2 
Gabrielli, the French controlleur at TawrIrt, also 
visited bin 'Abd al-Harlra at the end of June 1925. Despite 
bin 'Abd al-Karlm's protestations that he wanted nothing but 
peace with France, there was only one way to achieve this# 
"that France should recognise the independence of the R1f. ,3 
4 In return, France would keep authority in her zone . This 
was in direct contrast to his own propaganda to the Fassl 
lulamAl'. It seems that bin 'Abd al-Karlrri was trying to get 
what he could behind secure and recognised frontiers. 
Cabrielli returned home, ostensibly to report to his superior 
officers on bin 'Abd al-Karim's position. In fact, the 
discussions had ended and another attempt at finding a 
peaceful solution-had failed. 
Meanwhile, the conference in Madrid continued, 
with an agreement on the International Zone of Tangiers one 
on the boundary between the Protectorates, and finally, and 
in the end most importantly, one on the military cooperation 
between the two. countries. The two high commands would be 
autonomous, but the agreement allowed the temporary occupation 
by one party of territory ihthe other's Protectorate for a 
1 
Ibid., p. 259. 
2 Ibid. The meeting took place on 21 June 1925. 
3 Gabrielli, op. cit., p. 88. This meeting took place'on 
28 June 1925. 
4 Ibid., p. 89. 
5 Ibid., p. 99. 
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limited period. 
1 The conference ended on 25 July 1925. 
Meanwhile, in the Rif itself the burden of the new front was 
adding to the economic and political difficulties of the 
government. 
The Economic Situation in the Rlf, June to August '1925 
By the third week of June 1925, the almost total 
mobilisation was causing a serious dislocation of society 
in the central Rif. There are frequent references in the 
reports of Spanish agents to how few men were to be seen in 
the countryside. For instancel the Spanish. Intelligence 
reports from DAr*Mizzyan in the BanQ Walishak noted on 22 
June 1925 that there were no men to be seen, for they were 
all in the 4arka. There. were only women and children to be 
found anywhere. 
2 On 24 June, a Moroccan informant told them 
that in the Timsamdrit "all" the men had gone, to join the 
barka in the French zone, where three-quarters of them had 
3 
been killed and the rest had been wounded. Bin 'Abd 
al-Karlm was so desperately in need of troops that he had 
releasea mAny of the RIfI prisoners, given them guns, and 
sent them to fight. 
4 
This situation did not improve, indeed it spread 
to the newly occupied territories of the BanU. ZarwAI and 
Jib&la. At the beginning of July, French Intelligenceýin 
the'WazzZiii: region reported that in that area there was. no 
labour force to bring in the harvest, and crops were being 
1 Fleming, on. cit., p. 253. 
2 SHM Melilla. Leg. 27#, 'Confidencias, Dar Mizianp nota, - 
22 June 1925. 
3 Ibid., Sha'1hb. Muýaýmmad al-Marnlsl, ' 24 June 1925. 
4 Ibid., notal 11 June 1925. 
748 
being cut as they were neededf on a day-to-day basis. 
1 At 
the end of the month, they reported that the Banil Zarwal had 
lost. 1,000 men since the beginning of the fighting. The 
harvests had not been gathered in, for there was no one to 
do it. All the men had been forced to join the Iýarkas, and 
anyone who did not was fined about 40 pesetas. Deserters 
had their goods confiscated; "An enormous feeling of tired- 
ness is felt in all parts of the tribe, but people dare not 
complain because any sign of weakness is punished very 
, ,2 heavily . The same "tiredness" was also felt in the MazziyAt 
tribe. 3 The economic effects of all this were quickly felt. 
A graph of the prices of essential commodities 
such as barley, sugar and tea shows a wild fluctuation in 
4 
prices (see Table XII;. l). Thus the price of. tea could very 
1 
SHAT Maroc 156,2bme Bureau Renseignements sur Abd el-Krim, 
B. des. R., ReddouanT, -5July-1925., 
2 SHAT Maroc Rif 8, Groupement de Fez,, Mai-Juin 1925,, B., 
des R., Ain Aicha, 26 July 1925. 
3 ibid. 
4- 
The graph is based on information contained in reports in 
the SHM Archives. The relevant reports are in S11M Melilla, 
Leg. 28: 
(a) Informaci6n y confidencias de Tafarsit y Beni Tuzin, 
M4ammad b. Salma, 11 June 1925; 
(b) Oficina de Matalsa, hoja diaria, 15 June 1925. 
(c) Informaci6n y coii-fidencias de Tafarsit y Beni Tuzinj 
UAmid b. Mulýammad BQ. Ya'q5b1,. 18 June 1925; 
(d). Ibid., nota, 25 June 1925; 
(e) Oficina de Matalsa, hoja diaria, 2 July 1925; 
(f) Informaci6n y confidencias de Tafarsit y Beni Tuzin, 
Vamid b. Mu4ammad BQ. Ya'qQb1,, 'l2 July 1925; 
(g) Oficina de Matalsa, hoja diaria, 16 July 1925; 
(h) Holas Diarias, Beni Walishak, hoja diaria, 21 July 1925; 
U) Hojas de Confidentes, Matalsa, Salcllý. b. Mubammad, 22 
July 1925. 
(j) Hojas Diarias, Oficina de Beni Saidt hoja diaria, 31 
July 1925; 
(k) Informaci6n y confidentes de Tafarsit y Beni Tuzinj 
Mubammad b. 'Alldl Muýand, 6 Aug. 1925; 
(1) Hojas Diarias, Oficina de Beni Said, hoja diaria, 9 
Aug. 19 2 5; 
(m) Hojas Diarias, Beni Walishak, hoja diaria, 10 Aug. 1925; 
(n) Hojas de Confidentes, 'Matalsa, Muqqadam b. OAmar,, 
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between 50 pts a kilo on 9 August 
1 
and 3 pts a kilo at the 
beginning of September. 
2- But these are extremes--in general, 
prices of everything showed a steady climb over these three 
months, and the differences in price between the summer of 
1925 and the autumn of the previous year show an even more 
marked increase. Barley, 10 pts a kilo in October 1924, 
remained nearly constant, but other commodities increased in 
price greatly: soap from 2.25 pts a bar in October 1924 
to 6 pts a bar in August 1925 (up 140%); candles from 
50 ctos. each in October 1924 to 1 pta each in August 1925 
(up 100%); tea from 10 pts a kilo in October 1924 to 30 
3 
pts a kilo at the beginning of September 1925 (a 200%, rise). 
It is scarcely surprising that at the end of July, the BanQ. 
SaIld office reported "life is becoming impossible [in the 
Rif! . *Zone] j 
,4 and on 9 August talked of "fabulous prices" 
there. 5 
To a large extent the prices depended on the suc- 
cess of the smuggling operations from the French'and Spanish 
zones. In June, those were still feasible,. although many. of 
(o) 
-Informaci6n y confidencias 
de Tafarsit y Beni-Tuzing 
'Abd al-ýadlq b. 'Abd al-Ush (siC) 13 Sept. 1925. 
For an explanation of. these weights and measures, 
see above, pp. xviii-xix. It might be 
argued that these figures are misleading because they refer 
to different markets on different days. To a certain extent 
this, is true, but the fact that generally they show an over- 
all uniformity of prices indicates that the bends shown on 
the graph are a reasonable guide to what was happening. 
1 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Hojas Diariasj Oficina de Beni Said... 
hoja diaria, 9 Aug. 1925. 
2 SHM Helilla Leg. 28, Hojas de Confidentes, Matalsa,, 
Muqaddam b. 'Amar, 7, Sept. 1925. 
3 The October figures are from SHM, Melilla Leg. 27, 
Informacion Batil,. nota, 28 Oct. 1924, the 1925 figures from 
the sources already mentioned Above, p. 748, n. 4. 
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Hoj as*Diarias, Oficina de Beni'Said, 
hoja diaria, 31 July 1925. 
5 Ibid., hoja diaria, 9 Aug. 1925. 
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the smugglers were stopped by the Spanish. On 11 June, one 
such convoy was stopped in the BanU Nalishak, and the 
Spanish recovered 30 loaves of sugar (worth about 120 pts at 
that date), 
1 but in June contraband came in more easily 
2 
-through the French zone anyway. However, as the war with 
the: French went on, this supply route became more and more 
difficult. By the end of August, the Spanish were being 
3 told that there was no wheat or barley in the Rif. ' at all. 
While this may have been an exaggeration, there can certainly 
have been very little, for bin 'Abd al-KarIM took steps to 
prevent any extravagance, and banned the celebration of 
weddings, what the Spanish describe as'llbaptisms", and other 
festivities. 4 
Not surprisingly these difficult economic con- 
ditions caused great political'tension in the Rif itself. 
There were renewed, though muted, calls for an end to the 
war, and in some cases, attempts at rebellion. 
The Political Control of the Rif 
The combination of demands on manpower and economic 
difficulties caused considerable political problems within 
the Rif. 
The demands on manpower were enormous. At the 
beginning of June there were reportedly 800 men from the ' 
Banra Waryaghal and-Gaznaya tribes in the Gaznayal facing the 
French, 500 Timsam&nls., Tuz&n1s*, -and Waryaghlis at "Ain 
1 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Hojas Diarias, Beni Walishak, hoja 
diaria, 12 June 1925. 
2 Ibid., hoja diaria, 25 June 1925. 
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Informaci6n y confidencias, Tafarsit 
y Beni Tuzin, nota,, 26 Ausg. 1925. 
4 ibid., Khallfa of Muýaimnad b. 'Allal' Mulýand, 31 Aug. 1925. 
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MidyUna, 1,400 Jib7alls. under Akhrlr. fi 'in the Wazz7ari region, 
and the BanU Narrayn tribes wrote to bin 'Abd al-Karlia 
asking him to send them help to cut the Taza to Ujda railway; 
and this was by no means the f ull complement of RIfI troops 
in the field. This meant that the positions on the eastern 
front were reduced in numbers--there were only 40 men from 
the BanU Waryaghal and Gaznaya at Mi43r.. 
1 The . re was still 
a threat from the Spanish on the eastern front, and on 9 June 
- it was reported that that area had been. reinforced. 100 
Waryaghlis were sent to Sid! 'Idris along with 50 Timsam&nls; 
100 Tuzdnis to SUq al-Sabat of BanU. Walishak; 100 
Timsam2inis to saq al-jamal, a of. the same tribe; and 50 
2 
Timsamanis' to Sid! Ilisalild. 
The mobilisation was strict. Bin 'Abd al-Karlm had 
even sent his prisoners to fight; .- thenhe threatened that 
all deserters were. to-be. -shot. He carried. out this threat 
with a certain Qa"id Shallh who had abandoned a position on 
the French front when wounded, allowing the French to recapture 
it. 3 
More troops were sent to the Tetuan front, where 
4 
there was heavy fighting around Ddr bin Qurraysh. 650 men 
f rom the Bann Malishak, Timsamari, Bann Tftlri and Bann 
Waryaghal were sent on 21 or 22 June. 
5 In. addition, on the 
eastern front he ordered-that if a shot was heard,, everyone 
was to go to the spot. . Anyone who 
did not 'would be 'fined.. 
6 
1 Ibid., 'Abd al-lýabMan: b. Va, mid Gh&z1j. 1 June 1925. 
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Confidencias, Dar Mizzian, nota, 
9 June 1925. 
3 Ibid., nota, 13 June 1925. 
4 The Times, 18 June 1925, p. 16, dated Tangier, 17 June 1925. 
5 SHM Melilla Leg.. 27, Confidencias, Dar Mizian, Mu4ammad 
b. Bil 'Azz7a,: 22 June 1925. 
6 Ibid. 
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More troops were sent to the eastern front. 400 were reported 
on the beach in the Timsamdri on 25 June, 
1 
and on 28 and 29 
June, 600 Rifis arrived at SUq al-Sabat of the Banfl 
2 
Walishak. S! . 
"Abd al-Sal5m b. al-Va. jj Muýand was sent to 
Jabal Yuddia on 25 June, and many other posiitions were 
reinforced as well. 
3 
Bin 'Abd al-Karlm was now engaged heavily on all 
three fronts-, -against the French in the south, where he had 
by the end of June been forced to-a halt, and against the 
Spanish on the Tetuan and eastern fronts. Of the 76 'forward 
positions on the eastern front, 41 were attacked, and there 
was fighting on 21 days in June alone. ' 
4 
Not surprisingly, the people were exhausted by all 
this activity. Many of the people who had. fled from the 
Spanish occupation of the eastern part of the BanQ Walishak 
now told the Spanish they would like to return home, but 
they could not leave their families in the R1f, and could 
5 
not get past the Rifl. guards. But bin 'Abd al-Karim took 
no chances. Several Timsamdnis'l including many of the 
notables of the TrugUt clan, were arrested in mid-June for 
6 
suspected contact with the Spanish. The am1r himself was 
reportedly escorted everywhere by "500 men in front of him 
7 
and 500 behind" for fear of assassination., 
1 Ibid., notal 24 June 1925. 
ý Ibid., nota, 29 June 1925. 
3 SHM Melilla Leg 28, Informaci6n y confidencias, Tafarsit 
y Beni Tuzin, nota; _25 June 1925. 
4 Fleming, op. cit., p. 256. 
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Confidencias, 'Dar Mi'zian, nota, 16' 
June 1925. 
6 Ibid., nota, 15 June 1925, and SHM Melilla Leg., 28,, 'Hojas 
de Zý_onfidentes, 'Matalsa, 'Abdallah b. V5mid, 17 June 1925. 
7 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, *Confidencias, Dar Mizian, nota, 
13 June 1925. 
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Bin 'Abd al-Karim also stepped. up the propaganda 
campaign in the Rif. He reverted to the old promises of 
European supportr saying that France and Spain had been told 
to stop fighting the Rifis' or the rest of Europe would attack 
t hem. This was at the same time that his propagandists 
were making announcements of Gdrman support in Tangier. He 
also threatened that if those who had fled to the Spanish 
zone did not return, their property would be so ld. 
2 
Nevertheless, many of his subjects were'unimpressed. 
They had heard of the Spanish and French conference at 
Madrid and complained to him that "it was not the'same thing 
to fight with one nation as it was to fight with two. " To 
this bin 'Abd al-Karlm, replied that they nevertheless had ýo 
fight to the death. Anyone who did not would be shot. 
3 
Clearly it was only a matter of time before the 
will to fight the Spanish gave way., The first glimmerings 
of a revolt appeared in the BanU. BQ: "Ayy&sh clan of the 
Bana Waryaghal at the end of June, 
4 but bin 'Abd al-Karlm 
took'swift action to crush it. On 2 July, two 'Ayy&shl* 
military SL. ids--'Abd al-Sal&m b. al-U4jj Mubaýnd, the former 
Minister of War, and Muýammad Zdml--;. -were sacked along with 
5 
Mub Azarqari, the qal. id of the clan This may have been 
prompt action but it was most unwise, for the'first two soon 
became overtly opposed to bin tAbd al-Karim,,.. and in 1926 
1 SHM Melilla. Leg. 28, Beni Walishak, Hojas de Confidentes, 
Muýammad Ba "Azzd,. ' 22 June 1925. 
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Informaciones, Oficina de Kadia, 
Beni Said, Salard AkudUd, 26 June 1925. 
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 28,. 'Hojas Di-arias, Oficina de Beni'Said,, 
nota, 28 June 1925. 
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Confidencias Dar Mizian, Vammu 
'AllU: AmziyyAn,, 30 June 1925. 
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, *Confidencias, Dar Mizian, Mu4: 
Sha'lh, 2 July-1925. 
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led a revolt against him. 
The revolt might have been crushed for the moment, 
but the undercurrent of discontent flowed on. In the front 
line tribes of BanU. Walishak and Timsam&ri there were now many 
who wanted to submit. At the beginning of June, Mu4ammad 
BU Qaddur, probably one of the most consistent bet-hedgers 
of them all, again offered to change sides to the Spanish if 
and when they re-took Anw&l. In the BanU Walishak, the 
notables of the BanQ Jabal (a sub-clan of the BanQ Sabar 
clan) and the Banil *"Abd 'al-Nrar (a sub-clan of the Imazirzin' 
clan) promised to attack the R1f1 'positions if the Spanish 
advanced, provided that the Spanish confirmed them in their 
positions when they had reoccupied the tribe. 
' 
To prevent any possible defection, the positions 
on the eastern front and along the coast-were'again - 
reinforced. On 12 July,, one Spanish informant, -wh6 made no 
reference to the BanU. Walishak, and scarcely any to the Banil 
Taziri, reported 1,200 troops in the BanU. Ilaryaghal (on the 
coast) and Timsaman. 
2 in addition, bin 'Abd al-Kar1ri 
increased his personal control of government. In mid-July 
he announced that in future the 'q7a'*ids were not to have 
1 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Confidencias, Dar Mizian, nota, 1 July, 
1925. 
2 They were distributed at Dahar Sijjum, near Ajd1r (100 
Tdzanis), on the mouth of thw W. Ghis. (100 TUzanla), on the 
mouth of the W. Nakur (100 TQzan1s),, near Sid! BU Dalud in the 
Timsamari (100 TUzanis) , at Sid! Shallb in the Timsamarf (100 Timsamarilsl , hear 3ýa* Tarf in the Timsamdri (100 Timsaman1s) 
at Sid! . 1dris' 
in the Timsamari (200 Waryaghlis) , and 200 in the Mi4dr area (all Waryaghlis'and Gaznayls). It is signif- 
icantýthýat those positions in the Ban-TQz1n that are mentioned 
were staffed by outsiders, and TQzanl"forces were used ýn the 
Bana Waryaghal. Evidently bin 4Abd al-Karini did not trust 
the TUzanis and preferred their troops to be under his eye in 
the BanQ Naryaghal while their tribe was guarded by Waryaghlls'. 
SHM Melilla Leg. 28, ' 'in, forrna'ci6n, yconfidencias,,, ' Tafarsit* y 
Beni Tuzin, Va. mid al-BU Ya1'qQbi,: 12 July 1925. 
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responsibility for decisions over "justice", and all com-- 
plaints from the people in their charge were to go straight 
'to him. This meant that the qalids were removed from direct 
administration of the tribes, and their duties would be 
limited to the raising of barkas and the enforcement of 
military discipline. This was in fact the declaration of a 
state of martial law. 
From now on, bin 'Abd al-Karlm's grip became even 
tighter. All talk of casualties was again forbidden. 
2 
The 
cordon between the Spanish and Rif! zones was strengthened 
and on 24 July the Spanish. reported that no people from the 
3 
unsubmitted zone'ý had been seen at the Matd. lsa market. 
With his efforts to control possible. 'defections 
and rebellions, which bin 'Abd al-Karlrd succeeded in, doing 
with ease, the eastern-front itself was relatively quiet 
during July. Only 18 of the 76 front line Spanish "positions 
we re attacked, and there was fighting on only 11 days. 
4 
However, in August the campaign on the eastern 
front was stepped up. On 2 August, there was a meeting at 
Saq al-Khamis of the Timsaman, at which bin 'Abd al-Karlm. 
presided, and it agreed to attack the Spanish"in the Bant! 
Sa'Id and Mi4ar. sectors. Bin 'Abd al-Karlm said that 
he had sent money to the Spanish zone to win support behind 
the Spanish lines. However, in order to do this, he had 
1 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Confidencias, Dar Mizian, Mubanmad 
Bd. 'Azza,: 14 July f925. ' 
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Hojas de Confidentes, Matalsa, 
A". Isha b. 'Amar AkarrUsh, 21 July 1925. 
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, 'Oficina de Matalsa, hoja diaria., 
24 July 1925. ' 
4 Fleming, op. cit., p. 256. 
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Confidencias, Dar'Mizian, Mulý ýb. 
Shallh al-MarnIsI,: 2 Aug. 1925. 
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to cut back on the number of troops he sent against the 
French, and when BU Rabayl of the Mat&. lsa asked him for 500 
men with which to attack the French as Masun, the request 
was refused. -Bin 'Abd al-Karim explained that he needed 
the men for the attack on tAzIh Mi4Ar. *. 
1 
On 13 August, the Spanish were told that BU L. -d; ya 
had been put in charge of 1,500 to 2,000 men in the Mi4a. r 
area. Apparently, many of the members of thd' barka were 
unwilling recruits, which infuriated. Bd Labya, who called 
2 them "cowards" on. 14 August, 200 Timsamanis. ' and Walishakls* 
were grouped at Anwdl*, and bin 'Abd al-Karlia. announced the 
imminent arrival of a column of Jibails' under Akhrlrfi bn the 
eastern front. 
3 
However, the RifItroops were vastly overstretched. 
Bin 'Abd al-Karim, having built up forces on, the eastern 
front, was forced to send reinforcements back to the south# 
4 
where he felt the French were about to advance. On 18 
August, 1,000 men, many from'fhe BanQ -Walishak and Banri TQz1n, 
5 
were sent to the Gharb to fight the French. Yet. in other 
parts of the southern front, Rifi. troops were withdrawn. On 
21 August, S! Ma4ammad was reported in BanU. Barbar, where he 
had gone to reassure people that they were not being 
abandoned. 
6 On 26'August, bin 'Abd al-Karin! arranged a large 
1 SHAT Maroc Rif 8, Groupement de Fez, Mai-Juin 1925, 
B. des R., 11 Aug. 1925. 
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Confidencias, Dar Hizian, al-'Arbl 
b. Muý -al-Wal'!,: 13 'Aug. 1925. 
3 Ibid., nota, 14 Aug. 1925 and 'Amar b. Ijammu, - 14 Aug. 1925. 
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, : Enformac16n y confidencias de Tafar-'. 
sit y Beni Tuzin, Muhaýmad b. 'Alldl Muýand, 14 Aug. 1925. 
!; 
SliM Melilla Leg 27, ' Confidencias, ' Dar Mizian, Muýanýd BQ 
*Azz&, * 18 Aug. 192i. 
6 SHAT Maroc Rif 8, Groupement de Fez, Mai--Juin 1925, 
B. des R. , 21 Aug. 1925. 
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ýarka in the BanU. Waryaghal to send to the Larache front. 
1 
By now, the demands for troops to defend the Rlf 
were so overwhelming that, when the BanQ Waryaghal' Iýarka 
departed to the Gharb, bin eAbd al-Kariiii told the poeple of 
AjdIt that henceforward "the old men and wounded" would have 
to be responsible for its defence. ,2A week or so before 
this, bin "Abd al-Karlrri had repeated his order that anyone 
who heard gunfire was to go to the place-immediately. This 
ýime, however, the penalty for f ailing to do so was not a 
fine, but the death peanlty. 
3 
However, despite these difficulties, bin 'Abd 
al-Karim was still in full control of the situation. He 
'even managed to increase the attacks on Spanishpositions on 
the eastern front in August:, 42 of the 76 front lineposit` 
ions were attacked during this month and there was fighting 
on 20 days--a considerable increase over the figures for 
4 
July (18 positions and 11 days). Moreover, he proceeded to 
the disarmament of the BanU Tftlný. On 25 August he "ordered 
that all this tribe's arms should be taken to AjdIr. 
5 He 
stopped rumours about the death of AkhrIrU-; -whI: ch *anywýay 
were quite untrue--by threatening to cut-out, thd'tonque of 
anyone who spoke of it. 
6 On 31 August came'thd order for- 
bidding any further celebration of weddings and other 
festivities. 
1 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Hojas de Confidentes? Matalsa, 
'Abdallah b. Muhapmad Akashar, 26 Aug. 1925. 
2 Ibid. 
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Confidencias, Dar Mi*ziany Muýand 
BrI . *"Azza, ' 
18 Aug. 1925. 
4 Fleming, op. cit., p. 256. 
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Oficina de Matalsa, hoja diaria, 
25 Aug. 1925. 
6 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, *Tnfo*rma*ci6a y' 'confidentias, ' Tafarsit 
y Beni Tuzin, 'Abd al-Sal&m b. Vammu, 28 Aug. 1925. 
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The Rif'was moving towards total mobilisation. On 
30 August, bin 'Abd al-Karim ordered all the men over 15 
years old of the al-Mat&. Isa to meet at the site of the 
Tue sday market of Banil 13a. Bakar to form a ý*arka. 
i On I Sep- 
tember it was reported that he had ordered his Pashas to 
recruit men for the 4arkas. Qal. 'id BU BUt was sent to the 
Bran'is area with a large'4arka. 2 On 2 September, French 
sources reported that a general mobilisation had been ordered 
throughout the Rif. 3 By 7 Febru ary a huge number of men had 
been mobilised. One Spanish informant put the number on the 
eastern front at 1,500 (on the coast at SIdI. IdrIs, and SIdI 
Vussayn and in the Mi4a. r districts alone, which'again leaves 
out many other positions). 
4 other informants reported 8,500 
on the Fez front, and another 3,000 in the Brariis, nearly 
5 
all from the Jibala. However, bin 'Abd al-Karlm was con- 
cerned most of all for the defence of the coast, where a 
Spanish la ndi ng was expected at any moment. There were 
reported to be 3,000 troops at Alhucemas'and another. 1,100 
at. Wddi Ldw in the Jibala, under Akhrlril.. 
6 
Bin 'Abd al-Karlm was not wrong inhis assessment 
of the danger to the coasts; the French'and Spanish had 
been planning a landing for some time. 
1 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Oficina de Matalsal hoja'diaria, 
30 Aug. 1925. 
2 Ibid., hoja diaria, 1 Sept. 1925. 
3 SHAT Maroc Rif 8-, Groupement de Fez, Mai-Juin 1925,, 
B. des R., 2 Sept. 1925. 
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Hojas de confidentes, Matalsa, 
Sal&Výb. Muhc-qmad VammUsh, 5 Sept. 1925. 
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Ofi*cina"de Matalsa, hoja diaria-,, 
6 Sept. 1925. 
6 sHM Melilla Leg. 28, Hojas de Confidentes, Matalsa, 
SalaV P. Mu1janunad VammUsh, 5 Sept. 1925. - 
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Th6 Preparation for the Landin*g 'at Alhucemas 
After the failures of Gabrielli, and Echevarrieta,, 
both sides made one more attempt to negotiate with the RIfIs*. 
1 
Echevarrieta. visited Alhucemas once more, in mid-August. 
Details of his negotiations are unclear, as are those of 
French negotiators, who also apparently arrived at the same 
time. Apparently both the European powers had-been trying 
for some time to arrange. a separate peace with the RIfIs',, 
for on 4 August Harris telegraphed privately to his newspaper: 
"Situation delightful stop both France, and Spain been trying 
to make separate peace--Harris. " 
2 However, this renewed 
attempt at peace apparently convinced bin 'Abd al-Karlm that 
he was still "the master of the situation and in these cir- 
cumstances it was for him to impose his conditions and not 
for his adversaries. ,3 To show hi's contempt for his enemies 
he proceeded to order the bombardment of Alhucemas Island, 
on 20 August. 
4 Alhucemas, for most of the war, had been 
immune from this sort of attack because it remained an "open" 
port, for continuing trade with the mainland. It was an 
anomalous position, certainly, but the Spanish wanted to 
keep its island fairly peaceful, because it relied on water 
supplies from'the mainland, for which privilege they paid a 
large "bribe" to the Rifls',, 
5 
while the RIfIs' depended on it 
as a source of food supplies. Af ter the. f ailure of, these 
1 The Times, 17 Aug. 1925, p. 10. 
2 TAHP, The Times, Correspondence, ''1894-1933, Telegram, 
Harris to The Times, Tangier, 4 Aug. 1925, "Not for 
pub li cation- -very conf idential. 
3 SHAT Maroc E241 Propagande'Riffaine,. B. des R.,, Amjot,, 
16 Sept. 1925. 
4 Ibid.,, ' and The Times, 22 Aug. 1925, p. 10, dat'ed Madrid, 
21 Ku--g. 1925. 
5 Fleming,, * op-' cit.,,, p. - 272. 
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negotiations the Spanish began to move towards making the 
final preparation for a landing in Alhucemas Bay. 
Primo began to make plans for an invasion at 
Alhucemas Bay in April 1925.1 He was doubtless encouraged 
by the success of the disembarkation at al-Qaqrý al-ýaghlr 
in the 'Anjara on 30 March,, which The Times correspondent 
in Madrid believed to have been "a practice run for the dis- 
embarkation at Alhucemas. " 
2 
Primols new plans involved the Air Force and Navy 
fully in a bombardment of the coastline and only Moroccan 
Regulares and regular Spanish troops--not conscripts--would 
be involved. The dictator received approval from the King 
and on 11 May he told his Chief of Staff of the plan and 
instructed him to make preparations for late June., However, 
when the French agreed to cooperate with the Spanish at the 
Madrid conference, the invasion plans were put back to late 
August or early September 1925, in order toýallow for the 
3 
incorporation of a token French naval force. 
Not surprisingly, in spite of the secrecy in which 
the plans were made, news inevitably leaked out to-the R1f1s; 
this explains bin 'Abd al-Karim's concern with'the coasts in 
July and August and his attempts to juggle with his over- 
stretched troops. The bombardment of Alhucemas, on 20 August, 
was an act of open defiance, for the guns of Alhucemas were 
to be used in the attack. 
4 
Neverthefess, the final preparations continued. On 
1 Fleming, op. cit., p. 263. 
2 The Times, 8 Apr. 1925*, p. 14, dated Madrid, 7 Apr. 1925. 
3 Fleming, op. cit., pp. 263-264. 
4 Ibid., p. 272. 
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1 September the operational commanders were given their 
"General Instructions for the Disembarking Operation. in 
Alhucemas Bay". 1 
On 8 September, after simulated landings at WAdI. 
Maw in the west and Sidl ldris' in the Timsamaril Spanish 
troops disembarked in Alhucemas Bay. The invasion of the 
Rif had begun. 
Conclusion 
The general view is that. the RIf`I Invasion of the 
French zone was a mistake. Fleming, for instance, 'claims 
that:. 
"The vague nationalist ideology that motivated the 
top leaders of the Riff Rebellion ftic]. was given 
in almost every case precedence oveF-hdrd military 
considerations. And this was especially true when 
Abd el-Krim ordered the invasion of the French' 
Protectorate in April 1925. v, 2 
David Hart, who is much more sympathetic to the' Rlfls than 
Fleming, also considered the invasion. a "hopeless" --. 
undertaking. 
3 
Whey then did the Rifl. 'leadership undertake 
such an apparently foolhardy enterprise? 
Fleming offers a useful basis for discussion 
4 by 
putting forward four possible explanations for the invasion 
of, the French zone. The first is based on thd'fact that 
bin 'Abd al-Karlm nearly reached Fez, where, had he entered 
the city, he might have been able to claim the Sultanate. 
His aims, according to this theory, were to liberate all of 
Morocco. There is, at first sight, a. certain credibility 
in this position. Bin "Abd. a. l-Karlmls own. propaganda seems 
1 Ibid., p. 276. 
2 Ibid., p. 239. 
3 Hart, Aitlý Waryaghar, p. 396. 
4 Fleming, op. cit., pp. 236-239. 
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to suggest it: his letter to the F&ssl*. "ulam&'* contains a 
call for jihad, and for the religious leaders of Morocco to 
cooperate with the only true leader of the holy war. How- 
ever, if bin 'Abd al-Karlm was as able a leader as he clearly 
was, he must have realised that he could hardly hope to con- 
quer the whole of Morocco. The most he could expect was for 
the rest of Morocco to rise with him, and eject the French 
from their zone. 
Another possible explanation is that invasion 
was an attempt to pre-empt a French. attack on the Rlf, for 
the very existence of the Rlfl state challenged that of the 
Protectorate. If the Rifis'could cause enough damage to the 
French, the latter might be willing to recognise his 
leadership. 
third possible explanation is that bin *Abd 
al-Karlirf wished only to eject the French from the Wargha 
valley in order to safeguard his supplies of food. There 
is a considerable amount of truth in this, but it provides 
no reason for the'advance on Fez,, * which is not in the Wargha 
valley. 
A fourth possible explanation, -to which Fleming 
gives some credit is that bin 'Abd al-Karlm was encouraged 
to invade the French zone by his "European advisers", by 
which is meant presumably the French CommunistýParty who 
assured him of the opposition of-the French people to the 
wari-and the "Riff 
ýOmmittee" 1 in London, and by his cabinet 
who wanted to continue the war to the south, and in no way 
acted as a brake upon their leader. 
2 
1 See belowl ch. XIII for a discussion of the r6le of the 
Riff Committee. 
2 
Fleming, 'op. 'cit., pp. 236-239. 
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All these theories ignore both the sequence of 
events and bin 'Abd al-Karim's own stated opposition to the 
invasion of the French zone. 
' Certainly, throughout 1924 
and -1925 he tried to restrain the attacks on. the French zone. 
According to him, his only aim was to ensure his grain 
supp es. 
However, bin 'Abd al-Karim was well aware that an 
attack on the French positions in the Wargha valley was tant- 
amount to a declaration of war. He was also aware that such 
an attack would lead to spontaneous action by the tribes of 
the French zone. He therefore planned his invasion with 
great care. 
Nothing was done until the absolute obedience of 
the JibdIa tribes had been secured,, and it is here that the 
sequence of events becomes important. Control of the Jibala 
was vital because the majority of the troops which were used 
in the attack on the BanU Zarwal: were not Rif Is: but JibAlis. 
He. appointed administrators and qdl: ids, erected telephone 
lines and built roads and fortifications. Above all, he 
secured the area politically to such an extent that no one 
dared to oppose him. Certainly the new close control of 
every aspect of life did not appeal to many of the people 
of the Jibala but they could do little to oppose bin 'Abd 
al-Karim because his position in the Rif itself was 
unassailable. It is instructive to compare Shdean's account 
of his meeting with the 'Arrisýl *shaykhs who were less than 
enthusiastic about the new Sultan, as he seems to-have been 
E. g., in Roger-Matheiu, op. cit. 
_, 
pp. 137-140, bin "Abd 
al-Karlm claiams-that he was dragged into an invasion by a 
spontaneous rising inthe French zone. 
2 Ibid., p. 140. 
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commonly called, to the same writer's meeting with the qVids 
of the al-, Mata. lsa tribe a few weeks earlier when'he was given 
a colourful and highly exaggerated. account of the AnwZil: vic- 
tories and of the power of Muýaqmnad bin 'Abd al-Karlia 
"And the Riffi killed and killed and killed, until 
there were one hundred and sixty-four thousand million 
Spaniards dead upon the field ... And Generan Barro [sic., i. e, General Navarro in Rif! mispronunciation). 
and all the 
, 
coroneles and tenientes and many thousands 
and thousands of men worked for the sultan, on the 
roads and as slaves. The sultan is very great; the 
sultan is the Lord of Islam. The sultan can defeat 
all enemies in battle,. The sultan has many millions 
of fighting men who will. sweep the French and English 
and all the Christians out of the Arab's country. 
When the sultan has driven'the Spanish into the seal 
he will go to Spain and drive. them out of there too. 
Spain is Arab country. The Rif fi will kill until he 
is tired, and he will take all the rest prisoners. 111 
Admittedly the whole performance was put-on for a visiting 
European journalist, and in those circumstances the exag- 
gerations are understandable. Nevertheless, they are, 
exaggerations born of a, real feeling of confidence that un- 
der the amlr*ls leadership jihad would lead to the liberation 
not only of the Rif, but also of. the rest of Morocco. Once 
this is understood, Fleming's remarks about the "vague 
nationalist ideology that motivated the top leaders of the 
Riff Rebellion" may be seen to be incorrect. The real heat 
of nationalist feeling came from below, from the qal. ids in 
the tribes, and from the ordinary people who were convinced 
of the efficacy of bin 'Abd al-Karim's leadership, and who 
believed. that their "Sultan" would go on to eject all the 
"Christians" from Morocco. Whether bin 'Abd al-Karlm wanted 
to invade the French zone or not, the pressure put on him 
from below, from people like Sheean's Mata. lsl'q&'. Id or-the 
people described by 'All al-Majawl. on the French front who 
Sheeanj Adventures,. p. 47. See above p. 722 for the 
*ArQsl shay'RHs. 
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were eager to attack, was such that he would eventually be 
obliged to take some sort of action against the French. 
In any event, bin 'Abd al-Karim was already com- 
mitted to a limited engagement against the French positions 
in the Wargha valley. He knew that such an attack would 
bring him into conflict with the French anyway, and this, 
combined with the feeling which seems to have been wide- 
spread, in the Rif at least, for an attack on the French made 
the general attack inevitable. It was this sequence of 
events, the completion of the war against'the Spanish in the 
west, the attack on the Banfl*Zarwal:, and the imposition of 
a state of martial law over most of the Rif which brought 
about the attack, not the support of "foreign advisersl'-ý-ý-as 
will'be shown, Canning, , one of the principal members of 
the Rlf Committee, did his best,, after the Spanishlandings 
in Alhucemas to bring about a negotiated settlement to 
the war'--and certainly not nationalist ideology overriding 
military considerations among the leadership. 
I What was prepared then, was an attack on the French 
positions with the dual objectives firstly of satisfying 
the demands of the RIfI*public, and secondly of wresting 
back control of the grain supplies in the Warghd valley. 
Notwithstanding the millenarist propaganda in Pezj"*it was 
to be-a limited. campaign, as the-careful preparation of 
defensive positions on which Rififorces could retire clearly 
shows. 
Nevertheless, even an attack limited in its objec- 
tives raised insurmountable problems. Quite simply, the 
RIfIs', even with the assistance of the Jibdlls', did not-have 
See belowi, pp. 806-ý809. 
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enough men. The economic costs of the mobilisation were 
enormous, and prices shot up (and occasionally down) in a 
most disruptive way. Despite the discontent this caused, 
bin 'Abd al-Karim never lost control, for his authority 
reached down to all sectors of the Rif and Jibdla. In each 
T 
village he had his secret policemen and women. His officers 
had authority over who could stay in a particular place- 
such as Ajdlr. --and who could leave it. There was a well 
developed bureaucracy. Everything that 'All Al-Majawl said, 
or the Banri Zarwal: notables said,, was written down. The 
political and social control of the Rif that. the government 
machine exercised was quite clearly very great. 
However, the'authority largely--though by now not 
entirely--rested upon bin 'Abd al-Karim's ability to lead- 
the war against the Christians. This is reflected in his 
propaganda. The Fa'sT . ': 
1ulam2P. were called upon to recognise 
him as the legitimate leader of the jih&d, the people 'of the 
BanCI. Zarwal: were encouraged to support him in the name of a 
"regenerated Islam",, the people of Tangier were told that he 
had the support of Germany, which would allow him to continue 
the war. 
So bin 'Abd al-Karlm was forced to enter the 
French zone, because of populr demand and the economic and 
political need to dominate the Wargha. He could not accept 
the various French and Spanish offers of "autonomy" under 
their overall authýrity, because to do so would have been 
to deny the basis of his leadership, and his support would 
have ebbed away. 
The invasion of the French zone was necessary for 
these reasons but inevitably it brought the seeds of defeat. 
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The French and Spanish combined were too much for the Rlfls' 
and the landing at Alhucemas began the final stages of the 
conf lict. 
Chapter XIII 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE RIF! STATE 
"You can sleep on the road in the Riff, which you can 
do neither in the French nor the Spanish zone. " 
Alexander Langlet, a Swedish journalist, writing 
of the social conditions of the Rif' in March and April 1926. 
"We have not lost hope that you will know all about 
our victories and those which the glorious army of 
God must achieve (in the future].. " ' 
Bin 'Abd. -. al-KarlM, trying to encourage a Sd'id 
fighting for. the Spanish to change sides, in February 1926.2 
pray to God that times like those will never return. " 
Idris Mimran Khujjar a prominent RIfI military 
qalid, speaking after the war of the final days of the col- 
3 
lapse of RifI resistance. 
The RU! 'invasion of the French zone had been 
taken from a. position of relative strength, although it was 
itself the cause of an alliance between the, French and the 
Spanish which led to the eventual destruction of the RIf.. 
However, because the RTfl. forces were strong when the French 
and Spanish counter-attacks be5any the two European armies 
I were not able to defeat the RIfIs'immediately. Because of 
the determination of the resistance and the difficulties 
2 
Manchester Guardian, 29 Apr. 1926. ' po 9. 
Spanish translation of a, letter from bin "Abd al-Karlm'to 
Qal. id S! 'al-Mall&l,!. In B. N. A. in Miscelenea Garcia Figueras, 
Vol. 'XLII (no page number). 
3 Quoted in Andr6s Sanch6z-P6rez, La Acc16n Decisiva contra 
Abd-i-el-Krim, in Colecc16ri Bibl'iogrdfica' Militar, Vol. XXVIII, 
Toledo, Dec. 1930, p. 137. 
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caused by the winter weather, the advances stopped in 
October, and operations remained largely dormant during 
the next few months. As a result, bin 'Abd al-Karlm was 
able to, reinforce his political position even after the 
landings at Alhucemas. The system of government did not 
break down until the last month of the war, public. order 
was maintained, and the bureaucracy continued to function. 
Langlet wrote that-the countryside was safer in the RIf 
than in the areas controlled by the French or Spanish. To 
complement this political stability, bin 'Abd al-Karim con- 
ducted a vigorous propaganda campaign, not only within the 
RIf itself, but among the Moroccan members of the opposing 
armies, and even further afield, far behind the French lines 
in southern Morocco,, hoping to bring about a rising there. 
Nevertheless, in the end the French and Spanish 
cambined f orces were bound . to prove too much f or the Rif is. 
Matters were made worse by the great hardship caused by the 
collapse -of food supplies and of the economy in general. 
Eventually,; bin 'Abd al-Karim tried to negotiate a settlement 
but this proved impossible. For their part, the French and 
Spanish made another attempt at negotiations and a conference 
was held at Oujda in the French zone but this also failed. 
By the beginning of May the conditions within the Rif were 
so bad that when the French and Spanish attacked, organised 
resistance collapsed. 
However, the fighting did not completely stop, but 
continued for-several months in the Jibdla and Sinhaja. This 
fighting was highly localised, and based on the old forms of 
resistance that bin 'Abd al-Karim had tried to replace- 
( 
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small-scale leaders, acting independently and in disunity, 
who were bound to fail. it was the collapse of-the Central 
Rif which, led to the full victory of the European allies 
and, for this reason this chapter is focused. largely on that 
area. 
The Spanish Invasion 
The Spanish had undertaken much preparation for 
the attack on the Rif so it is not surprising. that the force 
that was used for the invasion was suitably impressive. It 
consisted of some 16,300 men, some of whom were support 
troops, 1, transported to the landing-place in a fleet of 
sixty. three civilian 'ships borrowed. from a civil shipping 
line, thirty three from the. Spanish Navy, and eight from 
the French Navy. They were also supported by eighty eight 
2 land-based aeroplanes and. twelve seaplanes. . Facing this 
force on the Rifi'coast were some'5,000 men. 
3 
, The operation began, on the morning of 8 September, 
with an artillery bombardment of the shores of Alhucemas- 
Bay.. In mid-morning the disembarkation began, but not in 
the Bay itself. - The chosen spot was a beach north--west of 
the Bay,, west of-Ra's 'Abld, which-the Spanish called "Playa 
Cebadilla", and the Rifis. "TaýjarCit". 
4 
Possiblý this choice of landing-place took the 
defenders by surprise, but with such a long coastline to 
defend, and. with the balance of forces firmly in favour of 
Goded, ` - c1t. , pp.,, 150-151. The total iýumber, however, 02- 
was nearly 21,000.. E'leming, 'op. -cit., p. 264. 
2 Ibid., p. 149, and Woolman, op. cit., p. 149. 
3' Fleming, op. cit., p. 298. 
4 Woolman, 2p. cit.,, -P* 19*, ' and al-BZ . 'Ayyashl,: op. cit. # 
Vol. II, p. 425. 
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the Spanish, it is not surprising that the Spanish succeeded 
in disembarking with relatively little difficulty. By 
nightfall the Spanish forces, led by the then Colonel 
Francisco Franco, had taken position between Cebadilla., and 
the rocky point south of Ra's al-'Abid known as "Morro 
Viejo" (see Map XIII: 1). Although the landing of further 
troops was prevented by high winds on the following day, it 
continued on 10 September. By the end of that day 9,000 
men had disembarked. 
1 
Once they had disembarked, however, matters became 
more dif f icult. The terrain south of Ra. 1 s al- "Abld is very 
irregular, with many valleys and coves and caves in the sides 
of the hills. The resistance was fierce and the Spanish 
-took a long time to fight their, way forward. More, troops 
2 
were landed on 13 September, but it was not until 23., 
September that Goded succeeded in fighting his way onto the 
beach of Cala Quemada, 
3 
which is now the beach- of aI-Ijusayma 
town, while Franco took Jabal MalmCisT. ' By that evening the 
Spanish line had reached the point of Morro Viejo, south of 
4 Cala Quemada. 
The next few days were reasonably quiet, until on 
30 September the advance began again. Spanish forces reached 
Jabal BU Jibar, on the coast, and Jabal Hammam on their right 
flank, that evening. 
5 On the following days they advanced 
still further, crossing the Wadi lsll*and taking Jabal 
Sijjum on 1 October. On 2, October, Spanish forces entered I- 
1 Martinez de Campos, 'op. cit., pp. 306r3O9. 
2 Ibid., p. 312. 
3 Woolman, op. cit., p. 192. 
4 Martinez de Campos, op. cit., p. 314', and Goded,,,., op,. * cit., 
map 3. 



























AjdIr itself, which was then burned. 
1 
Here, on Primols 
instructions, the advance"stopped. The Spanish dictator was 
nervous of over-extending his troops before they had a secure 
base from which to advance, and decided to spend some time 
constructing stronger defences and ensuring control of the 
2 
area that the Spanish already held. 
Meanwhile, the French in the south had begun their 
offensive on 10 September. They started, with a push to the 
3 
north in the Wargha valley and in the Kiffan area. Their 
advance was extremely rapid. In. the first two days they 
moved forward over a 36-mile front to re-take most of the 
Ban-d Zarwdl*, including Amjutt.,. the former headquarters of 
4 
the Darqdwlya order. However, 'Abd al-Ralýmari al-Darqawl 
did not return until the war was quite over. 
5 
By. 16 Septem- 
ber, Jabal Bib&n was cleared of RIfIs, and 1,200 families 
from the BanCl . 'Zarwdl and 
450 from the Bania Masgilda had 
submitted-to the French. 
6 
I At the end of September, French forces moved along 
the valley of the upper Wadi MasUft and Wadi Wizart. from 
Kif f Ari in the direction of the Wadi Kart.: 7 By 2 October they 
were positioned on the southern borders of the. al-Mata , 
Isa 
tribe. 
8 On 4 October an advance was started In the Tawndt 
1, Ibid., and Woolman, op. cit.,. p. 192, and Fleming, 
op. cit., p. 307, and al-BU 'Ayyashl, ' op. cit. j, Vol. II, 
pp. 436-437 
2 Fleming, op. cit. 
_, 
pp. 307-308. 
3 Wooman, op. 
lcit., 
ý p. 193, and The Times, 11 Sept. 1925, 
P. 12, dated Paris and Madrid, 10 Sept. 1925. 
4 The Times, -13 Sept. 1925, p. 12, 
dated Tangier, 13 Sept. 
1925, and SHAT Maroc E24, Propagande Rifaine, Lyautey to 
Ministre des Affaires Etrang6res, Rabat,, 24 Sept. 1925. 
5 Al-Fihrl, 'op. cit., p. 48.. 
6 The Times, 17 Sept. 1925, p. 12, dated Paris, 16 Sept. 1925. 
7 Ibid., 1 Oct. 1925, p. 14, dated Paris, 30 Sept. 1925. 
8 Ibid., 3 Oct. 1925,, p. lo,, - dated Paris',, 2 Oct. 1925. 
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sector of the front, up the valley of the Wadi Laban towards 
the Sinhaja Srair tribes. Spanish and French troops 
finally met at Siyd4,: near SQq al-Thalathal* of BanQ BQ Bakar 
on'6 October, for a Spanish force had moved down from Dar' 
DrIUs h. 2 French forces occupied Jabal Na7, Ur., some 15-20 
miles north of Kif f &ri, on 7 October, and "Ain Zuhra on 8 
3 October. On 13 October French operations were suspended 
4 
'for the winter, in order . to give time to Prepare 
before 
the snow. and bad weather began. In fact snow. started 
falling on the southern front on 16 November. 
In this way. the Rif was completely. surrounded by 
a ring of French and Spanish forces on a front stretching 
from Afraw in the east, through 'Az1b Mi4a. r., SiyaV, '- Jabal 
'Azrrl, 'Fazzara, B&b Taza, then into the-Wargha valley through 
Sakkar, Bibdn, to Wazzari, and then through the foothills of 
the western Jibala by the Fundilg' of *Ain al-Jadida to Tetuan. 
In addition,, the Spanish had a small front around Alhucemas 
6 Bay, and had the-still. unsubmitted 'Anjara tribe surrounded. , 
It certainly looked a. bleak picture for the Rifis'. However, 
there still remained a very large area--the majority of the 
Spanish Protectorate--which. was by no means defeated. 
Conditions in this area were, difficult, certainly, but the RIf 
was still, quite able to resist.. 
Ibid., 5 Oct., 1925, p. 14, dated Paris, 4 Oct. 1925, and 
6 Oct. p. '14, dated - 
Paris, 5 Oct. 1925. 
2 Ibid., 6 Oct., 1925, p. 14, dated Madrid, 5 Oct. 1925p and 
7 Oct. 1925, p. 14, dated, Paris, 6 Oct. 1925. ' 
3 Ibid., '8 O'ct. 1925, p. 14, dated Paris, 7 Oct. 1925, and 
9 Oct. -1925. 
4 Ibid., 14-Oct. 1925, p. 16, dated Paris, 13 Oct. 1925. 
5 Ibid., 17 Nov. 1925, p. 13, dated Paris,, 16 Oct. 1925. 





The Rlfl Response 
News of the Spanish landings spread fairly quicklyr 
particularly in areas bordering on to the Spanish lines. On 
8 Septemberl the day of, the landings, the Spanish announced 
the news to the BanQ. Walishak. In the areas which were 
already occupied by the Spanish, it was greeted, Military 
Intelligence reported, with some pleasure. 
1 
It is difficult 
to know what reliance to place on this for to show disap- 
pointment might have led to speedy detention by the Military 
authorities. On the Rif! . 'Side of. 
the front lines the news 
spread less quickly. On the day following the landings, 
9 September, the Spanish Military Office in SQq al-ThalathAl. 
of BanU 13U. Bakar in the al-MatAlsa reported that the people 
in the Rifi. controlled area of the tribe had-not yet heard 
of the landings. 
2 The Spanish doubtless told them fairly 
soon, but the fact that the news had not travelled quickly, 
despite the telephone service, which passed on information' 
very rapidly, indicates that the Rlfl. 'authorities' control 
of information was as tight as ever. 
In fact,, bin 'Abd al-Karim tried very hard to 
limit the spread of the bad news. He quickly prohibited 
the use of the telephone, and announced that all communications 
3- 
were to be carried out by letter . -presumably. 
to make it 
easier to censor news. On 12 September he banned any dis- 
4 
cussion of the landings in public. 
1 SHM Melilla Leg., 28,, Hojas Diarias_Beni Walishak, Hoja 
diaria, 8 Sept. 1925. 
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Hojas de Confidentes Matalsa, nota,, 
9 Sept. 1925. 
3 Ibid., Sala4 b,. M4ammad, 11 Sept. 1925. 
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Oficina de Matalsa, Hoja. diaria, 
12 Sept. 1925. 
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Apart from the immediate "blanket" which he placed 
on the landings, bin 'Abd al-Karlm also took positive prop- 
agandising steps of his own. He gave further promises of 
outside help from a European nation--without specifying 
which one--which would soon come to the aid of the RIf .1 He 
also engaged in black propaganda against the Spanish, and 
caused it to be announced in the markets that people who had 
made contact with Spain had been deceived by Spanish money, 
that Spain would, never forgive the RIfIs. for the defeats of 
1921,, and if. they succeeded in occupying the RIf. they would 
kill. the Rifis' and, their families. A good Muslim, he said, 
should die defending his land, and not live "like a dog". 
For his part, bin 'Abd al-Karlm said, he would-rather kill 
2 himself than fall into Christian hands.. Such propaganda was 
given some substance by the real behaviour of the Spanish 
forces. Repeated stories of atrocities committed. by Spanish 
troops were reported by Walter Harris, The Times corres- 
pondent in Tangier, in private communications to his 
paper. On 30 September he wrote to his Foreign Editor, 
Harold Williams, that a British Consular agent. in Tetuans, 
Mr. Todd, had. told him that of a group of 140 RIfIs'recently 
captured at Alhucemas, "15 were kept alive to give information. 
The rest were kill ed by the troops. ,3 Two weeks later 
Harris wrote again: 
"The Spanish are impossible to work. withr-they are 
jealous, mean, _and untruthful and cruel, and carry. out reprisals on every possible'occasion. 
The frontier tribes refuse to submit to them, but 
Y 
SHM Melilla, Leg. 28, Hojas"*de, Confidentes Matalsa 
Muqaddamýb- 'Amar, 16 Sept. 1925. 
2 Ibid.,, SalaVýb. * Mu4ammad-VammQsh, 17 Sept. 1925. 
3 TAHP file, The Times Correspondence, Harris to. Williams, 
Tangier, 30 Sept. 1925. 
779 
express their readiness to do so to the French. "' 
On 26 October he telegraphed: "British officers arriving 
from Alhucemas report Spaniards continue to kill decapitate 
,, 2 prisoners. The decapitation of prisoners was probably the 
most shocking aspect of this behaviour. Harris even obtained 
a photograph of members of the Foreign Legion holding up 
the severed heads of Moroccans killed during action around 
the post of QudlaC Tahar on the Tetuan front, 
3a 
photograph 
which Primo de Revera--who was apparently angry about the 
atrocities and tried. to, stop them--admitted was quite 
genuine 
4 
This behaviour was not, of course, the official 
policy of the Spanish army, and the military leadership made 
strenuous -efforts to prevent it. Those responsible seem to 
have been mainly members of the Foreign Legion and the 
Moroccan Regulares of the Spanish army. Nevertheless,, it 
could only encourage the Rifis. ' and their supporters to further 
resistance. 
The resistance was indeed fierce, andAt took the 
Spanish troops a month to occupy a fairly small beachhead in 
Alhucemas. They were opposed, initially, by the 5, TOOO men 
in the. Alhucemas area. This figure was soon increased. A 
few days. after the-landings, bin 'Abd al-Karlm, ordered 
"everyone" on the French front to defend the northern. coast. 
The BanUTQz. Ift reportedly sent 500 men to defend SIdI IdrIs 
in the Timsamari, and 1,000. to the AjdIr. region, the Gaznaya 
at least 500 to Ajdlr',. and the. MarnIsa 1,, 200 to the same. ' 
Ibid,., Harris to Williams, Tangier, 13 Oct. 1925. 
2 Ibid., -Telegram, Harris to Times, 26, Oct.. 1925, Confidential. 3 Ibid., Telegram, Harris. to Times, 17 Sept. 1925. 




At the same time all men over the age of 15 were 
ordered to join the barka, while the women and children were 
sent to the interior. All camels, mules and donkeys were 
requisitioned. 
2 Furthermore, bin tAbd al-Karlm released 
all the prisoners held in the BanaWaryaghal lands, and 
ordered them to fight. 
3 
Even al-Vajj. bil-Qlsh was released 
from detention in late September, on the condition that he 
went home to the Gaznaya to fo-rm a barka. His son, however, 
4 
was kept behind in the BanQ Waryaghal as a hostage. In 
the BanU. Waryaghal itself, it, was announced. that anyone who 
joined the new Iýarka would be, paid 2,000. pesetas... and at Saq 
al-Alýad. of RU7adT-. 'in the Buqquya tribe all the men attending 
the market were drafted into the ýýka--therewere. 3,000 of 
5 them,, of whom 1,000 were. unarmed. 
This does not mean'that there was. not, opposition 
to-the formation of yet, more barkas, but.. such. opp'osition was 
confined to areas close to the French front,,. and on the 
eastern front where political contacts with the. Spanish had 
existed ever since the reoccupation of the forward. positions 
in 1922. Here the effects of the bad behaviour. of Spanish 
troops was not felt, because by and large'there was relat- 
ively little ýf ighting - in the areap even during. the Alhucemas 
operation. Thus only a few. days after the landings, the' 
Banfi Trizli! rpfused, any-further*ýbarkas and did not attend the 
markets in orderto avoid being'conscripted by members of 
1 
SHM, Melilla Leg., 28,, Hojas"de Confidentes Matalsa, Faq1h 
tAbdallah b. Vd. mid, 13 Sept. 1925. 
2 Ibid., 
I, 
Mubammad b. 'Amar, -14 Sept. 1925. 




-SHM'Melilla Leg. -28, Informaci6n. Y. Confidencias Tafersit 
y Beni Tuzin, ý Muba; nmad b. al-Ijdjj, 1jammu,., 2-7 Sept.. 1925. 
5 Ibid. - Q&'. 'id Zaghud (of BQ -Vaf 
Ura) 17 
. 
'Sept. 1925. - 
781 
the RIfIregular army. 
1 
The BanQ Tftlri were still refusing 
men on 17 September and the Timsamdnis, ' also showed signs of 
2 being most unwilling to provide them. 
At the beginning of October the first real trouble 
started in the Rlfl'dominated area of the Tafarsit tribe, 
which refused to obey bin 'Abd al-Karlm's orders to attack 
the Spanish. A regular army group which was sent to restore 
order was ejected from the tribe. The rebels were appar- 
3 
ently led by Wuld al-ljaýssan, the Tafarsit! who, in, June 1923, 
had. shot-ldris. ' b. SaIld, the Moroccan from Sal6-who had 
negotated, the release of Spanish prisoners of. war. 
4 On 
5 October the"Rifl. 'galid in the Tafarsit fled to the mountains 
because the local people wanted to hand him over to the 
5 Spanish. On the same day aýsimilar rebellion broke out in 
the Gaznaya. t*ribe. 6ý Bil-QIsh apparently promised to put* 
the rebellion down, although, as the Spanish realised, bin 
'Abd al-Karlm. could hardly take his old antagonist's promise 
7 
very seriously. The-Gaznaya were by now begining to submit 
to the French in considerable numbers. What happened-next-is 
unclear. Hart-who-puts the dates somewhat too. late--says 
that Bil-Qlsh was poisoned on bin-'Abd, al-Karlm's instructions, 
while his son w as 11quietly disposed of" in the Wednesday 
8- 
market of Tawritt. -in the Banil Naryaghal. A Spanish, informant 
Ibid., 'Abd al-$adiq b. 'Abd al-Ush (sic) (Tafarsit), 
13,19-ept. 1925. 
Ibid., 'AmarCish b. Vaddu, b. al-Muqaddam, 17. Sept. 1925. 
,3 Ibid. 'Amarfish, -2 Oct. 1925. 4 See above, p. 605 
5 SHM Melilla Leg 28,. Informaci6n Confidencias Tafersit 
y Beni Tuzin, ýAmarUsh,, 5, Oct. 1925. 
-Ibid., 
Zaghdud, 5 Oct. 1925. 
7 Ibid., Muttammd, b. - al-lja. jj Vaýmmu, 11 Oct. 1925. 
8,, 
Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 399. ' He puts -the date as early 
1926,, but-this, is clearly too late. in the light of this new 
evidence. 
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on 19 October reported that Bil-QIsh was killed by a bomb, 
with no reference to bin 'Abd al-Karim's involvement. 
1 
Whatever the method used, and whether or not the murder of 
Bil-QIsh was carried out on the direct instructions of 
Mu4apmad b. 'Abd al-Karlift, his death was extremely useful 
for the Rifl. 'leader, for the rebellion in the Gaznaya quickly 
died down. 
Both the Tafarsit and. the Gaznaya were in border 
areas of the Rif, and as such more likely to fall prey to 
French and Spanish influence. ' The Spanish were. less success- 
ful in their attempts. to carry out a similar policy in the 
BanQ Waryaghal, after their occupation, of part of that tribe, 
but because the contacts they made during1the autumn of 1925 
were of importance, later, a brief account of them is now 
given. 
Sulaym2ift al-Khattabi 'and the Political -Action in 'the Banil : 
Waryaghal 
When, in the period immediately before the RIf war, 
in May 1921, General Berenguer had undertaken a'tour of 
inspection of the Rif coast, a number of Waryaghlls had gone 
to Alhucemas Island to see him.. ' One of these was Sulayman 
b. ýal-Muj7ahid of the BanQ.. Zar&9. sub-clan of the _BanU 
Xilsif 
W-"All. in the BanQ.. Waryaghal, ýýa distant cousin of bin 'Abd 
al-Karlrft. ' Bin "Abd. al-Karim had tried to fine all those who 
visited the island, and all except Sulayman paid UP. 
Sulaym, dri fled to Alhucemas Island, where he remained through- 
out the war. 
1 SHM 
' 
Melilla Leg., 28, 'Informaci6n y Confidenc"ias Tafersit 
Beni Tuzin,.! Alldl: b. M4apmad b. Allsha,, 19 Oct. 1925. 
2 See above, pp. 293-294. 
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on the Spanish occupation of Ajd1r`,, SulaymAn b. 
al-Muj&hid al-Khatta. bl. Was at once reinstated in his property 
in the village, 
1 
and became the chief R1f1 representative 
of the Spanish military authorities. His-job was to make 
political contacts in the Buqquya and BanQ. Waryaghal tribes, 
to collect information and encourage submission to the 
Spanish. In this latter function he was not very successful. 
The: Spanish occupied only a very small part of. the territory 
of the two tribes, and even, those,. people who were inclined 
to submit felt that it was t9o dangerous to do so. 
2 On 3 
October Sulaymaxi wrote a letter to be dis tributed to the 
BanU Waryaghalt Buqquyaj TimsamRn: and BanQ Tazlrf. Part of 
this letter ran as follows: 
"Spain is a mother to all those who are friendly 
towards 
, 
her and the proof of this is that those who 
live under her protection want for nothing, neither 
do they suffer in any way. I tell you that Spain 
only wants peace, and well-being. for you. Take no 
notice of, those who say-that Spain punishes and 
mistreats Muslims, for they-are ignorant people, 
and seek only evil and misfortune for-you and your 
children, and perhaps your ruin., 13 
Few people took much notice$ with one very impo rtant exception, 
Mulý : AzarqZIri of the Banii Bil : 
'Ayyash. 
, 
(This man should not be 
confused with Mulýamnad Azarqarf,,. the'RIfI Minister. for Foreign 
Affairs. ) This Mu4 Azarqan: had been appointed as qalid of 
4 
the BanU. BU: *Ayyash in, 1922-by biný'Abd al-KarIm. , 
He had 
never-been particularly, distinguished for his. loyalty,, however. 
In the period immediately following thei. proclamation of bin 
1 
The Times, 3 Octý. 1925, p. 10.1dated Tangier, 2. Oct. 1925. 
2 
SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Informaci6n de Alhucemas, Telegram, 
Comandante Jefe Oficina Informaci6n to Cor. Inspector-Gral. 
Interv., 3 Oct. 1925, Urgentisimo. ' 
3 ibid., Letter-from Sulaymari al-Khattdbl. to. the Tribes 
, of 
Beni Uriaguel, Bokoial Temsamam and Benu Tuzinj Alhucemas, 
3 Oct. 1925 (Spanish. version only available). 
4 See above,. p. -A98, 
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"Abd al-Karim in January 1923, he was one of the signatories 
of a letter to the Spanish promising to help them if they 
advanced. 
1 While the RIfIs had little to fear from the 
Spanish, bin 'Abd al-Karim, who was well aware of the prop- 
ensity of the BanU BU . 
"Ayydsh to rebel, contented himself 
with keeping the situation under control. . For the time 
being Mub Azarqari was tolerated, presumably in. order not to 
cause more trouble with his clan. However, when. the situ- 
tion got dangerous, in the sunmer of 1925, Mu. 'ý Azarqan was 
dismissed, along with three other Bil . 
`AyyashI''qaI. ids. 2 
When Sulaym&ný al-Khatt4bl became the Spanish 
representative in Aidir. *, Mu4,. Azarqari quickly. made- con tact and,, 
encouraged by SulaymAril sent a party which inclýded his song 
'Amar and a TCizanl, * to Melilla on his behalf. Bin . 
'Abd 
al-Karim decided f inallly to deal, with, Mub AzarqAn and arres- 
3 
ted him and his son. This was by no means the end of the 
story, for Mulý : Azarqan caused a good deal of trouble for bin 
4Abd al-Karini in the final stages of the Rif war, in the 
spring of 1926. For the moment, however, the incipient plot 
had been crushed. - 
In fact, despite the Spanish landingso the author- 
ity of bin-'Abd al. -Karim was stillindisputable. The command 
chain and organs of government'still functionedi,, and the 
political and social control of. the RIf continued. 
SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes, 2, Bani Waryaghal, 
Mubammad Azarqari, - 
Uzkddu b. Muba. mmad Amzziyant Misaled b. 
al-Shallw! al-Waryaghli, Mu4ammad b. 'Amar Akhatt-,, 4mad 
b. "Amar and-'Abd al-Sal&m b. SIdl AI; mad Abirkari to Coronel 
of Melilla, 12 Jumada 11 1341/30 Jan. 1923. 
2 See'above, p. 754., 
3, Alý--B. Q . "Ayyash! * op.. cit. # 
Vol. II, pp. 440-441. 
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The Operation of the Rift Government after the Landings 
The government structure set up by bin 'Abd 
al-Karini after his proclamation in 1923 had had among its 
aims the abolition of violence and feuding in the RIf, 
and the imposition of a central authority. Both these aims 
continued to be carried out during the period after the 
landings. 
Firstly, the central control became if anything 
closer and more. centralised.. In the months preceding the 
landings bin 'Abd al-Karlrd had. concentrated more and more 
power in his hands and those of his immediate family and 
supporters. This tendency continued after the landings. 
The policy of disarming the tribes continued. In the second 
week of October the BanUNittuft. tribe was disarmed. A 
deserter from the Rifiregular army--a Waryaghll Xrom the 
Banil that. members of the regular army 
2 
were disarmed before they-went on leave. This, may have 
been partly to ensure that as many rifles as. possible were 
available for'use, but the evidence of another informant 
shows that this was not by any means the only or even the 
major reason. In the period just before the landings, bin 
'Abd al-Karlm had set up "guards" (mabakmas) in each tribe 
and announced that as there were no Christians in the area 
and he was responsible for order, it was not necessary for 
individuals to own guns, and, therefore, they should all hand 
--them in at the'. mabakmas. *, The implication was that bin 'Abd 
SHK Melilla Leg. 27, Informaci6n de Alhucemas, T. O. Com. 
Jefe Of. Interv. to Gral. Jefe, Sector de. Ajdir, Alhucemas, 
12 Oct. 1925, "Urgente". 
2 Ibid., *Abd al-Sal&m b. 'Amar b. 'Abd al-Karlm, 29 Nov. ' 
1925. 
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al-KarIm saw the private possession of ams as a direct 
1 
assault on his own authority. 
The disarmament was certainly one aspect of the 
campaign to maintain order. The other aspect was the general 
knowledge that murderers would be punished. The execution of 
murderers also continued, at least into the first months of 
1926. In March, a man from the BanU. Ba Silmarf was condemned 
to death--he had admitted to. the murder of another man from 
the Bani! Nanjil, in order, to marry the dead man's wife. 
The evidence of witnesses. was taken,, and-sentence was passed 
2 
on himAn order to deter others, as the judgement explained. 
By and large these policies--disarmament and 
capital punishment--kept. the peace in the RIf very adequately 
even after the Spanish landings and resultant blow-to morale. 
There were exceptions, however, including a particularly,, 
violent blood f eud, which broke,, out in the BanQ Vizln' and Baml 
Waryaghal in. October and. November, in which'at least 14 people 
were killed. -This was, as-Spanish 
Military-Intelligence 
pointed out, with some glee, the first feuding since bin 'Abd 
al-Xarira took control in. the R1f. 
3 It seems to-have died' 
out--or more likely was suppressed, although. there, is no 
confirmation of-this--fairly quicklyl, for. there are no 
further mentions of feuding, in'Spanish files until the final 
days of the war and the. collapse of the RIfI. state. -, 
Evidence of, the strength of the rule of. law in 
ibid. 
2- MAEF,, Maroc, 519, p., '45. Declaration in the case of Miýad 
b. tAll b. -'4mad on. reverse his condemnation 
, to death for murderr, signatures'illegible, 25 ShMbAri 1344/ 10 mar. 1926. 
3 SHM Melilla. Leg. 28, Informaci6n y Confidencias Tafersit 
Y Beni Tuzin, Mubammad b. al-Vdjj Vammu (Igharbiln-, Band 
Tflzin),. 8 Nov. 1925. 
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4 
the RIf, even as late as March and April 1926, is provided 
by a Swedish newspaper correspondent, Alexander Langlet, who 
visited the Rif during those months for the Manchester 
Guardian. 1 Langlet, wrote: 
"Alk 
. del Krim's authority seemed to be absolute, and his laws--for example, against tribal and family 
feuds--seem to be kept. You can sleep on the road 
in the Riff, which you can do neither in-the rrench 
nor in the Spanish zone., '2 
, Certainly bin 'Abd al-KarIM does not appear toýhave lost his 
own self-confidence in the days after the Spanish'landing. 
Vincent Sheean, the American correspondent who had visited 
the Rif in 1924 . returned again in 1925, . at the height of 
the battle for Ajdlr*in late September. According to him, 
bin 'Abd al-Karim had in'factI, gained in-self-confidence'since 
their previous meeting. He was'less formal, and. totally, '. 
unconcerned of the danger from the-Spanish'aeroplanes. He 
expounded his demand for the-absolute independence of, -the 
Rif'while standing in the mouth of a cavep firing a rifle at 
low flying Spanish bomb ers. 
3 On 23 September, Sheean wrote 
in his diary: ý 
"His courage is magnificent. His'ideas have not 
changed, have even been reinforced by the present 
danger.. From what I saw of him today., Iýknow, that 
I had no idea'of him before. 'He has a grandeur, 
-added. to by-, the circumstances of horror. and great 
danger.. But,. in spite of this he is humorous, funny: 
makes me laugh, especially, wherihe assumes -aschool- 
masterish air and corrects my Spanish. 4 
Furneaux (op. cit., p. 220) , states 
that Langlet visited 
the Rif from Dec. 1925 to Feb. 1926. He is without doubt 
incorrect. Furneatfx is frequently at error both in detail 
and'in, general'. ' On this occasion he gives Langlet's name as 
"Langret", and-appears-. to ignore Langlet's, own assertion that 
"I have just reached-London after two months with the Riffs". 
in, the Manche ste r Guardian,., 29 Apr. 1926,, ' p. 9. ý 2 Ibid. 
3 Sheeanjp; 
_Personal 
History, pp. 149-151. 
4 Ibid., p. 152. 
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That is not to say that bin 'Abd al-Karim, underestimated 
the problems that faced the RIf. I state# and the importance 
of maintaining the confidence of the RIfIs-themselves. To 
this end, from mid-October onwards he conducted an intense 
propaganda campaign, in. an attempt to encourage his people. 
Propaganda 
.. The propaganda campaign in the Rlf hadthree main 
aspects--promises of outside help, promises. that France and 
Spain would soon withdraw. from. the RIf because of pressure 
within their own countries, and a return to a call. for JihAd. 
Promises of outside help were not new in the 
propaganda of the Rif war.,, Once again, the main focus of 
hope was the old First World War alliance of Germany'afid 
Turkey against France--a hope which. might be expected to 
have a. greater chance. of realisation after the, victories of- 
Mustafa Kemal. in Turkey. In mid-October, bin'lAbd al-Karlm 
paraded-four men, whom he described as "Germans" who had 
come to help him, on the Ajd1r. ' front. The rumour quickly 
spread that very soon German troops would disembark at 
Sldl 'Idrls*(in the, Timsam&n) or elsewhere, to help fight 
the Spanish. Bin-'Abd al-Karlm followed this. rumour with 
another one to the. effect that Germany and Turkey had both 
2 declared war on'France. in November, this theme was varied 
, slightly. 'It-was announced 
in the silqs that the French were 
unable'to advance 
ýecause they owed money, to, the British 
go vernment, which had to be paid immediately,. or, the British 
SHM Melilla-Leg. '28, Informaci6n y Confidencias'Tafersit 
y Beni Tuzin, 'AllAl b. Mu4aýmna b. 'Aisha, 19 Oct. 1925. 
2 SHM, Melilla Leg. 27, Informaci6n de Alhucemas, nota, 
21 Oct. 1925. 
789 
would refuse any more credit for further advances. Further- 
more, if the loan was not repaid the British would take over 
the city of. Oran in Algeria as payment. 
1 ý This, was a remark- 
ably complex piece of propaganda, and shows same awareness 
of, the intricacies of European politics--even. if, it was 
qu. ite untrue. 
Indeed, -the internal pressures on. the European 
allies, France and Spain, for an end to the war were quite 
well known to the Rif. l. government,, and, accordingly were used 
in, propaganda. At the, end, of December a letter from bin 'Abd 
al-Karlm, was read in the markets of the JibUa, referring to: 
... the financial difficulties in which France finds herself because of the need to repay America, the 
hostility of the [French]. people to the ' campaigns in Morocco and against. the Druzes (in. -Syria],. and the 
probable refusal, of credits to. continue the war. n2 
The opposition of France', to the war in Morocco came, naturally,, 
from the Left, and. was indeed severe enough. In. the ý Parlia- 
ment the Prime Minister, Painlev6,. was attacked,,, Jn October; 
for the heavy costs and'loss. of life in Morocco. 
3 
-'Outside I 
Parliament,, Communist, militants carried on a fierce. campaign 
4 
against the war. Other stories, which appeared In, the French 
press in Morocco, to, -the effect that the British. government 
wanted an independent RIf. I, 'state,,, were bemoaned by Walter- 
I 
., -,: SHM. Melilla Leg. 28, Informaci6n'y Confidencias Tafersit 
y Beni Tuzin, ZaghdQd', 8 Nov. 1925. 




1926, C; M. T. Fez, 31 Dec. 1926. 
, The losses up till 15 October were 2,178 killed and 8,297 
wounded. '158,000'men'were involved in'military-operations 
at a totalcost of, some 1,350,000,000 francs.,, Paul Isoart, 
"La guerce'du'Rif'et le Parlement Frangaisl, 'in Colloque, 
pp. 303-204ý. 
ý 4 In, November 1925,, 125 members of the French Communist 
Party had been imprisoned. and 263 we're wanted in connection, 
with offences committed while opposing the war. Robert 
Charvin, "Le-Parti Communiste frangais face-h la guerre, 
du Rif", ýJn Colloque, p. 226. 
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Harris, The Times correspondent: 
0 
". . . -they merely encourage 
futile hopes among the Rif Is',, and 'Abd-el-Krlm himself uses 
the French newspaper articles as propaganda among his 
tribesmen. The, third aspect of this propaganda was a call 
for jihad'. This seems mainly to have been diredted against 
those Moroccans who were fighting for the Spanish. For 
instance, in February 1926 a certain Qa9ld al-Mallall,, * who 
may have been a member of . the important pro-Spanish MallAll 
family of Alcazarquivir, received the following letter from 
bin "Abd al-Karlia: 
"Praise be to God. Alone--God's blessing be on our Lord 
MuI; ammad and his family. 
To the Kaid'Sid El-Mellali, God's peace and blessing 
be uponj4you. And then: 
We know that'you love and believe inyour religion 
and that you, hate the enemy. This is not remarkable, 
for. it is the duty of every., Muslim, for the world is 
a dream and its products'- [sic] 
Do you know what God has ordained for those who are 
treacherous or work under the authority, of the enemy? 
The Coran (Eic]. said"Oh! Believers, you shall'not 
ally yourselves with'Jews or. Christians nor take them 
for protectors unless you are physically, weak. 1 The' 
tradition of the-Prophet says 'Those who live under 
the protecýion. of. unbelievers will. be separated from 
me. l. 
We are astonished to see you allied. with the enemy 
and under his authority.., Do you. not know that he is 
now broken and, powerless, and 
, 
seeks your help? Why 
does he use you in the front lines against the , Muslims?. So that, you should die outside your-religion. 
He keeps his people in the rear lines and-you are 
deceived by it. - 
What answer doýyou have to what we have done to the 
[enemy's]. armies-when they occupied, our land? We', 
have done what is, required. by-our religion and the - 
defence of-our own ideas and customs. What, prevents 
you from. refusing him [i. e., the enemy]. the harkas 
which you now-give him,. to fight against your brothers? 
Do you believe that his., forces are greater than ours? 
I swear by the one God that his forces are inferior 
to ours! What'is happening that you should. sacrifice 
The Timest' 29 Mar. 1926,, ' p. 14,, 'dated Marrakesh, ' 28 Mar. 
1926. 
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your lives and souls outside the Muslim religion? 
There is no greater disgrace nor more infamous vice! 
Is there none amongst you who walks, the straight path 
of truth? How will. you excuse yourself before God? 
What will you reply on the day of resurrection? 
We advise and demand the unity which Godý, laid down to 
defend the holy religion and in this cause we offer 
our fortunes and our lives. Who will answer that he 
will come over to our side to fight against-the enemy 
and will help us? 
For our part we are willing to provide'everything that 
is necessary once you begin the task. Let us throw 
the enemy from our land. Let us carry the worthy 
standard of victory and-the shield of glory and free- 
dom which can be. won but not given. 
[Even]. if you close your'ears so that you do not hear 
our voices and that which God has laid down, and you 
do the contrary setting aside, prestige, we. will [still]. 
have carried out God's ccmmand by showing you the path 
of the Merciful# who is our witness. 
You know, having been told it, that our warriors have 
taken much of the riches of the enemy as booty in 
great battles. We have 
' 
not. lost hope that you will 
know all about our victories and those which the 
glorious army of God. must achieve (in the future].. 
I repeat my. appeal to you that you should brush away 
the dust that clouds yourjudgement.. Unsheath your 
arms against our enemies; -do not fear his now-exhausted 
strength, do. not listen. to his lies and deceits, which 
serve only to confuse you-that you should not. know the 
truth. They have said that they have occupied Ajdir,, ' 
whereas " 
in fact they occupied only a few stones on its 
outskirts. ., -I 
When we saw, them arrive there we rejoiced and were 
happy, for-we knew that all would then belong to us. 
we rejoice each time they advance,, - bedause'their losses 
increase in'killed and wounded. 
Those who are. experienced in. war know that the enemy, 
is overstretching his forces on land and sea, and will 
have to retreat withterrible consequences. for him. 
Believe 
* 
in. victory and the glory of God which are 
inseparable from him who fights. [for the faith].. 
,. 
God is our protector, out help against the enemy who 
wishes to expel us from our houses and dishonour our 
mosques! 
You should-know that the believers are daily in greater 
harmony and. their situation gets better despite the 
forces theýenemy sends by, 'land and sea. The Coran--the 
%sacred word--says 'the-believers promised and accepted 
the word in sincerity, some of, them are dead. and some 
still to, come, etc. ' 
''And 
so,. it. is necessary to annihilate. the enemy and 
make him submit to the truth, and respect our rights, 
by whatever method. 
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Do you want us to live without rights or to die in 
agony? 
God give you good judgement. And Peace. 
Mohamed Ben Ab-elr-Krým [sic]. el-jatabi. 111 
This letter marks a return to traditionalist Propaganda. 
Here there is no reference to the advantages of an ordered, 
Islamic state, it simply repeats the vague promises that the 
Spanish would have to withdraw, and concentrates on the 
religious nature of the struggle, berating Mallall for his 
treachery to his f aith and not to his watan. . Even more 
distinct calls for jihad' iri the old'style were made in letters 
sent by S! Mabammad to the Anti-Atlas region south 'of 
Marrakesh. in the south of Morocco, where Marrabl. RabQIX,. a 
son of Malal-'Ainlrf, was carrying on the war against the 
French. The recipients of these letters, all dated 5 Jumdda I 
1344/21 November 1925, were. ten of the most important leaders 
in the area, including Marrab! Rabalý himself, his brother 
Mul; apimad b. Mal. al-'Ainiri, and Madani. bin al-Ta. lib. Aým. ad 
al-AksELs*sl,: 
_qa'id 
of -the Akhsas tribe, and one of Raba4l. s 
2 
most powerful. supporters. The letter to al-Akhsassl.: is 
Spanish translation of. a letter from bin 'Abd al-KarIM to 
. Qal. id S! , 'al-Mall&ll,,: 
in B. N. E. S. de A. ',, Miscellenea Garcia 
Figuerast Vol. XLII (no'page numbers). The translation only 
is given, with a clearly erroneous date--"Aydir 13-2, ý; 2511 
(sic). As the letter. refers to the Spanish having. already 
occupied part . of Aj d1r, whi ch they 
had'not. done in. Feb. 19 2 5, 
it seems reasonable from-the context to infer that-this was a 
, misprint-(the 
translation is typed) for. 13-2-26, ' 
2.0 ther recipients were the. Faqlh S1d1'al-Vdjj. alrAbad, 
the main propagandist against the French in the'south- QAI. id 
Mubarak. al-Bin Iram! #,: an ally,. of Madin! al-Akhsass1,, * 
Auýammad 
b. alpBashir', , son of ,a 




1 Amran) , Sa ' ld ýb. AI)mad al-Kardilss I 'of . 
the. Ida U 
. 
Baqil, tribe, 'and Qdl. id Nuj! M al-Akhs&s'si.:. Translations of 
all these letters were forwarded, along with'a covering letter,, 
in, 'SHAT Maroc E24j, 'Propaqande*Riffain,, Blanc.. (Delegate of 
Resident-General in MoroccF) to Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangbres, Rabat,, 24. D3c., l925.,,. The Ait, Ba "'AmrZiri confederacy 
was centred. around the Spanish-claimed colony of, Ifni, assigned 
to Spain in.. the 1860. treaty on the supposed, site of. Santa- Cruz 
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typical: 
"Try as hard as possible to fight the unbelievers, 
so that the word of. God may triumph and so as to 
help your friends, although we are far, apart ... The moment has come when the warriors for the faith 
must show themselves, and. throw light on'. -thdir deeds ... Know that our purpose is to throw out the unbelievers and purify the Muslim lands of 
their presence, so as to set up a free Islamic 
government in Morocco.. Then it will be possible 
to revive the precepts of our religion in a perfect 
way ... ill 
All these letters, and that to al-Mall&ll, *appeal to their 
recipients to wage holy war, although the letters sent to 
the Moroccan south-west arethe more explicit. Clearly bin 
'Abd al-Karim. and his brother felt the need. to try to weaken 
their-enemies, France and. Spain, by encouraging defection 
and renewed attacks. on-them in other quarters. The prop- 
aganda vehicle they used was the one most suited to the 
occasion, a call to fulfil religious duties which might be 
conceived as, more effective than, say, vague promises, of 
German support, which Mallall 'could have known were untrue, 
and which to Marrabi Rabfflý. Might have less appeal than 
Islamic solidarity. 
The reason-for this desire to put pressure. on the 
European allies in other directions is not'hard to see. 
Although bin 'Abd al-Rarlm maintained control-in the, Rift 
the economic and military. problems were getting worse. '' 
Similar-forms of propaganda were used within-the RIf itself. 
Bin 'Abd al-. 7-Karim himself later described how, after the 
SPanish landing at Alhucemas, he had used a story--which' 
de Mar Pequefia (see above, p. 69 ) 
, so 
these recipients 
could be said to be in a position similar'to that of the 
RIfIs'l-in that-they faced a threat both from French and. 
Spanish, colonialism. 
Ma4ammad. b. "Abd al-Karim to Qa9*id MadanI. al-AkhsassI,: 
13 Nov. 1925, containe d. in. package mentioned'above in p. 792, 
n. 2. 
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+, [, LkC, 
according to him was VAM--that the Spanish had turned a 
mosque in Alhucemas into a stable, as a tactic which "doubled 
the bravery of the fighters, and increased their. devotion to 
oil myself and my cause. 
The Economic Situation 
The essence of the economic problems of the RIf 
after the Spanish landing at Alhucemasj and the French 
advance in the south, is very. simple: in short, the RIf ran 
out of food. The reasons are not hard. to find... Firstly the 
intensified. blockade of the coast and eastern, front, and the 
'French 
occupation of the southern RIf, cut'off. food supplies 
from outside. Secondly, -the harvests failed. 
To deal with. this'latter part first,. a graph-. -* of 
, rainfall in 1925 and 1926 shows that between January and 
--March 19261 when the growing-crops needed water., the rain-- 
2ý 
fall was very low indeed (Table XIII: 1) .. In -the autumn 
of 1925, grain had been relatively cheap. A detailed, picture 
Iý is not available, because the figures are lackingr-but there 
are pointers. At'the beginning of. October. barley was only 




of a year before-12 pts'.. a, mudd., in October 1924., , In'Nov- 
-, ember the prices,, did creep back. to'their-1924 levels--12'pts 
a mudd but it was not until the beginning of. January that 
Article in al-Manar, P. 632. 
2 Table XIII: 1',. is. derived from Resumen de las Observaciones, 
1924-1926. ' 
3., SHM Melilla Leg. 28, -Informaci6n y Confidencias Tafersit 
y Beni Tuzin, .2 Oct. 1925. 4 See above, p. -644. 5 SHM-Melilla Leg. 27; Informaci6n de Alhucemas, *Abd - 
al-Salam b*, 'Amar,, b. -'Abd al-Karlm. b. 'Abdallah (BanU 
Wlaryaghal), 
-29 











, , V- -- 
YV4VA "'t Vra 
'796 
prices began to rise sharply. There were two factors respon- 
sible for this: firstly the lack of rain, and secondly the 
disruption caused by Spanish and French bombing attacks, 
which prevented the Rlfls'from cultivating their lands. 
Because of the aeroplanes, people tried to spend as much 
time as possible in shelters below ground and came out only 
at night. By January much of the land was uncultivated and, 
according to French army prisoners who escaped from 
. 
the 
Rifis', famine had overcome the region. Barleyr which 
-18. pts a*mudd) until. the'last. week remained fairly low (15 
in February, more than doubled in price between 24 and 
28 
February. Although it came down thereaftert it never fell 
much below 30 pts a mudd (Table xIII: 2). 
2 It is interes 
I 
ting 
to compare these prices with those in the KabdMia 
I 
and AWM 
Sittfit tribes in -a'Spanish occupied zone. 
' Here. the prices 
showed much less variation, and although'they'remained very 
much the same as the prices in the Rif during January and 
February, and even peaked slightly in late February,, just 
as, those in the Rif did, they did not undergo. the same 
SHAT Maroc, Riff,, 3 I,, Interrogat6ires des. lndigýNnes, 
St. Mub, -ýmmad bin Brahim, Fez, Jan. 1926, and Tirrailleur 
MUs&'bin A]Mad,.. Fez,, ' Jan. ' 1926. - 2 Table 2 is derived from: 
-(a) Melilla Leg. 30, Of icina de Informaci6n* de Dar. Mizian Vatid b. , al-Bashir. 'Alldl,, 18 Jan., 1926. (b) Ibid. I tiamid b. al-Bashir tAllal:, 24 Teb. 1926 (c) Ibid. r Mubapund b. Abariaq, 28, Feb. 1926, * 
. 
(d) SHM Melilla Leg. 30,, Oficina: de de*. Tafarsit, Khallf'a "AmarUsh, 3-Mar. 1-9-26., 
(e) SHM Melilla Leg. 
. 
30, Oficin-a de Informaci6n de Drius, M#zý: mmad b., al-Mukhtarj, 15. m '. 1926 (f) , Ibid. 'Muýammad. 'b., 'Amar, 29 MaL 1926. (g)' Ibid., b. 'Amar, 30 Mar. 1926. 
The details are not, of course complete, and concern. a number of markets. ' There were doubtless local- variations.. Never- theless, there is considerable 'consistency and thd general trend-is quite clear. 
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enormous increases in March (Table XIII:. 3). 
1 This is a 
clear indication of the growing effectiveness of, the blockade. 
By April and May prices in the RIfI zone were running con- 
sistently at about 50% higher on average than those in the 
Spanish-occupied zone (Table XIII: 4) .2 
The worst problem of all was to, find. enough salt. 
As the French advanced into the Gaznaya,, they cut off the 
supplies which had previously come from that tribe., Bin 
'Abd al-Karim tried to encourage smuggling of. salt from 
the Spanish zone, which could be'sent to a. central point 
for distribution. 3 As the spring drew, on salt got more and 
more expensive and finally, after the end of, April,,. dis- 
4 
appeared altogether. . In fact, food in general had run out 
by this time. On 30 April a Spanish informant. reported that 
people were going three or four days without, food. Others 
had no clothes. 
5 
Not surprisinglyp'these terrible economic con- 
ditions affected the will, of many of the Rlfls'to fight. 
Nevertheless, bin 'Abd al-Karim. did not-finally. lose. control 
1 Table 3 is derived from SHM Melilla, Leg. 30, Oficina de 
Informaci6n de Zaio, Hojas Diarias, 11 Jan. ý 1926,13 Jan. 
1-9-26,15-jan. 1926,28 Jan. 1926,8 Feb. 1926,14 Feb. 1926, 
21 Feb. 1926,28 Feb. 1926, ' 11 Mar. 1926,14 Mar. 1926, * 
21 Mar. 1926, '-28 Mar. 1926. 
2 Table 4 is derived from: 
(a) SHM Melilla Leg. 30,. Oficina, de Beni Walishak,, Va, mid 
b. al-Bashir, 'Allal:, 4 Apr. 1926. - 
(b) 'Ibid., -"Abd al-Salani b. ', 'Amar, 10 Apr. 1926. 
. 
', (c) Ibid., 'Amar, b. al-Muqaddam, 10 Apr. 1926. * 
I (d) SHY4* Melilla'Leg. 30, Oficina de Khemis. de, Bent. Bil Ifrur, 
je) SHM Melilla-LeT. 30,,, Oficina de Intervenci6n'.. de Beni 
Ulichek, Muba. mmad b. 'Abd al-Sal&m, 11 May 1926., 
3. SHM Melilla Leg.. 30, OfIcina de inform - ac16n'de. Dar Mizian, 
Vamid'b. al-Bashir 'Allal: 1,30, Jan. 1926. 
4, SH&T Maroc Riff, 3 I,, Interrogatoires des Indigbnes 6vad6s 
du Rif, Capt. Clerget,. Taza, 29 May. 1926., 
5 SHM. Melilla Leg 30,; Oficina de Informaci6n de. Tafersit, 
MimUn, b., Zaghdfid, -ýO Apr 
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until French and Spanish f orces actually penetrated right 
into the heart of the Rif, He maintained his authority by 
the use of more and more,. violent dictatorial methods. 
The Effort to Keep, Control 
Bin 'Abd al-Karim faced two problems in late 1925 
and early 1926: to prevent tribes on the front lines against 
the French and Spanish from submitting to the Allies and to 
-I. t 
prevent subversion within the RTf. 
On the French frontýhis'principal enemy. was his 
old opponent 'Amar b. Vzýmldu, who was now working, with the 
French at the head of irregular Moroccan forces.. 'Amar b. 
Vamiduls centre of operations naturally was his old. power 
base in the Marnis'a and Sinhaja. Srair tribes. At the begin- 
ning of September, bin, *Abd-al-Karim: was reported. to have 
shot 100. hostages from the Marnisa,,, *bin VamIduls. tribe,, in 
an effort to so terrrorise that tribe that it would not join 
him. l.. - On the eastern front, bin. 'Abd al-KarIM promised a 
reward of. 50 pts for anyone who reported. another for iiisiting 
2 
the Spanish zone. In the Sinhaja a man was shot-on--the - 
orders of the commander, at Band Barbar for. encouraging 
defections. to the French. 
3 
Such repression was clearly not enough, 'ýand in'the 
Sinhaja and'Matlwa al-Jabal tribes large' numbers of people' 
began. to submit. to 'Amar b. IJamIdu. . 
'The. Awlrad BQ Al-Hadl 
, -clan of 
the Mat1wa al-Jabal joined him in the. last week of 
SHM, Mel'illa Leg. ý27,. Informaci6n de Alhucemas, Com. Jefe 
Centro de Interv., Ajdir. to Cmte. Gral. Melilla, 6 Dec. 1926. 
2 
, SHM 
Melilla Leg. 28, Informaci6n de Tafersit y Beni Tuzin,, 
'AmarUsh b. Vaddu al7Muqaddam, 8, Dec. 1925. 
3S HAT'Maroc Rif 8, '; Groupement de Fez , 15 Novembre 1925 h, 




and then at once proceeded to pursue a blood feud 
,, with members of a neighbouring clan. 
'Amar. b. Vakmldu took 
the opportunity provided by the confusion to. move into the 
Fanna-ssa. 
2 
At the beginning of January, bin, "Abd, al-KarIM 
executed all. his remaining hostages from th&. Marnls'a--the 
exact number is not given--except one. 
3, In the MastAra# the 
entire population of a village fled to avoid punishment for 
not sending reinforcements. 
4., Nevertheless,. bin 'Abd, al-Karlm 
could not for long hold the line against defections. Towards 
, 
the end of January, the BanQ Waryajal tribeAn-the Sinhaja 
also started to submit to. the, French. There were problems 
in the Jibala as well, where bin. "Abd al-Karlm. ordered the 
I replacement of. T7a. lib al-Shawnl,:, the man who., had originally 
been appointed as qa 91d of the 
, 
Banrl AbMad , af ter, the Rlfl 
capture of Shawin, and later. - as'- qal. id of the western JibAlan 
tribes of Ahl Sharif, BanQ Sikkar, BanU,. Issaf and Sumata. 
The Suradta, -his tribe, were 
furious and rose against the 
Rifis'. In the northern JiWila, Akhr1rQ Was forced to deal 
with the Banil Masawar who were attacking. the viiýal Tangier 
convoys. Nevertheless, the bulk of the Jibala-r-BanQ Vassan, 
Band and, Akhmas. -7were still loyal to the . R1f1s and 
5 
provided Akhrlra-with men. Howevert. the. slow trickling 
away of support, on. the southern front continued,,., despite., bin 
1 ibid.,, C. M. T. Tez, 21 Dec. 1925,, and C. M. T. Fez, ' 26 Dec. 
1925. 
2 MAEF,, Maroc 520, ! All b. Va 
, 
mmu al-Na:; d 
, 
r! 'al-Matlwl '(Pasha 
f Mativa, for bin,. 'Abd al-ý-Karl ), to bin 'Abd al-Karlm, -13 0 Im Jumada'II 1344/29-Dec. . 1925. 
3_SHAT Maroc-Riff 8, 'Groupement I 'de Fez, Novembre 1925-Juil-ý 
let 1926, C. M. T. Fez,, ' 5 Jan. 1926. 
4 ýIbid. j, C. M. T. Fez, 6 Jan.. 1926. 
5 Ibid.,, C. M. T. Fezj 25 Jan. 1926. "For. details. -of al-TAlib'- 
al-ýEhawnll. "s- career, see- above, pp., 695-696., 
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tAbd al-Karlm's efforts. His qd9ld in the Jaya tribe sur- 
rendered on 30 January. 
1 
On 1 February the Rlfl. q&llds 
in the Matlwa al-Jabal fled because. that tribe " was no longer 
.I secure, but did not dare'to return to the, Rli for fear of 
punishment. At the same time the Sumata tribe started to 
2 
arrest members of . the Rif 1 j: egular army -in their, territory. 
However, the Rif! 'command was still 'quite ''able to fight back, 
and Bri Lalýya arrived in the Jibala'-in, mid-February with 
around 1,000 men to deal with the. rebellion i-n, the BanQ ' 
3 Sikkar and BanUt Gurfit. By' 14 February hd. was, in control 
4 
and started to disarm the tribes. By. the'end. of February 
the western JibdIa was quite definitely back. under RIfI * 
control. 
5 Meanwhile the northern Sinhaja was largely kept 
6 loyal through. the power and influence of. the AkhamlIshIn. 
Matters were rather different in"the, Rlf, Here 
the absolute control of bin, 'Abd al-Karim was undisputed, 
and the government functioned normally., In an, effort to 
, 
deal with the food shortages, grain was, stored 'at- central 
7 
points --for, instance at S1 "All Bil . 'Uqba--and guards'were, 
put'on the silos. 
8 In order to replenishhis 'army's. depleted 
-stocks of - 
ammunition'. 'bin 'Abd -al: Karlm. announced that he 
1 'SHAT Maroc Riff. 8'0,. Gioupeýment de Fez, -Novembre 1925-,. - 
Juillet.. 1926#,, SM. T. Fez, 30 Jan. 1926. 
2 Ibid., C. M. T.. Fezi 1 Feb. 1926. 
3 Ibid.,,. C. M. T. Fez, 10 Feb. 1926. 'and C. M. T. Fez,, 13 Feb. 
1926. 
4 Ibid.,, C'M. T.. Fez,, 14 Feb. 1926* 
5 
ýIbid.,, C. T. O., -'Pez, 26 Feb.. 1926. 
-6 ibid.,,, C. T. O. Fez,, 23. --Feb. . 1926. 
'' 
, _7 SHAT Maroc Riff, 14, ' Dossier. III Mars' 1926r' Renseignments 
donn6s-par-Abd. el-Krim li_ýIýHadj-Ali, el Boucoyyii Tangier, 
4 March 1926 Chenceforeth referred to'as "Renseignements, 
Abd el-Krim el-Hadj. Alill). 
8. SHM Melilla, Leg.,, 30, Oficina'de Informaci6n deýDrius, 
. Aisa, 
b. '"'Amar AkarrCish, 4 Jan., 1926. -- 
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would pay for any unexploded bombs brought. to him to be made 
1 
ýinto grenades. Work continued on the road system; at the 
beginning of February a Spanish informant reported that a 
road was being built between Anwa3: and Saq al-Sabat of Banit 
Walishak. 2ý1, 
The administration also continued to work. The 
front line commanders continued to send regular reports to 
AjdIr. A typical one was sent. from TawArda. at, the beginning 
of-January, and concerned movements, of. the, Spanish Foreign 
Legion in the al-Mata. 3-sa, bombing raids'by,, Spanish, aeroplanes, 
and the crash of two of. those aeroplanes near'*Azlb Mi4ar. ', 
an argument over. the possession' of a rifle, the shelling of 
Spanish positionp by Rif.! guns, and - so - on. 
3 
Strict records of the distribution of weapons were 
still kept. On 7-February,,, according to, one slip'preserved 
-in the French Archives,, 
there were 50. Khamsiya-rifles handed, 
4 
out in the Zarqat: -tribe, and 1,8; in-the Tisfll:, and. so on. 
This implies that. the-bureaucracy,, 'at. least,, was still, 
_-. 
working. However,,, there were other problems. ' ,, - 
One of the worst of. these. problems. was, that of 
for money wasýslowly'running out. The shortage of 
money was seen to be-serious in December, *when. the regular 
ýarmy, had its pay. -cut..,, - The's alary, of. machine gunners,, for 
instance,,,, went-ý down; from 60-80- pts to AO pts'a month. in, 
12 Jan. Ibid.,, 'Aisa b. gAmar, AkarrUsh; 1926. 
2', SHM Melilla.,. Leg 30, Oficina de-Informaci6n'de Dar Miziant 
1jar6id'-b., al-Bashir... "Alldl', 2 Feb. 1926. 




77,, List'of, arms distributed to. tribe', 24 Sha ' bAn 
1ý4477 Feb. 1926., 
5 SIM. Melilla Leg. 27,, Informaci6n'de*Alhucemas,. Ijamid b. 
MUsA b. 'gAll'.. '(a native of-Tripolitania, captu-r'6ýy the R1f1s), 
1 Dec., 1925. 
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mid-January a Spanish informant reported that the troops 
were not being paid at all. 
1- The troops, were, not the only 
employees of the Rif! qovernment who were -not paid. 
on 
20 January 1926 one Sa"I(I b. - al-Q&Iid al-Sharif. ' wrote to bin 
'Abd al-Karlm tolcomplain that his mother. who, worked in "the 
bakery of the noble (al-sharif)Makhzan" had not been paid 
2 for three months. 
By the. beginning of, March the situation was. getting 
desperate both economically. and politically. ý'Prices of grain 
had increased greatly. over a short: period, and. there was 
even no grass to feed the.. flocks, because the rains had not 
3 
come. 4t the end of. the first week of March, when people 
went to bin 'Abd al-Karlm to ask for money with which to buy 
cartridges, he replied -that all the money given, - to him by 
Spain (in exchange for the prisoners) was now finished. - 
4 There was no. money, left. , At the same timeo,.. at. the beginning 
of March, the Rif! cause suffered its -first defection from 
the governing group itself. S! *'Abd. -al-Karlm 
b. al-jj&jj 'All 
of the Buqquya Ia relative of Ralls-Misa'rad -"Sibara" by 
marriage, and hence'of, bin. 'Abd al-Karim. himself, and-the 
5 
Rif! spokesman, in, Tangier, '-.. went to the French, representative 
in that city and told them that he was willing. to work for 
them. He explained-that since 
'the 
death, of'his brother, ý-in- 
law. "Sibara",.,. who, was,. according to him,. killed by a servant 
1 SHM Melilla Leg.. 30,, Oficina de-Informaci6nde Tafersitr 
Mubammad b. S! Mubapd.. b. al-ljdjj Qaddur, 18 Jan., 1926. 
2 
-MAEF, Maroc 519, 'p. '. 'l34,, Sa'ld b', al-Qalid al-Sharlf to 
Mubammad E-. -'ATd-, a1 -Karla, -6 *Rajab 13 44/20. Jan. 1926. This document is-. reproduced. in-the-appendix, No. 13. - 
31 
I-SHM melilla'Leg. ''. 30, 'Oficina'de Informaci6n. de Tafersit, Mubammad '. 'Allal: Mub: and,, ':, 8 Mar. 192-6. 
4 Ibid.,,! 'Amarf Ish, 9 Mar. -1926. 5 For details of the career. of.. 'Abd a17Karlm b. al-Vajj 
"AlT, * see above,, pp. 161-162; -176. 
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of Mu4ammad Azarqaft, the Minister of. Foreign Affairs,, his 
position in the RIf. had become impossible, and his only 
safety lay in "the friendship of Si Whammed ben Abd el 
Krim who has always protected me. 111-So he decided to leave 
,, 
the Rif and take refuge in Tangier. Knowing that he would, 
not be allowed to. stay in the International Zone without the 
permission of the Spanish and French, he had. decided to 
cooperate with the latter. He confi nned that-the RIfI 
government no longer had any money'to maintain, the troops, 
and revealed that bin. 'Abd al-Karim. 1's, car could'. no longer 
2 be used because there was no. petrol inthe RIf.. 
eAbd al-Karlm b. al-Vajj "All'also said that the 
al-KhattSbI brothers and their uncle "Abd al-Salam. were 
3 determined to continue the war to the very end. However# 
by this time rumours were already circulating, in the RIf *that 
bin 'Abd al-Karlra was tryingto negotiate a peace. -. Indeed 
he'had already, tried in January and February. 
The-Search for Peace 
The effort in January and, February, for a negotiated 
peace to the conflict. initially came from-a rather unlikely 
quarter: Captain kobert. Gordon Canning, one 'of. the prin- 
4 
cipal -members. of. the. Rif f., Committee in London.. . . 
'Canning was 
SHAT Maroc Riff 14,, * Dossier III Mars' 19261* Renseignements, 




-and. was The Riff Committee was set up in, 1925, in London, 
composed of. a_number'of. ýEnglishmen who. 'expressed sympathiesý 
for the cause, of Islamic. Nationalism.. -Prominent among its 
members were Arthtir. Field, Captain Canning, And. a Captain, 
Gardiner. ' Field was a member of the British. Communist Party 
and Secretary. of the" Anglo-Ottoman Society. % He had been in 
contact, with*john Arnall, a pro-Rlf!, English. *resident in, 
Tangier, - when the latter visited the RIE in -1922 '(see above, * 
p. 510), 
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encouraged by-remarks about,. autonomy for. the RIf made by 
the French Prime Minister#', Painlev6j in october. 1925j, 1 and 
having confirmed. with Painlev6 and-his ForeignýMinister 
Briand, and with Steeg,. the French Resident-Generallin Rabat, 
that this meant internal self-government, he set out to try 
to convince bin 'Abd al-Kar! M of the possibility of 
negotiation. It must be-said that there were considerable 
differences of opinion between the French. and Spanish 
leadership over this matter. - The, French wereýmuch more 
ýinterested in negotiations.., than, wer, e, the Spanish. '. The civ- 
ilian Steeg. had replaced General Lyautey. as., Resident-General 
on 28 September 1925.. as a result of this desire. Steeg was 
,a former Professor. of., Philosophy. and. a Radical-Socialist 
,, 
Canning had been 
" 
an-officer inr! the British army, during the 
First World War, and was later connected with the Red 
Crescent in London (al-Bril IAyydshI, ' op. cit. ,. vol. II 
p. '-442).. He later appearedý, in Palestine in. November 1929 
during the troubles. between Jews and-Arabs and proceeded, to 
support the Arabsý(Sheeanj Personal History, pp. 411-412). 
Gardiner had set himself,, up in London in 1923-as-IMinister- 
plenipotentiary, from the, ýGovernment of , 'the 
Riff! Ij from an 
office in the Strand. From here he wrote letters to a 
'number of governments, 'ýinviting them, to-recognise'the Rlfl. ' 
government and. set up diplimatic representation. in Ajdlr'. ' 
Recipients included. the governments of Mexico and Rumania; who 
, were understandably. puzzled 
(MAEE,. Antiguo Archivo 2543; 
carpeta VE 438, Marruecos Noticias%sobre querra,, Letter,, 
-Gardiner 
to Government of, Mexicol London, -29 Aug. 1923" and 
T. C. Amalfi. (Sp. --Minister, Bucarest), to, Alba, Bucaresto 22' 
Sept. 1923). Gardinerls interest inthe Rif- was originally 
financial,. and in June 1923 he signed-a contract--which the 
Rlfl, *government later denied---! to provide 
,a 
loan. of. E300,, 000, 
sterling in-exchange-for considerable commercial-rights in 
the Rif. 
-Heyould 
be, allowed to set, up a Bank,,. to develop 
mining, forestry, telephone'and communications and a'postal 
system,. to build, ports, ' schools. and technical colleges, rail- 
ways. and tramwaysp and- 
- 
even. theatres, cinemas and opera houses 
-7-FO. 371/W9218/7 , 
83/28,. Clive to Ramsay. MacDonald, Tangiert 
10 oct. *'1924,, "and,, FO-371/W9483/783/28,, Clive-to MacDonald, 
Tangier, 27 Oct. '-1924. Such plans were clearly pure fantasy, 
., whether the 
document'itself, was genuine'or, not. -, -In June 1926, 
after the-fall of the''Rlf*,,. 
IGardiner'turned. 
his attention to 
the SQs*, where he, ýsupplied, arms to. MadanI. *al-Akhsds'sI : (see, 
above,, p.. 793), ýlanding them from. -hIs. yacht, the*Silver- Crescent (MAEE, Leg. R966, *ex]? ediente. ''130, "Sospechosos en 
-Marruecos,. 
Fr. -Ambassador-to Spainjto. Miiiister, of Statel San 
'Iýebastidn, 29 July 1926). ", 
Fleming, op. '-, Cit P-. 309., 
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Deputy, and he wished for a peaceful. settlement although he 
quite properly emphasised .. that all negotiations 
had to be a 
joint French and Spanish undertaking. The, Spanish,, and 
particularly Primo de Rivera, after the success of the 
landings at Alhucemas, were less inclined to negotiate with 
bin 'Abd al-Karim. Both publicly and, in. private, Primo 
rejected any attampt at a pact with the Rifis'. 
2 
In factr 
Primo Is opinions, had changed f rom, a desire to. work f or a 
negotiated. settlement with. the, Rlfl 'authorities, to a total 
refusal. of any sort of negotiationj s1ncehe now realised 
3 
ýthat outright victory was within his grasp. 
Canning reached Targist sometime. in*January 1926p 
and after considerable discussion with. S1 Mabapmad, AzarqaA 
and later bin 'Abd al-Karlra. himself,, succeeded in, working out 
a series of Rifl. terms, for a peace settlement. ' These terms 
included agreement. that the Rif should have internal autonomy, 
but not independence, under the nominal authority of the 
Sultan,, that, there would be an open-door policy to. European 
trade. in. the, Rif',,. that the Rif! government would be. respon- 
sible for internal order, but that it would not enterýinto 
relations with anyýforeign country;, that'the head of the 
government. would be called -the. "Amir. ".; that its capital 
would, be Tetuan, 'but that. Spain would be allowedto'keep 
Ceuta, Melilla and Larache, although the Wargha. tribes and 
some of. the JibUa tribes (i. e., in. the. French zone) should 
fallýwithin the Rif. * 
4 
Not surprisingly.,. nei. ther, France'nor. Spain was ... 
1 Ibid., 'and Gabrie. lli, *. *op. - cit.., pp-0 167-168. 
2 Flemingi op--, cit-, _pp.,. 3ll-3l2. 
3 ibid. ý, pp. 313-314.. 
4 Al-BU '1'Ayyash1,: _- op. ' cit..,, 'Vol. II, pp. 443-444. 
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willing to give up such large parts of their Protectorates 
in this way,. and when Canning reached Tangier at the end of 
January . 1926 . he was attacked by. the French - and. Spanish press, 
and there were a series of -complaints about him by Spanish 
and French officials to the international governing body of 
the city. 
1 At the beginning of February, on the advice of 
British Consul-General Clive, Canning left Tangier. 2 
However,, despite, the failure. of these plans for 
peace, some sort of an end to. the war was desperately needed 
by the. Rifis'. The French. and Spanish were quite prepared 
to carry on to a final defeat of-the Rif. . Primo, although 
determined to. reduce. the burden, of. the war on Spain, and to 
bring back some 36,000 men, mainly conscriptsp from-Morocco, 
kept an army of some. 98,000 men-"Spanish Foreign Legion, 
Spanish regular troops, and Moroccan Regulares-ý-in the 
3 
Protectorate. With'these men he would'pursue. the war to 
the end. 
On 4 February. 1926, a French. military. delegation, 
includ 
- 
ing P6tain# the army, commander, in-Morocco, arrived in 
Madrid to plan -a spring campaign in the RIf., The French 
and Spanish decided on a series of operations 'starting 
with a French advance on, 15 April, and followed by Spanish 
offensives onýthe-Ajdlr and, eastern. fronts. Each'side, would 
4 
guarantee to. have at least 25,, 000ýmen ready for thd operation. 
-The Rifl. government, was quite aware of these prep- 
arations, and some 8f"its, members began to feel great, 
The Times,, 30 Jan. -1926, 
_p., 
10,,. dated Tangier,, 28 Jan. 
1926. 
2 'Ibid., 5 Feb. 1926, p. 16'. - 
3 Fleming, *, op. cit., p. 330. 
4 Ibid., pp., 331-332. ' 
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apprehension about the coming offensive. They split into 
two groups, one--including SI Maýaymad,, M4aýnunad Ba DrAj, ' 
Aýmad Bri Dra,,. * and BU La4ya--in f avour.. of continuing the 
war, the other --inc lud ing bin "Abd al-Karlm himself, SI ', "Abd 
al-Saldmi. Azarqdri, and MuýanmddBCIMiddr, the paymaster7-in 
favour of peace. At the end of February,. through the 
offices of Vaddu b. ljc-pmu, bin 'Abd al-Karlmls. former agent 
on the eastern f ront in 1921, and, later his unof f icial 
"ambassador" to the French zone, 
2 Gabrielli, the French 
controlleur-civil. in Tawrlr. t,, again made contact with the 
Rifis'. Acting. on. Resident-General, Steeg's instructions, he 
told Ijakddu b. Varmnu that negotiations,, could only begin on 
the understanding that they would involve both France and 
Spa n. 
3 
On 18 March the French,. having consulted the 
Spanish government, told Gabrielli of. terms. on which they, 
would agree to a. peace: submission to the Sultan, exile of 
bin 'Abd al-Karlm, the disarmament. of the. tribes, and the 
.4 
return of. all prisoners. He passed these terms on to 
Azarqan on 24 March. Azarqdri returned with these'conditions 
to bin 'Abd al-Karim"and on l. April, ljaddu returned with 
letters from, Azarqari, and bin eAbd, ali-Karlm agreeing to neg- 
otiations., on-these terms,, announcing an armistice, *on all, 
fronts, and stating, that. the RIfI delegates to thei. peace' 
conference - would be Azarq&rf, S! Mulýa; Tmad. Hitml-andýSl A4mad 
SUM!, ' two minor. f1gures-in thd.. Rif 1.1nakhzan.. 
5 
Gabriel1i,, *op. 'cit-, -p. -'178, and Sklraj,, op. cit.,, p. '147. 2 For klaýddu, b., Uaýmu, see above, pp. 386-388. 
3 Gabrielli, -op. cit*..,,, pp. 
180-183. 
4 Ibid.,. p. 185. 
5 Ibid. 1 pp. 191-194;. Shidd! was "Minister of Property, ",, 
Hart#,, Aith Waryaghar,, . p. 387 
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on 9 April an official. communiqu6 was issued in 
Paris announcing that the conference would begin. on 15 April 
in Oujda, a town on the eastern border of Morocco with 
Algeria. However, the conference was delayed. When the 
Rif! delegates y now including Vaýddu b. ljzammu, who had 
replaced al-Hitmi because of the latter's illness, 
2 
arrived 
at TawrIrt, they were first taken to the French post at 
Camp Berteaux, where they were toldl' on 10, April, that no 
conference could. take place, until all the. prisoners were 
released, and the French and Spanish had. been permitted a 
preliminary advance of several-kilometres along parts of 
the-front, in order to guarantee their "strategic security". 
As these terms, which the Rifis'. had expected to discuss-at 
the conference, were made pre-conditions, for, the conference 
being held at, all,,. the RIfIs-refused to agree to them 
without the permission. of bin 'Abd al-Karlm. Uzkddu b. Ua. mmu 
returned to the Rif, and' returned. on 20-April with )An 'Abd 
al-Karim's refusal. 
3" 
Faced with the possibility of a breakdown of thei 
conference, the French and Spanish'agreed, on-26. April, to 
4 drop their demands. Behind this decision lay considerable' 
pressure by. the French upon. -the Spanish authorities, who 
were still much'less anxious for, a negotiated settlement. 
The-talks, finally began on 27 April. However,, these'negot- 
iations also ran into trouble'over-the questions of who 
should carry out the disarmament, of. the tribes,., 'and the' 
Barris,, op. cit.,, pp. 278-279. 
2 Ibid., p. 279 
3 Ibid.,, pp. 285-287. 
4 Ibid., pp. 291-292. 
5 Fleming j 'op P. 340. 
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nature of local autonomy. This latter question raised the 
issue of whether the tribes' qVIds, after the peace treaty, 
should be confirmed by, the Sultan alone--as, the RIf Is 
wanted--or by the khallfa (in other words, the Spanish) in 
Tetuan--as the Spanish wanted. On 1 May the conference broke 
down when the French and Spanish again demanded the release 
of all prisoners. Azarqari and Jjamu were taken by sea to 
Alhucemas and thence to TargIst to, inform. bin *Abd al-Karlm 
that the French and Spanish were unwilling to. continue the 
Oujda. conference until all the prisoners were. released--not 
just women, children, and the severely ill, as. thd RIf1s' 
proposed. 
' Officially. the RIf. Is' were given a week to reply 
to this demand, but when Azarqaft and Vaddu b. Uammu returned 
to Alhucemas for the journey back to Oujda on -26 'May, bin 
2 'Abd al-Karim's refusal to these terms was. already known. 
The Oujda conference-had failed, despite bin 'Abd 
al-Karim's desire for a negotiated settlement. Harris, 
who covered the conference for The Times, laterýwrote: 
it was clear-from the begining that Abdel Krim's 
instructions, to his representatives left but little chance 
3 
of a successful issue. " In fact, both sides as. the confer- 
ence disagreed on nearly all the issues, under discussion. As 
Harris pointed out, any form of, autonomy for. thei-Rif could'- 
only be granted in. accordance'with the powers delegated to 
them by the Sultan in, the Protectorate treaty,. and in accord- 
ance with the terms of the 1904 treaty,. whi'ch'distinguished 
4 between French and Spanish zones of Influence.. Accordingly 
1 ibid.,. pp. 342-343,. and, Harris, * op. ' 'cit.,.., pp. 30.1-304, 
Sk1raJT, op. cit., pp. 148-149. 
2 
, Fleming, op. cit., p. 343. 3 Harris,, op. cit., p. 296. ' 
4 For the 1904, treaty, see 'above, pp. '76-77. 
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the Rifl. government would have to recognise the validity of 
these and other treaties. ' This they quite refused to do. 
To accept them would in effect have led to European control 
over the Rif', which was precisely what the Rlflr. had been 
fighting against for nearly five years. 
The other point of. issue was the release of the 
prisoners. Harris's explanation. of their refusal is quite 
simple: that "most of, the prisoners were dead# and Abdel 
1 
,2 Krim dared not disclose the fact! Accounts of RIfIs mis- 
3 treatment of. prisoners abound., , Hart claims that these 
accounts are exaggerated, and both he and Harris counter- 
4 
pose accounts. of. Spanish barbarities towards prisoners. 
Certainly a great many prisoners did die in captivity in the 
RU--although their numbers and the cause of their deaths 
are not certain--but at least 283 French and Spanish pris- 
oners were released on 26 May at the end of the war, some 
4 
of, them in an-appalling condition. Whatever the truth of 
the, allegation of brutalityr there: is,. another possible 
explanation. of the, refusal. to release the prisoners before 
the end ofthe negotiations. To have done so. would have 
deprived the Rlfls'of their strongest. point, of-negotiation 
with the, Allies, and so they could only refuse. In. any event, 
the Oujda. conference failedi. and, Spanish and French operations 
began again in. ac. cordance with the. plans made JLn February. 
Harris, 'op-cit.,, p. 301*- 
2 Ibid., p. 296: 
3 E. g., ibid.,, pp. 297-.. -299,. Coon, Caravan, p. 381, and 
Andr6s Sdnchez-P6rezl' "Abd, -el7Krim7ý, =Selecci6n de 
conferencias v trabados, real'i*zados 'Por' 'la:. Academia de 
Interventores durante, el* curso' d6-1949--ý; -50 -(Tetua-n; 1950)., 
po -,. 62. 
4 Hart, Aith Waryaghar, ' p. 399, and Harris, OP. 
- 
cit., p. 299. 
5 Martinez de 'Campos, ', op. ' cit., 'p. 329. 
814 
once they had begun, the final defeat of the RIf could not 
be long delayed, for the. authority of the government was 
breaking up under, the military, economic and political 
pressure. 
The Rif during the' Peace' Negotiati*ons 
During March and April. bin 'Abd al-Karlm was faced 
with considerable problems of. keeping enough. troops in pos- 
ition on the eastern front. - By-mid-March'the numbers had 
fallen considerably. There were only 30 at Jabal Yuddia, 
one-of the principal front line positions, 15, at Saq 
al-jum' a of BanU Walishak, 50 at Sid! Sha ' Ih, and 30. at SIdI 
b. Daild (both on the Timsam2in coast)., 15 at BU. Ghazl in the 
BanU Triz. lri,, 30 at. Imaj ardri in the Banil Sa I Idt and - some 600 
in other positions. By 22'March there was no one in Jabal 
Yuddia at all. 
2 Certainly; bin""Abd al-Karlm made a, strong 
effort to. reinforce the eastern -line: 100 man were sent to 
Issan Lassan and 300. to thd Tafarsit area. 
3 200'arrived at 
Jabal, Yuddia, and-another 100 at SQq al-Sabat of BanU 
4 
Walishak. Yet bin,. 'Abd al-Karlm seems, to. - have felt less 
and-less able to rely. on anyone, except people from thd-Banil . 
Waryaghal, and it-was men from, this, tribe who now practically 
monopolised. all. the positions as, -q&"ids on the front. 
. Bin 'Abd al-Karim seems-to have made one final 
effort to reorganise. the'. tribes.. ,A great, nuinVer.. of 5--V-Ids 
1 
. SHM Melilla 
Leg. 30, 'Oficina 'de Informaci6n de Tafersit, 
'AmarUsh, 14 Mar. 1926. 
2 SHM Melilla Leg. '- 30,, Of kcina: de de Dar Mizian, 
Muý b. - Jjaýddu, . 
22 Mar. 1926. 
3 SHM Melilla Leg.. 30,, * Of icina: de 'Informaci6n'de Drius, 
Sal&4 b., Mubaýnmad, 23 'Mar. 1926. 
4 Ibid.,, V4mid b. SaIld,, 26 Mar. 1926. ' 
5 ibid.,, Sala4 Mulýapmad, -23, Mar. 1926. 
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both military and tribal, were sacked# including V4mid 
b. Muýammad, the ga'. Id of'the BanQ Malishak (which was half- 
occupied by the Spanish anyway). He was replaced by 'Amar 
Bra "Azz7a, ' the qal: id of the tiny part of BanQ SaIld which was 
still unoccupied, who kept his old job and. was given 
authority over the TimsamAn' as well.. A group of. faqlhs; from 
the Bana. Waryaghal was sent into the Timsamaný to make a 
census of all the able-bodied men, and some 1,400 of them 
1 
were distributed on the eastern front. However, when bin 
tAbd al-Karim called a meeting in. Akhshlib'AmghAr. in the 
Timsam7ari,. to be attended by all the 'qa'. ids of.. the. eastern 
front tribes, apparently to. explain his new organisation, it 
was. widely interpreted by most of the people as something 
quite different., A. rumour circulated-that he was going to 
2 imprison all, the qd"ids. 
As a result ofýthe negotiations. with''the Frencho 
other rumours spread. ' Bin 'Abdýal-Kar! M encouraged the idea 
that he was-making a unilateral truce. -with the French? and 
pointed to the renewed presence of French-'supplies in the 
markets. His aim seems to have been to encourage people by 
implying that they would'. then only have to. fight the Spanish. 
Another. rumour, less useful. to. bin 'Abd. alý-Kaýlmls, cause, ' 
was that he had, packed, up all his property and sent it off 
4 to an unknown destination.. ........... .... 
SHK Melilla. Leg. 30,, Oficin'a:. de Informaci6n*de. Dar Mizian, 
V&midýb. " al-Bash1r. ' 'AlIall 2 Apr. -1926, and Qaddur Azugajj 
3 Apr. 1926. '' 
2 Ibid. ', Jj4iriid. b. al-Bashlr. *. 'All&l:, 7 Apr. 1926 and SHM. 
Melilla Leg.,. 30, *, Of Icina: de* . 'Informaccift' de' Tafersit, 5 Apr. 1926. 
3 SHM Melilla Leg. -30, *. Oficina de Informaci6n'--de Tafersit, 'Amarfish', 4 Apr. 1926., *, and SHM Melilla-Legý-30, Oficina -Je 
Informaci6n de Dar-Mi'zian,,, *Amar. b. -alý-Muqaddamf 4-Apr. 926. 
4 SHM Melilla Leg. '30,. Oficina de Informaci6n-de Drius, 
-'Amar AkarrVish b. 'Aisa,, *6 Apr. 1926. 
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More seriously, political, trouble was growing in 
the BanQ Waryaghal Atself where Mul; *. Azarq. Rrf of the Banri DO 
"Ayyash, "Amar b. ýýdlq of the BanQ AizkdhIfaj and 'Amar b. 
Muýa. mmad of the Banra. 'Abdallah 
1 tribes were'preparing to 
rebel. 
2 on 20 March, bin 'Abd. al-Karlm arrested two of Muýý 
Azarqan s contacts with the Spanish, ' Mulý : *Amar and Jj5mid 
3 
al-Darrl*(both from. the Timsaman). ,, It 
*seems likely that he 
arrested Mu4 Azarqari himself at the same time: an inference 
drawn from a report by, a Spanish'informant that on 22 March 
he was released "almost immediately". after his arrest on the 
request of the other'. qV ids_ of the Banra Waryaghal. Never- 
theless, bin . "Abd al-Kar! M. did announce that he had 
confiscated his propertyi-I Whether such'pronouncements any 
longer held any validity was growing, increasingly uncertain. 
If bin 'Abd. al-Karim. was unable to arrest, 
_let 
alone execute, 
one of his principal. opponents without-being forced to back 
Mub Azarqan needs no reintroduction, having been discussed 
already in this, chapter. -, eAmar b. *adlq was the brother of 
Mubammad b. ýýadlq, the'gal. id of th e clan. Both he and his 
brother were of doubtful loyalty(see above,. pp. 1741 304)# 
had manoeuvred. again stb. ., 
'Abd -al-Rarlra even at the time of the greatest RIfIvictories in August 1921 
and had been contacted%by IdrIs b. Sa! Id and the Spanish 
over the release of the prisoners. in October'1922 (above# 
p. 472). . 
'Amar b. -ýadlq was nevertheless a man of importance in his clan and was appointeAýasýa military alid by bin*'Abd 
al-Karim in late 1922, at thd, 'same. time*as Mu -AzarqAn was 
appointed over the Banil'13n . 'AyyRsh 
(above, p. 499). 
*Amar, b. 'ýadlq-was arrested.. in, july-.. 1923 as part of a purge 
of disloYal,, ýAnefficient and. corrupt*q&ýIds (above, p. 628). 
Bin ýaýdlql's. alliance with the third, member of. the. groupi, 
'Amar b. Mubammad of... the 13anil. "Abdallah, dated back at least 
to December 1922. when. they., 
, 
wrote to a Spanish agent com- 
plaining about lack of, Spanish support; They had helped to 
organise, resistance-to. bin . 
'Abd. al-Karim's attempts to impose 
taxes--unsuccessfully--and.. were in contact with4Amar b. 
jjcqýldu' (above, - p. 490). 
2 
ý SHM Melilla Leg. -30,, *Ofi*ciha de Informaci6n de Tafersit, 
SI_. *`Abd-al-Sal&m-MuIýammad (Band BUI . 'AyyAsh) and "Abd al: -Viahld b. --_4Amar_(BanQ:! Abdallah), 11 Apr. 1926. ' 
,3 Ibid 1926. 4-- Ibid., 'Zaghad,, 22 Mar. 1926. * 
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down by members of his own tribe, then his power was waning 
fast. Indeed, bin 'Abd al-Karlm seems to have been in fear 
of his life. He was keeping his whereabouts secrete and 
avoided sleeping in the same house on successive nights. 
' 
Nevertheless, heýstil, l had a, considerable amount 
of authority as a military leader and, despite the truce that 
accompanied the Oujda conference, he ordered the, front lines 
to be reinforced, although he issued orders for the cease- 
fire to all commanders. 
2. 
Defence preparations, which had 
begun with the. construction, of a telephone line.. to, Iharrushan 
in the first week of April, 
3 
continued with'a stockpiling of 
material at Anwdl, and a general reinforcement of the front 
lines. 350 men from the BanQ Naryaghal. arrived at SfIq 
al-Sabat . of Banfi Walishak,, and 50. at Ba- Ghazl,, with a machine 
4 
gun, on 17 April. 200 were sent. to SQq al-ThalathV of 
MUM, and 300 to Mi4ar.. 
5ý By 20 April the eastern front was 
reasonably well, garrisoned: . 600., men. near. Afraw,,. 200 at SQq 
al-Sabat (BanU Walishak), . 100. at Sidi. Misa'fid in. the Banil 
Sa'Id, 200 in Jabel. Yuddia, and another.. 1,, 200 in various other 
6 
positions. Bin 'Abd al-KarTrri started drilling and training 
7 barkas, on the front. 
All this time, bin 'Abd.. al-Karlm'was making- 
Ibid., ZaghdCid,, 19 Mar. 1926. 
2 Ibid.,, Zaghdrid,, . 18. Mar. 1926, 
' and 'Amar0sh, 18 Mar. 1926. 
3 SHM Melilla Leg. ý30,, 'Ofi*cina de Informaci6n de Dar Mizian, 
Va. mid b. al-Bashir. * 'Allaf, _ 12 Apr. 
4 SHM Melilla Leg., _30, '. Ofi*cina'de Informaci6n de'Tafersit 
. 
'AmarUsh, 17 Apr. 1926. 
SHM Melill a Leg. 30,, ' Of-i'cih*a' de'Drixis, 15 Apr. 1926. 
6 Ibid., Muttand. al-DarmQsl,: ý19 Apr. 1926,, ' and 'Abdallah, 
TUzdnl, 7 20 Apr. 1926. ' 
7 SHM Melilla Leg. 30,, " Oficina* de -*Informacion de Dar'Mizian, Vamid al-Bashir., -22 Apr. 1926and, al-'Ar-bi b. Mutt b. 'All, -, 23 Apr. 1926. 
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considerable propaganda with the peace negotiations in Oujda. 
His presentation of what was happening differed considerably 
from reality. He told people that. the peace negotiations 
were aimed at a, truce with France but not Spain. 
1 He also 
misrepresented the terms. offered at Oujda, ýsaying that there 
were three points: , the disarmament of the tribest the 
establishment of five . "European" military posts in each 41 
tribe, and that he-would. be a "delegate" of the Sultan. 
There was no mention of the'. release of the prisoners. In 
his letter to the tribes. setting. out-these "terms" he also 
I detailed his reply. . To the first--ý-the disarmament--he said 
he refused.. To the secondr-the establishment of. military 
positions--he said that these should be run by local people. 
To the third--his own position--in a startlingly, irrelevant 
evasion of the point, he told'them. not to worry, that he 
would protect them with, thd support of the United. States 
2 
and'United Kingdom. This is a. curious. explanation of the 
position. -The-cmispion of all reference: 
*to the prisoners 
seems to be. explicable only in terms of - their use 'as- a bar- 
gaining point--bin 'Abd al-Karim's control, of, the prisoners 
-was of vital 
importance in his negotiations with the French 
and Spanish, but also. marks a,, return to the position'in. the 
aftermath. of the victories of. August 1921, when th6 holding 
of prisoners-gave bin, 'Abd'al-Karlm'a, certain authority 
Clearly, -to admit now that he was negot- among the Rifig. 
iating' for. their release would have been a mistake. The 
disarmament'of-the tribes. was I -one'of the' principal'stumbling- 
blocks at Oujda,, but there the. over, who should 
SH14'Mei'illa Le 30, 'Oficina'de 'Informaci6n de Tafersit. ' g 
Zaghdild, -*25ýApr. 1; 26, * 
2 lbid; ', 'Z iýghdild, ', 2 6:. * Apr. ý 1926. * 
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do it rather than whether it should be done at all. The 
same applies to the position of. bin -'Abd- al-Karim and the 
relations with the Sultan, At- Oujda the RM delegates were 
offering to submit to the. Sultan alone, but not to the 
khallfa in Tetuan, in. a. form of local. autonomy. In this 
letter bin 'Abd-al-Karlm seems to. be-calling still for total 
independence. The Rifl. 'leader. was clearly telling his sup- 
porters one. thing and the. Spanish. 'something completely 
different. 
Despite bin 'Abd, al-Karlm's attempt to, play a double 
game,, and to imply that he was working only for -a peace with 
France, the general feeling in the Rif was now-for complete 
peace. Economic conditions were 'so bad . and the . political 
unity of the Rif! *state was breaking up so f ast, that this 
was probably the only practical course anyway. Certainly when, 
on 30 April, bin 'Abd al-Karlm called a meeting of the .* 
faqIhs 
of the Central Rif' and. asked them . to. choose between peace 
with France, Spain, or. with. both *countries,, they said they 
wanted peace with-both. 
" However, by this time bin 'Abd 
al-Karlm must have known that. thd conference 'at Oujda was 
failing, and he made preparations for thd'final resistance. 
He had re-arrested MutL Azaraqaný on thd Banil IM 
2 "AyyZish on 26 April and this time he. 'staye d in prison--while 
3 
rumours circulated-that hd, had been shot. A numberof other 
Waryaghl! 'qa'. ids were arrested as. well, along with 25 men 
from the Banii Vizin', and were, imprisoned irL a store. room 20 
SHM Melilla Leg. 30, ' Oficin'a: 'deý '-Trff0rma'c16n7 de Drius,, 
Vanunu "All&l:, Miztyari, 30. Apr. 1926., 
2 Ibid., Vaýmmu b. ' SaIld, 30 Apr. 1926, ' and SHK Melilla"Leg. 
30,6-f-icina de 'Inf ortnaci6ff de Dar. Mi'zian, Vamid b. al-Bashlr 
"AllU, 22 Apr. 1926. 
3- SHM Melilla Leg. 30, 'Ofi'cina'de Informaci6n de Tafersit, 
Vammu Darri, 1 4 May 1926.. 
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metres square. A qV. Id of 25 from Tafarsit was shot for 
having relations with thd'Spanish. 
2 
Attempts were made to reinforce the front against 
the Spanish and French, but Fleming's figure of some 16,500 
and Sdnchez P6rezIs of 20,000, as an estimate of the number 
of Rif is' prepared for the f inal battle ,3 must be, viewed with 
some reserve. Certainly there were large groups--1,000, at 
Tamasind who arrived from the Ghumara,, 360 in the Bann 
Walishak, 150 near Miý&. r.,, 50 at Jabal al-Mall. ' in the Bann 
4 Mzlri, and so on. However, 'there seem to have been fairly 
few people to act as further reinforcements. 'The guard at 
Sid! Mulýand - Jilall In the. Timsam&ri was reinforced with 
9 men,, 
15 bringing the total up to 29; and those men that. were;, there 
were not well armed. Of the 400.6n guard in, the, BanU. 
Walishak, one informant estimated that at least 210 had old 
Mauser and Remington rifles, which-'had been badly maintained 
and were consequently,. in, bad condition... Indeed,,. the total 
number of rifles'collected up afterýthe surrender of the 
7 
, 
Central Rif tribes. was only. l4j5OO.. . It seems likelythat 
Woolman Is estimate . of . 
12,000. men Is. somewhere nearer, to 
SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina'de, Informaci6n de Drius,, -7 
Ijammu 'Allal Mizzy&ný,, 30 Apr., 1926. 
2-. SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Informaci6n de Tafersit 
M#ammad b. 'Abd al-Salam, 28.1926. 
3 
, Fleming, op. cit., p. -345,, and SSnchez-P6rez,, Acci6n,, pp. 
21-22. 
4 
SHM, Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Informaci6n de Dar Mizian, 
, VdMid. b.., al7Bashir. ', 'Allal:, _I 
May 1926,, and 4 May 19261 
SHM Melilla Leg. 30-,, * Of icina: de Informac'i6n'de Tafersit 
Vaddu b., 'Sha'1bb. 'Amar,,. 3ýMay 1926,,, 'Abd al-Saldm b. Qaddur# 
8 May 1926; SHM Melilla Leg. 
_, 
30, * O'fi'cina de' Informaci6n de 
Drius, Ijammu bý. SaIld, 30 Apr. 1926. 
5 SHM Melilla ý Leg. '30, ' Of ic*ina de, Informaci6n de Dar Mizian,, 
Vdpid 
_b., 
al-Bashir 'Alldl, 4 May, 1926. 
6 Ibid.,, TjZipid. b. Tjaýddu, b., Qaddur, 9 May 1926. 
7 Martinez . "de , 
Campos,, " op*. 
_ 




In addition, the control of the R1f1s on the west- 
ern zone was failing rapidly. For some time people from 
the Central Rif had been returning home from the Jib&la,, 
Sinh2ija, and to a lesser extent the Ghumara. On 7 April, 
the Spanish were told that most RIfIs'had, left the Tetuan 
area. 
2 By mid-April most of the RIfIs had left the Sinh&ja 
as well. 
3 As a result, bin 'Abd al-Karlm told the local 
4 
people in the Sinhdja to prepare their own defence. The 
situation had returned to. each tribe looking after itself. 
Clearly, when once the French and. Spanish attack 
came, the resistance would crumble quickly. When the announce- 
ment of the peace negotiations was made on 6 May, it took only 
two days for the attack to begin. , 
The Final Invasion of the*Rlf . 
In fact, by the time thd. attack came, on 8 May, 
bin 'Abd al-Karlm seems. to have realised, that he, and, the Rlf, 
were inevitably going to be, ddf eatdd. Ranged, against him, 
on the Spanish fronts, were 28,000 in. the Ajd1r sector,, 12,000 
men, in the Banil Traziri and al-Matals . a, 3,000 in the Banil 
SaIld, and, on the French'fronts, 40,000 in the Gaznaya and 
*-Marnisa, 'and another 40,000 ýin the SinhAja and Banra Zarwal: 
--a total of: 123,, 000 men,, - together with 150 French'and 
Spanish aeroplanes. 
5 
Woolman! op. 'cit.,, p. '204., 
2 
, SHM, Melilla, Leg. 30, ' Ofi, cina' de 'Informaci6n de Drius, Muýammad b. -Vammfish, 7 'Apr. 1927. 
3 
. 
SHAT Maroc, Riff 8, Fez, '*Groupement de Fbs*, * Novembre 1925 
1926, C. M. T. ' l7 Apr 
ý1926. 
_4 Ibid. 
5 Scinchez-P6rez Acc16n,, pp. 14-19. 
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The plan agreed in Madrid in February was for a 
three-pronged attack by the-Spanish: from Ajdlr. *up the 
Wad! GhIs. and Wad! NakCir valleys towards the centre of Jabal 
Hamam; from "AzIb Mi(ýar through the Banil VIzIn*towards SUq 
al-Thalathal. of Azilaf; and an attack from the BanQ Sa'Id 
towards the Timsaman. The. French forces would also undertake 
,a three-pronged attack: 
from Bab Sultai! in the Gaznaya 
towards Timarzga; from al-Na? U. r of the Gaznaya into the 
-e Banu ' Amart; and through the Marnisa towards. Targist (see 
Map XIII: 3). The. intention was to break. the opposition of 
the Central. Rif, and only after that had been achieved to 
clear all the "rebels" from the Jibdla and Sinh2ija regions. 
The plan was followed almost to the. letter. 
The attack began on the morning of 8 14ay. It is 
not proposed here to describe the advance in detail, but a 
summary may be useful. The initial-attack-on the AjdIr. was 
heavily resisted from the Rifi. trenches, helped by their 
cannonst but Asýh&r was reached on the'first day, at a cost 
2. 
of 629 Spanish*casualties and 80 Rifis.. 
On the eastern front, the Spanish were able to 
advance from Mi4a. r with relative ease, the RIfIs falling 
back, under the command of Idrls*-b... MimQn Khujja,. in the face 
3 
of Spanish tanks. When they reachdd'SQq al-Thaltitha 9, of 
Azilaf on 9 May, there was considerable resistance, however, 
and the Spanish lost 86'men. 
4 Meanwhile the French moved 
up from the'soUth and met. the' Spanish. near Thal5th&l. 'Azillif 
5 
on 8 May. 
1 -ibid., pp. 12-43. 
2. Ibid., pp. 46-47. 





5 Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
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By 15 May the Spanish had move. d down to Tamasind 
and on 20 May met with the French forces moving up from the 
south. 
', Meanwhile Spanish troops advanced in the northern 
part of the eastern f ront. 'Amar Mil. "Azza, the qalid of 
the small part of the BanU SaIld that had remained unoccupied 
since 1922, surrendered on 15 May, and this was followed by 
the submission of the BanU Marghanin clan of the Timsaman, 
and the western part of the BanU. Walishak. Anwdl was reoc- 
cupied on 18 May, and on 20 May,. Spanish troops pushed to link 
up with the"Ajd1r f ront. 
2 
On the southern front French troops moved through 
the BanU Zarwal,. the Jaya, Mat1wa al-Jabal and BanQ Waryajal 
who submitted on 17 Maý. On 19 may French troops moved into 
the BanU . 
'Amdrt with 'little opposition, and -to the west 
'Amar b. Vamidu occupied Jab al, 'Uqba. 
3 By 23 May the French 
had cut the BanU. Waryaghal in-half. 
Bin "Abd al-Karlrils reaction to these advances was 
to move further away from the Spanish forces; his. personal 
will to resist seems to have collapsed. on the opening day 
of-the attack he moved to thd-*zawiya of S! 'Abdallah b. YQsif 
near KammUri in the BanQ Waryaghal. 
' 4. The prisoners were 
transferred to the- BanCl BV1 Yrd4.: 
5 His personal safety 
secured for the moment, he announced'Ithat it was the respon- 
6' 
sibility of each- tribe. to defend its own territoryý, As an 
Fleming, op. cit., P. 347. 
2 S6nchez-P6rez, Acc16n, 'pp. 93-94o 
3, Ibid., pp. 95-96. 
ý SHM Melilla'Leg. ', 3O,, _Of1cina: 
de inform'aci6n de Tafersit, 
MUlAy' "Abd al-SaUm b. RaVayl, 8 May 1926, and Sk1raj, 
op. cit. _, 
p. ' 151. " 
5 SH14 Melilla Leg. 30, *Oficina de''Informaci6n de Tafersit, 
'Abd al-Salam b. 
_. -Sha*1b,, 
-9 may 1926. 
6 Ibid.,, Vammu. DarrI,, * 8 May, 1926. 
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indication of his own frame of mind at this stage, Idrls b. 
Mimrm Khujja later told the Spanish 'that he and a number of 
other commanders visited bin 'Abd al-Karlm in Sl "Abdallah 
b. Yrisif, and when, on the following. morning, ýhe saw them 
eating their breakfast and drinking tea he asked: 
"'How can you be so calm, eating and drinking, with 
all that is happening to, us? l -We replied that we 
were men and had to eat and drink,. but that we would 
also die if necessary. Then he said to us 'For 
God's. sake, I have no, desire to eat. I want to know 
what to do! "'l 
In fact, the remaining fighting'was-being carried out, almost 
independently of-bin 'Abd al-Harlm, by such. 'as Idrls*b. 
Mimfin Khujja and 'Abd al-Sal&a, b. al-]Vaj*j Mulýaýndj, until'the 
latter was seriously wounded. On the eastern front, 'Amar 
Bfi"'Azz&*of the BanU. Salid. carried on the resistance,, arrest- 
2 ing those who were in contact with. 'the Spanish, until he 
himself surrendered on 15 May, when all, the BanQ Waryaghal 
3 
on the easternifront went home to protect their own homes. 
SkIrAj says that this. was on the authority of bin 'Abd 
4 
al-Karim himself, but by this time he had little authority 
lef t. The people 'simply lef t. 
Meanwhile, in the Jibala, Akhr1r. Q. And AbMad Bil * 
Dra made an attempt at a diversionary operation near'Tetuan. 
On 10 May about 1,000 Jiballs*and Ghumarls. 'attacked Spanish 
positidns near the Wadi Martil. At. -f irst they were quite 
successful and on 17 Dýay. the High Commissioner, Sanjurjo, 
-returned 
to-Tetuan from Alhucemas to-oversee the relief 
Sa^nchez-P6rezl* Acc16n, p. '108. "*. 
2 SHM Melilla Leg., 30, * Of i'c'ina' de'Informaci6n de Tafersit, 
'Abd al-Salam, b'. Shallbý, _12may 1926. 
3. SHM Melilla Leg. 30, * Of'i*ci na de Informaci6n de Dar-Mizian, 
IVdmid b. al-Bashir' 'Alldl:, 15, May 192 
4 
, SkIraj, ' op. cit.. -, pp.,, 141-152. 
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operations. On 19 May the positions were relieved. 
1 
This 
was the last offensive action against. the Spanish. From now 
on it was a question of the Spanish and French clearing up 
the last Rif! 
The Surrender of bin 'Abd al-Karlm 
Faced with a situation. in which the Spanish and 
French were pushing forward into the-RIf from the east and' 
south, a number of choices seem, to have occurred to him. 
Firstly he thought briefly that he could continue to lead 
the resistance in the Rif, with. 'support from, the JibAla. 
However, when he asked for troops from the Ghazliwaj, RahUna, 
Banfi Sikkar, Banri Issaf , Sumata and. Jabal Ija. bib tribes, his 
request was refused. 
2 Another alternative-that suggested 
itself was that he should himself cross-into the Jibala to 
3 
lead the resistance personally. This turned out to, be 
physically. impossible,, -for. the French were. 'already moving up 
through saq al-Ithnayn. of the BanU"Amart towards Targl-st,, on 
4, 
21, May, cutting the'road. to the Jibdla. ýThd road'along the 
coast was. impractical. anyway for his large'party. -The other 
alternative was to surrender. 
The iýsual explanation of, bin. 'Abd al-Karlm's 
decision to surrender to'the French'is thatýhe`was frightened 
that the Spanish would execute him. 
5 In any event bin *Abd 
Fleming, op cit-,,, pp. 348-349. 
2 SHAT Maroc Riff 8, ''Groupement de Fos*, 'Novembre''1925- 
Juillet 1926,1, C. M. T.,, Fez,, 21 May 1926. 
3. Skiraj, op'. ' 'cit., P. 152. 
4 S6nchez-P6rez, ', Acci6n, p. 115,. and Skiraj, ''op. * cit.,, p. 152. 
5 
, Woolman, 
'op. ' 'cit.,, p. 206, ' and Fleming, ' op. ' cit " p. 349 (quoting Sanjurio--letter to Primo de Rivera, 2 June 1926), 
and, Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 401. 
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al-Karlm did surrender to the French. The intermediary was 
Sidl Vapidu in SnAda. On 21 May, still thinking. of fleeing 
to the west, he had asked SIdI IjamIdu for animals to take 
his property and equipment from Targist into the Ghumara. 
At the same time he sent a letter to Sanjurjo and Resident- 
General Steeg. in Rabat, suggesting a cease-fire. The letter 
was carried out by, Pierre Parent,, head of-a Frenchmedical 
team which was visiting the Frendh prisoners. 'Parent crossed 
the Spanish. lines on 23 May, handed his-letter'to Sanjurjo 
2 
and was flown to Rabat-to hand, the other, to, Steeg. There 
was, however, no. time for such a cease-fire to be arranged. 
On 23 May, French'irregular troops under bin 'Abd al-Karim's 
3 
old enemy, 'Amar b. Vamidul occupied Targist. The following 
morning the Bann YiNtuf t, Bann .. GamII and Bann MQ Frlilý tribes 
offered to submit to the French. Bin . "Abd al-Karlm his 
escape route to the west finally, cut. off, turned to the only 
sanctuary lef t for him--the* "zawiya - of Ijapidu in Snlida. 
That same afternoon, after his arrivalin SnAda, al-RaisQlll. s 
son and Sid! Vapldu's. nephew arrived, at. Targlst and told the 
French that bin tAbd*al-Karlm could be*easily captured by only 
a few men. The F, rench*offi, cer in. command at, Targlst,, Colonel 
. 
Corap "did not believe he 'should give any encouragement to- 
this plan, which'appeared to him to serve the personal ambit- 
4 ions of the, two people 'concerned. " 'On the morning of 25 
April,. Sldl : Vamldu. himself arrived in Targist to submit to the "k, 
1. SHAT Maroc Riff i, ''Groupement de Fos, *Novembre-1925-- 
Juillet'. 1926, C. M. T. , Fez,, 21 May 1926., 
2F, leming, ' op. ' 'cit. ', p. 350. 
3 S6nchez-P6rez'; 'Ac*ci6n P. 115. 
4 
. SHAT Maroc Riff 
8 (no-file), 'Commandement Sup6rieur des 
Troupes du Maroc--Rapport du General Boichut sur les circon- 
stances deja reddition d'Abd'el'Krim, Rabat,, ' 9 June 1926, 
Secret. 
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French. Corap sent a letter back to bin 'Abd al-Karim with 
Sid! : Vamidu, -along with three French 'officers who, after a 
long discussion, persuaded.. bin 'Abd al-Karlm to. surrender. 
At 11 p. m. on, 25 May, bin 'Abd al-Karim ordered the prison- 
ers to be released and himself surrendered. The following 
morning the surviving prisoners were escorted to the French 
2 lines. On 27 March bin 'Abd al-Karlm himself arrived in 
Targist where he was courteously received by Corap, 
3 
and 
then escorted out of the Rif (see Photograph XIII: 1). With 
his surrender. the_Rlfl state was formally at an end, although 
fighting continue'd. for a few more monthd. 
41 
The Final Operations 
With bin 'Abd al-Karlm's surrender to the French, 
I 
the leadership of the Rifiresistance-for that was what. it 
had become--was removed. '. Fighting continued, but it was very 
fragmented. 
In the Rif, the Spanish*forces moved to occupy the 
Buqquya and-thd rest of the. Banii Waryaghal. On 28 May one 
1 Ibid. 
2 Harris, op. cit., p. 317. 
3 Ibid., p. 318.. The chronology of the'surrender is confused 
. 
by . the dif f erent authors. Fleming : 
(op., cit. -, p. 34 9) has 
bin 'Abd al-Karim's flight-to Sn&da'as early. as 16 May, 
Wooman (op. cit., p... 23). -says-that on 23-May bin 'Abd al-Karlm 
had "already" fled to Sn&da. -Neither of these. writers used ' the SHAT archives,. and the official French'account. is certain- 
ly the most reliable. ' This. account also makes the significant 
point that right up_. till 24 May bin 'Abd al-Karlm was still 
indecisively wondering whether he could. flee to the GhumAra 
and continue the struggle., 
4- Bin 'Abd al-Karim, his. brother and other members'of his 
family were taken by the French. 'to the island-of Rdunion where 
they remained until-1947.. (Hart, ' Aith Waryaghar, P. 401)-. 
other members of the* Cabinet , remained 
in Morocco., Indeed, 
two of them, Mu. ýLapmad-Ba DrA : and Mubammad Azarqan: formed a 
politicAl party, the' Vi: zb* al-4rat', of a distinctly conser- 
vative hue in the 1930s. Great Britain, *Morocco,, Vol. II,, 
P. 191. ý 
829 
Photograph XIII: 1 
Mulýaqmad bin. "-Abd al-Karim : (mounted left) riding 
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group of Spanish forces moved into the Buqquya while another 
occupied S! "Abdallah b. YUsIf without difficulty. There, 
in a house next door to the mosque,, ' they, found what had been 
bin 'Abd al-Karim's residence during the final stages-of the 
war. Apart from a huge quantity of personal effects,. the 
Spanish discovered a vast number of-papers and books which 
1 they took into their custody, and a flag of the Rif! ttate. 
On 29 May Spanish troops moved'towards SQq al-Abad 
of Tiq&. r' in the centre of the BanQ Waryaghal. Here they were 
attacked with considerable. vigour. Fighting lasted-all day, 
and the Spanish suffered over 600 casualties. 
ý' It was,, as. ' 
David Hart says,, "the final stand, ofthe Aith Waryagh ar. 11 
3 
With the defeat of the BanQ.. Waryaghal and the 
occuiation of the Rif', fighting contintied in the Jib&la, 
Sinhaja and Ghumara_. As_sooný'as bin 'Abd al-Karlm surrendered, 
the French Air Force dropped leaflets, on, the BanU. Zarw&l: 
4 informing them of the f act,., and. calling on, them to s'ubmit. 
However, the 'rest of the JiMla'eithdr did not know of the 
surrender, or refused to believe it. -A Frenchmemorandum 
of 31 May reported:, 
"The most varied rumours circulateinthe. mountains 
about the fate'of Abd el' Krim and, as a general rule 
1'. 
-P5rez, Acci6n, pp. ' 121-125. The flag was later Sanchez e 
handed over to the Museo de Infanteria. (now the Museo, del., 
Ej6rcito). in Madrid. The destination of the papers is' 
uncertain. It seems quite likely that they were taken to. 
Tetuan, and. they may now be in the-archives of the Moroccan 
Protectorate, housed at'present-in the, Archivos de la Pres- 
idencia del Gobierno in, Alcald de Menares near Madrid. 
Unfortunately these archives were, not available for consul- 
tation when the research for this thesis, was carried out. 
Very recently they have been opened, and itwould*be most 
interesting to examine them. 
12 Ibid. r'-pp. '128-133. 3, Hart, Aith Waryaghar,. p. 401. 
4, The Times, 29 May 1926, p. 12, dated Paris, 28 May 1926. * 
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people refuse to believe that he has surrendered. 
His former Lieutenanýs-in. the Djeballa continue 
to speak in his name and are still'talking of the 
rapid arrival of reinforcements. 111 
For a short-while those. "lieutenants" held, on to. their 
positions of authority. On 2 June al-Baqq&ll, Wuld al-Qarf a, 
one of bin 'Abd al! -Karlml. s most trusted commanders in the west,, 
remained in pharge of Sh&win, and tried to organise the 
resistance. He. ordered the Ghazawa and Rabqna notto attack 
the French but to send reinforcements to the. Band Idhlr. ' 
against. the Spanish. 
2 However, his. authority did not last 
long. On 2 June a previously insignificant qVid named Wuld 
al-Far decided to take'control in, the Jibala. He sent 50 
men to al-RaisUll I. s old home in TazarQt, to . arrest the RIf I: 
qd9ld there and a few members of the former Rlfl regular 
army, and announced he would take over in Shawin and remove, 
3 Wuld al-Qarfa. He. waslhelped in, this by, a general. wish for 
revenge on the representatives of the Rif! domination which 
was sweeping. the Jibala.. ',, The Banil 'Issaf and Akhmas*combined 
to send a force'to the Banfi Sikkar to "execute" the. Qalld 
al-Vattash, who had been instrumental in crushing the first 
4 
revolt in the Ghum&ra in July 1923, although. he succeeded 
in escaping to the Rif'. 
5 
The revenge against, the Rifis was widespread. A 
former Rif! official in the Akhm&s', was executed, as were 
6 
several in'the Ghumara. On 9 June Wuld al-Far. occupied 
SHAT Maroc, Riff Groupement. de Pbs, Novembre 1925- 
Juillet 1926, C. M. T. j Fez, 21, May-1926... 




2 June 1926. 
3 Ibid., 'C. M*T. fex, 8'June 1926 Tje few accounts of Wuld 
al-Far. that exist are unclear even about his origins. 
4, IIý ''I Ibid. :. 
for- al-VaýttZlsh, ý, see above, pp. 622,671. 
5 Ibid., -C. M. T. ' Fezl', 9 June 1'926. ' Presumably he. then sur- 
-renderedfor there 




Shaw. in, and executed Wuld al-QUrfa. 
1 On. 13 June, prominent 
pro-Rlflqaýids inthe Ghazawa were attacked and their 
houses burned. 2 
Meanwhile a Spanish force under Lt.! Colonel Capaz 
set out, on 12 June, from the Buqquya along the coast through 
the Masdsa. and Matlwa. On 25 June heýreached Amtar.. Then 
he struck inland into the BanU. Vassan before reaching WAdI 
Law on', 10 july. 
3 
This is not to say that by now all the resistance 
to the Spanish was completely overcome. There were still a 
number of important pro-Rif! . 1eaders 
in the Ghumara. at large,, 
and they tried, in a rather fragmented way,, to organise 
resistance. The most prominent of these was Akhrlra, *who 
joined up with al-Tdlib al-Shawn! And Maldy*AbMad al-Baqar 
4 to try to take control in the Jib&la Al-Baqar took over 
Shawin and proclaimed himself Sultan, signing himself Ibn 
al-'Abbas b. 'Abdallah. al--Alami. 
5 As his full name was 
May' 4mad b. Mu4ammad b. al-'Arb3: . 
11al-Baqar" this choice 
is not e asily explicable, except that by emphasising his 
connection with Jabal. -'Al&iri and therefore descent from Malay 
. "Abd al-SalZim. b. MashTsh,, the "pole" of Islam in Morocco, he 
was-reverting to the traditional practices of. leadership by 
Ibid., and C. M. T. Fez, 10 June 1926. ' 
2 ibid.,, C. M. T. Fez, 13 June 1926. 
3 Martinez de Campos, op. cit., p. 335. 
4 SHAT Maroc Riff 81 Groupement. de Fbs, N6vembre 1925- 
Juillet 1926, C. M. T. Fez, 28-June 1926. Mrilgy. AýqTd 
al-Baqar was ajong-standing enemy of Spain, 'and of 
al-Raisillljseeýabove, P. 363), who had helped al-Akhamllsh 
in the, initial Rlfl: sortie into the JibZ11a in Oct. 1921 
(above, p. 432), and had taken part in the final assault on 
al-RaisQlll. s base at Tazarrat in Feb. 1925 (above, P. 706). 
Al-Shawn! has already been discussed in this chapter, p. 802. 
5. Intervenci6n de. Larache, *Beni Aros, pp. 38-39. 
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important religious families, an idea which bin 'Abd 
al-Karim had rejected. 
His was not a successful reign, however, nor a very 
long one for by and large the majority of people wanted to 
stop fighting. When he ordered the BanrI. Issaf to assemble 
and form a barka he was largely ignored, 
1 
although he did 
undertake an invasion. of the BanQ Zarwal: at-the end of June# 
2 
which was unsuccessful. 
Meanwhile, in the Sinh&ja, Muýajrunad al-Akhamllsh 
tried to reimpose his authority, and sent out letters 
calling for resistance. 
3 The Sinhaja held out for some 
time, while Spanish forces under Capaz moved up from the 
Wdd! L&w to take Sh&win on 10 August, in a very rapid oper- 
ation later named the "Capaz Raid 1, .4 
AkhrIrQ Was killed in a skirmish in the Banri. 
Idhir in the Jabala on, 3 November, but parts of, the Sinhdja 
held out until the. beginning, of 1927. -The, final operations 
in'the Jibal: a took place in June 1927,. with, the Occupation 
of Jabel 'Alam on 14 June 1927. Two days before this, 
operation, started, al-Baqar was killed by a bomb, 
6 
and 
finally, with the occupation of the remaining parts of the 
7 
Akhm&s'which had not submitted, the last resistance ceased 
SHAT Maroc Riff 8, Groupement de F(ýs, Novembre 1925- 
Juillet 1926, C. M. T. Fez, 29 June 1926. 
2 The Times,, ' 1 July 1925,, p. 16, dated Paris, 30 June 1926. 
3 SHAT Maro'c Rif f 8, ' Gropp'ement de F6s*, ' Novembre 1925- 
Juillet 1926, C. M. T. Fez, 3 July 19261. 
4 Martinez *de Campos,, -op., 'Cit. ', p. 335. 
5 Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. '403., Martinez de Campos, *2]2. 
cit., pp. 342-348, describes the campaign of the winter of 
1926-1927 in the Sinhaja in detail'. 
6 Intervencift"de Larache,, 'Beni Arcs, p. 39. 
7, Martinez'de Campos, op. cit., pp., 352-356. 
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on 9 July 1927. 
Conclusion 
The months between September 1925 and July 1926 
saw the collapse of the RIfI state. Towever, it was not an 
immediate collapse, for when the Spanish landed on the coast 
near Alhucemas the RIfIs* were well organised,, and they 
resisted the invading forces with considerable determiriation. 
For all the huge numbers of Spanish troops involved, they 
were only able to advance a few miles around Alhucemas Bay. 
The French advance was. also resisted, and on the southern 
front. the Riffis' were able to stop the invaders on. the edges 
of the Rif'. In the west they were not forced to retire at all. 
Nevertheless, the landings in the heart of the. 
Rif did shake bin 'Abd al-Karini's authority. His problem 
over the next few months'was to maintain control. of the Rif. 
From the social point'of view, internal order. and discipline 
were maintained, at'least until the peace conference at Ujda 
was over. Feuding, which broke out for a brief period, was 
quickly stopped; murderers continued to be severely 
punished. In April,, Alexander'Langlet was able to claim 
that it was. possiblo to sleep in the open in. the RM This 
may have been an'exaggeration, but it. impl ies a high'level 
of order. 
From a political point of view, bin 'Abd al-Karlm 
remained in a strorýg position. Just before the Spanish 
landings'he had further centralised'power in his own. -hands. 
This bore fruit in the months after the Spanish landings. 
Those who were suspected of dealing with the enemy were 
Jbid. ", p. 356. 
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severely dealt with. Even as late as March 1926, a woman 
from the BanU TUzlri who was suspected of spying for the 
Spanish in Tafarsit was sent to prison in the Central RIf. 
However, a great deal of bin tAbd al-Karlm's 
authority had rested on his reputation for success. Once 
the Spanish had landed in Alhucemas, the propaganda by 
11 
success worked in reverse. It became increasingly diffic- 
ult to recruit people into, Iýarkasto-fight a losing battle 
when the harvests had failed and the economic situation was 
so difficult. Furthermore, these economic difficulties made 
it increasingly more difficult. to pay those who, were fighting. 
in these circumstances, bin 'Abd, al-Karlm was 
forced to rely more and more on severely dictatorial 
practices. However, these tactics were only, with difficulty 
applied to his more important opponents. 1 
To have been too 
severe with. important, local' qVids might very, well have 
caused yet more trouble. This is possibly why. Mub : Azarq&xi 
was only arrested--7and that for short* periods at, a. 'time--and 
not executed., Bin, 'Abd al-Karlixi was, forced to try -to, 
keep 
a precarious political balance between antagonising potential 
opponents and allowing latitude to, his actual opponents. 
That he managed to, do so, for sO, long in difficult economic 
and political, circumstances says a great-deal for, his ability. 
To help him maintain this political balance, he 
c. onducted-a vigorous, propaganda campaign. -It 
took a number 
of directions. -Firýtly he-, emphasisedthe possible, oppression 
that Spanish rule wouldýbring. 
_, 
In:, this he was, helped by the 
unsavou, ry activities of troops-in, Spanish employ. Secondly 
MAEF, Maroc 5l9, -'QdI. id-MutLainmad b. (illegib 
I leY'toýbin I tAbd 
al-Karim, 4 Rama(ýan 1344/18 Mar. ý1926,, ' committing Mizzyana 
b. Vaddu Varnbami al-TUz&nI-'to prison for spying., 
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he tried to encourage people outside the Rif to help him by 
appealing to their religious and nationalist sentiments, 
calling in effect-for a jihad. Thirdly he made frequent 
promises of outside help for the Rif--from Germany and Turkey, 
recalling those countries I help against- the French during 
the First World War, and making use of the prestige of 
Turkey after the victories of AtatUrk. Finally, he made 
considerable play of the pressures on Spain and France, and 
particularly France, from their own people, to end the war. 
This last. approach'gave rise to hopes of a negotiated peace 
with France, which might have, left him, free to attack Spain, 
hopes of which bin 'Abd al-Karim made considerable use in 
his propaganda. 
This raises the question of the aims of the peace 
negotiations and the terms on which ýAbd. al-Karlm and his 
principal supporters were willing to agree to an end to the 
war. During these nine months-bin"Abd. al-Karim told a 
number of different people different things about the terms 
which were acceptable. He told Vincent Sheean that the 
only terms were the "total'independence of the Rif". 
Gardiner was told that he would accept a position as a 
delegate of the, 'Sultan, with autonomy but not independence, 
but with his capital at Tetuan. -By implication, at the' - 
conference of Oujda, bin 'Abd al-Karlm conceded. the question 
of, Tetuan, agreed over the disarmament of the. tribes, but 
still refused to act as anything less than a direct delegate 
of the Sultan. ' Ye*t--he-'told his'own people at the same -time 
that he would - ref use . the disarmament and, again by implic- 
ation, that he - would be -a ýdelegate - of - the- Sultan'. - All 
this brings into-question the validity of the peace 
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negotiations at all. In fact, it seems, quite likely that 
bin 'Abd al-Karlm was trying to get the best possible arrange- 
ment that he could, provided that his formal autonomy from 
the Spanish was maintained. This was a minimum demand, which 
he could not-afford to drop# for it would have'invalidated 
all the developments of the previous five years. This 
desire to get the best possi. ble arrangements also explains 
why he would not release the Spanish and French prisoners of 
war, for they were both a vital bargaining counter with the 
Allies, and also a symbol of his. own authority in the RIf. 
The period-of negotiation also gave the RIfIs 
time to prepare their defences against the final assault, 
and during April and early May a great effort was made to 
reinforce the front and to train the troops. It is certainly 
true, as al-BU, "Ayyashi 'Says,, that the Rlfls* did not use the 
period between October 1925 and May'19261* when there was 
little fighting, to prepare themselves for the coming battle 
as much as did the Spanish, 
1 
or the French, for that matter. 
However, the Rifis" resources werefar too few and their 
defences were too stretched to prepare themselves adequately 
anyway. 
When the attack came the Rif. collapsed. It should 
be noted here that it was the core of the state,,. thd Central 
Rif which was attacked, and the core which collapsed. ' As 
pressure grew on the Rif, those Rifis who were elsewhere, 
in the Jib7ala or on-the French front in the. Sinh&ja went I 
home to help in the fight., 'At the same time, bin 'Abd 
al-Karim's own morale grew steadily worse. ' A-mant who on 
Sheean's account had been extremely optimistic in September 
Al-BU : 'Ayy7ashl, " op. - cit. Vol, II, p., 440. 
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1925, immediately after the landings, changed to one who, on 
his own admission, found it difficult to eat for worry. 
On his surrenderg, thpJibal'a and Sinhaja fought on 
for a while. Such was the authority of bin 'Abd al-Karlm 
that for a short while his supporters in the-Jibdla were 
able to pretend that he had,.. not surrendered. Harris says: 
"It is a curious fact that though the Jibala tribes 
had been slow to adhere to Abdel Krim's campaign, 
and had awaited-the downfall. of Raisuli before 
doing so, they were the last. to abandon, their fallen 
chief. "l 
This is not true. Once the Jibala tribes, realised that the 
state into which they had been forcibly. incorporated by 
invasion had been destroyed, they rose against its 
representatives. All pretence at unity-collapsed. Those 
who wished to carry-on fighting resorted to the traditional, 
highly localised methods of resistance, either through 
guerrilla warfare, or, attempts to set themselves up as 
"Sultans", basing their authority on- religious prestige. 
Clearly this'Idisunited resistance could not last. 
As bin 'Abd al-Karim, had proved, the only effective opponent 
of two states was another state.,, , Once the RIfI state was 
defeated the remaining pockets of resistance were quickly 
cleared away. 
Harris, ' op.: cit.,, p. 3260' 
Chapter XIV 
CONCLUSION 
The Rif war was a remarkable period in Moroccan 
history. For some five years# the Spanish and then the 
French were held back by an ill-fed, relatively untrained 
and hastily assembled army-of men from what was generally 
agreed to be one of the most backward areas of a backward 
country. It is clear, from the evidence examined in this 
thesis, that the explanations that have so far been given 
for the success . -and for theýultimate failure--of the Rifl: 
state are woefully inadequate. It will be-rpembered from 
the introductory chapter that these explanations, varied 
between the theories of men like Robert'Montagne, who saw 
the war as an'attempt to build a new state in the Rif on- 
the pattern of the great Berber empires of the Middle Ages# 
the views of a modern nationalist writer like Laroui who 
described the Rif war, as the last. outburst of rural resist- 
ance, bearing-no relation to modern urban-Moroccan,: 
nationalism, and. the. ideas of 'Allal'al-Fasl,: another modern 
political'theorist and nationalist,, who describes a modern 
democratic, movement'in the-Rif. "All these views also con- 
, centrate on,, the, personality. of the Rif. 1 leader, Mulýaýmmad 
bin "Abd al-]Karlrd., ' Thus, by trying to fit the war into'. a 
., 
neat. category, and by'seeing it as entirely the work of'a 
, single man, 
these commentators both diminish the achievement 
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of the Rif! movement, and oversimplify its significance 
so that its real place in'Moroccan history is lost. They 
explain neither. why the RIfI movement grew up, nor the 
position within it of. Mu4apmad bin tAbd al-Karlm,, *nor the way 
in which circumstances and ideology determined its growth, 
nor the reasons for its final failure. 
To be fair, the one person who could have 
explained some of these aspects, of the Rif. war, bin 'Abd 
al-Karim himself, did not do so. Bin *Abd al-Karlm's only 
personal account of the war takes the form of a really very 
short article in the Egyptian journal -al-ma*ndr. in 1927.1 
Al-ManAr was then edited by. Mulýapmad 'Abduh, one of the most 
important religious reformists of the timer and the article 
referred to here bears considerable relevance. to, the ideol- 
ogy of the Salafiya movement. The, article must be-seen in 
this light,. not as a sociological or even a historical 
analysis, but as an ideological attempt to explain to an I 
Arab public in Egypt and the Levant the "patriotic"; *aspects 
of a failed struggle. 
An ideological explanation, from the principal 
leader of the RIfIs*at war, is, of course a, document of great 
importance, raising'as it'does some of the fundamental issues 
t of the, struggle'. As such it is-reproduced here: 
Anonymous article "Jahl zu'amal. al-MuslimIn:. wa-mafasId ahl 
al-turuq wal-shurafal,. wa Kawnuhum sababan li-fashl'. zallm 
al-RIE alý-Maghrabi" ,- 
11 in al-Manar, pt. 8, 'Voo. 27,. 1344-5/ 
1926-ý27, pp. -630-634. 'The text of -the' 
articleappeared in 
the Egyptian weekly according to al'-Maýnarrý Shinar 
(op.,, cit. 'f, p. 173, =5-te, 1958), -says that is. was-also, reprinted 
in al-Minh&j. *, Muhdrram/ýafar, pp. 96 'ff. Shinarl, s article 
reproduces. about two thirds of thei-article'in. translation, 
but*omits the important opening paragraphs which 'were 'not 
completely relevant to his examination of thd'religious 
thought of-bin'tAbd al-Karim. 'For reasons. of-convenience, ' 
the whole'*article'is reproduced belowý* 
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"An interview with Mulýaqmad 'Abd al-Karlm [sic].. 
I wanted to make the-Rif an independent country like 
France and Spain, and to set up. there a free state 
with full sovereignty and not an Amirate, subject 
to the regulations and ordinances of, the Protectorate. 
From the first I tried to make my people understand 
that they could. not survive unless-they-were as close- 
ly joined together as are the bricks of a building, and 
unless they worked with sincerity -and. loyalty to form 
a national unity from tribes with different inclin- 
ations and aspirations. In other. words I-wanted my 
people to know that they had a nation (watan as well 
as a religion(din)., t 
I have been greatly criticised by'some people becausep 
in the Oujda negotiations I,, 'asked-. with. some. 'insistence 
for a definition of. the. meaning of. independence; ', this 
definition was very necessary, because our. aim was 
real independence, unmarked by. any blemish. By indep- 
endence ve meant that which would guarantee. our comp- 
lete freedom to determine our. development and the ' 
independent direction of our affairs, the right to 
make treaties and to form alliances-that we considered 
to be suitable. I and my brother gave our country the 
name of the 'Republic. of the Rif! (al-jumhUrlya 
al-Riflya) as a sign that we.. were a-state composed o 
independent tribes in an alliance, and not a repres- 
entative state with an-elected parliament. In fact, 
in our opinion, the title of, 'Republic"(jumhrirlya) 
could not take on its true meaning. for some time,, 
because all peoples need a period. in. which they'can 
form. themselves intoja state) with a resolute govern- 
ment, firm sovereigntyr and'a strong. national 
organisation. 
But-unfortunately I was understood by only a few 
individuals who could be counted on the fingers of 
both hands., On the contrary, even, my most faithful 
supporters, and those of the greatest-knowledge and 
intelligence believed that after the victory had -, 
been won I would allow. each tribe to return to com- 
plete, freedom despite their realisation that, this would 
return. the country to the, worst conditions of anarchy 
and barbarism. 
Religious,. fanaticism-was-the-greatest cause of my 
failure, even if I do not say that it was the only 
cause-, This. is. because the shaykhs. of the orders have 
greater infuence in the Rif than in Morocco as a whole 
or in, -the. rest. of the countries of the Islamic world. 
I. was incapable of acting without-them. and was obliged 
to ask their aid at every turn. 'At'first I tried to 
win over-the masses to my point of view by argument 
and demonstration, -but I met with great opposition 
from the great families with powerful influence--with 
the exception of the family of 'Khamlashal"[sic]. 
wh6se. head was an. old friend of my, father's. 
rest Were all, my enemies,. especially after - I'spent rabney from the awq&f to buy supplies for the war. They did 
not understand. that, this money could not be. spent oh a 
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more worthy object than that of the independence of 
the country. 
I do not deny that sometimes, I was obliged'to make 
use of religious, sensibility'in [an attemptl. to win 
political support. 'Thus, I, said that after the . Spanish had occupied Ajdlr. * they compelled the evacuation 
of a part of the village in which there was, a mosque, 
which they did not respect and they made into a stable. 
When I, heard. this I ordered three of, the. qdlids who 
were famous 
, 
for their piety and their bravery to 
verify the matter for-themselves. 'This tactic of 
mine doubled the bravery of, the fighterst and 
increased their'devotion to myself and my cause. 
The truth is that Islpm, ýs the enemyýof fanaticism 
and superstitions (khur&*At).,. What I know of its 
fundamentals is enoUgh-to make me declare publicly 
that Islam as I know it in Morocco and Algeria is 
very far. removed from the Islam brought by the great 
Prophet. - 
Those who truly or falsely claimed that they were- 
descendants of that pure stock [1. e., that of the 
Prophet]. turned their whole attention to gaining the 
sympathy of the people for their-transitory selves, 
and, set. themselves up. as-idols, to be served by the 
ignorant, and established religious'brotherhoods which 
were transformed into a, powerful-army to serve their 
personal ends. But Islam 
, 
is-as far removed'as may be, 
from sanctifying ihidividuals because it ordains- 
brotherhood and unity, in'-the face of the enemy and, 
encourages self-sacrifice [lit. 'death'] in the case, - 
of freedom and. independence. However, the shaykhs 
of. the orders and the, leaders. of religion tinkered 
with the Book of-God and the sunna of His Prophet in 
order to satisfy their own longings and to gratify 
their. greed. They took no part in the revolution 
under the, pretextlthat.: fighting for the fatherland 
(watan) had. no meaning for them, and. that they would 
. only fight 
in the-cause, of the Faith. 
I exerted myself to the. utmost, to free my land from, 
the influence. of the-'shaykhs of the orders. who are an 
obstacle in the, way of any., sort of freedom and 
independence. The policy. of Turkey pleased me 
greatly because I knew that the Islamic countries 
. could. not 
be independent. unless they freed. themselves 
from, religious. fanaticism and emulated the people of 
Europe*. ' But'the Rifla'did not understand me--which 
,, was my misfortune as well as 
theirs. Thus the shaykhs 
shook with'anger at me. when I appeared one day in the 
uniform of an officer, although I did, not do such a 
thing again. 
. _-The 
shaykhs of. the orders, were the bitterest enemies 
_both. 
of myself and my-country as it advanced. They 
omitted-nothing in their efforts to frustrate my 
policy, even spreading through the length and breadth 
of the, land-that-I wanted to follow the example of 
-Turkey, and, that that would inevitably lead to giving 
freedom, to women so that they could go, around in 
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[European]. hats (al-burn1ta), dressed like French 
women and aping their customs and so on. 
The machinations of these ignorant fanatics convinced 
me that progress is impossible in any country where 
they havd a strong influence unless it is brought 
about slowly and through the use of force and violence. 
I must, declare here and now that I did not find in 
the Rif. the least support for my efforts at reform 
and that [only]. a small group of people in Fez 
and Algiers understood me, helped me and agreed with 
my policy because they are in touch with foreigners 
and know where. lies the true good of my country. 
In short I came'before my. time to carry out this work,, 
but I am convinced that my desires will all be 
realised sooner or later-through the force of events 
and the reversals of time. "' 
The Ideological Explanations of the War 
The al-Manar. article is an ideological self defencej, 
but that is not the major objection to the picture that it 
paints. Far more serious is the f actý that it is only a very 
partial account. It makes no'mention of bin, 'Abd al-Karlm' s 
most important supporters, - gives no explanations of how he 
emerged as the leader or why, 'does not explain the economic 
factors of the war and ignores the place'of the new state in 
relation to the long history of Moroccan 'government, and of 
Moroccan Sultans' attempts to'oppose European interference. 
Above all,, it is a necessarily. personal account, presenting 
bin 'Abd al-Karlm, not only as the central figure, but as the 
0 nly actor on the stage. 
What it'does do, however, is to raise the essential 
constitutional and'ideological issue which is fundamental to 
an-understanding'of the course of the RIf war: the position 
of Islam within the new state. ' It was this question which 
helped determine the relationship of tribes and local groups 
in the unity of the whole of the, Rif. 'and Jibala. It defined 
in religious terms the r6le of the new leader,, Muýaýmmad bin 
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. 'Abd al-Karim, and set down the ideological terms of ref er- 
ence of the conflict, with"the tariqas and of, the war itself-- 
for this war could be seen either as one of, national liber- 
ation or as a jihdd against the Christians. 
The difference between what is omitted from the 
al-Manar article and what is commented upon is the essence 
of the tension between the practicalities of power and the 
calls of Islamic ideology, which so characterised the course 
of the war. This was a question-which'had-exercised the 
minds of Islamic thinkers, from*the beginning of theýnineteenth 
century, for the relationship between power and religion, 
and the r6le of Islam in a modern state, is at the heart of 
the whole movement of reform from Tahtawl. onwards,, and is 
specifically a concern of, the teachings of . 'Abduh'and RIda. 
This relation between religionand state. is clearly 
expressed in the al-Man&r article, when bin 'Abd al-Karlm 
says: "I wanted my people to know that they had a fatherland 
as well as a religion (la-hum watanan kama 'la-hum 'd1nan) 
In other words, bin 'Abd, al-Karim is saying# the novelty of 
the movement which. he led was that-it providedýa frame of 
reference which included'not only the religious community 
--the Oumma--but also a loyalty to, a defined area--the. 
watan. -The idea of. "watan" was the product, otthe reform 
movement in Egypt. dating back to TatLýawl,: although he 
formulated it to apply to-Egypt in order to take account of 
that country's history'as a nation before. the Islamic conquest; 
and of. the non-Muslim peoples who lived within its borders. 
Neither. of these two,: considerationsýapplied to, the Rlf of 
course, where, there had been noýprevious history of statehood 
Houraniý, - op. 'cit., 'pp. 78-80. 
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and where there were few non-Muslims. 
Wataniya had-other implications for Ta4tAwl,,, 
however, concerned with the duties of citizens towards their 
country-sacrif ice, submission to the law, and unity. it 
is these last two aspects of wataniya, submission to the 
law and unity, that were the most important to bin 'Abd 
al-Karim. However, it will be apparent from this thesis 
that "unity" changed its meaning in the course of the war. 
At the beginning of the war it referred to an attempt to form 
an alliance against the Spanish from a number -of disparate 
tribes; later it became a unity that was imposed from above 
by a single leader, Mubammad b. 'Abd al-Karlm.. This process 
is mirrored in the al-Manar. article, where bin 'Abd al-Karlm 
makes two apparently contradictory statements: he talks 
first of the need to "work with sincerity and loyalty to 
form a national*unity-from tribes with different inclinations 
and expectations. " This implies that the identity of the 
tribes would be absorbed. into that of the new state. On 
the other hand, he goes on to describe the state as -"composed 
of independent tribes in an alliance", which 'means the 
opposite,, that the, identity of the' tribes as separate units 
was maintained and that each was an acquiescent partner in 
an, alliance. ' In fact, the majority of tribes were incorpor- 
ated by-force and their, continued "alliance" was maintained 
throughthe use of coercion. This is recognised by bin 'Abd 
al-Karlm. when he sa'ys that even his "most faithful supporters" 
were wrong to believe "that after, the victory had been won, 
I could allow each tribe to return to ýcomplete freedom despite 
their realisation that. this would return the, country to -the 
Ibid., p.. 78. 
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worst conditions of anarchy and barbarism. " By using the 
pronoun "I" in this context, bin"Abd al-KarIM was emphasising 
the personal control which he reserved to himself as the only 
person able to make political decisions within. the new state. 
The basis of this unity under his authority was 
supposed to be religious. Although he made passing references# 
at the beginning. of the war, to the need for. local unity 
I 
based on language--as, for example, when he told the Gaznaya 
tribe to free John Arnall in 1922 on the grounds that they 
were Rif! by language and therefore had to. obey. him--the 
majority of his propaganda was religious,,. and the state was 
supposed to be based. on the unity of, the Muslims within it. 
By doing this, he was in. line with the modern thinking of 
people like 'Abduh and Rldý who rejected the ideas of trad- 
itional solidarity based on blood relationship, that had, 
for example, characterised. the, tribes of the Sahara in the 
Middle Ages, who had set up the, state of the al-Muwa4iýdan and 
al-MurAbita. ri. This secular, 'solidaritY,,, Qasablya, was 
disliked by Rldas-'for, instance, who believed that it perverted 
the sharl'ta. Bin 'Abd al-Karlm does not mention the idea 
of unity through secular bonds'in the al-ManAr article, 
instead he talks of the need for unity among tribes who were 
not connected by any ties of blood, and of.. Islam which 
"ordains brotherhood. and unity in the face of the enemy 
In short, bin 'Abd al-Karim wanted a new state in the R1f, led 
exclusively by him, lbut, united by the authority of Islam. 
The "authority of Islam" meant the imposition or 
restoration, of thd 'sharl"a. This was thd'central theme of 
all. the ideas of Islamic reformists. ý It was one of the main 
p. 2'99 
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demands upon Ml'dy 'Abd al-Uakf1Z whenýhe was given his bay'a, 
and in the larger Islamic', world beyond the borders of 
Morocco, the reimposition of the sharl'a was the concern 
of men like Khayr al-Diri in Tunis, who looked back to the 
times when the Islamic state was strong and civilised, and 
accounted for this by pointing, to its strict adherence to 
the law. However, this was a law which was, supposedly 
reinterpreted in the light of modern conditions and which. 
as many (including RfJ20 pointed out, would. have, to be 
accompanied by, a change, in the institutions of Islamic 
2 
society, particularly those, of government and. eduCation. 
Thus when he talked of, the idea of unity, in al-ManRr, and 
implied that he looked for the return of. thd, sharl'al bin 
'Abd al-Karim, was in line with the tradition. of reformist 
thinking in Islam.. 
However, -as he complains in the al! -ManAr-articler 
bin 'Abd, al-Karim was opposed in his attempt by local 
religiousýleaders. He'alleges that the shaykhsof the 
orders "omitted nothing in their efforts to. obstruct my 
policy. ",, He says that the reason for this opposition was the 
religious fanaticism of the Varlqas. Again, in his attacks'on 
the tarlqas he is at one with people like Rtda, who dismissed 
the brotherhoods-as making their religion, "a. joke and a 
3* 
plaything" --Even bin 'Abd-al-KarLals, language in 
adopts a similar tone; he refers to the shaykhs who "tinkered 
with-the Book of Gdd". There is,, however, another aspect to 
bin "Abd, 'al-Karim's attack'on the orders, in al-Manar; -he, 
says that the brotherhoods., were . 
". transformed. into. a powerful 
1. Ibid. , p., 89., - 
2 Ibid., p. -, 151. 
3 Ibid., p. 225. 
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army to serve their [the shaykhs'] personal 'ends, " that they 
were his enemies "especially, after I spent money from the 
awqaf to buy supplies for the war. " Bin 'Abd al-Harlm does 
not spell it out, but what he is describing here is a power 
struggle and a conflict over resources. 
The amlr's justification for taking over the 
resources of the awqAf., or to be -exact the justification which 
he gives in al-Manar, was that they "could not be spent on 
a more worthwhile'object than the defence gf. the country. " 
However, as we have seen, the country to. which he referred 
was the new Rif! state ruled over by, him,. - and claiming the 
obedience of everyone under his authority. It was precisely 
this watan that, the shaykhs of the orders-rejected: "They 
took no part in, the revolutionýunder the pretext that fight- 
ing for the watan had, no meaning for them and they would 
only fight in the cause of faith. " There is a clear state- 
ment h ere of the difference between bin 'Abd al-Xarlm's 
conception of the new state which he wanted-to see in the 
Rif,, a watan, behind defined frontiers and with-'a defined 
population, and the-*Iun-ma--a far vaguer and more. disparate 
entity which, was the only political form, which'according to 
him, -the Varlqas-would recognise. 
The very idea of the new state was thus revolution- 
I ary 
in the context of the Rif. The state to which bin 'Abd 
al-Karim referredwas not to be the old style*of decentralised 
Moroccan'government but. one comparable to France and Spain, 
which ironically were its principal enemied. In. other words, 
his conception of statehood was an idea that was based gn his 
experience of European politicaý structures. 'It is thus not 
surprising that this'new idea was not understood in the Rlf, 
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itself; significantly, bin, 'Abd al-Karlm, explains that only 
na small group of people in Fez *and Algiers understood mej, 
helped me and agreed with my. policy because they were in 
touch with foreigners. " This was unlikely, to appeal to the 
traditional conservative thinkers in Moroccan society, even 
to those who were opposed to European intervention in their 
country. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, 
al-Na*ir1,,: while bemoaning the growing power-of the Europeans, 
had complained that those who wished to, emulate. their milit- 
ary and technical achievements'in order. to protect Morocco 
ran the risk of betraying their faith: ' "They want to learn 
about war in order. to protect their religion, yet they 
neglect their,, religion in-the very process of. learning. " 
Thus when bin 'Abd al-Karla claimed. -that the-statemould be 
characterised by its Islamic, nature, one that, woulld allow 
efficient European methods to beýused to-preserve its 
independence, ', he was not-answering the. paradox-which al-Naqirl. 
had outlined over, twenty years before. - 
However,, the use of new political systems and of 
European methods in,. the Rif was obviously, of. the utmost 
importance. In fact. it was the only practical option that 
was open-to bin 'Abd al-Karim, since the old structures were 
clearly quite,, incapable of sustaining independence. ' Powerful 
local leaders, such as al-Raisall, had shown themselves willing 
to cooperate with the colonialists in order to preserve as 
much of the old polltical structure-and-therefore their own 
autonomy as possible; ' even where they,, or the*orders, had 
fought the Europeans--as thd Sands, iya ha'd. done. in Libya-- 
they had shown 'themselves. quite. unable to hold back the 
Al-Naq#I, ' op. * cit. ',, Vol.. -IX, p. 106. ' 
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invaders. The only other, alternative was a complete secul- 
arisation of the RIfj as. AtatUrk attempted in Turkey. Bin 
c M, 
bd al-Karlm did not, however, share Atatark's secularising 
zeal--he was after all a 'qdcjI rather than a soldier--although 
he admired the Turks' efficiency in expelling their enemies 
--an admiration he shared with Rfda', who equally rejected 
the secularising policies of the Turks. 
' For these reasons 
the policies proposed by the Salafiya movement were not 
only desirable from a religious point, of view, but necessary 
for their practical aspects,, representing as they did , 
Islam as a force for unity, ý, legitimising, the dislike of the 
tarlqas and stating the need to create I an Islamic nation- 
state--a watan. Thus ýthe, language in which. bin 'Abd al-Karlm 
spoke in, the al-Manar article, was couched in these terms. 
However, ideology alone is insufficient to explain the course 
of the Rif. war,,, although it provides a very important basis 
for discussion. The, reason-for this is quite simple. 
Mu4ammad bin 'Abd. al-Karim was not a theorist but an activist. 
Certainly he had an, interest in the movement of, reform in 
Islam and, -in 
the theory of government of an Islamic state. 
His prime concern, however, was to ensure that the, war against 
the Spanish, was continued and that he remained as the leader 
of the RIfIs.. '- Thus the practical problems as well as the 
theoretical positions are of-vital importance. In fact, the 
practicalities-of, power7-the imposition ofunity, the-form- 
ation of a state ad7ministration',, the spreading of the' 
sharl"a. 
'thd 
r6le, of bin., 'Abd al-Karlm himself. in relation 
to his followers--were-in the *end more, 'important-than the 
ideas of., Islamic-reform... Furthermore, a concentration an 
1 Erwin I. J. Rosenthal,, Isl*am in: the' Modern National State 
(Cambridge, ', ' 1965),. p. 1 71. 
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this aspect of the Rif war shows the extent to which 
previous commentators have', -failed to grasp. the essential 
point that it was the. daily-problems. of thd war which shaped 
its course rather than the ideologies behind it. 
Unity 
__ 
Bin 'Abd al-Karlm's first remarks in the'al-ManAr 
article are directed to the problem, of unity. They are an 
echo of the ideas expressed in his bayla, which., refer to 
the religious necessity of the, unity of the Muslims: "He 
who wishes to break up the. nature of this conmunity, when 
it is one, cut off his head with a sword, whoever he may 
be. "' As we have seen in chapters III. and IV, there were 
overiding political reasonsýfor bringing about unity--quite 
apart from any belief in its religious desirability. The 
long history of'resistance to the Europeans, from the war 
of. 1859-1860 onwards, ha. d, been characterised by its very 
disparate nature which had led-to the'ultimate: ineffective- 
ness of all. Moroccan action. Even after theAmposition of 
the Protectorate, resistance in northern Morocco had 
floundered largely because local leaders, al-Raisxlll. for 
example, had been unable to bring, enough troops into the 
field at'any'one, time. 
The basis, of any sort, of unity and. resistance in 
the Rif was, of course, the existence of a stable peace. * 
Provided that the area, was divided against itself in 
internal feuding, the Spanish could-rely on there being 
little opposition. - Thd'Spanishpolicy, 'therefore, was to 
undei-mine. stability, by... trying to prevent the, Imposition and 
MAEF,, Maroc, 517, p. ý180., 'Bayta of Muýaý=ad bin"Abd 
al-Karim. 
852 
collection of DýaM-f ines. In this they were extremely 
successful and they were able to create great rifts in RIfI ý' , 
society. Certainly there were attempts to form a wider 
front against the Spanish but by 1919 they had been remark- 
ably unsuccessful. 
The movement for unity was hampered by the lack 
of a suitable leader, since the major figure in the north, 
al-Raisfil.!,. ' was unacceptable to, the majority of, the RIf Is 
and the only alternative candidate, 'Abd al-Malik was more 
concerned with fighting, the French than the Spanish. - Never- 
theless,, the idea of unity did exist, and. a local. alliance,, 
slowly emerged in'the BanU Waryaghal. founded, on the reimpos- 
ition of the ýýfines. Once these fines had. been restored 
in 1920, they solved not only the problem of order. but also 
provided money to pay for. the barkas,, a problem which had 
overcome both al-RaisUll. and 'Abd alrMlik. 
By August 1920-a sizeable coalition, had emerged 
in the Rif formed of. elements from five-central. Rlfl tribesp 
who brought together a-considerable barka. However,, -the 
problem of leadership still eluded them. Based, as the 
coalition was, on an alliancel, and supported by the`. ýýfincs 
which were always liable to break down, the movement was 
extremely vulnerable. In such situations . "alliances' are 
fragile because the commitment of member groups is always 
tentative and con I tingent. 111, So the search'for a leade'r-began. 
The first candidatewas-a man calling himself. thd Sharif. 
al-ldris! who, in, September 1920, tried to set himself up 
11 Amal Vinogradov and John Waterbury, "Situations of 
Contested Ligitimacy in Morocco: an Alternative Framework" 
in Comparative', Studke's' Tný Society 'and HistoEX# Vol. 13,, 
no.. l, January 1971, p. 36. 
w. 
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as a "Sultan of the Rif". He did not last long, but his 
appearance was the first, ment-ion of the possibility of a new 
state in the RIf, and after his removal from the scene, the 
anti-Spanish groups continued to talk of a government in 
the Rif,, free from foreign influence and locally administered. 
The existence of the movement for unityl and the 
currency of the iýea of an autonomous political unit--it 
cannot be called a "state" at this stage--in the Rif, is 
enough to show the inadequacyof a number of. common concep- 
tions of the Rif war. In the first place, these ideas of 
unity were not initiated by Mu4ammad bin 'Abd. al-Karlm, for 
his involvement came, after these first efforts., This being 
so, both the "patriotic" Spanish explanation as advanced by 
Cerdeira, that the idea of an independent nation existed 
only in the fantastic imagination of the Aulad. al-Jattabi"I 
or Montagne's rather more coherent idea that the RIfI 
coalition and state was the result of a powerful local indiv- 
idual-using the mechanisms of tribal politics to take over_ 
first his clan, then his tribe, and then neighbouring tribes 
2 in a recreati on of the Berber movements of the Middle Ages, 
may be seen to be inaccurate. Both the movement-for unity,, 
and the coalition, existed before'bin 'Abd al-Karlm. emerged 
upon the scene. -, - 
However,. the fact that it was Mubammad bin 'Abd 
al-Karim and not anyone else who came to lead the RIf 
through five years 'bf war must be explained. 
Cerdeira, op. 'cit. ', pp. 72-73. * 
2 
, Montagne, ". Rdvolution, p. lig. - 
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The Eclipse of the Traditional'Leadership 
Muýammad bin 'Abd al-KarIM was by no means the 
obvious candidate for leadership of the anti-Spanish forces. 
He possessed no religious legitimacy--he was not a sharif or 
marabut-7his family, while it had a limited. local importance 
, in parts of his own tribe, was not powerful.. True,, his. 
father had been appointed to the position of q&41 by several 
Sultans, and his grandfather had also possessed the same 
title, but real political I authori'ty,. at that-time had r- ested 
with the local-councils of, the alyan. Above all,, his father 
was seriously compromised by his service, with the Spanish as 
one of their best-rewarded pensioners. 
Nevertheless, he had several attributes which were 
in his favour. In the. first place, his father, partly as 
the result of his friendship with. the Spanish, ' was a rich 
man. After heavy local'pressure by the'anti-Spanish alliance 
had obliged him to change sides, he would naturally occupy a 
position of some importance in the alliance. When he, -, "Abd 
al-Karlm al-Khatt&. b1,, died or was murdered, his eldest son 
inherited that position. In fact, however, simple wealth 
had not given his father. a commanding position. on the anti- 
Spanish side, and it did not. give it to his son. What Mubammad 
had, and his-father had lacked, was a far more-informed con- 
ception of the way in whichthe Spanish kight be defeated, 
and a grounding in thdIdeology of the' Sal'afiya. movement which' 
aimed at-ensuring thd preservation of Muslim independence 
, 
through the radical application of the 'shdrVa, and the 
fostering of Islamic unity. had a knowledge of European 
methods and techniques of-war, through his, contacts with the 
Spanish*army in Melilla and his brother-had a tehnical education 
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in mining. Above all, perhaps, he was an outsider in the 
sense that his. family was'not one which had been traditionally 
powerful in the central, Rlf. Ross, Dunn, writing of the 
political responses to French colonialism in south-eastern 
Morocco, has pointed out that: 
"Coordinated mass resistance in -segmentary lineage 
societies depended on the emergence 'of extra-tribal 
leaders, organisation and ideology, persuasive 
enough to heal''over,, at least for. a time, the 
natural fiss, ipariousness of political. action. 111 
In south-eastern Morocco this, mass movement never really 
developed fully. In the Rif. it 'did, and the. reason "for-this 
was that a suitable leader was found. 
This is not to. say that bin, "Abd al-? Karlm's leader- 
ship went unchallenged, ýfor it did not.. Significantly, the 
import of the challenge, was that. the new leader, was not a 
sharif. Thus, for example, at the very. beginning of his 
command, a group from hisýown'tribe, asked SIdI IjapIdu to 
assume the leadership on the grounds that bin, *Abd al-Karlm. 
lacked-these traditionally respected origins. Later, 
al-Raisfill-also would'attack theýamlr on precisely these 
grounds. ', Bin 'Abd al-Karim's,, or, his'supports, made an 
ideological response to this attack on his origins by invoking 
Islamic precedent: `his bay"a quoted a badith concerning 'Umar 
ibn al-Khatt4b'sayin on. his death bed, "You must be strong 9 
in faith, in God, and listen to and obey thd. Am. 1r., be he a 
2 
slave or an Abyssinian. " 
However,, bin 'Abd al Karlra hadý'far more'convincing 
answers, to criticism of his unsuitability as-ledder than this 
religious or. ideological'response.. *. . In. thd"first. place he, had 
Dunn, op. *cit. p. 268. 
2, MAEFi', 'Maroc 5L7, p. 180, 'Bay'a of Ilubammad, bin "Abd 
al-Karlm. 
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led the Muslims to victory over the Spanish, and in the 
second place he had the undeniable power to impose his will, 
whether his critics liked it or -not. 
The Organisation of the Rif and. the Formation of a Makhzan 
Bin "Abd al-Karim's'ability to impose his will 
and to defeat the Spanish depended on his, grasp of the 
organs of political power in the Rif. 'He could not do this 
alone, and was aided by an, ever7growing administration. 
Indeed, part of bin 'Abd al-Karim's preliminary political 
campaign to win the leadership of the alliance rested on his 
promise to bring about a radical reorganisation of RIfI. 
society. Even before Anwal', he had taken-steps to create 
the nucleus of a regularly'paid army, and had carried out 
a preliminary census of-the tribes. In May 1921 he announced 
that the country would have a "government and a flag". the 
symbolic representations'ofthe watan which bin 'Abd 
al-Karlm wished to, bring -into existence 
to complement the 
religion of his people. 'As'an emphatic confirmation that 
the movement against'the Spanish was not longer dependent 
on a tribal*alliance'but was a centralised opposition led by 
a single man, aided by powerful'supporters, the fragile sys- 
tem of ýý-fines was abolished and replaced by a concentration 
of justice in the hands of a constituted authority. 
All this happened before the defeats of the 
Spanish in July, and'August 1921,,. and at this stage it was 
admittedly on a very small scale. Nevertheless, when the 
attack on, the Spanish, did-; come it was immediately victorious. 
However, this success was'achieved not only as the result of 
the growing organisation o. f the Rif, but because of a 
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simultaneous rising behind the Spanish lines. This rising 
had been agreed upon in advance I certainly, but that did not 
imply that the people of the eastern tribes were willing to 
place themselves under the authority of the, new RIfI leader. 
As a result, when the Spanish had been pushed back as far as 
Melilla, bin 'Abd'ýal-Karlm lost control, yet another pointer 
that the opposition to the Spanish was not the result of 
the efforts of Mu4ammad-bin 'Abd al-Karlm, but was merely 
used, channelled, and organised by him. 
Thus we may see that,. there. were two aspects to 
the Rif! movement--the need to defeat the Spanish and the 
need to create an organisation in the RIf capable of sus- 
taining the opposition.. Returning again to Ross Dunn's 
account of the Moroccan'south-east, that author says: 
"Under conditions-of-extreme economic uncertainty, 
in which no lineager class, or faction could 
accumulate sufficient power to control the dis- 
tribution of resources, competition for them 
stimulated a profusion of more or less temporary 
groupings of leaders and followers which coal- 1 
esced to pursue specific-, short-run objectives. " 
In northern Morocco, this situation, as we have seen, 
certainly existed before the,, formation of a more permanent 
alliance under bin "Abd al-Karim. It did not apply after 
the victories of, the summer of 1921. This was because the 
Rif! leader and-. his close, supporters had enormous reserves 
of Spanish military. supplies'which had fallen into their 
hands, and, after,. the ransom ofthe prisoners, a consider- 
able financial, 'supdriority. over every other individual and 
group, in the area. '-The shortAerm objectives were surpassed 
and the coalition moved into a new stage. 
It was, in this-position of overwhelming strength 
Dunn, op. cit., -p. 265., 
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that bin 'Abd al-Karim was proclaimed as amIr, and was able 
to proceed with a detailed. organisation of government in 
the Rif. He formed a regular army, placed under the com- 
mand of people who were trained, or at least experienced, 
in their particular specialities. He set up an administrative 
system, both, to service-the army and ensure that it was 
paid, and to keep order in the countryside, where qVids and 
malýakmas were set up, and, backed by, a prison system to 
punish lesser trouble-makers. This system bore such a close 
resemblance to-that used by-the Spanish'to dominate'the 
areas that had been forced to submit to their military 
occupation, that the Ghumarls referred, to the RIfI mabakmas 
as "fisirias, an expression derived from Spanish. In 
fact, Rif! 'concerns were remarkably similar to those of 
the Spanish, to dominate and control areas that did'not 
particularly wish to be either dominated or controlled. 
In an effort to gain legitimacy, by using trad- 
itional Moroccan political te rms, bin 'Abd al-Karlm described 
his government as a makhzan. -The makhzan was-the model of 
the Moroccan government and one which everyone understood. 
The Spanish,,., in, their colonisation of northern Morocco, 
used the same expressionto describe their authority. 
However, the term was. not only a terminological convenience 
but also an accurate description of the new government for 
like any makhzan it had its ministers and-its qalids in the 
tribes. The ministers,,, many of them members of bin *Abd 
al-Karim's own family,, were given specific areas of respon- 
sibility,, were supported by a developedýbureaucracyr and 
protected by'a strong army, 
The administrative-reforms, the regular, army, the 
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taxation which *the administration and army combined were 
able to levy, despite the* complaints of those who were taxed. 
the whole apparatus of ni'? aTft which was brought. into being in 
the Rif, were precisely the 'ends towards which Moroccan 
Sultans had, striven from Mulýaýinmad IV after the Hispano-Moroccan 
war of 1859-1860, to 'Abd al-*Azlz and. *Abd_al-Va. f1:; -at the 
beginning of the twentieth. century. It is, therefore, 
difficult to agree with'Abdallah Laroui that. -the Rif war was 
simply one of "numerous rural and'mountaineer revolts" which 
bore no relation to the political phenomenon of. nationalism 
1 in urban Morocco. And it is quite impossible. to. agree with 
Abderrahman Youssoufi when he says that. bin . 'Abd al-Karlm 
did not try to set up a., makhzan in the Rif, and that the idea 
of the makhzan had already been discredited, in the eyes of 
the people on account of its past failures, and because of 
2 its genesis into the vehicle of European colonialism. 
However, in Moroccan history? the'. 'setting up of a 
makhzan was accompanied by the claim by an individual to the 
Sultanate of Morocco. This did not happen in the RIf, and 
Mulýammad bin "Abd al-Karim. made no very serious attempt-- 
beyond the immediate demands of propaganda to claim that 
position. The, explanation of this lies in the objectives of 
the Rifl. 'State and his position within it. 
Calipha te and Sharl1a: the Nature of the RIfI' State' 
The bay'a of bin 'Abd al-Karlm which he was given 
, 
in January 1923 started with a specific reference to the 
advantages of the-Caliphate: unity, orderý, morality, the 
Laroui,, History, p. 350. 
2ý Youssouf i in Col*l'oqUe,, p. 82. ' 
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maintenance of the sharl 'A, and the Caliphate Is opposition 
to tyranny, and to the rule of non-Muslims. There was nothing 
new about these ideas. Traditional'sunnI Muslim doctrine saw 
the Caliph as the man who: 
"should lead the community in peace and warl collect 
the canonical taxes and supervise the application 
of the law. ,. He was also the imam, the leader in 
prayer, and he'.. 'should himself be learned in the 
law and competent, to exercise the power of 
interpretation. ". It, was only in this limited 
sense that he was suc cessor of the Prophet ... but even in this sense'he was indispensable to the 
community, ruler'by divine right, and. ruler, in 
principle, over-the-whole community: for most, 
although. not, all, jurists held that the unity of the 
umma implied a unity of polit 
, 
ical authority. 'Ile 
who dies'without having known thd'imam of his time 
is as one who has died in the age'of paganism. 1111 
As will be remembered from the discussion in the intro- 
ductory chapter, the'figure of the Caliph in Morocco was 
combined with that of the Sultan, and the same doctrinal 
12 
characteristics applied. Thus reference to the Caliphate 
at the beginning of bin eAbd al-Karlm's bayea indicates 
that what is coming after is the declaration of a Caliph. 
And indeed I this is precisely. what the bay'a says: ' the 
Caliphate has come to. bin 'Abd al-Karim, and he was expected 
to make the sharl'a triumphant, to destroy heretical doctrines 
and to defeat the Christian enemy. 
Was bin "Abd al-Karlm to'be a Caliph'then? If 
Caliph means the ruler of all Muslims then the answer'. is 
clearly that he was not. The term must be understood within 
the context of the war and of the'bay'a itself,, which makes 
clear reference-only to "The tribes of the Rif and the tribes 
i Hourani, - op., cit. ',, p.. 5. -It will 
be noted that virtually 
the-same'phrase as that quoted by Hourani here was used in 
the bay'a of bin. abd al-Karim, i. e, '"A man who dies and has 
not made a bay'a dies'in ignorance" MAEF, - Maroc, ' 517,, p. 180. 
2 As. Lahbabi, has shown'(op. cit., p. 27). 
I 
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of the Jib&la". 
1 What Mutiammad bin 'Abd al-Karlm stood for 
was the freedom of the Muslim. s,, the purity of the sharl*a, 
the opposition to the Christians, in that area--the Rif and 
the Jib&la (in which the, Ghum&r. a and Sinhaja were assumed 
to be included) and that area alone. As such he was amIr 
al-mulminin, command. er of the faithful, but only of the 
faithful whom1he in fact led. Thus he could quite easily 
claim that his sovereignty did not impinge on that of the 
Sultan in Morocco because he was only the ef f ectiv'e leader 
of the faithful in the north,, although the Sultan to the 
south was under the control of the French. In other words, 
the intention of the bay'a was to organise in the RIf the 
conditions of a Caliphate, where the sharl'a, might be 
preserved and strengthened, beyond the control of the 
European armies, but on a local, level and within defined 
frontiers. As Magali Morsy has put it, "Where in 1922 was 
the Dar el-Islam if it was not in the Rif? ,2 for the rest of 
Morocco (as well as most of the rest of the Islamic world) 
had by then fallen victim to European expansion. 
It is obvious that it is impossible to separate 
the independence of the Islamic state from the maintenance 
of the sharl-a. - This is as true of the RIf as anywhere else. 
The'sharl'a could only be maintalned if independence was 
maintained, 'and that could only be done if unity was ensured. 
Th e key to unity was the sharl'a, the only way to supersede 
the fragile system'of hAM-fines, and the' symbol of the 
unity of the"lumma and the, watan., Again we see the way in 
MAEF, Maroc 517, p 180,, *Býy`a of. Muýaý=ad bin "Abd 
al-Karlm'. 
2 Magali Morsy, "Actualit6 d'Abd el-Krim" in-Colloque, 
p. 394. ý 
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which ideological desires and practical. needs were 
interdepehaent. 
So, the maintenance of, the leadership of Mubammad 
bin 'Abd al-Karlm depended upon'his ability to'control the 
legal structure, -of the Rif. His claim to legitimacy as amIr 
was based on the'enforcement of the sharl'ap and that 
enforcement was a political necessity just as much as it 
was his own personal desire. That is not to say that con- 
cern with the sharila was purely the-result of political 
opportunism. The principal. agents in the campaign. to 
create a "moral society"-in the Rif, BQ Labya and al-Shargl, 
wanted to enforce the sharl'a in every area of social activity, 
and not- just for social ly disruptive crimes of violence and 
theft. Thus, for example, as shown in chapter IX, a man 
was imprisoned for not paying, his debts, another for promising 
to marry a woman when that was forbidden by the sharl*a, 
another for assaulting, his wifel and ye. t another for spreading 
malicious gossip. At the same time the creation of just such 
a "moral society' increased the influence of the state 
authority and its, power over, the lives of every individual 
in the country. L 
The maintenance of political power and authority 
in the Rif, was, of, course, bin 'Abd al-Karlm's prime- 
concern. - Quite apart from the desire of, most rulers to 
, remainýin power, without-that-authokity his other objectives, 
defeating, the,, Spanish and maintaining the law, could not be 
,, 
achieved. ''.,. Indeed, the vastýmajority of the people who were 
imprisoned were punished because in some way--by spying or 
treachery--they had infringed,, or acted-against, --the author- 
. ity, of 
bin 'Abd al-Karim. Now the inseparability of'the 
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sharl "a from the authority of . the amIr 1ýecomes clear. If 
bin 'Abd al-Karlm was fighting the war against. the Spanish 
to protect the sharl Ia and, to preserve the independence of 
a Muslim stat , 
e. then any opposition to him1was irreligious. 
It was precisely in these terms that he attacked 'Amar bin 
Ijamidu and al-RaisUll.. ' -The authority 
for-his claim, in 
legal terms at least, was the, bay'a which had given himýthe 
position and duties of the Caliphate within the area of the 
Rif! state. 
Thus it may be seen, that bin 'Abd, al-Karlm saw his 
r6le as that of, amir al-mulminin. His relationship with the 
"faith , ful", who in theory had bestowed that position upon 
him by their bay'las, is therefore 6f the utmost importance. 
Ruler and People 
According to the theory of the Caliphate, 'or 
Sultanate, in Morocco, the ruler's position was the result 
of his recognition by the fulama". In fact, of course, the 
bay'a of bin Abd al-Karim, like that of any sovereign was 
more the recognition of a fait accompli, the'already exist- 
ing power of the ruler, rather than-his nomination to office. 
once in power, again according to traditional Islamic theory, 
the ruler should in some way consult the leaders of the 
community--a process known as shQta-andýbeadvised by them. 
However, as Hourani points out, "there was no clear idea 
who exactly should'be consulted and how, far the ruler 
sho I uld beý bound by 
I 
what they said. "' As we have'seen from 
the discussion of Moroccan political life in-the, Introduction, 
these ideas. of consultation and "election" have been used by 
Hourani, * '09. cit, P. 6. 
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more recent Moroccan political writers such as Lahbabi to 
justify the idea of a dem , ocra tic. monarchy in that country. 
Arguing along the same linesý -as Lahbabi, 'AllAI al-Fas]: 
has stated that in the Rif 1 'state there existed democratic 
structures through which the ruler was directly responsible 
2, to the people. On the other hand, bin, 'Abd al-Karlm himself, 
in the article in, al-Manar,, Put. the opposite view quite 
bluntly saying that the Rif! was "not a representative state 
with an elected parliament. , 
3--, The se are two descriptions 
of what was alledgedly the same system, and, they. are. 
contradictory. The truth,, ' as ever, lies between them. 
IA112il al-Pasi. is quite correct to say that there 
was an assembly of sorts in theIRIf; he is wrong to assert 
that it had any authority over the amir. ' As the discussion 
of the r6le of the majlis al-'umma in'c_hapter IX has shown, 
its function was advisory. It -could refer things to the 
amir but like, all'the other organs, of state, and their 
off ici als --ministers, military leaders, - qalids,, and local 
meetings of Ithe a'yan of 
tribes . it could only of f er him 
suggestions. 
Mu4ammad bin 'Abd al-Karlm would seem by nature to be 
an, autocratý, As we haveseenýin chapter V, even before 
Anwdl, when he, was criticised in the mosque, he'immediately 
silenced his opponent. ýIn any, event, if hd. was not an 
autocratýby nature, 'he. soon. became . one through force of 
Lahbabils book 
' 




of this-, -in Moroccan political writing. It is, of 
, course,, a-fairly, _standard i 
interpretation of "shOra" as a 
whol 
' 
e, 'and reformist thinking as developed by 'Abduh and 




C. f. -, Houra, ni, *, opý. ' P. 144,, 
' and Rosenthal,, 
op. cit., pp. 'I 43,101. 
2 Al-Fasl,, ' op. -cit., pp*. 121-122. ' 
3 Al-Manar', cited article. 
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circumstance. If the Rif! 'alliance was. to hold together and 
be formed into something more durablej,, then it would have to 
be he who made the decisions, and he who maintained unity. 
As he himself explained' in the al*-Man&r interview, he exper- 
ienced considerable difficulty in convincing even his suppor- 
ters that "I would allow each tribe-to return to complete 
freedom despite their, realisation that-this would return 
the country. to the worst conditions, of anarchy and. barbarism. "' 
The responsibility for avo iding the return to anarchy was 
bin 'Abd al-Karlrals alone, 
_- 
at least in, his own eyes. 
Certainly the al-Manar article'deals solely with what he 
thought was the correct course of action, and how he as 
an individual was opposed in his'plans, by, powerful and 
irreligious vested. interests. 
The-same view, of the individual rOle of the amIr 
was held by his supporters in the Rif. The al-Matalsl 
shaykhs encountered-by Vincent Sheean in 1924 saw the whole 
war in terms-of the-victory, of 7our lord",, who was the, 
2 "Sultan of Islam". The-title itself is significant for it 
is an echo of, the claim-to be the Leader of the, faithful. 
This puts into perspective bin eAbd al-Karlm's own remarks 
on accepting his bayla,, that he was not a. king but (something 
much more powerful)-"the collective voice of'overyone"--the 
popularly chosen leader of'the"faithful whose position 
depended'on his-religious'legitimacyi, - the-*u'pholding of the 
sharit. *a, and on geiýeral approval. Thus not only was any 
opponent'disobeying a leader with religious authority but the 
representative of. society. at large. '.. 
Ibid. 
2 Sheean,, -. Adventures,, p. 47. 
3 Skir*aj, ' op. cit.,, p. - 
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This is not. to say that bin 'Abd al-Karlm's 
autocracy was necessarily'ýheavy handed, for although he was 
not obliged either'in theory, or in fact, to take anyone's 
advice he frequently did so. The people of Burid in the 
Gaznaya', as we have'seen in chapter IX, did in fact receive 
the qVid whom. they wanted, and after the majlis al-Summa 
objected to Qa4lal-Shims, someone else was appointed. It 
was often easier for bin"Abd al-Karlm to get his way by 
consent rather than by force. Nevertheless# his authority 
went very deep into-the lives of his people, and the agents 
of his state were able to intervene in personal matters, 
between husband and'wife for example. 
It may be: seen-. theni, --. that 
bin 'Abd, al-Karlm was , 
not a tyrant ruling by 'force 
alone, rather an able polit- 
ician acting in a highly autocratic manner,, but sensitive 
to at least some of the aspirations of his people. Further- 
more, it was a position which was widely af firmed by those 
people, who saw in him an effective leader who would bring 
them-to victory and-ensure a stable society. This more 
complicated picture of the amir, explains the enigmatic 
character of. a rule who was forever trying to balance the 
political and military demands of the moment, with the more 
long-term-need to remain in power, to keep control-over his 
subjects; while at, the same time trying not to alienate 
their support. too much, through the demands he made on them 
for', service, taxation and obedience. It explains also the 
swiftly changing nature, of his propaganda, from his claims 
to represent'Islamic unity and, the wishes of his people, 
to the need to-, undertake. "negative" propaganda7-the use Of 
terror, arrest, 'impri'sonment and*execution. 
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However, it must be said that. bin"Abd al-Karlm 
was not a single f igure,,. ruling over a united country. Like 
all rulers he relied to a very large extent on individual 
supporters, and was opposed,, by -other individuals and groups. 
Too great a concentration on the personality of the amIr 
tends to lessen, the attention given to the motives of his 
supporters, and above all,, those of his opponents. 
Bin 'Abd al-Karlr6, the Orders 'and Locally Powerful Leaders 
The, main ý objection to an. ý exclusive concentration 
on the r6le of . Mu4ammad bin eAbdý al-Karlm is -that it gives 
the impression that he, was, supreme in the state and that 
everyone else was, subordinated to him and to his organisation. 
This was a goal that could not possibly have-been achieved. 
Bin 'Abd al-Karim, was faced with the same problems that had 
confronted previous, Moroccan Sultans who attempted to 
enforce their control. in areas where it had previously been 
weak. 
Edmund Burke'has pointed to the obstacles placed 
in the way of-the'Moroccan Sultan in his attempts to create 
a stronger unity-in-the-country,, under his-leadership: 
the, centralizing, drive of 
, 
the' makhzan, antag- 
onized-the'provincial notablesý and incurred the 
opposition, of-'the-religious-brotherh6ods and 
zawiyas, whose interests were threatened by salafiyya- 
oil inspired"reforms. 
It is clear: that, bin 'Abd al-Karim's state was-opposed 
precisely. by-those same orders and individuals. It is equally 
clear. from the material put forward in, this the's-is that bin, 
I'Abd al-Karim-'s opponents wetemotivated not, so much by- 
"religious-, fanaticism", as the amIr himself claims in the 
Burke Pre lude, p. 
_215. 
868 
al-Man&r article, -but by considerations. of power and 
influence. It is simply untrue'to state that it was only 
the s4aykhs of the orders who opposed him, or that they all 
opposed him, with the exception of the one family of the 
Akhamlishin. 
In the first place, ' the R1f1 movement was sup- 
ported by a large number of shaykhs, from'religious brother- 
hoods who were appointed as qa I ids'- and . pashas in the RI fI 
administration, and one of them, ýa Nasirl sharif'from the 
region near Tangier, was one of the main'leaders of the 
expansion of the'war into the north-West. There were 
others, such'as Sidi-Ijamidu of Snada,, for example, who, while 
they did not actively support, bin 'Abd al-Karlm's authority, 
did not oppose it. Certainly Sid! Vam1du, with a con- 
sistent reco rd of fighting both the French and the Spanish 
before the Rif war, and of helping thp movement at the very 
beginning, could not be'descri, bed as a traitor to Islam, 
and despite his withdrawal from overt political and military 
activity, his very'neutrality allowed him to perform useful 
service to bin 'Abd al-Karim as a mediator. 
In the-second place, some of the most ferociousý 
and determined opposition came from an alliance of three 
locally powerful individualst 'Amar bin VamIdu, al-U&jj 
Bil-QIsh, and 'Abd' al-Malik, of whom only the last had even 
the most tenuousýclaim to-religious prestige, ýthrough-, his 
grandfather, theýAlgerian'"Abd bLl-QAdir. The others were 
secular leaders trying to protect their own local authority 
and prestige. meant cooperating, with the Spanish 
or the French'in-order-to'win for themselves a measure of 
local autonomy and importance, then, in the manner'of 
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al-RaisUll, they were quite prepared to. do so. What they 
did not want was to be forced into a position of subord- 
ination to a powerful centralised state like the RIf. 
Two prominent religious figures, al-RaisUll and 
'Abd al-R4man al-Darqawl, did oppose bin 'Abd al-Karlm , 
and their incorporation into the Rlfl state. Their 
objection, as bin 'Abd al-Karlm says in the al-Manar articler 
was to the use. of "their"-Vabus'property for the purposes 
of the state. However, since they were religious figures* 
and since the basis of the RIfI state, as laid down in the 
bayfa of its amir, was -also religious--to protect Islam,, and 
to maintain the , 
sharl'a--the propaganda which accompanied 
the clash between theltwo sides was expressed in religious 
terms. Thus Bin 'Abd al-Karim attacked al-RaisQlI as the 
man who had allowed the Spanish into the Jibala, and 
al-Raisdll attacked bin 'Abd. al-Karlm as irreligious because 
he made war on his brother Muslims. . 
This is not to say, that the attacks on the 
t-arlqas w. ereý-entirely the result of a conflict over power. 
Clearly, in the Salaflya interpretation of Islam, the orders 
were-irreligious, and bin 'Abd al-Karlm objected to them on 
this ground as'well., But. it is always important to realise, 
in discussing the events of the RIf war, that the concern 
for the sharl'a, though quite genuine in itself, had the 
additional advantage that if it were brought into effect it 
would furtherstrengthen the political position of bin 'Abd 
al-Karlm. 
The confusion over religious motives vanishes in 
the case of, 'Amar bin VamIdu. and Bil-QIsh. Here, the extent 
of the play for power is'absolutely plain. The only terms 
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of reference of these two-local leaders were to their own 
personal advantage. Even'their alliance was, subject to 
this,, and when it suited him, 'Amar bin VamIdu betrayed his 
former ally Eýil-Qlsh to cooperate for a short time with bin 
eAbd al-Karim. The,, same tactics were used, by a lesser figure, 
Mulýammad BU Qad'dur,, who, tried to ensure, his position by 
simultaneously backing, boýh,,, the RIfI state and the Spanish. 
once again, the preservation of the power of an individual 
was a matter of overriding concern. 
This is not to pass, judgement on these individuals. 
By acting in this, way they were protecting not only their 
own power but also the livelihood of their families and the 
local groups to which they belonged. After-all, the penalty 
for making a mistake, and aligning themselves too closely 
with a losing partyr either in theconflict between the RIfIs 
and the Spanish, or between the Rifistate and 'Amar b. 
Vamidu, could be. disastrous. Houses and crops would be 
burned and animals confiscated or destroyed. Thus we may 
see that Ross Dunn's'point about south-eastern Morocco applied 
equally in the Rif: 
individuals, local communities, and alliances 
. defended themselves, not only against Europeans, but 
also against. the pressures and importunings of kings,, 
... saints, prophets, and other meddlers who would 
corner them: into taking risks and making sacrifices 
-dangerously 
incompatible with'the urgent imperatives 
of protecting land, waterr crops, and herds. "l 
Such people had-to be coerced into cooperation with'the RIfIs, 








As we have seen, the efforts to form an anti- 
Spanish movement in the Rif preceded the rise of Mul; ammad 
'Abd al-Karim to lead it. Equally, the people of the 
JibAla and the, Ghumara did not feel the need to depend on 
the Rifis for leadership. 
There had been a history of opposition to the 
Spanish in the Jib&la, which grew -after the- occupation of 
Shawin in 1920. This opposition, ' while fierce, was 
spasmodic in nature and, centred on the Akhmas tribe. 
Although they received help from Rif! barkas even before the 
rise of bin 'Abd al-Karim, they never put themselves under 
any obligation to the Rifis, and such cooperation never 
inhibited local freedom of action. ý 
This same feeling still existed when the Spanish 
were expelled from the Jib. &la in 1924. However, times had 
changed. Now the tribes were not allowed to revert to 
their previous conditions of independence and "anarchy". 
For Mulýammad, bin 'Abd al-Karlm expanded the RM state 
into the area. The Rifis, set up mabakmas and telephone lines, 
built roads, imposed taxes and confiscated the babOs 
property., When'the Akhm&s protested, their rebellion was 
put down with great ferocity.,, In fact, the RM army 
behaved as anarmy of occupation, and their methods as we 
have seen were. remarkably similar to those of the Spanish. 
The Jiballs had to endure this situation but they were 
never happy-7about the occupation, and when bin 'Abd 
al-Karimlsurrendered, and the Rif! state collapsed, thdy 
drove out or killed all 'the RIfI officials they could find. 
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The reasons for this aggressive expansionism *are 
not hard to find. The presence -of the Spanish in the west 
meant that they were a thr eat to the R1f1s1 rear. Once they 
had been driven out, however, bin 'Abd al-Karlm could not 
tolerate the, presence of disorder on the edge of the state 
which he ruled, for it allowed a base for those who were 
opposed to him and his supporters, and provided the 'manpower 
for an alliance to resist the Rifis. In addition, a 
reversion to the old political system of the tribes, 
in the newly, "liberated! ' territory, would have negated the 
whole concept of order,, and'sharl'a on which the RM state 
was based. 
Thus by 1925, the term "Rif! state" was in one 
sense a misnomer, since it included an area far-larger than 
the Rif itself. On the other hand it was a R1f1 state 
in the sense that it was a territory wh*i6h had largely been 
occupied by the Rif! goverrLment,, with backing from Rifl 
troops. It was far beyond the stage when bin 'Abd al-Karimp 
in, 1922, could appeal to the Gaznayls to obey his orders 
because they, were Rif! by, language. It-may be seen, there- 
fore, that the Rifl'state-was held together, not by secular 
lasablya based on-a common. Berber tradition, but on a 
mixture ofl-force and religious propaganda, the most promin- 
ent-characteristic of all the political action of the RIf 
war., Similarly it may be seen that this was an attempt to 
go - beyond the limiting f actors of tribal, unity to, create a 
far wider unity. over the'whole of northern Morocco, supported 
'by-a technical-superiority, and an administration the like of 
which had. not been seen before in the area. 
However, 
lthis 
unity brought with it new dangers, 
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because it was eventually bound to come into conflict with 
the French and to impinge'on their zone. 
The War with the Fren'Clý-and the' Relatkons' with'the Sultan 
Involvement with the French wass-according to bin 
'Abd al-KarIM himself, a step, which he wished to avoid. 
However, as we saw in chapter XII, he had great difficulty 
in preventing. it.,, There were. a, number of reasons for the, 
eventual expansion to. the south. ' 
The first reason, and the simplest to explain, was 
a question of economics. By occupying the Wargha the French 
cut the Rif off. from a, vital source of grain supplies. ' Thus,, 
in order to maintain. the economy of the Rift there was bound 
to be at least a limited involvement with'the' French. 
More complex reasons exist, howeVer. Bin OAbd 
al-Karim's government and the movement which It led was a 
prisoner both'of its own propaganda and of its very success. 
In the pro-Rif! propaganda, in the posters on the walls of 
the mosques in Tetuan, for example, and in the' bay. a given 
to bin 'Abd al-Karihi, 'there were-calls to protect Islam, and 
to promote, the peace, and well being of the Muslims. Again 
in the posters, in Tetuan, and, in the propaganda circulating 
, in-the Rif, great emphasis was laid on. thd economic aspects 
of colonialism--the loss of land and property, as well as the 
threat to Islam as a. religion. As a result,,, Islam came to 
-represent, 'not onl)F-azeligious system of governmento but - 
also. a symbol of economic and cultural independence to com- 
plement political and religious freddom., However, if this 
claim was-to be made for freedom from Spanish rule, it was 
RogerMathieu, -op. cit., pp. 133-140. 
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logically, and from the point of view of the consistency of 
the propaganda, difficult'to*avoid it being made for 
independence from French"rule. -_, And since many of the people 
living on the, 
lsouthern 
boundaries of the_RIfI state were 
far more at risk-from the French than from the-Spanish, 
they were liable toý. make strong efforts to fight the other 
colonialist nation to the south. 
In addition, a-'great deal-of the legitimacy of 
bin 'Abd al-Karlml s rule depended on his success., His, 
following among Sheean's- aqquaintances in the al-Matd1sa 
tribe, for example,., depended very largely on his prestige 
as a war leader. If it could be seen that he was completely 
unwilling to defend, -people against the'French, then that 
prestige would thereby be-diminished. 
For these reasons, it was inevitable that the 
Rif! state would be drawn into conflict with the French. 
Bin 'Abd al-Karlm was well: aware of this, and said as much 
when he accepted his bayla. He was not keen to bring about 
this involvement, however,, but pressure on him grew. ' By 
the time the Spanish had been expelled from the Jibala, 
he'had no mo re-excuses to avoid an invasion of the south. - 
As-we saw in chapter XII, the enthusiasm of-his local 
commanders for military. 'action against the French was 
overwhelming. 
-,, However, before the attack took place it was 
planned with great-carep and a strong defence line was pre- 
pared for Rifl. forces, to'fall back upon. In other words 
it was intended to be a limited campaign, aimed, at-ensuring 
the continued support of the Rifi, commanders and trOopsj, and 
at taking over vital economic 'areas south of the Rif, but 
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also a campaign which would allow the RTfIs*to withdraw to 
previously prepared defence lines.., It was not the result 
of the "vague nationalist ideology" of the RIfI leadership 
as Fleming puts it, but Of the, strong nationalist feelings 
of the main body, 
lof 
the RUT army. To this extenti, the RIfI. 
state was based on popular consent in the sense that its 
leadership was the prisoner of the desire of the people to 
undertake the invasion of. the French zone. Once it is seen 
in this way, the virulent propaganda'campaigns-in Fez, may 
be understood in a different-light. The letter to the 
culamd' of the Qarawlylri laid, great emphasis on the superiority 
of the RT-f! Ieader, 
_Muýammad 
bin 'Abd al-Karlm compared with 
the succession ofpast, Sultansýand Pretenders to the Moroccan 
throne. He, bin 'Abd al-Kariml claimed the authority of the 
Caliphate, an authority that had'already been claimed for. 
him before, in his bayla. What he, said in the letters was 
not that he. wished to be Sultan-over allýMorocco, but that 
the people of Fez should cooperate with him out of Islamic 
solidarity to ensure that the limited Dar al-Isldm that 
existed in the. Rif was not destroyed. ' He alone had been 
able to carry out the duties in which'past. Sultans had failed. 
It is for this reason that the attacks on the Sultanate were 
limited only to the period of. the*attack on the French zone 
. --there-are, nolexamples of 
them in the Rif itself--and they 
'were for the'limited purposes of the moment. 
However, the-idea of war of limited extent against 
the French or, one who . se main, aim,, was to defeat the Spanish 
alone raises. fundamental questions about'whethe'r or not this 
war may accurately be, described as a: 'jih&d. 
Fleming# op. 
- 
cit., P. 239'. 
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Jih&d or a War of Independence? - 
Traditionally, jihAd implied a war against'non- 
Muslims,, to-extend the area of the Dar al'-Islam. However, 
by the nineteenth century this had become a practical. impos- 
sibility, at least as far as conflict with'the Europeans was 
concerned. War "in thýe, cause of God" became an attempt to 
protect the already-existing boundaries of the Muslim 
world, rather than to extend them. This revised doctrine 
of jih&d, the product of circumstance, was adopted. on an 
ideological level by the theorists of the Salaflya movement. 
Rida, for example defined jih&d as being, lawful only to 
protect Islam, but that any attempt to compel Christians 
to become Muslims_would, infringe the principle of toleration 
of the "people of the Book". 
' 
Thus jihdd was limited both in theory and in 
practice. The Rif war was also limited in its scope by the 
practicalities of the situation. This does not mean'-that 
the Rif war was therefore simply a jihad with a limited 
scope. Indeed,, bin 'Abd al-KarirrC-himself denied that it 
was a jih&d at all. He wrote to Gabrielli, the French 
organiser of the Oujda conference: 
"I wish to, state, since I-am accused of leading a 
, 
holy warip, that, this is: incorrect toýsay the least. 
We no longer live in the Middle Ages, nor at the 
times of the'Crusades. Quite simply we wish to be 
independent and to, be governed only by God. "2 
By saying this bin-"Abd'al-Karim was not just referring to 
the impracticality of the idea of a war to expand Islam. 
He was also talking of two other considerations; firstly 
the limited nature. -of. the. war. itself,. and secondly its 
1ý Hourani, op. ' cit. -, p. 237. 
2 Gabrielli, ' Op'. ' 'cit.,, -, p. 85. 
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objectives. This war was'not only concerned with Islam but 
I 
also with nationalism. As he himself put it in al-ManAr. 
Ilwatan" as well as "din". That# however, was, a concept not 
easily grasped by, the traditional leaders of Moroccan society. 
The orders refused -to help, according to bin 'Abd al-Karlm, 
"under the pretext - that 
f ighting f or the f atherland had no 
meaning for them a nd, that they would only fight in the cause 
of the Faith. " 
1 
The concept of nationalism was not only'foreign to 
the ideas of the amir's opponents. Many of his followers 
had the same difficulties, of%understanding. The shaykhs whom 
Vincent Sheean met among, the-al-mat&. Isa tribe, talked of 
driving all the Christians from Morocco, and then reconquering 
Spain as well., 
2, For them'jihad was hardly a war of defence. 
AkhrIrQ,. as his letter referred to in chapter XII shows, was 
motivated by a strong feeling of hate for thd'Spanish 
becaue they were-Christians. 1' 
Nevertheless, t he'people's 
feelings'had much in', common'with those'of bin "Abd al-Karlm. 
Like him. they. wished-to'protect their-land and their religion 
from an enemy that both'threatened to destroy their economy 
andýsociety, -. and'to dominate their religious freedom. However, 
bin 'Abd al-Karlml_s-vision went-beyond this, and looked for- 
ard to the creation of'a strong, centralised and modern state 
founded on the precepts of Islamic law. For both these 
differiiig, - points of view there existed thd double edged 
problem of. what-was desirable and'whdt was possible. -Bin 
I 'Abd al-Karlm wished to create a modern . 'Sal'aflya-inspiied 
state, but this, given thd political and social conditions 
Al-ManTar, cited article. - 
211 
__Sheean, 
'Adventures, p. 47. 
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in the. RIf and northern Morocco was a goal that was impos- 
sible to achieve since the majority of his followers neither 
understood nor accepted it. On'the other hand many j per- 
haps the bulk, of those followers wanted to attack, the 
"Christians", wherever they might be on Moroccan soil, but 
this was also - impossible given*the overwhelming strength 
of the European armies. 'I It is this tension between ý the 
desirable and the possibleý on_the part of both:, ruler and 
people, whichgives the Rif war its multi-faceted and 
confused appearance. ' Events, policies and ideas had 
relevance on different levels. -, Reform of the law was 
desirable from, both a_religious and a political point of 
view: it guaranteed both the functioning of the sharl"a 
and a centralised unity. The call-to attack the Spanishp 
was the response to that country's immediate threat to the 
independence of-the Rif and also a response to the deep- 
rooted dislike. felt-by many Rifis for the Christians. Unity 
itself, the-fundamental pivot-of-lall the political activity 
of the Rif war was--both an organisational'necessity and a 
desirable thing from the religious point of view. In the 
end, the Riff-attempt to Secure independence failed, and yet 
it was markedby considerableýpolitical, military and social 
achievements. 
came before my* time" 
Wo'have sýeen a number'of reasons why the war was 
lost"by the, Rlfls': ý. the economyF' the vastly-superior might 
of the-. Spanish and French armies, the internal-opposition 
to bin "ABd al-Karlift, all these played their part. 
These, are not the reasons-which'al-ManAr gives for 
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the failure however. ', Basing his remarks on the interview 
with bin 'Abd al-Karim,, the commentator in that journal 
notes the amTr's criticism of the "religious fanaticism" 
of his opponents and'his complaints that he was not 
understood. The al-Manar writer accepts without question 
the underlying assumption. 'of the article that the whole of 
the Rif war was entirely, the,, work of bin"Abd al-Karlm, and 
then proceeds to attack him for his personal failure. ' Bin 
'Abd al-Karim's reliance on European methods to defeat the 
Spanish, it is argued, 
"weakened, the great: bravery of his people. He was 
so infatuated with, the appearance of European 
civilisation that he wished to introduce them 
[European methodp], in a way which weakened the 
spikitual strength of his people 
The author goes on to castigate bin 'Abd al-Karlm for the 
purely imaginary'crime of wishing, to emulate'AtatUrk, 
abolish the Caliphate and 'set up a, secular state. Al-ManAr 
was of course opposed to the very idea of such developments; 
but so, as we have seen,, was bin 'Abd, al-Karim, for his- 
efforts we're'directed towards the imposition of the sharl'a 
and the strengthening of, islam in the Rif. ' The ill-informed 
-conments of al-Mandr would not beývery important in under- 
standing the Rif, war_if,, it were not for the fact that they 
underline one oflits most important aspects: conflict 
between political desires and praptical-necessities. For 
instance, -al-Manar* dismissesýbin 'Abd, al-Karlm's remarks 
about religious far 
, 
iaticism in the'following manner: 
I'Vffiat Mulýammd bin "Abd al-Karim calls 'religious 
fanaticism' and what he 'criticises and found no 
way to suppress, except to"copy the Kamalist Turks 
is not-fanaticism of religion, but-ignorance which 
Al-Ma'nar cited. article;, remarks ofýan, unnamed 
commentator. 
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is cured not by bridling its strength, but by 
spreading knowledge. 111 
This analysis completely fails to recognise'that the real 
problem of the RIfI 'state and of, its leader was the question 
of time. With. the Spanish on the edge of the Rif,, there 
simply was not enough. time to undertake an educational 
programme of the type recommended by, al-Manar. it is for 
this reason that the Rif war, does not entirely lend itself 
to analysis in the light,, of Salafiya theory alone. Certainly 
the theories-of that movement had some relevance to the war 
but there were other,,, more pressing, factors as well. 'The 
people had to be organised rapidly and-order imposed by 
force, if necessary, in order to carry. out the first objective, 
the defeat of the Spanish. 
Thus it is the. achievement of unity and order under 
a centralised authorityý'the creation of, a'state in the RIf# 
which becomes the outstanding achievement of the war. There 
can be no doubt that a state was formed in. thd RIf. Danziger, 
writing of tAbd al-Qddir's resistance to the French'in 
Algeria quotes a definition, of "state" which'applies equally 
to the entity headed by bin 'Abd al-Karlm: 
"A body of people permanently occupying a defined 
territory-and politically, organizdd under a' 
sovereign government almost entirely free from 
external-control and, possessing-coercive power 
to maintain order in the community. "2 
The Rlfl*state fulfilled all these conditions; its territory 
was defined, by conquest; * it was politically organised with' 
detailed administration; heither the Spanish'nor any other 
outsider had control over its policies; 'its-government could 
Ibid* 
2 Webster's Third intern'atlonal'Dictionary, *(Unabridged), 
1971, quoted in Danziger, *op. *cit., p. 2o4. 
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and did use its coercive-power-to maintain order. 
Yet what happened I in the Rlf between, 1921 and 1926 
was a new event in Moroccan history only in so far as it was 
a successfull attempt -to carry out policies whi: ch*had been 
tried before, but which. had failed. Successive Sultans had 
attempted to change-the nature of Moroccan society and to 
impose the sharl'a, 
-to 
organise a trained and, regular army, 
to reform the administration, and to increase the authority 
of the central government. ', 'Only in. the RIf were these 
objectives achieved. Thus Mulýzýmmad bin, 'Abd al-Karlm, and 
the Rif! state whii-ch, he " led, - was a new and successf ul phase 
in a continuing process. 
We are thus drawn back to the amir"s statement 
that "I came before my, time to carry out this work but I 
am convinced that my desires will all berealised sooner or 
later, through'the f orce'of events and. thd 'reversals of time. 
What bin 'Abd al-Karlm was trying to do was to ensure the. 
independence of-a part of Morocco. It was not a large part 
of that countryf but all his other hopes for religious 
reform, social change, 
land 
development were'dependent on, the 
fulfilment of that aim. His was an aim larger than that of 
many, perhaps the majority. of his followers, who simply 
aimed at independence. Nevertheless, both he 'and they came 
nearer to achieving their desires than the inhabitants of 
11 any part of Morocco, ýor'any Moroccan leader, had done since 
the European threaE to that country's independence had begun 
in the middle of'thd previousýcentury. Certainly they were 
bound to fail at that time, * for the'forces of two modern 
European states. were, ranged against them. But the five years 
1 Al-Manar, cited article. 
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which they did survive showed how much further they had 
advanced down the path, of organisation and unity than all 
the attempts, that had been made before. No'movement of 
U! S-M- 
rural resistance this; " the Rif war , no - less than 
an attempt to put into effect the ideas of Islamic unity, 
to give practical shape to'the attempted reforms of four 
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Biblioteca Nacional de Espafia, 
_ 
Hemeroteca Nacional. -ý The 
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Anonymous Jefes Rebeldes en'1925-1927 El Talib 
Mohammed Chauni, Typescript in B. N. E. S. 
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Ayache, Germain "Les Origines de la Guerre du Rif"j 
-unpublished Ph. D thesis, Paris (Sorbonne) 1979. * This thesis was 
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the period before the Rif war. 
886 
Cab Reb 1913-1927. See below, Zona. de Protectorado 
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Fleming, Shannon "Pkimo de Revera and Abd el-Krim 
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, jn, B. N. E. S. de A. ý- 
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'y 
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B. N. E. S. de A. 
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Protectorat". unpublished paper 
given at Durham Conference on 
Modern Moroccan STudies, 1977 
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, Maroc. 
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Ch6fs, Indig(ines 
oficina-Central de Datos Sobre los Princi2ales 
intervenci6n y 
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Rebeldes de la Cfibila de 
Tropas. Indigenas Anyera, n. d., typed MS in B. N. E. S. 
de Tetudn de, A. 
I oficina Central de . Datos-Sobre los Principales Cabecillas 
Intervenci6n y Tropos Rebeldes. de la Cabila del Hauze n. d. # 
Jalifianas de Tetudn typed MS in B. N. E. S. de A. 
Seddon, David "Political Forms'and Economic 
Structures in-Precolonial florocco"t 
u npublished_paper 
Skiraj, -4mad "Al-? all al-war1f fl mubAbara al-RIf 
am 1443-1924" unpublished MS in 
National Archivesj Rabat. 
Zona de Protectorado, Cabecillas Rebeldes de 1913 A 1927, 
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N. B. only works which have direct bearing on'thi's thesis 
or have been used are listed here. 
Anonymous Historial de la, Harka Melilla 
ý7nos 1924-1925, Melilla,, Tipografla 
la Hispana, n. d. (but,, pre-1930) 
Anonymous "Jahl zu'ama*. al-muslimIn wa- 
maf&sid, -ahl al-turuq wal-shurafA', 
wa kawnhum sababan li-fashl zallm 
'al- Rif al-Maghrabl", in al-ManAr. 
pt., 8, Vol., 27,1344-13 AH, 
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the interview with bin 'Abd al-Karlm 
in which'he gives his explanation 
for hisIdefeat. ' 
III 
Anonymous (ed. ), 'Abd el-Krim et, la_Rdpublique du 
ýRif. Actes du Colloque International 
TEtudes Historiques et 
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., Faust. Meine Erldbnisse vor und des Weltkrieges 
-in Marokko, Leipzig, 1925 
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S. N. E. D., 1974 
"Pous6e Nationale et D6mocratid h 
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. Responsibilidades, , informaci6n instruida por la l1amada ' 'Comisi6n de Responsbilidades" 
acerca del desastre de Annual,, 
Madrid, n. d. The statements of 
witnesses called to. give evidence- 
about the military and, political 
failures leading to the defeats of 
.. 1921,, referred to in citations as Responsibilidades. 
Coon, Carlton S. Caravan, the Story-of the Middle 
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"A Tribal Market in the Spanish Zone 
of Morocco" in Africa, vol. XIO 
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APPENDIX 
The documents reproduced here are a selection of 
some of the more interesting letters'and records referred 
to in this'thesis.. It was impossible to reprodtice every 
Arabic document referred to, so the selection is only an 
illustration of the range of d6cumentation that was 
available. A number of internal Rif! documents--prison 
registers, payment sheets and'bureaucratic communications 
are included, as specimens of their types. Each document 
is transcribed--in so far as they are legible, with the 
exception of lists, of names which are just reproduced in 
photocopies. * Where a translation does, not-appear in the 
text, one is attached here. 
In dealing with these documents it-must be born 
in mind that they were written not by highly, educated 
faqlhs., - but for the most part by-semi-educated people. The 
writing and the grammar are consequently not all that might 
be desired. In some cases they are, quite unreadable, even 
to Moroccan Arabs from the area. Mr. Mulýammad al-. Manqar, 
from the. Jibala, has given me great assistance in this matter,, 
but even he found certain expressions impossible to decipher. 
Furthermore, 'the writers had a tendency to abbrev- 
iate certain words, -particularly titles: thus OU (qA'id) 
is rendered and rLI-41 (al-Vajj) is rendered r_. The 
original has been transcribed as accurately as possible. In 
the case of wild mis-spellings which might lead to confusion, 




The maballa of-TisVttin to, - 'Abd 'al-Oad ir bin al-Uajj 
al-Tayyib and the tribe, of ýýIBand Shikar', ' translated by 
Spanish Army 27, July, ý1921. 
Source: SHM Melilla-Leg. -, 18, Informaci6n Julio 
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Translation 
Praise be to God alone and God's blessing be on 
our lord Mu4ammad. -and his family. 
To all Of our brothers in the Bana Shikar 
including the Shaykh 'Abd al-ýQddir Wuld al-Vajj al-Tayyib 
and the Shavkh -Mu4ammad Azaman! 'and all your 
brothers great 
and small. Peace be upon you and the mercy and blessing 
of God may he be exalted. [This letter is written], upon 
the stipulation of our Lord may God help him and make him 
victorious. 
To continue: 
Oh'our brothers! Be on your guard, be ready to 
make your stand upright with firmness and diligence for 
the hour of happiness has arrived for-the Muslims. Do 
not imagine any other path'r. is open to you] because 
[Muslims should be] as, one, person. We wish that you, oh 
our brothers, ' should be attentive and passionate in carry- 
ing out the. 'jih&d. As, the great God has said, "Make holy 
war with your possessio ns and your bodies and so on. " As 
for your brother Muslims, do not harm, a single one of 
them, but the un believers, may God destroy them and 
scatter them, them you should, killi, them you should. flatten 
into the ground. ýDo not [hold back from] them until you 
have removed every trace of them. - We know and think in 
our hearts that, with,, the,. agreement of God and his Prophet 
we shall meet [you],. 
'God 
willing, in the city of Melilla 
and that you will be'as one, body. This is what we have 
to tell you"and your companions. And peace. 
We are'staying in the fortunate maballa in 
904 
Tiztiltin [sic].. 
On the order of your'brothers the mujahidin 
of the tribe of BanU Waryaghal and those who follow them 
from the other tribes May God protect, them. Amen. 
On the reverse: 
To the Sayyid 'Abd al-Qddir bin al-Vajj al-Tayyib 
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Document 2 
Letter from. 'Abd al-Mdlik bin al-AmIr. 'Abd al-Qadir Malýyl 
al-Din to Muýammad bin 'Abd al-Karlm. 
14 Dhil al-ljijja 1339/19 August 1921. - 
Source: IMAEF,, Maroc 517, p. - 250. 
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Praise be to God alone. 'God Is blessing be on our, 
Lord Mubammad his. family and companions and'his complete 
peace. 
To our beloved: in God, the fighters for his faith 
and. the Faqlh Mubammad bin al. -Sayyid "Abd al-Karlm may God 
, protect you and keep you'., Peace be-upon you and the Mercy 
of God and his blessing' 
And to continue: ' 
We have'written to you, before and have received 
no reply, nor has'th, e'makhzan1, (i. e. ý, soldier) whom we sent 
'with the-letter returned. , We have been waiting for your 
reply. Meanwhile some, of the a1yAn of the, Wargha sent a 
letter to 
. 
-us, Ia copy, of which we enclose. If this letter 
is ; Ln truth from you--and we do notýthink that You would 
do such a thing--then, we--are not wI ell rewarded by you for 
ý, the great length of time in-which, we have carried out holy 
war. 
. 
1f'the letter, is, notlfrom you then you must tell us, 
so, that we may'inform'yoU, about'who sent it and he may thus 
-receive his necessary punishment'for his forgery of the 
(true) voice of the, mujAhid1n of which this letter is an 
example. 
you should know'that we have never received any 
letter from you callingýon us to form a barka in the Wargha 
or for any other reason.,, We,, thought we would hold ourselves 
ready against the enemyp attempting to join the tribes 
together and to, unitthem so that they would be of use on 
the day, when the enemy attacked this area. - What we have 
done in. this matterhas impressed every right-thinking 
909 
ýuslim, so you should let' 
should have done anything 
the French have been able 
arouse the tribes" longin, 
this Islamic federation. 
us know at once if you think we 
different. The supporters of 
to, spread their deceptions and 
for disobedience, and to break 
One who has done this is theýlson 
bf al-Darqdwi and. ýothers. ' We`(on the other hand) belong to 
God and to him we shall return., I cameýto my wits' end 
1'(trying to) sort out tribes when they are unable to disting- 
, 
ýIsh'between what-is', and what is not, to. their advantage, 
and between what is good and bad. -,, If -you think-that I 
should give up all these affairs, because I-find it dis- 
(that, i' active-either in . tasteful, S)II or, -anyone else who 
is 
, the Rif or Tib&la, 
' tell-me at once so that I may go to 
Uve in the Rif or Jib&la or'somewhere else. 
We ask God that he may set us and all Muslims 
If re'e from all war. 
, 
And peace. ' 
. 
on 14 (? ) Dhu-al-ljijja, al-Yjar&m in the year 1339. 
'Abd al-1-Idlik bin, al-Amir 'Abd. al-Qadir Mabyl al-D1n, may 
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Document 3 
Letter "all the a'yAn of the 
I Wargha" to 'Abd al-SalAm b. 
al. -Jjablb al-FannAssl,, 10 Jum&da. 11 1341/28'January 1923. 
SO, Urce: SHM Melilla Lego" 22, Cartas Arabes, - 2, Marnisa 
-Y Warciha. 
The translation of this document appears above, p. 488. 
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The bay'a of Mubammad bin 'Abd al-Karlm dated 14 Jumada II 
1341/2 February -1923.1,,,,., 
Source: MAEF,, Maroc 517, p. 180. 
Theýtranslation'of-this, document appears on pp. 514-518. 
Unfortunately, this document, is too large to be reproduced 
as a photograph'and remain, legible,, and would not photocopy 
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Announcement of mailis''al-'Oumma not to-ýccept nomination 
of Minister of Justice, -27 Jumada 11,1341/15 January 1923. 
Source: MAEF, Maroc 520, p. 34. 
This document is translated in chapter IX, p. 529. 
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Letter of nomination of Alýmad al-Wajdlrl as qaqll of Rabala 
al-Fawq&nl, signed by llubamnadbibal-$&lib. 
Source: MAEF, Maroc 519l p. 185 
See above, p. 530. ' 
Transcription 
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In accordance with the duty to maintain the laws, 
and in consideration of the importance of the department of 
justice in this countryl- the Minister of Justice whose 
signature appears"below, considers it fitting that the 
excellent Faqlh Sid! Abmad. al-Wajd1r1. al-Timsam&n1 should 
be appointed qA -in the Raba' al-Fawqanl in TimsamAn it 
is this that I have, the honour to lay before your highness. 
And peace. - 
23 Rama(ý&n 19342 












Unsigned letter of appoint, ment--'is I sued-by, the'mabakma of 
ý, -al-Muzimma dated 29 Jumada 11-1342/6 February 1924. 
Source: MAEF,, Maroc'519, p., 196., 
The translation appears'in Chapter IX, pp. 530-5310 
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List of artillerymen and payments: 
15 Mubarram,, 1341/7 September 1922 
3 $afar 1341/25-September 1922 
6 ýafar 1341/28 September 1922 
7 $afar 1341/29 September, 1922- 
Source: MAEF, Maroc 519, pp. 81-82. 
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SadIq b. al-Shadli to Mabarmad bin 'Abd al-Karim,. 
21 Ramaoan, 1342/28 April 1924. 
Source: DIAEF, Maroc 520, ýp. 109 
See above, p. 557. ' 
Transcription 
LrU. 
ZI 01. oja az-j &U %.., Jl 
JWL' Lil La::. ýJ)L-- 
I JJ-'-J I C"ýV 1 &0 'IjjIq "ýL fl 








o. Oji-tJ5 C) 
1 1. 
ulo 
;. 3 Le eLVI 
LI ýU 
A-4 ; -)ý=j 1 15 1.3 Ij L ý. j I L! &t. LY; -. 31 r'l* j bt 




&U II VJ J-J 
I 
and written lengthways. on the left side: 
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There are a-number of-dialect words or words of uncertain 
origin which need to be explained. For some reason the 
writer seems to, have used, C, f or in the word a 
ruler).. This makes it'probable that the word C, 01 is in 
fact, --LVI,, z, ýL: is a Moroccanisation (in the plural) of. 
the French word 11pelle" meaning "shovel". The same process 
has happened with the Spanish word "pintural''(paint), which 
is. rendered here 
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Translation 
Praise be to God alone and God's mercy be on our 
Lord Mubammad and his family. 
His majesty our Lord the khallfa the most fortunate, the 
man who devotes himself to the affairs of the Muslims, 
who directs (our) heroic and audacious country, Sidi 
Mabammad bin Sid! 'Abd al-Karlm al-KhattAbl may God 
increase his power and. make eternal his happiness and 
glory. Peace be upon your exalted person and the mercy of 
God be upon our, worthy lord the beloved of God. 
And to continue. 
Mubammad bin al-makki al-Wazzan! came to us in 
the malýakma and asked us to write to your majesty about 
matters (connected with) the repair of roads for which he 
is responsible. He wants a ruler and a set of scales'and 
six (explosive charges? --illegible) and twenty shovels and 
twenty machines (? --illegible) in addition, to the tools 
belonging to the noble makhzan which he already has, because 
the road in the Buqquya is very difficult'with many stones 
in it. Unless he receives the above mentioned equipment it 
will be impossible to set the road to rights quickly as our 
lord has'ordered. Also, he wants paint, both black and 
white. -He wants to write in big letters on (the door of) 
each'office like the door of the matakrýa of al-Muzimma and 
the office of our'lord and his khallfa and the office of 
the Minister for War, etc. In'short, you must SuPPlY 
everything that we have mentioned. ' May you stay well. 
_ 
And peace. 
21 Rama4ý&n 1342, ! ýadlq b. al-Shadll, may God protect him. 
I 
927 
(written on lef t hand side) 
We ask your majesty to i nform. us of the exact day on 

















Declarations-of witnesses and condemnation to death, 
25 Shalban 1344/10 March-1926. 
Source: PMEF,, Maroc 519,, P. 45 (writing on both sides of 
the paper. 
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PrAise be to God. 
'At 
Lmad bin"All bin-'Umar'all Saba Ii al-MashrawAni: L 
of-Ithe (BanQ), BU Sal&ma, declared and admitted and bore 
witness against himself in front of two witnesses'that he, 
made. an, agreement with his. companion Mubammad bin Uammu 
Muftab al-'AyyTashl al-Bashbat! and RuqIya bint Abmad bin 'Amar 
al-Vajar-al-, Wanjall to kill her, husband 'Amar bin'Aýmad, 
bin-l"A . mar al-ljajar, al-Wanjall. They entered his house, and 
_the., 
first man Alýmad_and the wife Ruqlya, alreadylmentioned 
stabbed, him. , He was caught with the knife of the second 
mans', Mulýammad,, in his possession., The, latter was standing 
at the, door. They'left himý(i. e, the husband) with no, 
breath or life, in him. There can be no doubt about their 
,. (responsibility). The crime was not. done for the trappings* 
of this-ýworld or-for any, other reason except that-he should 
take-, his said wife. - Those who 
heard the said declaration 
(affirm, 
_that'it 
was given)' willingly and not through coercion. 
Their, testimony. to this, effect-was recorded without it being 
demanded, from them. On 15 of blessed Sha'ban in the year 
. 1344. The servent of his God (two illegible signatures follow). ', 
931 
Below 
Praise be to God. second-man mentioned above, 
Mubammad bin Tjammu al-Bashbat! denied that he intended 
anything except to do something with, the 'wife''which was 
unpleasing to . God and 
his Prophet. . As, f or - the murder he , 
knew nothing, nor did he know anything about the knife with 
which he was stabbed. ', But it, was-his (knife). The above 
mentioned-wife said and-he, rself bore witness that, he, (the,., 
murderer), came in-and captured'her and he, gagged her- 
mouth at night and-she screamed, and cried. And those who 
heard what each, of them said recorded what they had said on 
the date given above.. 
The servant of his God (two illegible signatures follow). 
On-the reverse of the'sheet 
., 
Praise be-to God alone. The, declaration of Abmad 
bin-"All the, above mentioned has been'proved. He is respon- 
sible for shedding, the blood-of his brother Muslim who has 
emigrated,, in'the cause of Godr, 'Amar bin AtLmad al-Wanjall 
-who was protected from the law of blood feud because God, 
may, he be. exaleds, forbade the killing of a man who has made 
a covenent, without cause. Indeed killing is 
the ruinatiorý8f what, was'intended to be the aim of creation, 
and He ordained. that the killer should be killed, as, a 
discouragement. to murder, so 
should, be'ýa, punishifient-that 
He forbade it-saying, may He 
life through this, punishent, 
(illegible) perhaps you will 
that killing (a murderer) 
reduces (the number) of murders. 
be exalted,, You will find 
Oh keeper of the gate ... 
be strong. He ordained the 
killing of, unbelievers who were fighting (Muslims) because 
killing them is the removal of a threat to the Muslims. 
932 
Traces of the murder were found on him in that 
his outer, garment and shirt had blood-on it., The Imam' 
must therefore, punish him. The author of the Tufba says 
A murder (may be'proved) by finding the culprit-with'the 
marks of the'killing-clearly upon him, and. also by his-own 
declaration. And-he said I killed him so that I might take 
his wife and go with her, to the city of unbelievers and marry 
her. ' 'Knowing this, there can be-no pardonfor-the killing, 
because he-assassinated-his brother Muslim'(1iterally, 
"exile in, God's cause"). _It was announced that the pardon 
of the relatives of the dead man, all of them'or some of 
them, is not valid or of any use, valid'in a 
'case 
of assassin- 
ation and fighting. because, the, death. penalty, for it is one' 
of the laws of God which may not be set aside, Al-JazQll 
said"the definition of assassination is that-it should be 
treAcherous-and be 'done for money or a wife. " Al-ZarqanI 
said "It is killing by subterfuge. " -He said in his RisAla, 
There is no pardon for, ýassassination. Al-Jazall said flit 
[i. e,, pardon]'is. not a matter for the man who has been 
attacked'nor for the saints, nor for the Imam, but is the, 
prerogative of God, may he be exalted. 
That. is enough of this, enumeration. And God, may 
lie be exalted,, is wiser and more just than anyone else. 
We'have written this in disturbed circumstances and 
without being, able to consult (legal) sources because of the 
difficulty of obtaining. books. 
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Letter from Mubammad b. MimQn al-Timmitt! al Sa'ldl, to 
Mabammad bin "Abd al-Karim, 5 Rajab 1342/11 February 1924. 
Source: MAEF,, Maroc 519, p. 47. 
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-QT'id al-Sharif to Mubammad bin 'Abd al-Karlm, Sa"Id bin al a 
6 Rajab 1344/20 January. 1926.. '-. 
Source: 
- 
MAEF,, ' Maroc 519, '. p.. '134. 
See above, p. 805. 
Transcription 
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Praise be to God. *alone and God's blessing bon on 
our lord Muýammad, and his family. 
6 Rajab 1344 
To His majesty our, lord Mulýammad ibn Sidl. Abd al-Karlm. 
May his rank and glory and honour and authority be prolonged. 
Peace be upon, you. and,, (God's) mercy embrace, you. and cover 
your person, and may he. make the meadows of your pastures 
fertile-with his blessing and generosity. 
To continue: This is toýinfdi; m our Lord of the following. 
my mother'has worked in the bakery of the honourable makhzan 
-(following word unclear) and she requests 
the pay that is 
-owing'to her for three months. 
And peace. ' 
The ser 
.vI 
ant of the makhzan, SaIld bin al-Qa'. id al-Sharlf. 
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